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ABSTRACT
Between Magic and Reason
Science in 19th-Century Popular Fiction
The scientist in fiction is much maligned. The mad, bad scientist has
framed much of the debate about literary representations of science and with
good reason since he is a towering icon of popular culture. Yet, I will
propose that an equally preeminent figure provides an alternative model of
science in fiction. This is the detective.
Links between developing scientific disciplines and the emerging genre of
detective fiction have been well described to date. Yet the history of the
detective as scientific icon has not been told, particularly not as it engages
with the history of the mad scientist. These two paragons of modem culture
developed from a groundswell of gothic narrative and imagery that emerged
in the late 18th century and continued to entertain and challenge audiences
throughout the 19th century, as they still do to this day.
My aim is to recover some of the complexity of past public images of
science, and the understandings that such icons relate to, as they develop
and meander through a variety of 19th century fictions. In a series of time
slices I relate these figures, their iconography and narratives, to
contemporary debates about science and follow through the elements that
each generation retains, remoulds and claims for their own time.
Ultimately, I hope to show that an analysis of the mad scientist alongside
other fictional scientific figures provides a far more nuanced picture of
potential meanings, than the negative and fearful response that he is often
assumed to represent. This is significant because both these icons are
current in popular culture today and as such are part and parcel of the
present pool of cultural resources that provides tools for thinking about
science and society in the 21 st century.
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INTRODUCTION
Between Magic and Reason
Science in 19th-Century Popular Fiction
This study aims to develop a more in depth understanding of iconic fictional
figures of science. It is an attempt to understand the historical roots of some
of the current cultural resources that feed into public understandings of
science. Not understandings of science fact, rather understandings of the
nature of science and its meanings. To do this I have proposed that such
tools consist of more than the stereotypical representations of the mad
scientist and that there is an alternative scientific icon in the form of the
detective. This work explores a history of the fictional detective as it
intersects with and grows out of visions of science in fiction, mad and
otherwise. The detective-scientist, which will be the main focus of this
thesis, and the mad scientist have not been drawn together in comparative
history before although they emerge from the same groundswell of gothic
literature at the end of the 18th century and are deeply entwined throughout
the 19th century in gothic, mystery, sensation and detective genres.
I will argue that the function of such iconic images is to provide a socially
shared pool of resources for thinking about science and society. The
significance of these two figures in particular is that although they both
arose in the 19th century, in a recognisably modem form, they still exist
today as a means for thinking and debating the meaning of 21 st century
SCIence.
In order to explore the history of literary images in a way that is relevant to
scholars working at the interface of science and public, I have taken an
interdisciplinary approach binding together theoretic threads from
sociological and literary heritages. The literary influences have given me
the tools to analyse the relevant elements of the fiction, while the
1
sociological ones give me a means to draw them together, providing a lens
through which to examine potential social meanings.
My belief is that popular fictions engage with debates about science in
public, not about science fact, but about what science means to people and
the society in which they (we) live. Each chapter takes a different fiction, or
set of related fictions, and examines the play of science, within the
narratives, which I then relate to contemporary public debates about science
in order to interrogate this public-science-fiction boundary. In doing so, I
have tried to garner some understanding of the influences that lead to the
development, by the end of the 19th century, of the quintessential English
detective and scientist, Sherlock Holmes, a figure who is as popular today, it
seems, as ever he was then.
Each chapter can be seen as a time slice and can be read in isolation from
the others, although there is a developmental line that runs through the
thesis as a detective figure emerges. In the conclusion I will draw together
the analyses of all chapters and examine them as a whole in order to draw
out the major themes that arise from a discussion of the mad scientist and
the detective. This turns out to switch debate rather dramatically from the
assumptions that elide mad science with bad science and public negativity
or misunderstanding to something rather more informative about the way
we view reason and its social role as a simultaneous force of enchantment,
innovation, disenchantment and discipline.
Chapter one explains the thinking behind my proposal that the detective
figure is an important representation of science. I will explore reasons for
the towering status of the mad scientist and ask what the function of such
icons might be. Chapter two builds the analytical architecture with which I
will approach the fictions at hand and explains how I have made my
particular selection of texts. In the third chapter, I will begin the study
proper.
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Chapter three explores the late 18th-century gothic ground from which, I
argue, both modem detectives and mad scientists arise. Here science is
either a purifying force, which can elevate its devotees toward the Mind of
God, or it is a powerfully instrumental force ruled by Satan. The fourth
chapter takes an early example of mass-market fiction, a 'mysteries' novel,
and finds a model of the scientific professional that is a prototype, perhaps,
for the later detectives. In this work, darkly gothic body snatchers merge
with scientific super-healers and are set against a landscape peopled with
hypocritical self-serving institutions. The picture is surprisingly nuanced
for such a formulaic fiction, yet it is ultimately the scientist who is
championed, darkly gothic or not. These mysteries separate magic from
science, whilst at the same time giving their scientists an iconic magical
veneer.
Chapters five and six can be taken together, as analyses of the first detective
novels of the thesis. Both of them present a detective-scientist pair who
collaborate to unravel the disturbing mysteries that beset the communities
within which they work. Here, science is undoubtedly championed, but the
professional is not. In the first of these novels, magic is wholeheartedly
taken on board as part and parcel of the scientific method. In the second,
the scientist appears to be an extraordinary, exotic and supernatural creature,
but in fact, demonstrates in some detail a scientific process that runs through
hypothesis, experimental design, to experiment and interpretation. These
two novels uphold the view that science is a socially beneficent force, in a
way that professionalism perhaps is not. There is twist on the construction
of the iconic detective here, who in his own time, was intentionally designed
to sparkle with a veneer of science, but to fail at the first post. This was a
comment on real contemporary professional detectives. Yet, the image then
influenced Conan Doyle, who turned similar iconographic detail to effect in
creating one of the most enduring legends of detection ever.
Last, I will follow the detective into a full-blown supernatural landscape and
explore the fin-de-siecle experiment to push the scientific narrative into new
worlds. The fictions I have chosen here sit at the head of that experiment
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and are skilfully wrought short stories that point out the limits not only of
the professional expertise but also of science itself. As the experiment
developed it produced a number of 'occult detectives' who were supposedly
scientific, but who could not investigate their supernatural quarry and at the
same time stick to what was reckoned to be a plausible 'objective' scientific
process. These kinds of stories have tended not to last. Yet rather as Conan
Doyle turned an also-ran into an apotheosis, so Bram Stoker achieves the
same transformation and the vampire hunter drifted into 20th and 21st
century cultures as an indelible part of the fabric of popular culture. I will
explore how he managed to merge magic and science and have reason
investigate the supernatural in a way that is still plausible enough for a
modem audience, where others failed.
In my concluding round up, I will map the themes that have coalesced
around science across the whole set of fictions that I have placed under
review and I will draw out the recurring motifs that work through it and
have acted as cultural resources for popular thinking about science and
society in the past. I will briefly point out the legacy of some such thinking
devices in current 21SI-century popular stories about detectives and
scientists. The discussion draws together motifs of science, enchantment,
transgression, innovation and professionalism. Such themes clearly
continue to provide meaning for audiences today judging by the abiding
presence of these two towering icons - mad scientist and detective, still
poised between magic and reason.
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CHAPTER ONE
MODERN MYTHS: MAD SCIENCE AND DETECTION
The scientist in fiction is much maligned. Studies of the representation of
science have tended to emphasize a surfeit of mad, bad and dangerous types,
while a slow but steady stream of writing flows from the science community
bemoaning a perceived dearth of decent scientists in fact and in fiction. I
Each seam of writing supports the other in an exclusive focus on the mad,
bad scientist, both being in agreement that Mary Shelley's (1818)
Frankenstein is a, if not the, classic example of such a negative image. No
doubt, Frankenstein and the mad scientist more generally, have become
icons of popular culture as familiar today as a cup of tea or a can of soda;
common enough, in fact, to get an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary?
Yet, this is a very narrow vision of what science is. In the West at least,
almost no part of our lives is left untouched by science and technology,
from essentials like food and shelter, through to leisure, health and
communications. In light of this, it is stranger still that the sum total of
public imaginative response to science is concentrated within such a
fearfully negative image.
The cliche of the irresponsible, often dangerous, crazed scientist has been a
common motif in fiction from 16th-century Faustian legends to modem
representations of genetic experimenters like those of Jurassic Par~. What
precisely defines the mad scientist is a matter for debate, but those authors
who take his pedigree back to Frankenstein, usually agree on a few
characteristic features, especially that he is driven by personal ambition, is a
1 For studies of representation which focus on, or emphasize mad, bad science see Baldick
(1987); Basalla (1976) "Pop Science: The Depiction of Science in Popular Culture" in
Holton and Blandpied (eds) (1976); Cohen (1981); Frayling (2005 and 2006b), Haste
(1997); Haynes (1994; 2003; 2006), Jackson (2008); Jones (2001); Jorg (2003); Millhauser
(1973); Rose (2003); Schummer (2006); Skal (1998); Tourney (1992); Tudor (1989);
Tumey (1998); Weart (1988); Weingart (2006); Weingart et al (2003); Weingart and
Pansegrau (2003) for scientists bemoaning bad press see Emsley (2001); Sir David King in
Frayling (2006b); Gilbey (2008); McDonald (1989); Pollack (1998); Rohn (2006)
2 "mad scientist n. a scientist who is mad eccentric, esp. so as to be dangerous or evil: a
stock figure of melodramatic horror stories; freq. attrib." Oxford English Dictionary
3 A novel by Michael Crichton (1990) and a popular feature film directed by Stephen
Spielberg (1993) and produced by Universal Pictures
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male, neglectful of the social consequences of his actions and works with
bubbling vials or arcane electrical equipment. Jon Turney (1998) follows
Shelley's monster into every nook and cranny of culture, and finds various
versions of him in theatre, periodicals, literature, and as social and scientific
metaphor", Roslyn Haynes (1994), whose extensive study of fictional
science covers some four centuries, devotes a whole chapter to Frankenstein
because, "the extraordinary influence it has had on subsequent
presentations of the scientist. Frankenstein has become an archetype in his
own right, universally referred to and providing the dominant image of the
scientist in the twentieth century fiction and film."s
In view of these assertions, Shelley's ever-abiding vision seems to be a
sensible starting point for an exploration of what defines the mad scientist
and why this image of science seemingly dominates the dual cultures of
scholastic and popular endeavour. Issues that arise from discussions of
mad, usually bad, scientists raise assumptions about public fears of science.
This is not to say that the public do not have fears about some types of
science, of course they (we) do. But some studies of science representation
have overemphasized the point and worse they equate negative images with
public fear and lack of public understanding." Such a point takes me
inevitably to issues that arise from specialisation and the fragmentation of
disciplines and the two cultures controversy ofCP Snow's instigation. Here
I will suggest that the mad scientist is a boundary object in the sense that his
image sits between scientists and non-scientists, on the boundary, perhaps,
of two cultures. Last, and more importantly, I argue that there is an
alternative, equally potent scientist, with a similarly powerful presence
today and this is the detective, who is perhaps not studied as a scientist
because s/he is narrowly stereotyped as a crime fighter. My aim in this
chapter is to persuade the reader that the study of a fictional detective as a
scientific icon is a worthwhile and important exercise, which has the
potential to add to scholarship on the representations of science in a
4 Tumey (1998) pp26-42
s Haynes (1994) pp93
6 For example: see Asimov (1983); Frayling (2005) p224; Gilbey (2008); Haynes (2006)
pI3
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meaningful way.
Last, I want to lay down two important caveats. The first is the obvious fact
that the persistence of the mad scientist is probably the primary reason for
academic interest in it and quite rightly so, but my own academic footnote
to such work suggests that, towering icon though he is, the mad scientist
should not be allowed to obliterate all other versions of science and the
scientist that exist in the popular realm.i Second, the work of this thesis is
interpretative at every level and designed to intersect with other
interpretative work on science representation or the mad scientist.
MAD SCIENCE IN FICTION
The Focus on Frankenstein
In his classic study of Frankenstein, Chris Baldick (1987) advocates a
broader interpretation of the story that goes beyond representations of
science to encompass the politics of the French revolution and the newly
industrialised society. He makes a strong argument against a purely
technological reading on the basis that Frankenstein is a powerfully
evocative work, which revolves around the relationship between the
monster and his creator and raises associations with the parent-child
relationship, the ruler and ruled, master and servant, God and man and so
on. The sheer reach of interpretative potential of Frankenstein is perhaps
7 There are studies that do not prioritise this vision so strongly. Some find and have argued
for the recognition of greater complexity of representations of science in fiction: see
especially Locke (2005) and Orthia (2010). Others find heroism: see Rosenberg (1963) for
a study of scientist Sinclair Lewis' (1925) scientist hero, Martin Arrowsmith; Long and
Steinke (1996) find images of science to be more constructive than detrimental in
children's educational science television programming; one study follows the scientist as
comic virtuoso in fiction after the founding of the Royal Society in 1660: see Duncan
(1916); Terzian and Grunzke (2007) describe parodic scientists in 1960's films as
ambivalent representations; several studies find genuine ambivalence toward the sciences
in fiction: see Ball (2006); Crichton (1999); Hirsch (1958); Jensen (2008); Jones (2001);
LaFollette (1990) finds 4 stereotypes in media images 1919-1950: the wizard, expert,
creator/destroyer, and hero; Lamboume et al (1990) find pure esoteric research is more
dangerous than a problem-solving domesticated science in 1950's movies: see pp96-1 06;
Mulkay (1995; 1996) who also finds Frankenstein type images used as a rhetorical strategy
by proponents of embryo research; Russell (2007) follows science professionalization in
British 19th-century literary fiction; and Schnabel (2003) describes flip-flop, God to Devil,
images of science in the press
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partly what has given it such lofty status in all literary fields including in
studies of fictional scientists.
When Baldick does focus on science, he claims that "after Frankenstein, the
figure of the scientist in fiction has, almost as a rule, to be that of an aspiring
young medical student who dabbles in galvanism, and whose long hours in
the seclusion of the laboratory engender or reinforce a misanthropic, or at
best insensitive, disregard for his social bonds and duties." Baldick's
archetype is useful shorthand for the mad scientific stereotype, which
extends to other flawed scientists such as Stevenson's Dr Jekyll and Mr
Hyde (1886) and Wells' vivisectionist, Dr Moreau (1896). The medico-
biological hallmark of these scientists is something that Turney (1998) takes
up in his study of biology in public, in which he argues convincingly that
Frankenstein is "the governing myth of modem biology.'" The biomedical
component of Shelley's story, the fact that it is about generating life, is what
Tumey believes makes it so relevant to zo"-century debates about
biotechnology. There is no doubt that the story is a fitting, if frightening
metaphor for much techno science of our own time."
That said, when the medico-biological detail is put aside, what Baldick's
scientists amount to are scientific over-reachers whose work almost always
ends in self-destruction, and usually in the destruction of others as well.
The script is simple enough, a scientist creates something, drug, dinosaur,
bomb or other, which runs out of control, turns on its creator and his kind,
and precipitates destruction and disarray. This is a classic case of the
hubristic philosopher - a tale that was told and retold long before and after
Mary Shelley wrote about Victor Frankenstein. I I Many of these stories,
including Frankenstein, are versions on a Faustian theme, in which the
8 Baldick(1987) pl42
9 Tumey (1998) pp3
10 See also Liakopoulos (2002) p26-27 for images in press of biotech nolo gists as mad
scientists
II Joachim Schummer's (2006) extensive history of fictional representations of the chemist,
finds the hubristic over-reacher to be the most powerful and longest lasting of all. He calls
this the 'mad scientist.' Schummer argues that it develops from the mad alchemist who
sought the philosopher's stone and then was transformed into a chemist who was either
morally perverted or in league with Satan.
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'soul' is swapped for the achievement of some productive process or
other.12 In the original Faustian legend(s) the productive process is
supernatural, often diabolical magic. It seems to have been Shelley, who
first swapped magic for science and secularised the myth. This then, is the
script that Frankenstein in all his incarnations of mad science, medical and
otherwise, so often plays out.
The script that has become associated with mad science is a less than
pleasing picture of what science can do and is perceived as problematic by
many scientists, which in itself is a powerful drive for academic focus on
it.13 Indeed, Jon Tumey's (1998) study testifies to the symbolic power of
the story in our own time. Frankenstein has become cultural shorthand, so
familiar that it is only necessary to borrow a prefix in order to conjure the
monster in novel forms like Franken-foods and Franken-cat14• Tumey sees
these kind of references as "perpetuating a mutual distrust between
scientists and lay opinion, with researchers accusing the public of taking
Frankensteinian fears literally, and laypeople feeling that scientists refuse to
respond to their genuine concerns, however knowledgeable and
sophisticated they may be.,,15 This statement, of course, raises a thorny
question of a chicken and an egg. What comes first, the mutual mistrust, or
the images of Frankenstein?
Certainly, there are scientists who believe that the image has a negative
effect on public perceptions of real science. In a recent letter to the Times
Higher Education Supplement, scientist John Gilbey bemoans the
prevalence of mad scientists in popular culture. For him the problem is that
"the popular image of the scientist is based so closely on fictional
representations of science and - in particular - on science fiction that the
public view of science itself is becoming just a mirror of these fantasy
12 Baldick (1987) p64
13 See especially Baldick (1987) p142; Cohen (1981); Frayling (2005), Haste (1997);
Haynes (1994) ppl-8; Schummer (2006); Skal (1998); Tumey (1998); and for scientists
uniting script and image see Gilbey (2008); Pollack (1998)
14 Cited in Liakopoulos (2002) p22 also in Jorg (2003) p297
IS Tumey (1998) p221
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creations.?" The fantasy creation, which he places at the root of all others
is, of course, Frankenstein and he seems to imagine that this is what real
people think that real science is. Gilbey is not alone in this view. The
former Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government, Sir David King,
also sees the image as a major PR problem for science.!" In fact, judging
by the consistency with which this view is aired in popular and academic
press, the idea that non-scientists conflate fact and fiction in this regard is
taken as read."
In this instance, and others, Tumey's (1998) assertion, that scientists believe
the public(s) take 'frankensteinian' fears literally, certainly seems to hold
water. Be that as it may, Tumey is more nuanced than many in that he sees
the issue as one of framing and not as the passive absorption of a fantasy on
the part of the masses. The Frankenstein frame he argues hinders detailed
discussion of the technology and leads to 'yes' or 'no' responses that
conceal the real issues at hand. That said, a particular cause for concern
within scientific circles in the UK is a measurable decrease in the number of
students enrolling on science courses, which understandably fuels worries
over PRI9• Still, there is no real reason to suppose that popular culture has
any influence on this trend, indeed what people actually think of science
seems to be a more complex affair than the apparent trends in science
education suggest.
The reasons for the perceived cultural dominance of the mad scientist over
other visions of science seem to revolve around the abiding ubiquity and
16 Gilbey (2008)
17 See Frayling (2006b)
18Basalla (1975) "Pop Science: The Depiction of Science in Popular Culture" in Holton
and Blandpied (eds) (1975); Frayling (2005 and 2006b); Haynes (1994; 2003; 2006);
Hirsch (1958); Jackson (2008); Jones (2001); Rose (2003); Turney (1998); Gilbey (2008);
McDonald (1989); Pollack (1998). Michael and Carter (2001) report that in interview
scientists were inclined to see fictional science as a potential tool for enthusing the 'public',
but showed concern over the potential for misinformation, in other words scientists believe
public(s) believe fiction as reality. Kirby (2003) p262-63 briefly reviews those who argue
that fictional television images are harmful to the public understanding of science in the
USA and Nelkin (1995) pp64-72 summarises the complexities of the science-public
interface
19 See Braund and Reiss (2006) who argue that this effect is partly due to an outmoded and
restrictive style of science education in secondary school education and that there is no lack
of interest in science outside of the school laboratory.
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power of the image; its prescience as a metaphor for biotechnology in our
contemporary scientific culture; its heritage in Frankenstein, a novel of
much broader interpretive depth than the role of science in society; its
ability to raise pertinent questions about whether we can control the
technologies we make; and last, the assumption that it directly represents
fear and negativity on the part ofpublic(s) toward science or at least
impedes a healthy relation between scientists and non-scientists. There are
two questions at issue in this last statement. Do public(s) really see science
in such a negative light? If so, can this negativity possibly result from the
influence of familiar fictional icons?
The Function of Fiction
On the issue of actual public perceptions, opinion polls and public attitude
surveys give patchy results, to say the least. Haynes (1994) and Frayling
(2005), both of whom emphasise negative portrayals of science, cite 1950's
American surveys of high school children who, to some extent, see real
scientists as mad scientists." In calling attention to such studies within their
own work that focuses on fictional mad scientists, these authors support a
latent assumption that fiction has direct effects on public opinion in some
way that they then do not explain." In other words, they fall into the same
trap as many scientists who assume that non-scientists take fiction, or
metaphor, as reality. In any case, it seems that the overall public negativity
about science is a debatable phenomenon. Jon Tumey (1998) cites more
recent public surveys, also American, which indicate much more positive
attitudes toward science.f Indeed, in his study, Tumey finds a mixture of
fascination and optimism about the medical benefits of biology in press
mixed with a growing unease about potentialities for playing God or
Frankenstein.
20 More recent surveys of public attitudes tend to reveal ambivalence, some stereotypical
images mingle with realistic ones, and fear with respect and hope. See Gaskell et al
(1997;2000;2006); Ipsos MORI (2008;2011); The Wellcome Trust (2000)
21 Haynes (1994) ppl-2 Frayling (2005) pp12-18
22 Tumey (1998) p4
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More recently in the UK, the latest UK Research Councils (2008) study on
public attitudes finds a remarkably high proportion of positive perspectives
on science and engineering among its respondents. The latest MORI poll
(2008) too gives positive feedback. It places scientists at number six in a
league table of professions, which has doctors at the top, teachers, second
and professors, third and so, in fact, the top three categories all contain
scientists of one kind or another as well. Having said that, what emerges on
the whole from survey data tends towards genuine ambivalence on the part
of the public}3 Fears about the unintended consequences of technological
innovation and lack of control over changes to long cherished lifestyles
commingle with optimistic visions of combating disease, ameliorating
hunger and generally improving the human condition. There appears to be
no decline in support for science perceptible from survey data of West em
publics." A re-read of Margaret Mead's seminal 1957 survey reveals that
even she finds ambivalence amongst high-school students and not just
negativity. In any case there can be no simple answer to the question of
whether public(s) are disillusioned with science or not, the answer being
dependent on which public, which science and at what time.
Public(s) sometimes respond in negative or fearful terms to some kinds of
science or technology in one context, but respond positively to similar
techno sciences in different contexts and vice versa.25 Given the enormous
variety of sciences this is not surprising, and raises the question of how far
any generalised fictional image can impinge on public attitudes. Martin
Bauer's (2002) extensive study of quality British press and public attitudes
to biotechnology was able to demonstrate a measure of influence of mass
media on perceptions, but in a way that is specific to particular issues and
stories. A content analysis of newspapers over three years showed that,
23 Gaskell et al (1997; 2000; 2006); Ipsos MORI (2008; 2011); The Wellcome Trust (2000)
24 See, for example, See Gaskell et al (1997) (2000) (2006); Ipsos MORI (2008; 2011);
Nelkin (1995) p68
2S See Gaskell et al (1997) (2000) (2006). In the latest report there is widespread support for
medical (red) and industrial (white) biotechnologies, but general opposition to agricultural
(green) biotechnologies in all but a few countries - this pattern has remained the same since
1997, but optimism for biotechnology overall has increased since 1999, having been in
decline between 1991 and 1999
12.
following controversies over cloning, GM-food and crops, agri-food
applications were cast in a negative light in the press, while biomedical
applications were treated benignly. Eurobarometer survey data over the
same period showed that by the end of the study period readers followed the
slant of the newspaper coverage and made greater distinctions between agri-
food applications and biomedical ones.
Bauer's approach reveals useful detail about how press reporting may
impact public opinion. The combination of qualitative and quantitative
approaches in Bauer's work is a powerful means of revealing fine grains of
press influence and media effects. The same methods would be hard
pushed to pick up the effects of symbolic stereotypes like Frankenstein,
which are beset with confounding variables, such as the multilayered
meanings of symbolic forms, the familiarity of the symbol itself and the
content of the story using the symbol etc. This makes it difficult to gauge
the effects of popular metaphors using direct methods such as these. So we
are left with the question of what, if any, function do fictional images serve?
There is a long and sophisticated discourse on the topic of popular culture
and its effect on the populace, which extends from the work of the literary
critic, FR Leavis in the 1930's, through Marxisms, structuralisms and post-
structural isms, to recent post-modem theories. Underlying much of the
work on science representation is the assumption of a passive, unresponsive
audience." In some ways this thinking mirrors Leavis' views on literary
culture. He perceived a culture under direct threat from standardisation and
dumbing down in the popular market and to counter this process advocated
that "the citizen ... must be trained to discriminate and to resist" such
deadening trends." Similarly, some of those who write about mad
scientists, from whatever perspective, have a tendency to emphasize it as the
standard image and to bemoan the fact that this dulls lay understanding,
26 See Storey (2006) for an excellent history of discourse on popular culture; Bates (2005)
ff49-50 too summarises notions of a passive audience in relation to genetics in public
Leavis and Thompson (1977) Culture and Environment Westport Connecticut
Greenwood Press quoted in Storey (2006) p21
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stopping genuine debate, or learning, dead in the water."
Yet, it seems unlikely that popular representations have no impact on people
and cultures, but effects are likely to stem from a more nuanced
understanding of stories and how they function. Literary critic Tzvetan
Todorov (1975) warns that the idea of representation itself needs to be re-
examined with respect to literary texts, which are not representative in the
sense of referring to 'a thing' in the world outside the text, in the same way
that a 'factual' statement refers to 'something' exterior to the statement
itself. The events and characters of literature are only internal to the text,
they both exist and they do not exist. Todorov has usefully elaborated on
this difficulty, and is of the view that because fiction describes events and
characters that have parallels in the real world, to deny it any representative
role at all would amount to defining an object only with the object itself.
There must be at least an oblique relationship between real world and
literary representations.
Yet there are important nuances to be taken into account that he helpfully
identifies. First, there is what he calls the 'polysemy of image,' which
suggests that icons like scientific villains may have different meaning in
different narrative contexts. Second, the temptation to seek a direct
equation between an icon and a meaning "must be rejected, because each
image always signifies others, in an infinite network of relations." And
third, unlike a word, the image itself is not a signifier, "because it signifies
itself ... it possesses a certain density" and if we negate such density, then
every image turns into allegory, which overstates its referential role and
treats it as if it were transparent. 29
This last point is an important reminder that the mad scientist is quite
simply an entertaining figure. A study by Andrew Tudor (1989a) of nearly
28 See Frayling (2005 and 2006b); Haynes (1994; 2003), Kirby (2003) pp262-63 for review
of arguments that fictional images can hamper public understanding of science; Millhauser
(1973); Tourney (1992); Tumey (1998); Weart (1988); for scientists making the same
assumption see Emsley (200 I); Gilbey (2008)
29 Todorov et al (1975) pp 143-144
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one thousand feature films found that "[a]long with supernature and
psychiatric disorder, mad science is one of the three most common sources
of horror-movie monstcrs.r'" Yet, this is not because Hollywood
scriptwriters and their audiences really believe that science is a terrifying
and disastrous enterprise, it is because science is one of the few activities
that is plausibly powerful enough to make monsters." Oddly enough, mad
scientists begin to lose ground in 1960 and decline in favour of a different
kind of psychotic horror.
What defines the mad scientist for many is generally this kind of disaster
narrative as much as the representation of the scientist him or herself.
Though there are some recurring characteristics that appear to accompany
the narrative, Baldick, for example, gives his medical student galvanic
apparatus, presumably to connect him to the laboratory and to mildly grisly
work of Luigi Galvani. In 1803, Galvani's nephew, Giovanni Aldini,
showed that the cadaver of a decapitated criminal would open an eye, twitch
its legs and raise an arm upon the application of electric current, giving it a
semblance oflife.32 Most mad scientists are men, they have equipment, not
always galvanic, but often bubbling vials or other arcane instruments and
they are commonly unkempt or shambolic.P Some scholars see the images
themselves as an unbending critique of science. Christopher P Toumey
(1992) believes the scientific paraphernalia associated with the mad scientist
to be an illogical bundle of magical iconography, a hangover from alchemy
that constitutes an antirational critique. Those scholars focussing on the
disaster narrative itself are also inclined to take it as a straightforward
reflection of fear on the part ofpublic(s).34
30 Tudor (1989a) p589
31 Weart (1988) makes the same point that there are few sources of power plausible enough
to create monsters - science, supernatural and human deviance
32 See Knellwolf and Goodall (2008) p7
33 Such images are well documented from so-called 'draw-a-scientist' studies, for example
Wade-Chambers (1983); Rahm and Charbonneau (1997) and in Mead and Metraux (1957)
survey. That said, the disaster narrative is by no means fused to this image and some
scientists make positive use of the image see, For example, see Professor Martin Poliakoff,
presenter of short chemistry videos: http://www.periodicvideos.comlabout.htm accessed
26.06.11; or the education group http://www.madscience.org/accessed26.06.11
34 For this assumption see Basalla (1975) "Pop Science: The Depiction of Science in
Popular Culture" in Holton and Blandpied (eds) (1975); Cohen (1981); Frayling (2005;
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In defending the popular movie against scientists who decry their flawed,
unrealistic on-screen image, novelist and filmmaker Michael Crichton
(1999) makes exactly this point "All professions look bad in the movies.
And there's a good reason for this. Movies don't portray career paths, they
conscript interesting life-styles to serve a plot." For one thing, narratives of
darkness and destruction play to the modem human propensity for enjoying
being frightened by something that is not actually dangerous. For another,
this script contains a genuine and abiding concern. Crichton quotes Paul
Valery on this point: "Can the human mind master what the human mind
has made?" and he adds himself, "That's the question that troubled
Oppenheimer .. .It troubles many scientists now. And it should." Crichton
was pro-science and himself a one-time medic. He appeals to scientists to
take the critique as evidence of the power and success of science; to take the
attention as a compliment "[a]nd get over it" because "[w]hat really matters
is not the image, but the reality." 3S
True, to an extent, but image does matter. One of the social functions of
iconic fictions has come out of focus group work. For example, a study by
Bates (2005) designed to penetrate understandings of genetics found that
participants used multiple cultural referents, from fiction, faction and factual
sources, to support their own claims. They approached "genetics in the
news, and in documentaries and stories about genetics in fiction as ways of
interpreting the impact of genetic technology on social collectives," and
they drew upon all these materials to provide multiple frames for discussing
the impact of genetic technology." In short, they did not passively absorb a
single icon of mad science as a frightening metaphor for a monolithic
science and allow it to frame their entire debate, in spite of the fact that
Tumey has identified this icon as especially pertinent to genetics. What
these focus group participants seemed naturally to work through was
Todorov's 'infinite network of relations' that lead the group through one
2006b); Haste (1997); Haynes (1994; 2003; 2006); Millhauser (1973); Rose (2003); Gilbey
(2008); Pollack (1998)
3S Crichton (1999)
36 Bates (2005) p59
16
image after another, each signifying others, real and imaginary.
The role of fictional images is the topic of two papers by Michael Mulkay
(1995 and 1996), which examine debates over embryo research in the UK.
He found that images of 'mad science' were used particularly by advocates
of human embryo research, as part of a rhetorical strategy to suggest that
opponents to the research were simply confusing fact and fantasy. Mulkay
suggests that although opponents rarely invoked such fictions themselves,
their objections drew on caveats that hinted at mad science out of control.
For example they cited the power of science, its unknown consequences, its
resistance to societal control, its ability to manipulate natural processes, the
potential for some unethical uses of the technology etc. Indeed if
everything on this list were to go sour, it would result in a horror movie
disaster. Hence, the accusation of confusing real science with mad. Yet to
take opponents' fears as fiction, in fact, draws on the same taken-for-
granted idea that mad science stories translate directly into publics' fears
about real science. This is not a dissimilar move to scientists who believe
"the popular view of science itself is becoming just a mirror of these fantasy
creations.v'"
Does this mean that part of the stereotype of fictional mad science is the
assumption that it equates to public fears or negativity? Lindy Orthia
(2010) believes so. She has pointed out that the assumption that the
scientific villain is both symptom of and influence on negativity or fear on
the part ofpublic(s) toward science does not hold water. In her study of the
UK television drama Dr Who she investigates the role of a number of mad
scientists who threaten to disrupt the universe with their will to power. Yet,
the fact that the impending disorder is always restored to order by Dr Who's
own techno-scientific abilities results in "a powerfully pro-science
statement.?" This is an example of Todorov's 'polysemy of image' in
which the meaning of the image changes according to its narrative context.
37 Gilbey (2008)
38 Orthia (2010) pIS
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Despite the fact that survey data repeatedly turn up public(s) who harbour a
whole host of hopes and fears about science(s) and perceived public
disillusion is not as entrenched as it is believed to be, there is a lingering
assumption in some scholarship that mad science stories equate to a fearful
public. Yet this positions the public as deficient in understanding the art
and function of fiction such that they naively absorb fiction as real, and
allow a single image to dominate and guide their debates. Focus groups
reveal the opposite. Participants used fiction in just the sophisticated sense
that Tzvetan Todorov describes they might. Pro-embryo research groups
turned mad science stories to rhetorical advantage, and popular television
series tum scientific villains into positively pro-science messages. Images
can be utilised in extraordinarily complex, multilayered ways, which
suggests that they simply form a pool of resources for thinking and debating
about science in society."
MAD SCIENCE BETWEEN TWO CULTURES
Christopher Frayling (2005) finds that the zo"-century narrative of
cinematic science reveals a slow decline from awe, to suspicion to, "not
outright disdain, but deep-seated concerns ... ,,40 and he goes on to link this
trend directly to a gap between scientific knowledge and the public
understanding of it. On this latter point he quotes the scientist, Carl Sagan:
"We've arranged a global civilisation in which the most crucial
elements ... profoundly depend on science and technology. We have also
arranged things so that no one understands science and technology. This is
a prescription for a disaster.v" Frayling goes on to say, "The gap between
specialised knowledge and a general need for understanding was and is the
gap the story-tellers fill.,,42 The link between understanding science and
watching feature films is never made more explicit than this. Crichton
(1999), responding to similar claims, protests "Scientists often complain to
39 One of the conclusions reached by Simon Locke (2005) p42
40 Frayling (2005) p224
41 From Carl Sagan (1995) The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark
New York quoted in Frayling (2005) p224
42 Frayling (2005) p224
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me that the media misunderstands their work. But, in fact, the reality is just
the opposite: It is science that misunderstands the media."
It is notable that debates over how science is represented drift into the
territory of what the public, or rather what non-scientists, understand or do
not understand about science.Y The question that appears to be at the root
of this phenomenon is whether or how people assess the status of
knowledge. How do people draw boundaries between different types of
knowledge? It has been my contention that publics are perfectly able to
understand that fiction is just that - it is make-believe. So how does this
square up with the fact that fictional images are regularly drawn into debate
about research policy and other serious matters? This is an issue taken up
by Michael and Carter (2001) who have used focus groups to explore how
people categorise different types of knowledge and sort the trustworthy
from the untrustworthy. They compared three groups, students, teachers
and scientists.
Scientists and teachers, both, were enthusiastic about the potential
'springboard' effects that fiction may have in encouraging readers to find
out more, yet at the same time worried that it may present science
information inaccurately. In this regard, both groups "tacitly deploy the
'deficit model"', since fiction is constructed in their terms as ifit were in the
service of science (or not) by enthusing its audience and providing
information." In this scenario, students or other non-scientist readers are
doubly deficient, in understanding the function of fiction (as are teachers
and scientists apparently) and in understanding science. Students, on the
other hand, showed a much more sophisticated ability to assess different
43 See Doman (1990) for review of a 'dominant concern' within conceptualisations of
'science and the media' that sought to create an informed populace which was assumed
would make for greater or better democratic process, owing to the objective superiority and
neutrality of science. The 'dominant concern' still underlies much public understanding
claims, such as Frayling's,
44 Michael and Carter (2001) pIS The deficit model of public understanding of science,
positions the public as a single, passive entity deficient in an understanding of both
scientific fact and process: see Thomas and Durant (1987) and Durant et al (1989); House
of Lords Select Committee (2000); for review and history see Bauer (2009) esp pp222-22S;
for critique Dickson (2000); Levy-Leblond (1992); Wynne (1992)
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sources of knowledge for different purposes, and to critically engage with
all of them. Their accounts of the purposes of representations in fiction,
faction and fact, "straddle pedagogy, entertainment, emotion and ethics.?"
Yet teachers and scientists saw these media largely in the much more
limited terms of the deficit model.
Students had a much more flexible, creative and sophisticated understanding
of cultural products, presumably because they were unhampered by the
strictures of expertise. They did not see themselves as specialists, whereas
teachers and scientists positioned themselves as experts with students and
public as 'other.' Not to see that fiction is fun, or that it raises questions of
an emotional and ethical nature about science is a blatant demonstration of
blinkered expertise, although in their defence these groups were presumably
approached as experts. Nevertheless they were blinkered and this is in large
part what fuels fears over the fragmentation of knowledge, an anxiety that
has echoed down the centuries and taken shape in regular spats over the
'correct' understanding.
As early as 1834, historian and philosopher William Whewell bemoans the
hostilities that have riven realms of knowledge: " ... the students of books
and of things are estranged from each other in habit and feeling .. .If a
moralist, like Hobbes, venture into the domain of mathematics, or a poet,
like Goethe, wander into the fields of experimental science, he is received
with contradiction and contempt. .. ,,46 What is understood and by whom it is
understood are important sites of contestation in the long running dispute
between representatives of the sciences and the arts, more recently
epitomised in CP Snow's Rede lecture (1959), The Two Cultures. Such
pronouncements as those of Frayling, Sagan and Crichton echo Whewell
and they do not simply reiterate the conflict between two cultures, they are
4S Michael and Carter 2001 p26
I use the term 'faction' to refer to a hazy ground that exists between fact and fiction in
which factual accounts are part fiction and fictional accounts contain real world elements.
It is a term that is often used in studies of policing in the media and is the subtitle for
Leishman and Mason's (2003) study of the police in the press
46 William Whewell (1834) "On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences by Mrs
SomerviIIe" Quarterly Review in Kramer et al (eds) (2003) p360
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part and parcel of it.
In 1959, pro-science writer and novelist, Snow, like Whewell before him,
invoked the idea that the arts and sciences were disparate endeavours, but by
now they are separated both ways by a "gulf of mutual incomprehension.v"
His work caused a storm of response, favourable and unfavourable. Most
famously, the literary critic, FR Leavis responded in the 1962 Richmond
lecture with a performance that has gone down as one of the finest examples
of academic vitriol in history. Passions ran high on both sides.
Snow had accused literary scholars of intellectual Luddism that spread an
"unscientific flavour", which is "often, much more than we admit, on the
point oftuming anti-scientific" (the same feeling that the mad scientist is
said to represent today)." Snow then takes a tone of assumed authority
likely to get under the skin of any self-respecting literary scholar. He
proclaims scientific debate as "much more rigorous, and almost always at a
higher conceptual level, than literary persons' arguments ... ,.49 Leavis leaps
on the air of authority: "a tone of which one can say that, while only genius
could justify it, one cannot readily think of a genius adopting it.,,50Far from
genius, Leavis condemns Snow as "intellectually as undistinguished as it is
possible to be" and his work as "an embarrassing vulgarity ... " full of
"panoptic pseudo-cogencies ... "SI
The fervour of these exchanges testifies to their importance. What is at
stake is cultural authority. Snow is a positivist; his belief is that science will
improve the human condition. For Leavis, the reduction of the human
experience to something quantifiable, classifiable and manageable is an
anathema, as ludicrous as the character of Mr Gradgrind in Charles
Dickens' anti-utilitarian novel Hard Times (1854).52 Snow takes Leavis'
47 Snow and Collini (1959/1998) p4
48 Ibid ppll
49 Ibid ppl2
so FR Leavis (1962) quoted in Snow and Collini (1959/1998) pxxxiii
5) Ibid pp pxxxiii
52 Mr Gradgrind, a parody of a utilitarian teacher, drills his students and his own children in
facts and statistics, to the exclusion of all imaginative or emotional activity - and all to a
2.1
reservations as anti-science feeling, in a similar vein to the interpretation put
on fictional science by present-day scientists and some scholars of
representation. Snow dismisses 19th-century authors, who raised the spectre
of the human costs of the industrial revolution, as Luddites who, lacking
understanding of science, spread an anti-scientific flavour. Today the
debate has shifted onto popular representations, which come under attack as
emblematic of poor understanding of, and disillusion with, science.
Countering this, of course, are shouts from the arts bench that scientists
misunderstand the literature. And so on.
Similar interchanges have been intermittently winging to and fro between
science and arts camps for the last two hundred years or more. It seems
extraordinary that details of whether people can and cannot relay facts about
thermodynamics or Shakespeare plays are taken as the terms for serious
debate. Yet, the debate goes on in precisely these terms. It is so current, in
fact that the UK Observer newspaper recently put a panel of three writers,
three scientists and two broadcasters through a science test, which included
the fateful thermodynamics question first posed by Snow.53 Interestingly
enough, the scientists on the panel did not seem to fare a lot better than the
writers and broadcasters did, a factor that probably points to the extent of
their specialisation. 54
In his introduction to The Two Cultures, Stefan Collini (1959/1998)
suggests that the controversy can be read as a re-hash of that well-worn
dispute of English cultural history - the Romantic versus the Utilitarian,
Coleridge vs Bentham, Arnold vs Huxley, and many more. He points out
that each new melee in a cultural war that has a long history carries the
bad end. Gradgrind and CP Snow do broadly share a belief in the value of the application
of science to the human condition and Leavis' derision of such reductionism is enacted in
Dickens narrative. Gradgrind's children go off the rails as a result of the strictures he places
ufon them. Utilitarianism is discussed further in Chapter four, see pp 106-17
5 In the 1959 Rede Lecture Snow asserts: "A good many times I have been present at
gatherings of people who, by the standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly
educated and who have with considerable gusto been expressing their incredulity at the
illiteracy of scientists. Once or twice I have been provoked and have asked the company
how many of them could describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The response was
cold: it was also negative." Snow and Collini (1959/1998) p15
54 See Adams (2007)
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weight of the past attacks, defeats and outrages, so that there is more at
stake than the apparent cause of the current dispute. The war has always
been, and continues to be, over cultural authority, which might be defined as
the probability that some knowledge or other become generally accepted as
true and valid.ss Hitching a ride with cultural authority are the added
benefits of credibility, status, power and material resources.
The fundamental problem addressed by Thomas Gieryn (1995) in his classic
paper on the boundaries of science, is to understand exactly this process.
How does science obtain the cultural authority that it has? The temptation
is to attribute exceptional qualities to science's methods, social norms or
paradigmatic perspectives of similar kind that defined it for Popper, Merton
and Kuhn, but studies of day-to-day science do not find these practices
much in evidence. 56 In that case focus is best shifted away from the practice
of science and on to the representation of it, which by the act of
representing, gives some perspective on the question of what science is. In
order to represent, boundaries must be drawn which demarcate attributes
that characterise science from those that do not.57 The unceasing squabbles
between arts and sciences disciplines are symptomatic of ongoing boundary
work of the first order. In a sense, Gieryn envisages science as consisting
more of boundary than of content. Science, he says, is "[n]othing but a
space, one that acquires its authority precisely from and through episodic
negotiations of its flexible and contextually contingent borders and
territories.?" The on-going two cultures debate, Coleridge and Bentham,
Huxley and Arnold, Snow and Leavis, precisely exemplify Gieryn's
process.
Gieryn's idea of 'cartographic contests', which erupt periodically to reset or
ss This definition follows Paul Starr (1982) The Social Transformation of American
Medicine New York Basic Books pl3, cited in Gieryn (1995) p405
S6 For example see Collins and Pinch (1998); Latour and Wool gar (1986), which both in
different ways show that science in practice does not conform to these ideal methods
S7 The importance of image, boundary and representation of institutions is deepened by a
look at the work of Everett C Hughes (1971) in the following chapter pp61-66. For the
~urpose of this argument a focus on Gieryn's rendering of boundaries is sufficient
8 Gieryn (1995) p405 (his emphasis)
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confirm new boundaries, would not be lost on TH Huxley. The
consummate science professionaliser and propagandist, writing in Nature in
1894 speaks of a Baconian "division of the world of thought into two - an
old and a new." In the old, "scientific method was anathemised [sic]", while
in the new it was embraced, creating "two states, in which mutually
unintelligible languages were spoken."s9 Following the division, "it was
becoming plainer and plainer that a vast tract, hitherto claimed for the old,
was being steadily invaded and annexed by the citizens of the new world.,,60
Huxley could not be clearer on the territorial advance of science as it
"invaded and annexed" and bounded, the cultural space previously occupied
by the other.
The details of the debate have changed since Huxley, Snow or Whewell
raised their flags for science. The images of mass culture have become a
powerful focus for boundary issues. So, when Gilbey (2008) suggests that
art scholars take directions to the science buildings on their campus to
enable them to distinguish between real and mad scientists, the response
from the arts department rings forth, "I don't need directions to the science
building on my campus, John Gilbey. They're the ones full of real scientists
who think I'm too stupid to know the difference between stereotype and
reality.,,61 Though today's participants still tussle over cultural space, their
focus, their boundary setting, has moved into the arena of mass
representation as the touchstone of authority and power. This is not
surprising since universities are increasingly forced to operate a business
model, in which brand, image and mass-appeal are seen as an important
measure of market resilience.
The mad scientist may not seem to be the perfect face for a serious
academic enterprise, although many a brand manager might disagree, since
it is an undeniably striking and recognisable image. Yet, it may irritate
59 Huxley (1894) pI
60 Ibid p2
61 Nia Edwards-Behi reply to Gilbey (2008)
http://www. timeshighereducation.co.uklstory.asp?storycode=402421 Accessed 09.08.2011
See Gilbey (2008)
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scientists, and indeed does seem to, on the basis that it never contains a
demonstration of any science in process of whatever kind.62 What exists of
the mad scientist's method usually consists of masses of wonderfully
evocative glass equipment, perhaps some electrical input, an obsessive
attitude and the odd shout of eureka. In other words, the average mad
scientist's method is a mystery. For a brand manager this is meat and drink,
because mysteries are alluring, they draw forth our curiosity to discover the
hidden knowledge. They also hint at one of the ways in which cultural
authority might be constructed, which is to show off potently transformative
knowledge of a kind that no-one else can find out.
Michael and Carter (2001) have described how fiction might 'interject' in
the public understanding of science, by which they mean it provides a
thinking resource and practice that serves to create understandings of
different kinds. I would suggest that the 'mad scientist' has 'interjected'
into boundary disputes between the sciences and the arts over cultural
authority. Furthermore, the characteristics of mad science to which
scientists most often object, are in fact exactly those points which reflect the
ways in which they are maintaining cultural authority themselves.
In the present climate of deepened public accountability, when scientists
and funders must work with market forces, tensions around popular images
are bound to be heightened. The mad scientist is a boundary object in this
respect. He draws attention from scientists whose boundary process
consists of arguing that at best the image is not lifelike and at worst he
fosters public(s) disapproval and suspicion.f Humanities scholars tend to
overplay the extent of distrust in science and present the dominance of the
62 Even those attempts to showcase science as a real day-to-day process sometimes cannot
avoid the edge of the exotic. See, for example, the Nottingham University periodic table
series of videos starring Professor Martin Poliakoff, whose image is every bit the 'mad
scientist,' and accompanied by demonstrations of reacting chemical elements. The whole
impression is ofa process and a type of knowledge that is out of the ordinary, special and
unconventional: see http://www.periodicvideos.com/accessed 02.08.2011
63 Frayling (2005; 2006b); Gilbey (2008); Pollack (1998); Crichton (1999) answers the
boundary work
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mad scientist as a reflection of this fear." For example, Kramer (2003) in an
introduction to an excellent anthology of literature and science, thought it
uncontroversial to say that "Today 'science' can be used as a term of
opprobrium and its high-priests, the 'scientists', are seen by some to be
puppets of entrenched commercial and political interests." 6S To suggest
that science is a term of abuse is a strong claim indeed, for which no
evidence is forthcoming. Commercial and political interests do
intermittently rouse suspicions, of course, and rightly so, but this does not
turn scientists into hated and feared high priests - for most that is the stuff
of fantasy.
The cultural alternatives to the mad scientist, which do exist, get less
attention perhaps because of the compelling urgency that is encompassed in
such boundary contests." Yet public opinion surveys reveal a whole range
of fears and hopes, positives and negatives when it comes to science. In the
following section I will propose an alternative vision to the mad scientist,
equally iconic and popular, that is seldom included in studies on science
representation.
THE MAD SCIENTIST GAINS AN ALTER EGO
In the 20th century, Frankenstein gained a partner in Dracula. Bram
64 Many studies of the mad scientist make an assumption, sometimes tacit, about inherent
public 'fears' of science: see, for example, Cohen (1981); Frayling (2005 and 2006b);
Haste (1997); Haynes (1994; 2003; 2006); Tumey (1998)
6S Kramer (2002) pxxxii in Kramer et al (2003)
66 That said, there are a few studies that find alternatives: see, for example, Duncan (1916);
Hirsch (1958); LaFollette (1990); Locke (2005); Long and Steinke (1996); Rosenberg
(1963); Russell (2007); Terzian and Grunzke (2007). Debates on type of scientist and
genre seem to be more common in studies of science fiction, which tend to consider a
greater variety of science and scientists than the stereotype of the mad, bad man. For
example, Cranny-Francis (1998) describes a broad canvas: "Science takes a number of
different identities within individual science fiction texts." But science fiction, "by
fetishising science and technology ... makes the point that the nature of a society - its
values, beliefs, attitudes - is a function of its industry, the way it organises labour and the
people who perform it." See Cranny-Francis "The 'science' of science fiction" in Martin
and Veel (eds) (1998) p75 and p77 respectively. Lamboume et al (1990) find reassuring
and alarming science in 1950's sci-fi movies. In a discussion of science fiction films Vieth
(2001) noting the overlap between science fiction, horror and fantasy, writes: "In some
films, the scientist is portrayed as evil...in other cases, the tragedy of the search is the death
of the scientist who causes harm to no one but himself." p24
2.6
Stoker's (1897) novel was adapted for the big screen by Universal Studios
in 1931 and was an immediate box office success. Frankenstein followed
only a few months later. After this the two great horror icons drifted into
popular culture and over the next forty or more years, they appeared as a
matching set, in double horror bills, in compendium story books, in comics,
television shows and all manner of cultural products." David Skal (1993)
notes that the dual horrors of Frankenstein's monster and Count Dracula
" ... present a dynamic, if demonic mythology for modem times. Each figure
conjures the other by contrast ... ,,68 The same can be said of their
respective scientific protagonists. Although Dracula is not reckoned to be a
story about science, in an obvious way as Frankenstein perhaps is, the novel
does have a powerful scientific protagonist. Where Victor Frankenstein
makes a monster, Stoker's Professor Van Helsing destroys one.
Bram Stoker's (1897) Dracula tells ofa vampire hunt in which Professor
Van Helsing, "a philosopher, and a metaphysician, and one of the most
advanced scientists of his day" saves humanity from the curse of the
"undead" by injecting a shot of calm empiricism into the vampire hunt. 69
Few on-screen scientists can have rivalled Victor Frankenstein for air-time
more than Van Helsing has in the 20th century. Jon Tumey finds over 40
film adaptations of Frankenstein up to 1982 and in Stephen Jones' movie
guide compiled a decade later, he counts 400 films loosely based on the
same story.70 A quick count of movies, listed by the same author, reveals
that there are 664 vampire films made before 1990 that include a character
based on Van Helsing."
Despite this Van Helsing tends to have been over-looked in studies of
fictional scientists. Roslyn Haynes (1994) identifies him as a "scientist
saviour", but devotes only two paragraphs to him and then dismisses him as
a reflection of "Stoker's own predilections rather than any contemporary
67 Skat (1993): see especially ppSl-139
68 Ibid pSI
69 Stoker (IS97/199S) p147
70 Turney (199S) p27-S
71 Jones (1993)
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scientific attitudes." Haynes believes Van Helsing is singular in his refusal
to "reject the talismans of religion (as Victorian readers might have
expected) ... Such an alliance of science and religious tradition is
atypical. .. ,,72 This is an anachronism. The assumed dividing line between
natural and supernatural or between science and religion as might be
expected today does not hold in this period. On the contrary, Victorian
readers would have been well used to stories, Sheridan Le Fanu's In a Glass
Darkly is a famous example, and press reports, that merged natural and
supernatural, and believed the spirit world to be a proper and exciting object
of scientific enquiry.73 Debates on this issue were particularly prominent at
the fin-de-siecle, when Dracula was published, owing to a flurry of
boundary setting activity on the part of scientists and spiritualists involved
in variously denying, supporting, or just investigating the British fashion for
talking to spirits.
Aside from Haynes' odd footnote to him, Van Helsing rarely gets a mention
in work on the representation of scientists. Yet, he is a particularly
interesting figure. Although cast in the character of scientist, and
apparently a practised medical doctor as well, he is critical of too narrow-
minded a scientific focus, not unlike some of his counterparts, equally
eminent in the real world, William Crooke FRS, Alfred Russell Wallace and
Lord Rayleigh, to name a few." Van Helsing's scientific status does not
prevent him from employing the talismans of religion when he needs them.
His particular toolbox includes a typewriter, syringes, telegrams and a
phonograph alongside a crucifix, some wild garlic flowers and a vial of
consecrated water. When he explains to his fellow vampire hunters the real
horrors of what they face, he says "We have on our side the power of
combination - a power denied the vampire kind; we have the power of
science ... [and] tradition and superstition ... Does not the belief of vampires
rest on them? A year ago which of us would have received such a
possibility, in the midst of our scientific, matter-of-fact nineteenth
72 Haynes (1994) p169-70
73 See Chapter 7 of this work, pp205-237 for a discussion ofLe Fanu's (I872) In a Glass
Darkly and more on the natural and the supernatural
74 Noakes (1999)
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century?,,75 Here, Stoker is joining the boundary setters; the inference of
the novel is that to be of use, science needs draw supernatural folklore under
its umbrella of expertise.
Van Helsing is open minded enough to take superstition seriously, but he
also knows how to use science where it is needed. In contrast Victor
Frankenstein's lack of superstition is what enables him "to spend days and
nights in vaults and charnel houses." Examining "every object, the most
insupportable to the delicacy of human feelings ... how the worm inherited
the wonders of the eye and brain ... ,,76 In the same paragraph the lack of
superstition is transformed into a lack of 'human feelings', part and parcel
of the 'misanthropic bent' described by Chris Baldick (1987).
Frankenstein's complete split from the realm of feeling is his tragedy,
whereas Van Helsing's character harks back (or forward), almost
sentimentally, to a time when all knowledge was one thing and men were
WIse.
In many ways, the figure reiterates the themes so lamented by William
Whewell and subsequently taken up in all the various engagements, or
disengagements, over cultures, knowledges and understandings. In a study
of the history of the mad scientist, Joachim Schurnrner (2006) sees him as
arising out of anxieties over the splitting of knowledge. Indeed, Professor
Van Helsing replaces the "metaphysical system to provide an overall
framework and orientation ... " that Schummer believes to have been lost in
the fragmentation of the sciences from arts, humanities, philosophy and
perhaps religion too.77 Indeed the project of science and technology studies,
along with many related topics of focus, hopes to benefit from re-connecting
disciplines that have to some extent lost touch. Van Helsing appears to be
another kind of response to increasing drive of specialisation.
75 Stoker (1897/1998) p277
76 Shelley et al (1818/1994) p80
77 Schummer (2006) p125
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The Detectives
Although Dracula is clearly an important story in the 20th century, academic
responses to it tend to be limited to a few dominant interpretations, which
are psychosexual, political and postmodemist. 78 In the literary critical
tradition of Matthew Arnold and FR Leavis, the novel was relegated to the
bin of mass culture and, as Skal (1993) notes, it is still considered naive
entertainment, engaging emotion, rather than intellect. 79 Indeed, Baldick
(1987) dismisses it as rather inconsequential on the basis that it
"proceeds ... to drown out all its teeming symbolic suggestions ... to enact a
single-minded rite of exorcism.t''" That said, the novel has since drawn
more academic attention, particularly from literature scholars interested in
how Stoker negotiates ideas of degeneration, evolution, and ideas of
'normal science'i'" When it comes to the scientist in fiction though, Van
Helsing is not reckoned to have anything of much importance to add to
debates about the representation of science. Oddly, in this, as in so many
other respects, the novel mirrors its Hollywood twin.
Stoker's novel is narrated in epistolary form, in which letters, diaries, and
newspaper clippings together tell a story that gives the reader a sense of
evidential material and positions her/him as judge and jury. As the story
passes from one witness to another, a mystery unfolds that impels detection.
The lead detective is Professor Van Helsing, assisted by his sidekick, the
alienist, Dr Seward. Bram Stoker originally conceived the professor, not as
one, but as three individuals, a detective inspector and two historians.V In
the event Van Helsing is not a detective by profession, although his mission
entails tracking a known deviant by logical, empirical means. As such, the
character belongs to a lineage of fictional scientists who are the scientific
detectives. These scientists inhabit a 'restorative' script that reverses the
order of the over-reacher and are portrayed as restoring moral order to a
78 See: Skal (1998) p84-87; Baldick (1987) p147-148
79 See Skal (1993) p83
80 Baldick (1987) p148
81 See Glover (1994); Greenway (1986); Jann (1989)
82 Frayling (1991) p305
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temporarily disordered society.
One of the most famous and popular scientists ever to have existed in fiction
is Mr Sherlock Holmes'", The lines that introduce Holmes place him as "a
fellow who is working in a chemical laboratory up at the hospital. .. ,,84 A
few sentences later, "He is a little queer in his ideas - an enthusiast in some
branches of science/''" And "he is well up in anatomy, and he is a first class
chemist. .. His studies are very desultory and eccentric, but he has amassed a
lot of out-of-the-way knowledge which would astonish his professors. ,,86
There is no doubt that Holmes is a scientist. Ultimately he represents
rational order set against the murky disorder of the criminal underworld, just
as Van Helsing lights up the dark realm of the supernatural.
Holmes is both laboratory scientist manufacturing forensic tests and
thoughtful deductive logician. Yet, Haynes (1994) pays scant attention to
him, despite acceding to the fact that he is an important model for a socially
beneficent science. She asserts that Holmes and other detectives, like
Austin Freeman's Dr Thorndyke, are cast in similar mould and their
"connection with laboratory scientists usually resides in their recourse to
deductive logic (which is tacitly assumed to be identical with scientific
method) and their use of some strategic chemical tests, but overall there is
little to distinguish these forensic scientists from routine crime-solvers such
as Agatha Christie's Hercule Poirot.,,87
It seems that for Haynes a scientist has to work in a laboratory and science
is laboratory science. In excluding 'deductive logic', by which she seems to
be referring to all the kinds of thinking and puzzle-solving that detectives
and scientists do, Haynes has effectively excluded the detective as having
anything to do with science. Even those ones who do forensic science in
laboratories do not fall into her remit. It is difficult to know what her
83Arthur Conan Doyle's A Study in Scarlet was the first Sherlock Holmes story, published
in 1887
84 Conan Doyle (1887/1981) pll
8S Ibid pll
86 Ibid pll
87 Haynes (1994) P179
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criteria are for identifying a scientist, and to be fair a precise definition is no
easy matter in a fictional universe. Yet to exclude anyone who does not
spend all their time in a laboratory means that many physicists, social
scientists, field scientists of different sorts, climate modellers, theoreticians
in all science disciplines, and many more, are not scientists. Detectives
clearly have their own powerful professional image as crime fighters, but
their process, at least in fiction, is represented as scientific, even when it
patently is not. Indeed, many detective fictions are not tacit in asserting
that the detective's logic is identical with scientific method, in the way that
Haynes remarks, rather they are explicit on that very point."
The second chapter of Conan Doyle's (1887) A Study in Scarlet is entitled
"The Science of Deduction." In it Watson reads an article on the topic of
deductive logic written by Holmes himself, in which, "[t]he writer claimed
by a momentary expression, a twitch of a muscle or a glance of an eye, to
fathom a man's inmost thoughts. Deceit. ..was an impossibility in the case
of one trained to observation and analysis. His conclusions were as
infallible as so many propositions of Euclid.,,89 Observation, analysis,
deduction, and logic are all skills that are claimed, probably as often by non-
scientists as scientists, to be attributes of science. Indeed, at a recent
meeting entitled 'The Two Cultures', physicist Alan Sokal spoke of a
'scientific world-view' intrinsic to the detective story and Cambridge
mathematician, Marcus du Sautoy reviewing a recent detective novel for the
UK Guardian writes of "the many similarities between cracking a crime and
. h ti I th ,,90trymg to prove a mat ema rca eorem.
Science as a process of detection is not an uncommon metaphor in the
88 Some modem detective fictions seem specifically to create an image that is 'scientific':
see UK television dramas: Silent Witness, Waking the Dead and American imports, Quincy,
CS!, CS! NY, CS! Miami, and Criminal Minds. Likewise the 'forensic novels' of Kathy
Reichs, Patricia Cornwell and Jefferson Bass
89 Conan Doyle (1887/1981) p22
90 Sokal spoke at the Two Cultures meeting organised by the London Consortium in
January 2009; du Sautoy is quoted in Reisz (2008)
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scientific press either, particularly in medical contexts." RE and E Peschel
(1989), who write of the art of diagnosis as demanding 'detective skill,'
describe the process of building a complete picture from a "complicated
jigsaw puzzle with the hitch that you cannot have all the pieces.'.92
Similarly, Claudio Rapezzi and co-authors (2005) find that detectives and
medics share skill sets in the fundamentals of observation, reasoning and
knowledge with an added talent for probing the social and psychological
and for spotting inconsistency.
A further piece by R Jane Macnaughton (1998), in similar vein, aims to get
a better understanding of the role of evidence in medical practice, by
looking "beyond medicine to the way in which scientists and detectives
view evidence ... ,,93 Here, the author makes an interesting point. Although
"[ t]he 'detective model' of evidence is similar to the scientific model in
important respects - the collection of data, the observations and the chance
discoveries, followed by the formulation of hypotheses which transform
some of this information into evidence ... it is unlike the scientific model in
one important respect. It is not logically possible to generalize. The
evidence is relevant to one and only one situation ... ,,94 In this account the
detective process is identical with the scientific process, except that it is
bounded, safely bounded and in this respect less frightening than the work
of mad scientists who very often attempt to understand nature at a more
basic level. Frankenstein is able, for example, to generalise from the
process of decay he observes in the charnel house, to the animating
principle that he uses to vivify dead flesh.
THE DECTECTIVE AS SCIENTIST
Why is the bounded, safe scientist not the subject of focus as a
representation of science in public? It is surprising that given the scientific
91 See Rapezzi et al (2005) for discussion of medics as detectives; Markel (2005) for Conan
Doyle's 'diagnosis' of Koch's lymph in Tb cures and Peschel and Peschel (1989) for
medical detective stories.
92 Peschel and Peschel (1989) p33
93 Macnaughton (1998) p89
94 Macnaughton (1998) p90
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bent of the detective, and his or her iconic status, that the figure has not
been brought out of the shadows as an alternative to the mad scientist.
Perhaps, as is clearly the case for Roslyn Haynes, the reason is that the
detective is not associated with a laboratory, and is simply not seen as
relevant, although more and more of the modern crime fighters have donned
the obligatory white coat."
The element of the detective, which draws much critical attention, is oddly
highlighted by Schummer's description of how 19th century writers worried
about science as it evolved into an ever more esoteric, powerful and
independent discipline. He describes a responsibility that writers felt "to
warn the public of misleading hopes and promises resulting from
preliminary successes in the sciences.'?" It seems as though the detective
may have been a fictional manifestation of such a moral mouthpiece, instead
of warning about science, it applies science to the policing of society as a
whole. Indeed, it is social order, its provenance and its maintenance that has
occupied many a recent scholar of detective fiction. The view arising from
many current studies is that social discipline of a Foucauldian nature is
reflected and even cultivated by the detective genre, and as such this view
has become de rigueur for much of the discussion surrounding detectives
and crime fiction today.97
Indeed no study of crime fiction seems complete without reference to the
work of Michel Foucault, especially to Discipline and Punish (1977).
Crime narratives are an obvious place to seek out evidence of the proposed
shift in power structures from the sovereign to the disciplinary across the
18th/19th_century boundary. Stephen Knight (2004) draws attention to The
9S Cranny-Francis (1998) in Martin and Veel (1998) p64 remarks that taking a broad
definition of science fiction as a "story that must seem scientifically plausible" might also
include detective fiction
96 Schummer (2006) p125
91 Exceptions include a famous essay by WH Auden (1975) "The Guilty Vicarage" in
which the detective story is a kind of psychological catharsis achieved by "the miraculous
intervention of a genius from outside who removes guilt by giving knowledge of guilt"
p 158; see Scaggs (2005) pp31-54 for summary of history of criticism including
psychoanalytic (famously Lacan's analysis of Edgar Allen Poe's (1845) "The Purloined
Letter") and structuralist approaches to detective fictions; also see Podlas (2006) and
DiFonzo and Stern (2007) for media effects approaches
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Newgate Calendars, which were stories of prisoners, originally written by
the Ordinary of Newgate (the chaplain). They sold as anthologies or as
cheap pamphlets and broadsides throughout the is" century and up to the
mid 19th. The stories follow a formula that relates the facts of the crime,
the final confession and the public execution; there is little or no effort at
detection. Knight (2004) describes how each story marks "[t]he body of the
criminaL.with retribution for ... an offence against the king's peace.t' "
This is an example of sovereign power at work in which the criminal is seen
as personally resisting the power of the sovereign. 19th-century criminal
broadsides described crime, confession and punishment in text but were
very often imprinted with a standard image of gallows and hanging prisoner
and as such they too took part in marking the bodies of criminals.
The shift to disciplinary power is evident in the emergence of the literary
detective mid-century. Ronald R Thomas (1999) begins his study of
fictional detectives with an epigraph taken from Discipline and Punish,
which describes the shift almost as it evolves through crime narratives - "we
have moved from the exposition of the facts or the confession to the slow
process of discovery; from the execution to the investigation; from the
physical confrontation to the intellectual struggle between criminal and
investigator.T" Thomas goes on to look at how the disciplinary powers of
the detective are extended by such forensic devices as the fingerprint, the
mug shot and the lie detector. By disciplinary powers, Foucault refers to
rational enquiry, to the application of reason and scientific method to
ordering almost every facet of society. The detective embodies this force by
studying evidence, finding out what it means, to whom it points, and finally
delivering the criminal, thereby restoring moral order. The detective makes
detection public and hides punishment.
The eye of the detective becomes the public eye of surveillance. The
98 Knight (2004) p14. Criminal bodies are retributively 'marked' in the Newgate Calendars
(and in history) by execution and sometimes torture. For example, a servant who murdered
his mistress for money had his right hand cut ofT and nailed to the gallows on which he
hung, presumably to mark his desire to grab his employer's money.
99 Michel Foucault from Discipline and Punish quoted in Thomas (1999) pi
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detective co-opts members of the wider social group into the investigation
by calling upon them to provide the evidence for the investigation. DA
Miller (1980) has shown this process at work in Wilkie Collins' (1868)
novel, The Moonstone.IOO Here, as in many stories of the detective genre, a
social group is contained in a closed environment equivalent to a social
panoptic on in which each person and all their movements are knowable by
reason.l'" The detective, Sergent Cuff, cannot perform the function of
surveillance alone, all the members within the group supply information
about each other. So, the function of the detective is diffused throughout
the social group, in a microcosm of society in which the citizens have
learned to police each other - a mirror of Foucault's surveillance society.
The power to penalise has drifted away from the King at the tip of the
pyramid and spread through all the subjects below and at the same time the
tools of control change from corporeal punishment to rational monitoring.
There is nothing in my approach that is incompatible with the idea that
detective fiction encodes or encourages disciplinary power and in many
ways it forms an important background to my work, because what
distinguishes mad scientist from detective is the social restraint of
discipline. The former tending to evade it while the latter upholds it.
Nevertheless, I have different aims than to flesh out Foucauldian power
shifts with more supporting texts and it would restrict the kinds of questions
that I wish to address.
My interest is in describing, and attempting to understand something about
public understandings of science. I do not refer to facts about science.
Fiction, I believe, engages with debates about science in public, not in terms
of factual science, but in terms of what science means to society. My aim in
this work is to recount a history of two fictional icons of science. I will
position the detective figure as scientist first and crime fighter second, and
100 Miller (1980) in Pykett (1998)
101 Bounded environments limit the scope of possibilities in some of Conan-Doyle's work,
for example The Hound of the Baskervilles. The so-called 'locked room' was a feature
particularly well developed by 20th century authors, like Agatha Christie, Margory
Allingham and Anthony Berkley.
keep the mad scientist always in relief. In fact, I have very little to say
about crime fighting as an activity in itself In each chapter I will simply
ask, how do the narratives of science in the fiction relate to narratives of
science in public? In this way I hope to gain an insight into how fiction
relates to, works through and reiterates contemporary cultural concerns
about science. Within the time span encompassed by my selection of texts
there is also the opportunity to examine how a new public icon is
constructed, as the then quintessential detective emerges from the
intersections of popular journalism, police 'image work' (more broadly
public relations) and popular fiction. Finally in my conclusion I will ask
what meaning, ifany, has the study of the detective brought to the study of
science in fiction and not least, to the society in which we live now.
In my view, Haynes and others have ignored one of the most abiding
representations of fictional science to have existed in popular culturel02•
Conan Doyle's creation has been as popular in the zo" century as Dracula
or Frankenstein have, giving rise to no less than 260-plus film adaptations
and countless hours of radio and television.l'" In recent years, there have
been many more made in his mould. UK television dramas such as Silent
Witness, Waking the Dead and Cracker, featuring pathologists and forensic
psychologists, along with endless forensic whodunits imported from
America, among them, Quincy, CS!, CS! NY, CS! Miami, and Criminal
Minds. Novels like those by Kathy Reichs or Patricia Cornwell are a regular
feature of the bestseller lists, both authors regaling their readers with stories
of gruesome crimes, which are solved by dedicated forensic scientists,
doubling as full-blown detectives.i'" And these are only the most
laboratory-oriented of all the detectives. There are countless 'deductive
logicians' whose laboratory is the mean streets, the urban landscape, or
society as a whole. In fact, the detective-scientist has a hold over the
popular market that mad scientists are unlikely ever to be able to touch and
102 'Others' might include: Basalla (1975) in Holton and Blandpied (eds) (1975); Gilbey
(2008); Frayling (2005 and 2006b); Haste (1997); Jackson (2008); Pollack (1998); Tumey
(1998); Weingart (2003a and 2003); Rose (2003)
103 The Sherlock Holmes Society of London
104 See Clee (2008) for crime fiction bestsellers
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this has been the case for more than a century.
A comparison of Frankenstein with the scientific detectives not only adds
depth to an understanding of the mad scientist, but it also provides a more
complex picture of scientific representation in popular culture. When
Frankenstein is placed against Van Helsing, his 20th-century twin, he
appears as only one side of the picture. So while he reflects anxiety about
Faustian technoscientists, who are misanthropic and work in secret, we also
understand from Van Helsing that science is an empirical exercise that
reveals hidden truths, which could save our lives.
If scientists read anti-science feeling into popular Frankensteinian
stereotyping, then perhaps they might find succour in the scientific
detective. Those of us who study representations of scientists, on the other
hand, would do well to probe the history of this figure as s/he develops
alongside the mad scientist. This involves studying examples of the
forerunners of detective fictions in the genres of gothic, mystery and
sensation fiction. In the past those fictions and the scientific characters who
populate their pages have been of less interest to scholars of science
representation, either because such scientists do not work in laboratories, or
because they work in both supernatural and natural realms. In the 19th
century science was limited on neither score. Including the detective-
scientist, within the arena of science representations promises to create a
more nuanced discussion of how dual, over-lapping territories of science are
represented, mapped and valued or not, in the popular realm. In the next
chapter I will go on to outline the ways in which I intend to approach such a
hotbed of science, crime, and supernatural.
CHAPTER TWO
ICONOGRAPHY, NARRATIVE AND SIGNIFICANCE
In the last chapter I proposed that the perpetual twinning of Dracula with
Frankenstein in 20th and 2151_centurycultures suggests that Bram Stoker's
(1897) scientist Professor Van Helsing might provide a model of science as
important as Victor Frankenstein is today. My initial observation was that
the so-called mad scientist by which I simply mean the whole string of
characters who share heritage with Mary Shelley's (1818) scientist,
excludes Van Helsing as an oddity and that such notions of mad scientists
have framed much of the discourse on fictional science and its relations to
public(s). In response to this, I have argued that Van Helsing far from being
a one-off peculiarity of vampire fiction, belongs to the much wider tradition
of fictional detectives and these figures constitute an alternative model of
science to the one that is given by the mad scientist.
To suggest that the detective be viewed as a scientist challenges the
assumption that the definition of a scientist must be tied to the laboratory
bench. Such a narrow definition seems to be what prompts Nicholas
Russell (2007) to remark, following Haynes (1994) that literary scientists
are surprisingly scarce in 19th-century fiction given the enormous influence
that science had upon culture at the time. Yet, it would also be true to say
that for most of the 19th century professional scientists were just as scarce.
Indeed Ruth Barton (2003) convincingly argues that even in the second half
of the century science was the domain of a variety of 'scientific'
professions, along with a few academic scientists and some amateurs. She
finds that the label 'men of science' was the preferred term to 'scientist,' as
a phrase that better reflected the multiplicity of routes by which people
involved themselves in doing science. lOS In this case, stepping beyond the
lOS See Barton (2003) for an excellent survey of the complexities and inconsistencies in the
19th century professionalization of the sciences. See especially pl 04 for the way the term
'men of science' was used to present science as a united endeavour that, in fact, referred to
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emblematic laboratory and identifying characters as scientists based upon
their process - an investigative process based on reason - gives a more
genuine snapshot of how the contemporary culture viewed its scientists in
fact and fiction.
What this amounts to is going beyond a stereotype and given my aim is to
place the detective and the mad scientist in the same frame, and to explore
the history of the former in relation to the latter, I am essentially comparing
the popular image of two institutions, both encompassed by the 19th-century
label 'men of science.' Just as the mad scientist conjures an image of men
with white coats and crazy hair, so the detective is a criminal investigator
who might peer at a footprint through a magnifying glass, have hawk-like
powers of observation, a rarefied ability for reasoning from effect to cause,
and often a lonely or conflicted personal life. Since my study is effectively
a comparison of two stereotypes, I will begin this discussion by exploring
how the term stereotype may be usefully re-framed as Alfred Schutz's
notion of typification, a move that gives the concept more flexibility, greater
theoretical depth and a more neutral role as social currency.
Having relocated the mad scientist and detective stereotypes in the more
fluid category of typification, I go on to describe a second level of analysis
that will enable me to get a basic grip on the narrative orientations of the
scientific characters that populate the pages of the fiction. I then have a
system of separating narrative from iconography, which will prove to be
productive in examining the construction of the detective. That said, there
is a tricky theoretical twist to be made in linking narrative elements to
contemporary cultural concerns. In order to do this, I have borrowed ideas
from several scholars and propose a means of following the historical
construction of a modem myth - a myth that persists today.
I then move on to explore the significance that such modem myths have for
the institutions that feature in them. I have suggested that the mad scientist
the whole gambit of men (mainly) and professions who were involved in science at some
level
40
is a boundary object and provides the ammunition of endless jibes that pass
backwards and forwards from arts to science buildings, in a 'two cultures'
styled dispute. I now deepen this discussion with reference to the work of
sociologist Everett C Hughes, which highlights the importance of public
perception to the institutional structures of society.
This brings me to what is probably one of the oldest, ifnot the oldest, of
boundary disputes that scientists, or natural philosophers have negotiated
between science and magic, initially between science and alchemy. It is this
boundary, over all others that the fictions of this thesis draw, or discard, in
various ways. It inevitably raises the question posed by Max Weber's 1918
dictum that science is a source of disenchantment for the people of Western
societies, which I will raise briefly here, in preparation to return to it in the
final conclusion.i'" Disenchantment and its opposite is such a strong theme
of the fictions under analysis here that it is worth highlighting from the start.
Finally, I will move on to describe in more prosaic terms why I have chosen
the particular selection of texts that I have.
IMAGE - TYPIFICATION OR STEREOTYPE?
Available survey data indicate that certain motifs are emblematic of science
and that these have apparently remained remarkably consistent across the
entire 20th century.l'" Such images appear to be built up from a shared pot
of popular symbols, which have taken on meaning as signifiers of science.
Through time the pot has taken on new icons and scientific developments as
they have arisen. Roland Barthes (1972) comments on how, following his
death, Einstein's brain came to signify the totality of the man. lOS
Interestingly enough, it is the anonymised brain that subsequently turns up
in popular consciousness as an iconic symbol of the scientist alongside
mushroom clouds and 19th-century fictions like Frankenstein's monster and
106 Weber initially raised the notion of the disenchanting effects of intellectualisation of
society in a speech entitled 'Science as a Vocation' which he gave at Munich University in
1918. See Weber, Gerth and MiIIs (1991)
107 Mead and Metraux (1957); Rahm and Charbonneau (1997); Wade Chambers (1983)
108 See Barthes (1972) "The Brain of Einstein" pp68-70 in Mythologies
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Dr Jekyll's chemical concoctions. If these processes have been observed
across the whole 20th century, then there is good reason to believe that
something similar was happening in the 19th century.l'"
Alfred Schutz's (1932) notion of typification, in which he analyses the
thought processes of everyday social reality, usefully describes shared,
socially embedded constructs, such as these visions of science are.110 For
Schutz individuals understand the world by interpreting it in terms of a
stock of previous experience, which encompasses their own experiences
combined with that communicated by parents, relatives, friends and cohorts.
This stock knowledge forms a schema through which all new experience is
measured, so that each new object and event is perceived at the outset in a
typical character - a typification. In this way, the world can take on
meaning, without the necessity to process each new experience from afresh.
Typifications are essentially learned common-sense constructs applied to
new sensory experiences of places, people, events and things. Schutz
argues that it is through this process of typification that individuals are able
to take meaning from situations of which they have no personal experience.
He explains "[p Jutting a letter in the mailbox, I expect that unknown people,
called postmen, will act in a typical way, not quite intelligible to me, with
the result that my letter will reach the addressee within typically reasonable
time. "Ill
Schutz' explication of type begins with Edmund Husserl's
phenomenological notion of 'natural attitude', which describes a subjective
common-sense stance where all experience, physical, psychological, social
and cultural is perceived as unquestionably real.1l2 It is a place where the
world is assumed to be constant and activities repeatable.l':' In the
109 See Mead and Metraux (1957); Wade Chambers (1983) and Rahm and Charbonneau
(1997) for 20th-century surveys of iconography of science
110 Schutz (1932/1967); Schutz and Natanson (1973)
111 Schutz and Natanson (1973) pl7
112 For review of Husserl see Hutson "Edmund Husserl" pp146-62 in Simons (ed) (2002)
113 For the differences between natural attitude and phenomenological attitude see: Hutson
"Edmund HusserI" ppI55-56 in Simons (ed) (2002); Schutz and Natanson (1973) ppll-12
and ppI21-22
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common-sense stance we take for granted that the world is shared with other
individuals whose perception of objects does not match our own. The fact
that natural attitude is a fundamentally subjective stance and individuals do
not share the same viewpoint adds up to create solipsism. To bridge the
social-subjective gap, Schutz proposes the "general thesis of reciprocal
perspectives", which involves two taken-for-granted thinking constructs.l'"
Firstly, if I change places with you, I will see the world as you do and vice
versa; secondly, I1we discount the differences in our perspectives
originating from our personal histories and assume that you/we experience
the same object in "empirically identical" ways. I IS
In a sense, what Schutz is saying, is that for this system of reciprocity to
work - for me to be able to assume that the world that I take for granted is
the same as the world that you take for granted - we must both use the same
taken-for-granted thinking structures. In fact, everyone within a social group
must have access to the same stock of knowledge; it must be socially
agreed. If this were not the case then we are thrown back into the realms of
solipsism. In order to engage in the same reciprocal arrangement with
regard to science, we must assume common sense constructs that are able to
encompass an enormously diverse group of activities and people. The
function ofa simple emblematic toolkit is clear in this light. Schutz'thesis
of reciprocity states that we both share the same toolkit, which enables us to
signify science with ease and meaning.
Type constructs are variously detailed, precise, familiar and vague and they
are always open to change. In effect they are a kind of cultural-social
shorthand. They obviously fall short of a complete, or even what could be
called a realistic, understanding of the object in question and yet Schutz
asserts that "in spite of all these inadequacies, common-sense knowledge of
everyday life is sufficient for coming to terms with fellow-men, cultural
objects, social institutions - in brief, with social reality.,,116 These meaning
114 Schutz and Natanson (1973) p12
115 Ibid pll-12
116 Schutz (1932) quoted in Heritage (1984) p49
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constructs are the "sedimented" products of past activities of comparing and
contrasting sensory inputs with previous types to form new, slightly altered
constructs, which are in themselves elastic, changing through time to reflect
new conditions. The process is reflected in the way that Einstein's brain
joins bubbling vials, and galvanic apparatus as another symbolic icon of
science. The upshot of this process of typification is that new experiences
occur within what Schutz has dubbed "a horizon of familiarity and pre-
acquaintanceship ... ,,117
The cartoon-like visions called forth by some surveys of public perception
that so frustrate scientists are, I would suggest another product of this
process. These are the surveys that tend by their mode of question, to
prompt a symbolic typification in response. So Mead and Metraux (1957)
asked school children to complete the statement "When I think about a
scientist, I think of ... " and Wade-Chambers (1983) simply instructs school
children to 'draw a scientist,.118 My contention with such open-ended
questions is that the only option is to revert to the symbolic details of
typificatory structures in response, because actually there is nothing about
scientists, which makes them look notably different from any other human
being, apart from the fact that they do science. The question oddly assumes
that there is and that whatever it is can be described within the confines of a
brief note or even more difficult, in a drawing.
Rahm and Charbonneau (1997) repeat the Wade-Chambers draw-a-scientist
test using undergraduates with some interesting results that demonstrate this
issue. First of all, the authors express disappointment and surprise to find
that the majority of undergraduates, who were in continuing education (and
so ought to know better), drew images not dissimilar to those found in the
Wade-Chambers' data, using all the usual symbols of mad hair, white coat,
vials etc. Rahm and Charbonneau make particular note of the fact that 8%
of their sample of 49 students produced "explicitly non-stereotypical
images" that were usually accompanied by captions, some lengthy,
117 Ibid p5I
118 Mead and Metraux (1957) p385 Wade-Chambers (1983)
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explaining that a scientist looked like an ordinary person. The authors
interpret these drawings as confirmation that the stereotypical image is alive
and well "while trying to be as egalitarian and nonstereotypical as possible,
[the artist] is nonetheless acutely aware that the image produced is highly
'unscientist-like' to the point of requiring detailed justification.v'!" Yet the
captions are required because the subjects who drew them have purposefully
avoided drawing a typification. The length of the caption that they feel is
required is a sign of the lengths to which individuals would be forced to go
in order to communicate with one another meaningfully.
Further, Rahm and Charbonneau stipulate that if one were to adopt a single
icon to characterise 'contemporary' scientific practise, then most scientists
would apparently agree on the computer. Yet, computers were sparse in
drawings, presumably because a computer cannot signify science
sufficiently well. A picture of a person with a computer might be a novelist,
a scholar, a software programmer, a hacker or any number of other
professionals. A computer is too general to be an effective typification.
Having said that the authors write: "In terms of the 'tools' of science, our
results would suggest that our subjects remained frozen at the level of their
last high school chemistry class (how about that for a scary thought).,,12o
Again the essence is missed. The subjects have been asked to draw the
elemental symbols of science and bubbling vials are a long time staple of
the typificatory structure of the scientist.
In an odd way these kinds of rather unhelpful surveys, which attempt to
gauge public perceptions of scientists serve only to consolidate the
proposition that the mad scientist is a typification and has purpose as
such.121 In Schutz's terms what they draw forth is a distinction between
personal types, which include individualising details of the people we know,
119 Rahm and Charbonneau (1997) p776
120 Ibid p776
121 Boylan et al (1992) criticise the 'draw a scientist' tests on the same basis and have
shown in interviews with children that "there was a qualitative change in the level of
understanding about science and scientists which increased from Grade 3 to Grade 8 and a
clear separation in the students' mind of what they see as the current public stereotype and
their personal constructs of science and scientists p4 75
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from "course-of-action types," which are essentially procedural recipes. He
points to the fact that at the anonymous end of the social scale, personal
type is superseded by course-of-action type, so 'a scientist' or 'a doctor'
becomes one with their professional role, their image losing all shades of
grey and taking identity with symbolic features of their work. This
tendency to take features of professional function and identify the function
with the worker is common enough. Even nursery school children become
familiar with the process when they learn to identify Mr Bun, the Baker, Mr
Parcel, the Postman and so on from the popular card game Happy
Families122• In effect, these children are mastering the rudiments of
typificatory structures that they will build upon for the rest of their lives.
Draw-a-scientist type surveys seem also to assume, that by some odd quirk
it is scientists alone who are singled out for this kind of caricature. Yet, the
instruction, 'draw a lawyer' is likely to draw forth an image of a man in a
wig and voluminous gown (in the UK, anyway). Clearly, lawyers are
ordinary people who do not wear wigs and gowns at all times, but the
question has called forth Schutz course-of-action type. If asked to draw a
doctor, men with stethoscopes and perhaps scalpels would materialise;
'draw a detective', conjures a man with a magnifying glass. Yet obviously
it is understood if a friend who is a detective came to dinner he would not
arrive with magnifying glass in hand (one hopes), likewise the doctor would
not bring his scalpel. Still Rahm and Charbonneau persist in the belief that
their survey reveals "a largely unrecognized shortcoming of the science
ducati ,,123e ucation process ...
John Durant (1993) has described a more sophisticated picture of how
adults might undergo the same process in relation to science, but he does not
see the process as a social necessity and like Rahm and Charbonneau, sees it
instead as a failing, presumably on the part of non-scientists. "The most
serious weakness in the standard view of the processes of scientific inquiry
122 At the time of writing this game is widely available in the UK, for example: a search on
http://www.amazon.co.uk brings up all manner of Happy Families games. Accessed
09.08.2011
123 Rahm and Charonneau (1997) p777
is its tendency to project the qualities of scientific knowledge upon the
individual scientists who produce it. Scientific knowledge is (generally
speaking) objective, so it is presumed that individual scientists approach
their work in a spirit of objectivity; scientific knowledge is continually
being revised and improved, so it is thought that individual scientists
approach their work in a spirit of open-mindedness and humiIity ...,,124 Even
though Durant considers it lacking, this image is very positive. Realistic or
not, it constitutes a somewhat sophisticated course-of-action type in
comparison to the white coated, unkempt survey responses.
The advantage of using Schutz's theoretical approach over the idea of a
stereotype is that it can encompass such flexibilities, which lie on scale
between 'personal type' and 'course-of-action' type. Yet most studies
focussing on science representation use the concept of a stereotype, usually
without defining it. In an in-depth discussion of stereotype and its meaning
and usage, Richard Dyer (2002) acknowledges a phenomenological basis,
and makes a distinction between a 'social type' and a stereotype, the former
being a more flexible category than the latter. He argues that the
iconography of social types is used in a more open and flexible way than
that of stereotypes, which he finds are almost always associated with
particular plot lines. By this definition if mad scientists are stereotypes then
white coats and shouts of eureka, might always be accompanied by a
villainous plotline, whereas, if they are social types, they may take a variety
of good, bad and indifferent roles. Indeed, the association of the term 'mad
scientist' with villainous plot and by extension negative image is commonly
made, and has been noted by Lindy Orthia (2010) who has rendered the
whole set of ideas together as the mad science trope.125
Are the mad scientists described by Orthia stereotypes or social types?
They are villains, but they are thwarted by Dr Who, himself an eccentric
outsider who could well be described as a mad scientist himself. In which
124 Durant (1993) "What is Scientific Literacy" in Durant and Gregory (eds) (1993) pl3S
125 Orthia (2010) pIS; Rohn (2011) wonders, like Orthia, whether the idea that scientists
have poor public image is as much part of a stereotype as the mad hair and white coat
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case the mad scientist is a social type in Dyer's terms. Yet, the Oxford
English Dictionary defines the mad scientist as "a scientist who is mad
eccentric, esp. so as to be dangerous or evil: a stock figure of melodramatic
horror stories." So here is Dyer's stereotype. Defining what is or what is
not part of a stereotype is one of the problems of using such a construct.l'"
Indeed, this discussion highlights the need to make clear that when I use the
term mad scientist I do not imply a plot of villainy, but when I use the term
mad, bad scientist, I do.
For these reasons, I prefer the idea of typification and typified
characteristics. Indeed, what emerges from pages of the fictions reviewed
in this study, are some images that conform to the dictionary stereotype and
some that do not. What is clear, and well described by Schutz' process, is
that iconography and plot are elements within a repertoire of typified
resources that authors select from in order to build new characters and plots,
which are at the same time recognisable and novel. This is also a view
supported by the work of Simon Locke (2005) on superhero comics and
Lindy Orthia (2010) in her work on Dr Who.
Typified literary figures, such as mad scientists and detectives cross the
borders of different fictions and genres and migrate outwards to become
general sociocultural referents.127 Typified emblems of the mad scientist,
such as eccentricity and emotional coolness, were already in existence when
the first novels in this corpus were written, but during the time span,
detectives were constructed in both real and fictional worlds. It is with
particular reference to detectives that I am able to explore how extra-textual
reality influences intra-textual worlds. In terms of constructing the
quintessential detective, I find that emblematic details associated with other
course-of-action types are carved up from others and put together to concoct
a new repertoire. The popular fictions of this corpus imbricate real-world
events and ideas, such as reason, transgression or a failed police
126 Barker (1989) has made more damning criticism of the analytical use of the term
'stereotype' as "dangerous on epistemological and political grounds ... which tells us only
about the worries of the analyst." p2l 0
127 For example, see Bates (2005) and Michael and Carter (2001)
investigation, with standard fictional fare of magic, mystery and sometimes
menace. The whole is then interwoven in such a way that it is nigh on
impossible to extract one element clean from another.
Having said that in the following section I will explore ways of doing
precisely that, in order to formalize models of science that incorporate
typified iconography along with narrative elements and are present in the
fiction. I will first look at the difficulties of using a typology and, following
Vladimir Propp (1928), suggest instead a focus on narrative that allows me
to get a leverage on the meaning of science and scientist within the text.
NARRATIVE, MYTH AND REALITY
The seminal study on the representation of scientists in fiction, upon which
most others draw, is Roslynn Haynes' work entitled From Faust to
Strangelove (1994) in which she reads a staggering four centuries-worth of
fiction and using a typological model categorises her fictional scientists as
one of six types, which she actually refers to as stereotypes. Her types are
labelled 'the alchemist', obsessed or maniacal; 'the stupid virtuoso', out of
touch with social life; the 'Romantic scientist', unfeeling and lacking human
bonds; 'the heroic adventurer', superhuman and sometimes a danger; 'the
helpless scientist', unable to control his creation; and 'the idealist', the "one
unambiguously acceptable scientist.,,128 The trouble with such a typology is
that much of her data, her fictional characters, fall into several categories at
once - a goodness of fit problem not unknown in typologies.F' Victor
Frankenstein, for example, could be the alchemist, the stupid virtuoso, the
romantic scientist, the helpless scientist, sometimes the idealist, and
arguably he is also the intellectual heroic adventurer. So Frankenstein can
be made to fit all categories, though perhaps he is a special case. That said,
the generic mad scientist almost always fits the first three categories and is
generally a helpless scientist as well.
128 Haynes (1994) p3-4
129 See McKinney (1969) for a distinction between typologies and typifications - the
former are constructed, as by sociologists, or literary theorists, the latter, which he calls the
existential type, are used by people in social systems
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My point is not to split hairs; clearly Haynes has done a careful reading of
her fictions and decided on that basis which is the dominant mode of each
scientist. The trouble is that each new reader will have their own and
potentially different idea on the fit of the scientists - in addition they may
question the very nature of the categories themselves. In itself that is not a
problem except that Haynes makes inferences from the chronological spread
of her types, which she uses to formulate wider conclusions about science
and society. "The majority of these stereotypes" writes Haynes "represent
scientists in negative terms, as producing long-term liabilities for
society.,,130Furthermore "the recurrent mutual suspicion between scientist
and other members of society was developed and reinforced in Western
literature ... ,,13l I have reviewed the underlying assumptions and validity of
such statements in the previous chapter, so suffice to say here that such
assertions have become a taken-for-granted credo, which has framed many a
study on science in fiction.132 One reason for this is probably the sheer
reach and volume of her study alongside a perfectly valid analysis of the
darker side of the scientist in fiction.
Leane (2007) also takes a typological route in order to describe real
physicists who are the protagonists of popular factual texts. Interestingly
enough, the hard-boiled detective is one of her types. She finds the defining
traits of this character and genre reworked in two popular physics works,
James Gleick's (1987) Chaos: Making a New Science and M Mitchell
Waldrop's (1992) Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order
and Chaos. A noir atmosphere peopled by cynical, self-reliant scientific
misfits echoes elements of the hard-boiled genre, as Leane explains: "the
main ingredients are present: a lonely scientist/detective in a drab cityscape,
taking solace in alcohol, cut off from society around him, cynically
embracing bad weather".133 The notion that popular science texts style their
principal scientists on streetwise detectives testifies to the perceived
130 Haynes (1994) p4
I3J Haynes (1994) p6
132 See this work pp7-26
133 Leane (2007) p143-4
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crossover between science and detection in the popular realm.
The model of a savvy urban detective appears distinct from any of Haynes'
types, but the characteristics of the PI emphasized by Leane and presumably
by the physics texts, could place him within three or four of Haynes'
categories. In fact, Leane makes this point herself: "the hard boiled
detective is only one of a series of stereotypes evident in prominent late
twentieth -century popularisations ... These stereotypes are not identical to
those that Haynes observes in fiction, but there is considerable overlap
between the two sets. They include the scientist as "absent-minded
professor", the scientist as priest or Zen-master, and the scientist as
obsessive. All these stereotypes are united by an emphasis on "outsider-
dom": a sense that the scientist is in some way removed from everyday
life.,,134 What confuses the issue here is that the boundaries between
typological groups and between fictional characters are exceptionally fuzzy
and notoriously difficult to pin down, a feature perhaps of the particular
topic, which renders it difficult to divide up for taxonomic purposes.
Typological fuzziness is a literary issue of long-standing and was one of the
triggers for Vladimir Propp's famous 1928 study of the Russian fairy tale.
In The Morphology of the Folktale (1928/1968) Propp complains at the
outset that "Clear cut division into types does not actually exist; very often
it is a fiction.,,135 His critical eye is focussed on work that categorises folk
tales on the basis of content and theme, both elements too variable and
complex to give any consistency of classification. Such systems, he
believes, fail for reasons which I have discussed in previous paragraphs in
relation to typologies used by Haynes (1994) and Leane (2007). Indeed,
Propp writes that "every investigator who purports to be classifying
according to [this] ... scheme is, in fact, classifying differently.,,136 By way
of countering the 'sorry state' of folk-tale research as he saw it, Propp
attempted a consistent and 'scientific' classification of tales based upon an
134 Leane (2007) p140
135 Propp (1928/1968) P11
136 Propp (1928/1968) p6
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analysis of narrative structures. Though my aim is not to formulate a
comprehensive taxonomy of fictional scientists, Propp's analytical toolbox
offers a means of assessing the basic orientation of their plotlines. The use
of structure in this way separates narrative role from typified elements,
which gives me a more systematic means of approaching the fiction.)37
First to Propp. His innovation was to recognise that the recurring constants
of fairy tales consist in the actions of the characters, in what they do, rather
than in their characteristics or means of action. In an analysis of one
hundred fairy tales, Propp finds that divergent stories attribute the same
actions to different characters. What matters, he says in terms of defining
the fairy tale is what he calls the 'functions', which should be "understood
as an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for
the course of the action .... Functions of characters serve as stable, constant
elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled.
They constitute the fundamental components of the tale. The number of
functions known to the fairy tale is limited.,,138 Narratives can be broken
down into the simplest of action statements, from which functions can be
defined, for example:
1. A tsar gives an eagle to a hero. The eagle carries the hero away to
another kingdom.
2. An old man gives Sucenko a horse. The horse carries Sucenko
h ki d 139away to anot er mg om.
The actions or the verbs are identical in these two examples while the
characters and means change, the action provides the basis for Propp's
'functions', which occur routinely in all Russian fairy stories.)40 This
137 In using the terms such as 'structure' or 'structural' I do not imply European structuralist
theory as was developed by Roland Barthes, Levis-Strauss and others in the 1950's and
60's. Propp's structural analysis is not the same thing. In addition Propp is often thought of
as a Russian formalist, but there are grounds for arguing he is not, since he does argue for
'defamiliarisation' of the world through folk tales. See Barker (1989) p120-121
138 Propp (1928/1968) p21
139 Propp (192811968) P19
140 I have used inverted commas around 'function' to indicate that I am using the term to
denote Propp's specific meaning, I will cease to do this from now on.
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particular pair is defined as "provision or receipt of a magical agent,,141in
the first statement and in the second, as "spatial transference between two
kingdoms, [or] guidance,,142. Propp identifies thirty one such functions that
appear to define the whole fairy tale genre. More surprisingly he finds that
they also always proceed in the same order - even where some functions are
left out or repeated, the sequence of the others is not altered.l'" The type
and the succession of functions together comprise the structure of the fairy
tale and for Propp, it is this that differentiates it from other genres. The
variety of tales arises from the who, how and why as he explains: "one may
say that the number of functions is extremely small, whereas the number of
personages is extremely large. This explains the two-fold quality of a tale:
its amazing multiformity, picturesqueness, and colour, and on the other
hand, its no less striking uniformity, its repetitlon.v"
To apply Propp's method wholesale to the long format of the novel would
be inordinately long-winded and unproductive, especially given my focus is
not on genre anyway. That said, it is very useful to ask the same sorts of
questions as might have been posed by Propp about the function of
scientists within the universes of the various novels. In the terms of
Propp's study in Morphology, the functions that scientists serve are more
important than the characteristics they have.145 Sticking with examples,
which I have discussed in the previous chapter, a skeleton of the narratives,
each of Victor Frankenstein and Professor Van Helsing, might be written:
a) Victor Frankenstein creates a monster. The monster threatens to destroy
him and his family, possibly humanity.
b) A monster threatens to destroy humanity. Professor Van Helsing
captures the monster.
141 Propp (1928/1968) p43
142 Propp (1928/1968) p50
143 Propp may have overstated the uniformity of functions See Barker (1989) p123
144 Propp (1928/1968) p21
14S I take Propp's point on this and agree that 'what happens' is a potent indicator of
meaning, within the text. Yet iconography is also a vitally important part of the picture and,
in fact, Propp does acknowledge this in Propp (1928/1968) "On the Attributes of Dramatis
Personae and their Significance" pp87-91
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The two examples oppose each other in their narrative direction, so where a)
could be called a disordering narrative b) becomes a restorative narrative.
Of course, it is perfectly possible for such disordering and restorative
remnants to be joined into a single story that switches from one to the other,
as for example, in Michael Crichton's (1990) Jurassic Park, in which
dinosaurs created by scientists pose a serious threat that is finally contained
by a palaeontologist. Indeed, a large section of Shelley's original story is
devoted to Victor Frankenstein's pursuit of his creature ostensibly so that
the scientist re-order what he has disordered, though there is no science
evident in the final chase and in the end the creature destroys himself
anyway. Such bold statements of plot are deliberately stripped back simple
scripts that illustrate the most basic possible functional elements involving
science. In other words they represent the boiled down narratives of science
extracted from relatively complex works of fiction.
The characters from other novels can subsequently be slotted into identical
function statements, with the result that a new landscape emerges, in which
novels are categorised according to the narratives that they tell about
science. In the disordering category are the following:
a) Dr Jekyll creates a Mr Hyde. Mr Hyde threatens to destroy some or all of
the community.
and
The mad scientist creates a novel or deviant form of some kind. The new
deviant threatens to destroy some or all of humanity.
In the restorative category are the following:
b) A criminal threatens to destroy a community. Sherlock Holmes captures
the criminal.
and
A deviant form of some kind threatens to destroy some or all of humanity.
A scientific detective contains the deviant.
Switching characters in this way reveals that Frankenstein unsurprisingly
falls within a group of stories that are regularly held up as narratives of mad
science, as is Robert Louis Stevenson's (1886) Jekyll and Hyde. Dracula,
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however, is usually reckoned to be an example of fantasy or horror fiction,
but under this scheme it falls into the same bracket as the detectives, though
its epistolary form, similar to Wilkie Collins' novel The Moonstone (1868),
has long been acknowledged as a detective-styled structure.l'" Nonetheless
the point is not to challenge long-standing genre definitions, but instead to
classify such stories on the basis of the structure of science narratives. What
is striking is that in so doing a large class of narratives immediately
becomes apparent that is rarely acknowledged in studies of the scientist in
fiction. These narratives offer an alternative model of science to the
disordering one in which scientists produce the Haynes-styled 'long-tenn
liabilities for society' so often associated with mad science.l'"
In many ways, genre has little relevance here, except to say that it may
reinforce the apparent imperceptibility of those scientists in fiction, who use
science, like detectives of all kinds who work as scientists but for some
reason do not look like scientists, probably because they are typified as
crime fighters, vampire hunters, doctors or other professional, course-of-
action types. Popular genre fiction is after all defined according to the
characteristics of its content and stories about supernatural monsters,
criminals, policemen or even doctors and disease are not often recognised as
stories primarily about science and they all fall into different genres to boot.
Yet, a classification of these stories on the basis of the structure of their
science narratives, places Professor Van Helsing's techno-magical toolbox
beside Sherlock Holmes' chemical apparatus. The variability of content in
these restorative narratives obscures an overall constancy of form and the
centrality of science to their structure.
Related to this is the fact that in disordering narratives science provides the
impetus to initiate the plot, being always associated with the first function.
This has the effect of making these stories very obviously about science
since they raise it at first post, so to speak. Restorative narratives, on the
146 See Greenway (1996) p251-52 for a discussion of the framing of Dracula as a legalistic-
scientific narrative
147 Haynes (1994) p4
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other hand, begin with problems of diverse kinds and use science within the
second function as a means of righting initial perturbations. In many ways
such narratives make no issue of science and so it more easily goes
unnoticed as a 'non-problem'. In Propp's tales order and meaning are
coupled. The meaning of a function within the text is principally governed
by its place in the course of action, although the relationship between order
and meaning is likely to be more complex in the longer form of a novel than
in a fairy tale.
In the examples I have given the meaning of science flips from liability to
blessing depending on whether it is associated with the first or second
functions. Ultimately, of course, if science is to restore order then it must
be responding to some initial event that has disordered the world. Yet,
Orthia's Dr Who narratives are a case in point where science perturbs the
order, or threatens to, and another type of science restores order, making the
science narrative more complex. The same situation is true in Michael
Crichton's Jurassic Park as I have already noted. With that said, Stephen
Knight (1980) has remarked on the preservation of structural order in
Sherlock Holmes stories, which always follow the sequence of"reJation,
investigation and resolution", where relation is the equivalent to revelation
of the threat or misdemeanour.!" As in my scheme, Knight's structure has
science always associated with the second function, although he uses
different labels.
Propp's work on folktales stops at a description of form and in a sense we
are left there high and dry. He describes a common sequence of functions
and says nothing more about the significance of it. The structuralists, most
famously Claude Levi-Stauss, attacked him harshly for leaving the 'real'
interpretative analysis undone.l'" In Propp's Morphology of a Folktale
(1928) form is meaning, really only because form is his object of study, and
148 Knight (1980) p77
149 See Levi-Stauss "Form and Structure" in Propp et al (1984). Broadly speaking, his
criticisms come under four categories: that Propp is a formalist and formalism has no value
because it does not engage context and meaning; that, as a formalist, Propp is inconsistent
anyway, muddling content and form; that myths would have been more informative than
folktales; and that the analysis is left 'under-done' anyway
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meaning is limited to, or only arises from, the intra-textual world. Yet it
would be extraordinary to imagine that there is no relationship between
meaning and the cultural background that the reader brings to a text
whatever its form and indeed this is not what Propp had imagined either.
Form was simply the limit of his morphological study. ISOAside from the
kind of structuralist interpretations recommended by Levi-Stauss, there are
also whole bodies of theory specifically built upon the interface between
reader and text. 151
That meaning be held entirely within the form of a text, or not, is a problem
helpfully discussed by Tzvetan Todorov (1975). He defines a fictional
genre that he calls 'the fantastic' which ultimately relies upon the reader's
response to events in the text that are judged as either potentially real or
imaginary. Such a judgement must interface with the reader's extra-textual
reality and leads Todorov to discuss the relationship between a piece of
fiction and representation of the external world. Todorov explains that
"literature is not representative in the same sense that certain sentences of
everyday speech may be representative, for literature does not refer ... to
anything outside itself ... But to deny literature any representative aspect for
this reason is to identify the reference with the referent ... It is no accident if,
in fiction terms commonly employed are: characters, action, atmosphere,
etc., all of which also designate a non-textual reality."IS2
In this view, some elements of non-textual reality are drawn into the interior
universe of a narrative, and then, these in themselves draw forth different
interpretations depending on the extra-textual reality of individual
ISO He recommends that 'morphological investigations' accompany historical study and
that "the tale must be studied in regard to religious notions" in Morphology, see: Propp et al
(1928/1968) p90. In later works, he explored the historical and ethnographic roots of
folklore, which he believed to be closely tied to religious and spiritual belief systems. See,
for example: "The Nature of Folklore" and his reply to Levi-Stauss, "The Structural and
Historical Study of the Wondertale" in Propp et al (1984) pp3-1S and 67-81, respectively
151 Reader response theory emphasises the reader's interpretation of the text, such that the
text is co-constructed by author and reader. In a classic essay entitled Interpreting the
'Variorum' the critic Stanley Fish (1976) describes 'interpretive communities' to explain
how groups of like-minded individuals, who share similar assumptions about how a text
should be read, converge on the same interpretation - or meaning. The idea has been
empirically tested and seems to hold water, see Dorfman (1996)
152 Todorov et al (1975) p59
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readers.P' Martin Barker (1989) whose interest is in ideologies contained
in comics, advocates a development of Propp's account of form such that it
"can enable us to link the internal structures of the stories, with the social
possibilities of its use ... " He goes on to suggest "a form does not
mechanically take its audience through its predetermined sequence of
elements. It. . .lays down invitations on how they should relate to itself -
such that the meaning of the text is not simply in the form, its elements and
their ordering but is a function of the kind of relationship into which the
reader is invited."IS4 I would suggest in addition to Barker's idea of an
invitation, the extra-textual reality that the reader brings to the text will alter
the terms of the invitation. It is after all only possible to perceive an
'invitation' that is coded in a way that is comprehensible to one's own
culture. ISS It is from text, its form, elements and ordering and the sum of
the readers' cultural knowledge that meaning arises.
In a brief aside about the nature of fairy tale characters, which being the
mutable elements of Propp's morphological system might constitute an
artistic blank canvas, he makes note of their markedly repetitive qualities.
For example the witch's hut is usually in the forest and the princess often
has golden hair. If theme and structure both are repetitive, this moves Propp
to observe that, "the fairy tale in its morphological bases represents a myth.
We fully realise that. ..we are expressing a totally heretical idea."ls6
Without wishing to enter the thorny ground that lies between Propp and the
structuralists, there is an element of the mythological as described by the
two examples of Frankenstein and Dracula, which I have used. In fact, it is
153 In fact this is common criticism of Todorov's definition of the fantastic because it is
dependent on reader response and minimises the importance of textual elements. See Chris
Morash "The Time is Out of Joint (0 Cursed Spite!): Towards a Definition of a
Supernatural Narrative" in Stewart (ed) (1998) p129
154 Barker (1989) p133
155 There are two examples of this in this thesis - the meaning of Wilkie Collins' (1868)
portrait of his failed detective Sergeant Cuff changes with the knowledge that the failure of
professional detectives was a common gripe in the press in Collins' own time. In his own
time his story invited readers to reflect on how image and ability of detective police did not
match, but since his time critics tend to 'overlook' that particular invitation and they
believe Cuffs framing as the great detective and sideline his failure. A similar situation
occurs with Sheridan Le Fanu's (I872) portrait of Dr Hesselius. For full discussion see
PRI72-204 and pp205-237 of this work respectively
6 Propp (1928/1968) p90 (his emphasis)
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not the connection between tale and myth that most outrages Levi-Strauss
about Propp's work, indeed he accedes that "Propp is right: there is no
serious reason to isolate tales from myths ..;" 157 I also find some support for
such a connection in the work of literary critic, Chris Baldick.158
In his study of Frankenstein, Baldick (1987) claims the novel as an example
of a 'modem myth,' an expression that he admits is a contradiction in tenns
in the sense that a myth is considered to be the product of a pre-literate
culture. However, he argues that a modem alternative ought to be
recognised, with the added caveat that it does not carry the cultural weight
that its pre-literate forrn does nor that it is of quite the same nature. He sees
the lasting significance of such stories as Faust, Don Quixote, Robinson
Crusoe, Frankenstein, Jekyll and Dracula in Western culture as evidence of
the existence of a modem mythic form. Indeed, "if there remain any
problems in according mythic status to these tales, they resolve themselves
into problems of distinguishing myths from literary texts ...159 That
particular intersection is not one that I intend to take up, suffice to say that
Baldick makes a strong case in support of the idea of a modem myth. Most
importantly, "[m]ost myths, in literate societies at least, prolong their lives
not by being retold at length, but by being alluded to, there finding fresh
contexts and applications. This process strips down the longer stories from
which they may be derived, reducing them to the simplest memorable
pattems ...160 Such simple patterns are what I have tried to draw out with
relation to mad scientists and detectives.
I am now able to propose my own method, which aptly mirrors the myth of
Frankenstein in being built from the parts of others. From Propp I have
taken the idea that form is related to meaning, and from Todorov I take the
insight that fiction incorporates extra-textual realities into its own universe.
Barker then proposes the idea that the form of a text has a role in
positioning the audience in social relation to itself. Barker's thinking is
157 Levi-Stauss from "Structure and Form" in Propp et al (1984) p 176
158 See Barker (1989) p123 for discussion of Levi-Stauss' objections to Propp
159 Baldick (1987) p2
160 Baldick (1987) p3
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aimed at specifically political ideologies, but I want to shift this into the
realms of the fictional scientist. A disordering scientist might, for example,
invite certain readers to engage with the potency of science and to consider
how it is carried out and regulated, or not. I have argued that this is a
response reliant upon the sum of knowledge and cultural background of
individual readers as well as the form of the text. Baldick then adds the idea
of a modem myth, a modem novel that is widely and abidingly alluded to, is
re-written, re-versioned and re-formatted, yet retains a core skeleton of its
original narrative that retains meaning for each new audience.
So, I will use the Proppian formula as an initial guide to describe science
narratives as either ordering or disordering, and will separate out the
typified elements of character from means of action. This will allow me to
see how flexibly the typified constructs of science are used. Then, on the
basis that the extra-textual realities of the reader impinge on what they
understand, I will place the texts within the contexts of their own cultures.
Here I am not interested in making connections between specific elements
of scientific knowledge and elements of fiction, but rather in making the
connections between public debate about science and how fictions relate to
these. In concluding, I return to a larger picture to map the recurrent
themes that coalesce around modem myths of mad scientists and detectives,
which allows me to identify themes common to the developing detective
figure in the 19th century and the mad scientist. It is this final process that
allows me finally to conclude that the detective was an alternative model of
science in the 19th century.
Such a system enables me to gauge how an extra-textual reality is drawn
into a fictional universe and to compare the popular, mythic faces of two
institutions. In my view it is a compliment for any profession to be depicted
in modem myth whatever the narrative, because myth both recognises and
hails its potently significant function in fiction and probably in society as
well. This may be a simplistic suggestion for those who prefer a more
interpretative or analytical line, perhaps even a structuralist one, and would
like to see such categories as professions read as ideological symbols or
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socio-political referents, but that is not the rationale for this study. I would
argue that as much as that approach has value, so it is also important to take
the narrative surface seriously. One reason for this is that many readers will
do the same. Detectives and scientists regularly take mythically inscribed
roles in the most popular fictions in the West and aside from ideological
readings, this is important for understanding the interface between fiction,
profession and public(s). How real institutions relate to public(s) and
image, or fiction, is the topic of the next section.
Having defined the way in which I intend to approach the literary texts, the
following sections essentially give a background, not so much to my
analytical approach, as to questions raised by the fiction itself. The first
section explores the theory of Everett C Hughes on the development of
institutions and in it I simply seek to explain why image is important and so
often contested as it has been. Hughes' work shows that image is inevitably
a boundary object, sitting as it does between institutional insiders and
outsiders. Here, there is an opportunity to explore how fictional images are
constructed and contested over time. The detective profession and its image
are in construction over a time span that largely corresponds to the period
covered by this study. The image of the scientist, on the other hand, has an
older provenance derived partly from alchemists that is absorbed to an
extent into the detective image. Indeed, the boundary between science and
magic, which is inevitably invoked by 'alchemy', is the one that the fictions
at hand most energetically negotiate, elide or re-erect. This raises inevitable
questions about the potential for disenchantment of society by science and
rationalism, to which I will briefly turn below.
INSTITUTIONS, IMAGES AND BOUNDARIES
Michael Crichton (1999) believes that "[a]U professions look bad in the
movies." Himself a one-time medic, Crichton appeals to scientists to take
the attention as a compliment "And get over it" because "what really
matters is not the image, but the reality." 161 Professions are groups of
experts who claim access to some special type of knowledge, or know-how
that is different or outstanding in comparison with the kinds that outsiders
can muster. One of Hughes' (1971) contributions was to suggest that in
order to survive professional institutions must fulfil some perceived need in
society. So, although Crichton may well have a point in that all professions
do look bad in the movies, all professions are also highly concerned with
precisely the problem that they must not look bad in public because this
may negate the perceived need for them. Thankfully, for scientists, and
other professions many people use fictional images as symbolic structures
for thinking about science, law, medicine, policing etc rather than believing
them as fact. 162
Nevertheless, the importance of public image is emphasized in Hughes'
vision of society as made up of institutions, which interact as individual
species would within an ecological system. In his ecology, the selective
pressure that shapes institutions comes from the needs and wants of the
society, which the institutions serve since they come to control certain
functions in respect of certain wants (their niche). Competition occurs
because the needs of the people are not indelibly linked to a single
institution and other institutions may compete for the same niche. For
example, in the 19th century and beyond medical practitioners calling
themselves 'scientific' competed with folk healers to fulfil the needs of the
sick who were free to choose the institution that best suited their needs or
beliefs.163 Just as in any ecological system, individuals will either compete
for resources, or adapt to new or specialised resources. Institutions adopt
both these strategies.
What is most pertinent in Hughes' thought is the link he makes between his
ecological model, the processes of competition and adaptation, and the
social psychology of meaning. Because institutions mediate between the
161 Crichton (1999)
162 See Bates (2005); Michael and Carter (2001)
163 See Davies (1999)
wants of the people and functions that supply the wants, they must not only
detect wants and values in the population, but also keep them alive. So, to
survive an institution must find a place in the day-to-day material lives of
the people as well as in their value systems - or in their hearts and minds, as
one famous military institution has been fond of pressing home in recent
years.
My point about the presence of a profession in popular narratives at face
value hinges on precisely this need. Detectives, for example, are in the
hearts and minds of the people more often than, are say, dentists, because
detectives are the heroes of some of the most popular fictions in existence
and dentists are not. This does not, of course, mean that as a result real
detectives are valued more than dentists, but it does mean that detectives as
a profession have a high profile in the cultural lives of the people they serve,
whether they are, in reality, valued or not.l64 Itmay be the case that some
professions have greater need for a high cultural profile than others. The
dentist, for example, has a function in alleviating pain, a function that comes
within the personal experience of many people. The detective does not have
such an obviously beneficent function and therefore may need to reach the
hearts and the minds by other, less direct, channels.
Furthermore, where there is competition between groups that perform
similar functions, in the way that sciences and arts are units in a larger
system of knowledge production, Hughes notes that competing groups then
become very focussed on the way they are perceived by others. This, of
course, makes sense in light of the fact that the resource niche, which the
institution is dependent upon, requires an engagement with the material and
psychological lives of others. Put simply, scientists need to be wanted, their
existence as scientists depends on the fact that people believe science and
not art should produce knowledge about nature. It is plain from this
164 There is some evidence to support the view that the 'CS! Effect' partly consists of a rise
in application rates to university forensic science courses, in USA (CS! is a television series
about forensic science). In which case, there may be links between amount and quality of
airtime and interest in professional training for certain professions. Similarly USA law
schools experienced an upsurge in applications that followed airing ofthe popular
television series LA Law. See Pod las (2006) pp442-443
scenario, why scientists might find the mad scientist so objectionable; as a
result of his knowledge, the mad scientist unleashes monsters upon society,
this is not a desirable feature in a group licensed to supply knowledge about
nature. Of course, it is largely artists, in the broadest sense, who raise the
profile of scientists as monster makers.
Such competitive behaviours appear, according to Hughes, as clusters of
people sharing expertise tum professional, then, "The people in the
occupation get somewhat self-conscious about many things concerning their
work; jealous of their name and badge ... ; dreadfully afraid that some of
their number will not observe company manners and so will hurt the
reputation of all ... ,,165 This self-conscious guarding of reputation is a
contextualised version of Thomas Gieryn's (1995) boundary work, in this
instance amounting to maintenance.
One of the early efforts in boundary construction in science was the
Baconian edict that science or rather natural philosophy, should proceed in
public as opposed to private.l'" The effect of such a stipulation was to
exclude magicians from the practise of science, for both magician and
alchemist had often been forced to operate within a culture of secrecy as a
matter oflaw. Though, there are positives to a concealed method as John
Baptista Porta demonstrates when in 1658 he instructs his readers on how to
be effective magicians: "if you would have your works appear more
wonderful, you must not let the cause be known: for that is a wonder to us,
which we see to be done, and yet know not the cause of it: for he that knows
the causes of a thing done, doth not so admire the doing of it; and nothing is
counted unusual and rare, but only so far forth as the causes thereof are not
known.,,167
165 Hughes (1971) quoted in De Vries et al (2009) p558
166 See Shapin (1996) pp85-93 on Bacon's advocacy ofa registry of facts about nature and
the methods of obtaining it and pp 106-09 on the idea of knowledge as public and shared
and mistrust of individualistic intelIectualism
167 From John Baptista Porta (1658) Natural Magick quoted in Crosbie Smith (1994)
"Frankenstein and Natural Magick" in Bann (ed) (1994) pp39-59
A scientist, like a conjurer, benefits from keeping methods relatively
hidden, which, if revealed, could have ordinary people creating marvels of
mind and matter. The secrecy surrounding method in magic and in science
is a strategy that triggers wonder and appreciation in others and is therefore
important for the survival of the institution. Seen in this light, the claim of
some knowledge producers to have access to 'special' knowledge via
'special' methods is a clever means of reaching the sentiments of the public.
This appeal works carrot-on-a-stick style, in that the invocation of special
knowledge, which is unobtainable by those who do not know the correct
method, is in itself alluring and inclined not only to chime with, but also to
bring alive, the desire for this otherwise unreachable knowledge.
Yet, scientists are at the same time keen to define their knowledge against
magic, as having a rational, natural basis that assumes a single knowable
reality. Magic, on the other hand, relies on esoteric, occult (hidden) powers,
that might be negotiable, but are likely not knowable. The mad scientist is
an inherently magical figure as has been repeatedly pointed out and, as such,
creates a dilemma for scientists, who wish both to emulate the mad
. . d to exclud h' 168magician an to exc u elm.
I use the term magic here, very loosely, to suggest any symbolic system that
engages, or might engage, the supernatural world. That said, secular magic
in the form of theatrical conjuring relies just as much on concealed method
for its impact, even though the audience know that its methods conform to
natural, rational and theoretically knowable laws. Indeed conjurers have
sometimes famously been involved in the debunking of supernatural magic
and shown that supposedly supernatural phenomena are achievable by
natural means. 169 Although organised religion could fall into my definition
168 For the media construction of scientists as magicians, see LaFollette (1990) pp98-100;
Weart (1988); for a discussion of 17th-century beginnings of boundary work that aimed to
exclude magic from the sphere of the new (natural) philosophy see Shapin (1996) pp44-46
and Duncan (1916) pp281-83 on the comic confusion of scientists and magicians in fiction
in the 17'h century
169 For example, at the end of the 19thcentury conjurers, John Nevil Maskelyn and George
Alfred Cook copied some supposedly 'spiritualist' feats, such as levitation. Peter Otto goes
as far as to say that "the Victorian supernatural develops in dispute (and usually unadmitted
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of magic, I am not including it under the same label, although I will
sometimes refer to the 'supernatural realm', which may include the powers
of God - the relationship between magic and pious religion being an
important influence in the early gothic novels, which I explore in the next
chapter.17o
The exclusion of magic and the supernatural from the sphere of science is a
process that has sustained boundary patrolling across at least two centuries.
Public spats over 19th-century spiritualism, fake or fraud style; the treatment
of Jaques Benveniste's experiments concerning the memory of water; early
20th century Scopes trial that challenged the State of Tennessee to allow the
teaching of Darwinian evolution in schools; and continuing creationism
debates are but a few examples of boundaries specifically aimed at
excluding magic and/or the supernatural from the realm of science. The
boundaries between science and magic, and between natural and
supernatural appear to have had particular allure for 19th-century novelists.
These borderlands will inevitably provide a theme for this study.
One of the most famous invocations to arise from tensions at this boundary
is Max Weber's (1918) dictum that society is disenchanted by science and
rationality.V' I will return to this question in my concluding section when I
will argue, with evidence taken from the fictions, that a drive to unite magic
and science in the narratives comes partly out of a commonsense dualist
conception of reason. Science, as a special case of reason, is a process,
which is both magically, mysteriously intuitive and a boring, mechanical
drudge, at the same time.
Although Weber suggests that the notion of a single knowable world
negates the need for a belief in mysterious or supernatural powers, he too
invokes this dual notion of reason as a process of both magical mystery and
mechanics. By drawing on such an enchanted form of reason, I have added
dialogue) with secular magic and Psychical Science." See OUo (2008) for a short summary
of the antagonisms (and some alliances) between secular and supernatural magic
170 See pp71-102
171 See Weber (1918) "Science as a Vocation" in Gerth and Mills (1991)
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to a proposition made by Michael Saler (2003), which argues that Sherlock
Holmes himself has re-enchanted modernity by infusing the mundane - a
footprint, a smear of paint - with meaning. This is undoubtedly magical.
Yet this thesis will show that science and detection have often been
enchanted in 19th-century popular fiction, and can generally be positioned
somewhere on a scale between magic and reason. Seen in this light, Saler's
re-enchantment is, in my view, a much more expansive phenomenon than
he has described.
THE FICTION
In treating the developing figure of the detective as a scientist in the 19th
century, I am, in a sense, continuing the work of Regis Messac (1929), who
debates the extent to which the development of scientific thought drove the
development of a detective genre. Like Messac' s, my selection of texts
takes a trajectory through gothic, to mystery and then detective fiction,
although his focus is different and his time period is longer. He seeks
components of detective fiction, such as lawful picaresque and investigative
procedures or scientific thought in other genres. He argues, for example,
that Ann Radcliffe's technique 'the explained supernatural' was a product,
not of hers but of her time. Her skill as a suspense writer gave the whole
package an edge with market consumers, who, under the influence of
Protestant and scientific ideas, responded enthusiastically to the
rationalisation of the supernatural.V'' Ultimately, Messac concludes that
'pseudo-science' and literary technique had as much influence on the
genesis of a detective genre as did 'real' scientific thinking, which he
defines rather narrowly as induction.l"
Although I have taken up a related topic and texts to Messac, in many ways
I have doubled back on him, particularly on the notion of 'pseudo-science,'
a problematic term in that it is prone to be anachronistic. Some of what
passed as science in the 19th century, such as physiognomy, phrenology,
172 See Messac (1929) pp 161-165
173 See Messac (1929) pp656-57
spiritualism, appear to a 21st mind to be pseudo-science, yet in their own
time they were perceived as sciences, albeit contested ones. For this reason I
have used a broad definition of science. I have recognised science in two
ways, firstly, as any person or process in the text that is described as
scientific, a scientist, or as science. Secondly, I have recognised science
very broadly as an investigative process based upon reason. I have
discounted no scientists, either, on the basis that they also perform magic,
however far fetched it may be.
So where Messac seeks to separate out elements of scientific thought in
inherently magical worlds, I have looked at the joins and I have greater
focus than him on the overlap or space between magic and science.
Although there is evidently a general move toward a cause-and-effect style
plot in my corpus, as Messac describes in his, this shift by no means
obliterates the magical and supernatural from the popular story telling
repertoire.V" As such I have tried to link two strands of thinking on
developing detective fictions, one that has detectives riding the tide of
scientific thought, as Messac (1929) describes, and the other, far more
recent, which explores the links between the presence and importance of
supernatural forces in crime fictions, as does Maurizio Ascari (2007) in his
study A Counter-History of Crime Fiction. Although his thesis is not
particularly concerned with science and reason, it clearly touches on the
same ground, and his primary concern is to retrieve some of the magic that
has been excluded from histories of crime fiction. He encompasses an
enormous range of texts, going right back to the Middle Ages and extending
to the 20th century.
My texts are sampled from the literary ground that critical commonplace
considers as influential in the development of detective fiction and as such I
have mined from the same seam as both Messac and Ascari. 175 Although
my individual novels differ from theirs, the genres I cover are the same.
174 For other work on the intersection between rationality, detectives and magic see Ascari
(2007); Bloom (2007) "All dark inside: zombies and detectives" in Bloom (ed) (2007)
pfs278-290; Day (1985) pp50-62; Punter (1996) pp20 1-207; Saler (2003)
5 For example see Ascari (2007); Day (1985); Knight (2004); Worthington (2005)
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From my point of view, as well, I wished to choose fictions that would join
Frankenstein to Dracula. I have set out, as it were, from the 1790's gothic
genre, important because it is reckoned to be the originating milieu for both
Frankenstein and crime fiction. Then moving on to the penny weekly
fiction ofGWM Reynolds, whose 'mysteries' genre has strong gothic
overtones and some powerfully evocative depictions of science. This is of
particular interest because it is an early example of mass-market fiction and
it sits, in terms of its genre, between the gothic and the sensation genre. The
following two novels, both detective novels are examples of sensation
fiction, which is reckoned to be the originating genre of the detective
novel.176 Finally, I explore a volume of short stories by Sheridan Le Fanu,
which brings the detective into the supernatural world, which of course, is
what Bram Stoker does, with far more lasting effect than Le Fanu.
Most importantly, for my purposes, I have chosen fictions that were actually
popular, following Knight (1980) who believes that "[t]he fact of
[commercial] success in itself is an important, even a compelling reason for
choosing certain books to examine.,,177 All the texts chosen for study here
are or were successful in the marketplace and this seems to suggest
"irresistible proof of real social meaning in the stories.,,178 'Proof' is a
strong word, and perhaps too strong, yet the stories I have chosen, some still
alive and popular today either in their original forms or re-worked, must
have some real value as social currency.
I have chosen to examine a set of texts that hold the origins both of
detectives and mad scientists, using tools that tease apart iconography from
narrative. Then I will relate each story to its own cultural context and find
that in these most formulaic of fictions complex contemporary sociological
landscapes are artfully drawn into magical universes of popular gothic,
mystery and detective fictions such that they add to and embellish the pool
of resources 19th-century audiences could use in thinking about science and
176 Knight 2004 p44
177 Knight (1980) p2
178 Knight (1980) p67
society. By examining iconography, much of which has become typified,
and narrative as separate levels of representation, what emerges are variable,
multiple and sometimes contradictory meanings that explore, work out and
build far more complex visions of what science is than any simple either
good or bad, either enchanted or disenchanted, model suggests they
rnight.!"
179 By the term 'iconography', I simply mean images and emblematic details that constitute
symbolic representations traditionally associated with certain people or professions
70
CHAPTER THREE
THE MAGIC OF GOTHIC SCIENCE
Ann Radcliffe (1791) The Romance of the Forest; Matthew Lewis (1794)
The Monk; Charlotte Dacre (1806) Zofloya; Mary Shelley (1818)
Frankenstein
In the introductory chapter, I proposed that the detective may provide an
alternative mythic vision of science to the model which is contained within
the 'mad scientist'. Here I will examine texts of the gothic genre, which had
its heyday in the 1790's and into the early years of the 19th century, for the
roots of these two visions of science. The 'mad scientist' is usually
considered to herald from the gothic traditions of the late 18th-century and
early 19th-century and particularly, of course, from Frankenstein (1818),
which was published just as the fashion for gothic romances was on the
wane.lSO There has been little, if any attention paid to the representation of
science within the gothic genre more widely, even though it is perceived as
the originating milieu for that most enduring of all scientific fictions.
Fictional detectives too, are reckoned to have links with the gothic genre,
though in a more general sense. They originate in a variety of sources,
among them the memoirs of the Parisian thief-taker, Vidocq, Voltaire's
Zadig and Edgar Allen Poe's gothic-styled detective Dupin stories.
Although following Poe, a gothic provenance for fictional detectives has
become a commonplace observation, few studies have really examined the
links between the gothic and the detective genres.i" I will take a
complementary direction to those that have and suggest that an association
made between reason and morality, which is especially strongly marked in
Ann Radcliffe's gothic, is recapitulated by detective fictions of the 19th
century. This is one model of science that emerges from gothic fiction. The
180 For examples of this view see especially, Baldick (1987) Haynes (1994); Tumey (1998)
181 For development of detective fiction see, particularly, Knight (2004); Rzepka (2005);
Symons (1985); Thomas (1999); Worthington (2005) For links between gothic and
detective fictions see Ascari (2007); Day (1985) pp50-62; Sussex (2010) pp26-44 finds
gothic threads in female detective stories
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other, which has stronger links, via Mary Shelley'S (1818) Frankenstein, to
the mad scientist, has its roots, if anything, more firmly planted in traditions
of magic than in visions of reason.
The first job of anyone approaching the matter of science representation in
the gothic genre, however, is immediately to dispel the myth that has crept
into work in this area, which dictates that gothic works can be bundled
together under the banner of an anti-enlightenment, anti-science drive,
which rebels against the rule of reason.l'" Such an idea probably arose as a
result of the gothic genre's association with the supernatural. Whichever
way, gothic fiction has long been relegated to the bin of popular, non-
literary fiction.183 And until fairly recently the effect in academic terms was
to shelve gothic, and for a long period rely on inherited 'wisdoms' in place
of careful reading. According to Sage (1990) such 'wisdoms' have "pigeon-
holed Gothick as part of an excessive reaction against the dominance of
Augustan rationalism, a fashionable rush into nostalgia for a more vigorous,
primitive life by an age that had grown weary of Enlightenment values.,,184
Scholars of science representation too are inclined to take the line that all
gothic works are anti-rational. Perhaps the perception of Frankenstein as
emblematic of the gothic is a misleading factor.I85 For example, Tourney
(1996) writes that English gothic literature comprises an 'anti-enlightenment
culture' and "if science was the apex of Enlightenment culture, the fear of
science was the core of the anti-Enlightenment culture."!" A similar idea
sometimes reverberates around discussions of romanticism. According to
Haynes (1994) the Romantics attacked the Enlightenment "entrenched
182 For example, see Haynes (1994) pp 75-79; Rzepka (2005) p46; Smith(2007) pp2-3;
Tourney (1996) pp 128-29, who all see either the Romantics or gothic fiction, or both as
anti-enlightenment. See also Scarborough (1917/2001) whose study is an old and much
cited classic, undoubtedly one of the 'received wisdoms,' who writes that gothic "voiced a
~rotest against the excess of rationalism and realism ... " p6
83 Botting and Townshend (2004a) pp 1-17
184 Sage (1990) p8
18S Frankenstein is not always considered to be afully gothic work since a supernatural
world is not even suggested and it does not follow the 18th-century gothic formula in which
"beleaguered heroine is chased by powerful licentious man." It is sometimes re-cast as
modem gothic. See Hogle (1998) Frankenstein as Neo-Gothic in Botting and Townshend
(2004b) pp289-317
186 Tourney (1996) pl29
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position of science" more radically than did their predecessors. More recent
scholarship, both literary and historical, questions such positions and paints
a more nuanced picture. To begin with, the 18th century is best seen not as
an age of reason, but as a period which tested out the scope, limits and
meanings of the term. Likewise the gothic and romantic writers evaluated
contemporary values, including reason, in complex and subtle ways that
threw a dappled light, rather than a black shadow, over science and
reason.187
The content of gothic fiction does appear to resist the rule of reason, and
though much of it has a moral message, both reason and morals are lost on
many a critic. This seems to have been the case from its own time until
today.!" Gothic romances have regularly attracted moral opprobrium or are
simply dismissed on the basis of supernatural or far-fetched content,
regardless of whether or not the narrative actually has a moral lesson to
impart. Yet, the point of gothic fiction, as Angela Carter counsels, is that
"characters and events are exaggerated beyond reality, to become symbols,
ideas, passions ... " effectively challenging the reader to go beyond "the
perennial human desire to believe the word as fact.,,189 The symbolic nature
of gothic fiction gives it a mythic quality, which is perhaps why its
influence is ever abiding. In a sense, this whole thesis is imbued with the
gothic, as I follow the detective and mad scientists through a morass of
magical and scientific worlds from this starting point.
To begin I take Radcliffe's Romance of the Forest (1791) as a key text from
which to explore popular understandings of reason and science, not at any
187 For examples on Enlightenment and Gothic Fiction see Botting and Townshend (2004a)
ppl-17 for a good summary; Sage (1990) pp8-28; ElIis (2000) ppI21-152; Myrone (2006)
ppI2-20; Punter (1996) pp54-86; Sussex (2010) pp26-44; and on Romantic science see
Holmes (2008); Knellwolf and Goodall (2008) and Cunningham and Jardine (1990)
188 In a review of Matthew Lewis's The Monk, published in The Flapper (1796) Aurelius
writes, "The moral which the Author in question professes to inculcate, is the necessity of
resisting the first temptations to sin: but in order to press this with effect upon his reader, he
should have represented those temptations, and those only, to which we are all
exposed ... when we see a wretch exposed to perpetual solicitation by the devil in person,
suggesting evil things, and furnishing supernatural means of accomplishing them, the moral
is lost in the improbability of the story ..." Quoted in Myrone (2006) pp281-82 Aurelius
(1796) The Flapper No. 55 17 September
189 Angela Carter (1974) quoted by Frayling in Myrone (2006) P14
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factual level, but in terms of what they meant to individuals and society.
Her novel engages with the heart of debates that were swinging to and fro
over the value of reason verses that of birthright in organising society,
which were particularly intensified in response to the 1789 French
Revolution. The nub of debate hinged on moral virtue and how itwas to be
developed, through reason or breeding? Radcliffe's novel positions reason
as the road to virtue and her vision of science is an exalted form of reason.
She recommends an open, domestic, democratising model of science, which
has it as an activity that could be taken up by anyone with relatively simple
means. This was one public model, which found support in pious,
enlightenment communities, Joseph Priestley being one of its major
proponents. It is this model of science to which I have linked the ideational
elements of detective fiction.
I will then move on to explore a very different image of science in the
novels Matthew Lewis' The Monk (1796) and Charlotte Dacre's Zojloya
(1806). Both novels and science portrayed in them contrast sharply with
Radcliffe's universe. Where her supernatural was ultimately a hollow facade
that dissolved in the face of reason, Lewis and Dacre fully embrace
supernatural worlds. And where the supernatural reigns, so magic is as
much a method for understanding or doing as is science. These novels
celebrate an alchemical concoction of science and magic that is ultimately
ruled by Satan. Here science-magic happens behind closed doors, its
symbols shifting away from Radcliffe's domestic sphere, to include all
manner of evocative arcane ephemera. This science is potently
instrumental, its symbols are showy, but its methods are hidden. At the
same time certain models of public science were similarly showy and
emulated magical wonders, without the dark Satanic overtones, of the kind
that arise when methods are hidden. One of the greatest proponents of the
magical scientific show was the flamboyant and eminent chemist,
Humphrey Davy. Having explored this model, I will tum briefly to Mary
Shelley and examine how she transforms this model, cuts out the devil and
gives us hell on earth in the ultimate mad, bad scientist.
THE ROMANCE OF THE FOREST
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Romance and Reason
In the 1790's Ann Radcliffe, author of Romance of the Forest (1791),
enjoyed unparalleled success critically and commercially, to such an extent
that her biographer Robert Miles (1995) has dubbed her the most successful
novelist of the decade. 190 Yet, there is no mass market in her day and
Radcliffe writes for her own middle ranking social group. Just as she is
influenced by them, so her influence is felt through the engagement that
other writers had with her work. Although her market was relatively small,
her influence was wide. Radcliffe became something of a metaphorical
grande dame for other later authors of gothic and mystery tales, well
beyond her own period and her fiction remained in print for many decades
following her own time. Romance was the work that launched Radcliffe's
success as a novelist. Although her third book The Mysteries of Udo/pho
(1794) is her best known fiction, I have chosen Romance because it is the
only one to feature a natural philosopher.!"
Radcliffe injects her heroines and their saviours with morality that has its
roots in reason as opposed to rank whilst her high-class villains, preferring
passion to reason, are effectively lacking in moral fibre. Such themes raise
this novel above the simple fairytale pulp to which it has so often been
relegated, and give it the kudos of a work that was fully au courant.
Radcliffe is engaging in a cultural debate about the true provenance of
morality, which pitted virtue learned via reason against virtue inherited via
noble breeding and questioned whether the true route to righteousness was
meritocratic or aristocratic. In an essay on the development of the novel,
Michael McKeon (1985) argues that form becomes a key vehicle for this
particular argument and that the common formula of 'a virtuous middle-
ranking girl, pursued by immoral aristocrat,' constitutes a critique of what
some novelists deemed to be an outmoded assumption, that the aristocratic
were virtuous by breeding. Radcliffe's Romance reiterates exactly such a
190 Miles (2002) "The 1790s: the effulgence of Gothic" in Hogle (2002) (ed); Miles (1995)
I will refer to Romance of the Forest as Romance from now on
191 See Miles (1995) and (2005) for a discussion of Radcliffe's career and publication
history
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critique.
Romance begins as Pierre de la Motte steps into a midnight carriage to flee
Paris, his creditors and officials of the law. En route, he is forced to take
Adeline into his runaway group from a gang who have been commissioned
to murder her, but have recoiled from the task. La Motte is "a gentleman ...
whose passions often overcame his reason, and, for a time, silenced his
conscience ... ,,192From the outset Radcliffe sets out her store - the
interlocking themes of reason, passion, virtue and social rank are evinced in
the first pages. La Motte is a man "naturally violent in his passions", prone
to the want of "luxurious indulgences'Y" His indiscretions number
amongst them card fraud, unpaid debts, robbery of the Marquis and
conspiracy to murder Adeline, but "with strength of mind sufficient to have
withstood temptation, he would have been a good man; as it was, he was
always a weak, and sometimes a vicious member of society: yet his mind
was active, and imagination vivid, which, co-operating with the force of
passion, often dazzled his judgment and subdued principle ... in a word, his
conduct was suggested by feeling, rather than principle; and his virtue, such
as it was, could not stand the pressure of occasion.,,194 The picture, then, is
of a man whose passions lead him into 'dissipated pleasure', and who lacks
the powers of reason to resist.
This notion of dangerous passion that could be mitigated by 'strength of
mind' or reason was a view held by progressives such as Mary
Wollstonecraft and William Godwin, who countered the old-guard belief
that virtue was as one with noble blood and courtly mores. The debate
intensified around events in revolutionary France, which was often
perceived as having taken inspiration from a belief in the value of reason
over breeding. In his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790)
conservative politician and writer, Edmund Burke laments that "the age of
chivalry is gone, - That of Sophisters, oeconomists, and calculators, has
192 Radcliffe and Chard (1791/1986) p2
193 Ibid p317 and p218 respectively
194 Ibid p2
succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever. Never, never
more, shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex ... All the
pleasing illusions, which made power gentle, ... and which, by a bland
assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and
soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of
light and reason.,,195 Put simply, Burke argues that the chivalric code is the
only way to a decent and virtuous society, and 'light and reason' are set to
destroy the dependable, old social order, as they will do in France.
Wollstonecraft makes a vehement response in Vindication on the Rights of
Men (1790). For her, aristocratic mores have little to do with moral
behaviour, quite the opposite in fact. " ... [E]very custom that an arbitrary
point of honour has established, refines the manners at the expense of
morals, by making sentiments and opinions current in conversation that
have no root in the heart, or weight in the cooler resolves of the mind ... Will
Mr Burke be at trouble to inform us, how far we are to go back to discover
the rights of men, since the light of reason is such a fallacious guide that
none but fools trust to its cold investigation?" Wollstonecraft goes on to
suggest that " ... conscience, or reason .. .in my view ofthings ... are
synonymous.t'i'" Apart from being about reform of the old order, or not,
the debate places reason firmly centre stage as its proper potential is
contested. For Burke 'the conquering empire of light and reason' is set to
destroy the aristocratic idyll, in which the nobility inherit virtue along with
power. Wollstonecraft has a meritocratic vision in which reason is the seat
of virtue, which means that morals can be learned through education and are
not restricted to lines of noble inheritance.
That said, Wollstonecraft does trouble to point out that "the cultivation of
reason is an arduous task, and men of lively fancy, [find] it easier to follow
the impulse ofpassion ... ,,197 Here, then, is La Motte's process boldly stated.
As he falls under the spell of the villainous Marquis, La Motte confesses to
19S Burke, Edmund (1790/2008) pl13 and pllS
196 Wollstonecraft et al (1790/1997) p39-40
197 Ibid p63
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his weaknesses, admitting to having joined a gang of fraudulent card
players, so he could "return to those scenes of dissipated pleasure, to which
passion had ... attached me.,,198 In response, the Marquis feigns empathy,
"[t]hat rigid virtue which shall condemn you, may dignify itself with the
appellation of wisdom, but I wish not to possess it; let it still reside, where it
generally is to be found, in the cold bosoms of those, who, wanting feeling
to be men, dignify themselves with the title of'philosophers.vl'" With this
pep talk, the Marquis aims to soften La Motte in order to incite him to
murder Adeline. The Marquis is expressing a Burkean vision in words that
in themselves seem to echo Burke, who himself condemns "barbarous
philosophy" as "the offspring of cold hearts and muddy
understandings ... void of solid wisdom, as it is destitute of all taste and
elegance.,,200 By placing a Burkean ideal into the mouth of a would-be
murderer, we are left in little doubt that Radcliffe is engaging in the Burke-
Wollstonecraft opposition, on the side on Wollstonecraft and rational virtue.
Furthermore, the Marquis has "an air of dignity, which declared him to be
of superior rank ... [and] ... softened aspect and insinuating manners ... " Later
he is "polite, affable and attentive", his manners are "easy and elegant" and
he has "an acquaintance with the higher circles and with topics of the
day.,,2ol His boudoir is so opulent that it "rather resembled the palace of a
fairy than any human conformation.,,202 The "pleasing illusions, which
made power gentle" and manners that "beautify and soften private society",
which are all the marks of chivalric honour and of virtue in Burke's opinion,
become worse than unreliable in Radcliffe's narrative, for beneath the
courtly guise the Marquis hides unfettered murderous passions.
The revelation that taste and manners were a sham devoid of reason is a
fairly typical device of late 18th-century gothic. William Godwin, for
example, writes a novel, Caleb Williams (1794), in which the gracious,
198 Radcliffe and Chard (179111986) p220
199 Ibid pp220-21
200 Burke, (1790) p 115
201 Radcliffe and Chard (179111986) p87 and p99
202 Ibid P156
aristocratic Mr Falkland, turns murderer in a fit of passion and then blames,
bullies and pursues an employee oflower rank to the death of both, all in the
name of retaining honour. David Punter (1996) remarks that in three classic
gothic novels - Radcliffe's Mysteries ofUdolpho (1794) and The Italian
(1797) along with Matthew Lewis' The Monk (1796) - many of the villains,
or villainous acts arise from a 'revolt of the passions against virtue'. Indeed
Punter finds that Lewis refers to the passions as 'despotic' and ready to
over-power or dominate the virtuous realms of'reason.i'" Just as the
Marquis hides his dark motive beneath glitz, so Ambrosio, the monk, hides
his murderous soul under a facade of godliness and the drawing power of a
mellifluous voice.
Neither were the heroes and heroines of gothic fictions immune to the drag
of the passions upon reason, though these characters do their feeling in
altogether more subtle and patently more acceptable ways than do villains.
Here feelings, as opposed to passions, give rise to sensibility, or sensitivity,
and too sensible a disposition leads to an overactive imagination. At its
extreme is the spectre of madness. For example, in one late night incident
of Romance, Adeline's "imagination refused any longer controul [sic] of
reason, and, turning her eyes, a figure, whose exact form she could not
distinguish, appeared ... ,,204 The figure is, of course, entirely imagined.
Radcliffe's 'explained supernatural', as it is called, demonstrates that overly
sensible natures need the harness of reason if they are to survive. Radcliffe
presses home the value of keeping one's head in pressing circumstances.
Adeline's midnight vision is not just a frightening delusion; it demonstrates
how superstition might be fostered in the weak minded. Superstitious belief
and magic were almost universally frowned upon by Protestant religions. As
a general rule, the gothic fictions at the tum of the 18th and 19th centuries
raise the spectre of superstition in order to repudiate it. Radcliffe discards it
as a mere figment of an overactive imagination. This 'explained
supernatural' is a particular characteristic of her work, which distinguishes
203 Punter (1996) p72
204 Radcliffe and Chard (1791/1986) p134
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it from the novels of Lewis and Dacre who fully embrace supernatural
forces, but still repudiate them by placing them squarely as Satanic, not
Godly, forces.
Any magical belief provides a convenient boundary between Protestant and
Catholic faiths, which in England, at least, is a means of 'othering'
Catholicism. Lewis's The Monk is dotted with incidents of boundary work
of this kind. For example, one suggestible character, Dame Jacintha, is "a
miserable slave to fear and superstition" and as direct result, delivers the
heroine into the arms of the (Catholic) monk, whose own horrific mindset is
blamed upon other (Catholic) monks who brought him up and "terrified his
young mind, by placing before him all the horrors with which superstition
could furnish them." 205 In addition, virtually all nuns, again Catholic, are
hopelessly superstitious and as a result fall entirely under the control of the
depraved, scheming abbess.
Whether Radcliffe's explained supernatural can be interpreted in the same
explicitly religious terms or not, is a moot point that was questioned by
Regis Messac (1929) who argues that she may simply have been influenced
by a growing cultural appreciation for rationalist thinking and a literary
fashion for suspense, which she was particularly adept at creating.i'"
Whichever way, for the heroine of Romance reason provides the ability to
escape; to resist mental collapse; to expose the villain; to reveal the true
hero and finally to marry (the true hero). Without reason, she could not
survive. Conversely lack of reason creates a consummate villain, The
Marquis, whose passions eliminate any moral feeling, which he may have
had. In this sense, reason or lack of it, is the defining moral attribute of
gothic characters and its ability to dissolve the supernatural world was
certainly a feature that would have appealed to Protestant tastes.
So if reason is the means by which we contain our basest and most selfish
drives, give substance to our moral worth and resist the temptation to
20S Lewis et al (1796/2004) p267 and p2I4
206 Messac (1929) pp IS8-177
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believe in superstition, then what of science? In 1802, chemist Humphry
Davy suggests that not reason in general, but science could fulfil a similar
role. He wrote in his Discourse. Introductory to a Course of Lectures on
Chemistry that natural philosophical pursuits, such as chemistry, "may
destroy diseases of the imagination, owing to too deep a sensibility ... Even
to persons of powerful minds, who are connected with society by literary,
political or moral relations ... It [natural philosophy] must strengthen their
habits of minute discriminations; and, by obliging them to use language
representing simple facts, may tend to destroy the influence of terms
connected only with feeling.,,207 Science takes on the golden glow of reason
here as it does for Radcliffe. It functions in two ways for her characters.
Natural philosophy enlarges their minds, and so aids reason and by dint of
that, encourages virtue; and it puts them closer to the Mind of God.
Romance and Science
In the last third of Romance, Adeline is thrown on the kindness of strangers
for a second time. Her second saviour opposes La Motte in almost every
facet of character. Arnaud La Luc embodies Radcliffe's religious and moral
ideals, "his mind was penetrating; his views extensive; and his systems, like
his religion, were simple, rational and sublime.,,208In the La Luc household,
Radcliffe depicts a haven of serenity and comfort etched against the
preceding dark gothic background of the abbey with its claustrophobic
atmosphere tinged with anxieties of death and destruction. The charitable,
rational and self-disciplined La Luc is a perfect foil for the chaotic,
indulgent and undisciplined La Motte. The changing style of narrative from
a gothic to a more realist one, at the point when La Lue enters the novel,
serves to further highlight this difference and sets the La Luc family as an
ideal for emulation in which Radcliffe reiterates the formula of the novel of
manners.
207 Davy (1802) Discourse. Introductory to a Course of Lectures p22 quoted by Sharon
Ruston (2009) "Romanticism and Science: William Wordsworth and Humphry Davy"
Seminar at the Institute of Science and Society, Nottingham University 19.11.2009
208 Radcliffe and Chard (1791/1986) p245
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Radcliffe scholars appear to agree on the fact that the character of La Luc is
modelled on the 'vicaire savoyard' from Rousseau's Emile (1762), where
the vicaire emphasizes the pre-eminence of a rational religion over a faith
based on revelation and ritual. 209 Rousseau advocates natural religion that
emphasizes the works of Nature as proof of the existence of God. Indeed,
La Luc veritably lives natural religion. In a passage describing the La Luc
residence, Radcliffe marks out the hall, which fosters views of surrounding
nature, La Luc's small laboratory with its "chymical [sic] apparatus,
astronomical instruments, and other implements of science" and, Madame
La Luc's herbal pharmacy.i'" Other rooms that would exist in any family
home are scarcely mentioned before Radcliffe reverts to a lengthy
description of the picturesque setting. The proclivity of the family is
reflected by the assortment of rooms given precedence and foregrounds
their occupation with the study of Nature.
Here Radcliffe depicts natural philosophy as a distinctly domestic
enterprise, in a scene that is reminiscent of Joseph Wright's (1766) painting
The Orrery, in which the rapt faces of a whole family are lighted in the glow
of the natural philosopher's orrery lamp.211 In Radcliffe's version the
family are captivated by a view of the real sky, though the scene is equally
intimate: "They found the supper spread, as was usual in the hall ... Clara
and Adeline loved to pass evenings in this hall ... from which they had a
wide view of the heavens. La Luc pointed out to them the planets and the
fixed stars, explained their laws and from thence taking occasion to mingle
moral with scientific instruction, would often ascend toward that great first
cause ... ,,212
Science practice as a paragon of domesticity is rooted in Radcliffe's
enlightenment ideals, which have public and science mingling in the home
as is depicted by Wright. In line with this, Gregory and Miller (1998)
describe a process in which the manner of interaction between public(s) and
209 See Chard in Radcliffe and Chard (1791/1986) p386
210 Radcliffe and Chard (179111986) p248
21 I See Appendix p270
212 Radcliffe and Chard (179111986) p275
scientist underwent a gradual change in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
The relationship becomes more distant and less rooted in everyday life. The
scientist takes up position in a lecture theatre separated from a detached
audience often by a laboratory bench, or demonstration table, laden with
special instruments.i'? No two figures represent this shift better than
chemists, Joseph Priestley and Humphry Davy.
The former began his career as a Dissenting preacher and later turned
experimental natural philosopher, though he maintained an active
intellectual interest in a wide variety of topics and wrote on many. He was a
true Enlightenment progressive with a deep held belief in the democratising
power of science. He presented his work as written instruction, including
within it extensive details on apparatus and technique, which he believed
should be kept as simple as possible, so that his audience could replicate and
interpret his experiments for themselves. Priestley's vision of science
united experimental philosophers, amateurs and general audiences in a
project to advance knowledge in step with progressive religious and
political emancipation - these goals were inseparable for Priestley.
Humphry Davy, on the other hand, built his name on the spectacle of
science and was deeply reliant on expensive instruments, which he used to
dazzle large passive audiences who were expected to accept his
interpretations forthwith.i'" Aside from the influence of William Radcliffe,
her radical husband, Radcliffe had been exposed to and admired her Uncle,
Thomas Bentley, who was one of England's most prominent dissenters, a
passionate advocate of William Godwin and part of the same circle of like-
minded intelligentsia as was Priestley.i"
Though created in honour of Rousseau's 'vicaire savoyard', Radcliffe's La
Luc is clearly aligned with Priestley's ideals on the function of natural
philosophy. La Luc is the epitome of the idealised amateur, for whom
science takes place in the home and is a means to "soar beyond the sphere
213 Gregory and Miller (1998) p21
214 For a comparison of Priestley and Davy in public, see Golinski (1992)
215 See Miles (1995) p22 and p29; Golinski (1992) p18S
of his existence, penetrate the secret laws of nature, and calculate their
progressive effects.,,216 He is one of those proponents of science for whom
God reveals himself in two books, the book of His words (the Bible), and
the book of His works (in nature). For La Luc, no study, "so much enlarges
the mind, or impresses it with so sublime an idea of the Deity ... " as
science.i'" Only the most beneficent characters of Radcliffe's narrative are
scientific. Aside from La Luc, only minor, but none-the-Iess decent
characters, like Monsieur Vemeuil have a mind "enlightened by science", as
does the Marquis'S brother, who has "a love of virtue" and a mind "enlarged
by science ... ,,218
In Radcliffe's vision science is a particular brand of reason, its crowning
glory, in fact. What reason can do, science can do better. The sense of
science's specialness, though, might be more aptly connected with its
religiosity and the view that the study of Nature, of God's works, offered
ways both of developing reason and moving closer to the mind of the Deity
in one. One of the striking features of Radcliffe's vision of science is that
although it enriches the lives of the people who practise it through religion
and reason, it is not given effect in the outside world. In fact, the figure of
La Luc is frustratingly passive. When his son is condemned to die for a
crime that he did not commit, despite professing ardent love for him, the
vicar is near pathetic in his impotence, and the task is left to Adeline to
extricate the beleaguered prisoner. It seems as though his science and his
religion render him too otherworldly to get his hands dirty in this world.
So, though it is bathed in glory, Radcliffe's science apparently has no
instrumental value in the external world. Its benefits manifest themselves
largely in mind and spirit as natural philosophy and not in the manipulation
or control of nature as would instrumental science. Her science is a cerebral
and religious 'truth', of a similar kind described by Peter Dear (2006) as
'natural philosophy,' which he finds tends to be accorded high cultural
216 Radcliffe and Chard (179111986) p275-6
217 Ibid p275
218 Ibid p272 and p343 respectively
value while instrumental science is grubby work. Dear finds such dualistic
conceptions to be a recurring theme throughout the history of science and he
relates them initially to the terms techne and episteme as conceived by
Aristotle in 4BC, which translated into Latin terms, ars (art) and scientia
(science) in the Middle Ages. Certainly, the distinction has long roots; for
one 16th-century philosopher alchemy, when stripped of theory, amounted to
"a mere mechanical broiling trade.,,219 And in the same vein, David Knight
(1990), writing on Romantic science, makes note of the fact that "(a]round
1800 'science' was not opposed to 'arts' ... The real division was between
the realm of science, governed by reason, and that of practice, or rule of
thumb; and apostles of science hoped to replace habit by reason in the
affairs of life. ,,220
In Romance the benefits of science clearly come from its foundation in
reason and are entirely confined to the personal sphere. In keeping with this
outlook, Radcliffe moulds scientists who do not conform to the classic
callously detached types as described by The Marquis, or Edmund Burke.
They do not have "the cold bosoms of those, who, wanting feeling to be
men, dignify themselves with the title of philosophers.t'V! Her scientists
are able to balance head and heart. For example, La Luc has "the strength of
philosophy united with the finest tenderness of humanity - a philosophy
which taught him to correct his feelings, not to annihilate them ... ,,222. In
this model, feeling is, in some unexplained way, corrected by the practice of
philosophy. So the feelings that La Luc has given rein to are those which
point toward such ability as emotional empathy and sensibility, indeed he is
"equally loved for the piety and benevolence of the Christian as respected
for the dignity and elevation of the philosopher ... The people of his parish
looked up to him as a father.,,223 In some way, it seems as though the
charitable vicar is able to filter out the most selfish of passions.
219 Dear (2006) p 178
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With regard to feeling, Radcliffe is adopting a more Humian position here,
in which reason alone cannot govern morality because only feeling has the
power to drive thought and action.224 Mary Wollstonecraft too
acknowledges the power of emotion which she likens to "the sun of life:
and, without his invigorating impregnation, reason would probably lie in
helpless inactivity.,,225As does Hume, Wollstonecraft gives feelings the
power to animate. William Godwin (1793) grapples in greater detail with
the relationship of reason and feeling. For him "Reason is merely a
balancing and comparison of different feelings. Reason is calculated to
regulate our conduct, according to the comparative worth it ascribes to
different excitements.,,226 In this vision reason reflects on the worth of
different emotions and guides action in accordance with mindful reflection.
The distancing effect implied by the function of reason with its capacity to
ascribe worth to different 'excitements' lends it the quality of
Wollstonecraft's 'cooler resolves of mind' compared to the feelings, 'the
sun of life'. 227
Mary Shelley then goes on to create a scientist, in Victor Frankenstein, who
undoubtedly has the energy for action, yet whose cool resolves of mind
seem ultimately to obliterate his feeling. Shelley asks what happens if
reason itself becomes unbalanced and imagines a polarised image of The
Marquis, whose passions obliterate his reason. In the early stages of
Frankenstein she reiterates the belief, described by one correspondent of
Joseph Priestley's, who praised experimental philosophy because, "inducing
the world to think and reason, [wilI] ... overturn the empire of
superstition.,,228 Yet, Shelley takes this to extreme, and Victor Frankenstein
admits, "I do not ever remember to have trembled at a tale of superstition, or
to have feared the apparition of a spirit. Darkness had no effect upon my
fancy; and a churchyard was a mere receptacle of bodies deprived of life,
which, from being the seat of beauty and strength, had become food for the
224 Daniel Shaw (1992) who argues that Hume has reason and desire as necessary for action
225 Wollstonecraft et al (1790/1997) p63
226 Godwin and Kramnick (1793/1976) p77
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worm.,,229 Lack of superstitious feeling allows him to visit graveyards and
charnel houses in order to discover the secret of life and death. But, once he
has made his creature, his lack of feeling for it or for any of the other people
around him who all suffer as a result of his social blindness, turns his story
into something as dark as any superstitious fear. This is the nightmare of
reason.
With all that said, what is actually present in Radcliffe's gothic is a vision of
science that is entirely the reverse of Shelley's hellish vision. This places it
about as far from the hackneyed image of a crazed, self-absorbed scientist as
one could get. The science of Ann Radcliffe's 1790's gothic is an exalted
form of reason. Science is domestic, democratising, pastoral, spiritual and
not only is it unthreatening, it is positively uplifting. Its lack of
instrumentality means that its only associated function is through its ability
to enhance reason and where reason can curb the most dangerous passions,
science can balance feeling to virtual perfection - until that is, Mary Shelley
gets hold it.
GOTHIC ORIGINS OF THE DETECTIVE
A number of scholars have noted links between gothic and detective
fictions. The common point at which to place the intersection of the two
forms is with Edgar Allen Poe's (1841) first Auguste Dupin story, The
Murders in the Rue Morgue.23o Yet, as William Patrick Day (1985)
remarks, it is not so easy to explain how and why the detective should arise
out of the gothic formula. There are several interpretations of how this
might have happened. Some describe it as a Foucauldian process in which
sovereign power is coded in the aristocratic villain and shifts to a
disciplinary power that is coded in the detective. Or it represents a stage of
thinking on a pathway from miraculous to rational thought. Others simply
229 Shelley et al (1818/1994) p80
230 This story was published in 1841 Graham's Magazine in Philadelphia USA. See Sussex
(2010) p45
point out crossovers in discourse particularly of transgression, passions and
reason for example.231
Lucy Sussex (2010) remarks upon the fact that the belief in a rationalism
that rescues Radcliffe's gothic worlds and their heroines from complete
disintegration has strong similarities with the world-view of Sherlock
Holmes.232 She points to moments of actual detection undertaken by the
gothic heroine in Radcliffe's novel, Mysteries of Udolpho (1794). There are
equivalent moments in Romance, for example, when Adeline in
investigative spirit, explores the abbey and finds a dagger spotted with rust
and a handwritten manuscript in a secret chamber.r" The manuscript
eventually provides her with the evidence she needs to condemn The
Marquis. But all such moments are driven by extreme and pressing
circumstance, there is no actual narrative drive of investigation in the
gothic.
The most incisive of all observations on this is William Day's reflection that
"[g]othic fantasy lacks an effective hero, a character who through his own
efforts can resolve the mystery and put an end to horror. The figure of the
detective develops from the tension created by the lack of true hero. He is,
in effect, the hero the Gothic world needs but cannot sustain.,,234 The
inability of the gothic world to sustain a hero, in Day's terms is owing to the
fact that it presents a mystery without any resolving explanation. The
mystery is unravelled in the plot, but it is never explained. This is true and
there is certainly no active force in gothic fiction that seeks out and
disciplines the criminal, not even in momentary bursts. The gothic story
consists of the interaction between a transgressor and their victim, or their
object. The detective story makes the transgressor into the object, or victim,
of the detective.
23 t See Ascari (2007) for general links of discourse; Knight (2004) on Foucauldian shifts
and Poe; Messac (1929) on shift from magical to rational thinking; Thomas (1999) on
Foucauldian shifts and Poe
232 See Sussex (20 I0) p30
233 Radcliffe and Chard (1791/1986) p 115
234 Day (1985) pSI
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Yet I would like to finish Day's sentence as it were, by proposing that what
stands in place of a hero in Radcliffe's gothic, in both Romance and
Udolpho is reason. In her universe it is only reason that can 'resolve the
mystery and put an end to horror.' This clearly does not occur in any active
way, as it would if a hero were part of the narrative, yet is has the same
function of restoring moral order. Day suggests that the detective grows out
of the dynamics of gothic fantasy of absolute instability and that the figure
resolves both the instability of gothic world and narrative, but he does not
go so far as to suggest the detective is gothic reason personified. Yet, the
reasoning detective is able to apprehend the impassioned criminal in the
same way that the gothic heroine uses her reason to resist both the passions
of the villain and her fear of the supernatural. The detective figure is reason
embodied in a hero. Reason and science have equivalent functions in both
detective and gothic scripts. The skeleton of the detective narrative, which
remains popular today almost always involves the rational purification of
the worst excesses of the passions by the action of detectives in hunting
criminals and restoring order.
If the detective is a personification of Radcliffe's gothic reason and reason
was already typified as cool, or cold, then one would expect the detective to
be an unemotional personality of the kind that Alfred Schutz would term a
'course-of-action' type, in which the person takes on characteristics of a
process. This does not always have to be the case, although detectives
commonly are unfeeling outsiders in some way.23S Sherlock Holmes is a
prime example. In A Scandal in Bohemia, Watson is moved to remark of
his detective friend, that "[g]rit in a sensitive instrument, or a crack in one of
his own high power lenses, would not be more disturbing than a strong
emotion in a nature such as his.,,236 Such an image is reminiscent of Mary
Shelley'S hellish vision of unbalanced reason. Shelley pushes reason to
extreme, so that Victor Frankenstein is 'noble' as reason is perceived to be,
but he lacks any of the 'tenderness of humanity' that characterises
235 See Leane (2007) on popular physics texts, in which the authors have modelled
themselves on urban 'hard-boiled' type detectives who are all outsiders in some way
236 Conan Doyle 'Scandal in Bohemia' in Conan Doyle and Hodgson (1994) p32
Radcliffe's La Luc.237 Holmes is not dissimilar in this regard. Although
these two icons of fiction, Frankenstein and Holmes, function in opposite
disordering and restorative directions, they both embody reason, and
ultimately they both must pit their wits against an impassioned being - be it
creature or criminal.
At their core both these stories place reason in relation to feeling, whether
that be self-serving passion or empathic emotion. In the late 18th and early
19th-century culture it was not only writers of gothic fictions, but
intellectuals and politicians who took part in debates about the merits or
otherwise of various admixtures of these human qualities. Indeed, by the
1820's, the notion of reason as a civilising force was so commonplace that
those who seemed to be without it were tainted with monstrosity. In 1824,
Foreign Secretary George Canning, speaking in the House of Commons on
the emancipation of slaves, remarked that "to tum him loose in the manhood
of his physical strength, in the maturity of his physical passion, but in the
infancy of his uninstructed reason, would be to raise up a creature
resembling the splendid fiction of a recent romance.,,238 The creature is
Frankenstein's monster and the argument stood ground since it was another
nine years before West Indian slaves were emancipated.
That such a remark should trip off the tongue so easily, in the number one
power-house of the day, shows how far the notion of reason as a socialising
force had become taken-for-granted credo. Detective fiction is another
example of the assumed improving potential of'reason.i" It takes the idea
that human thought can order or quell chaos-inducing passion and shifts it
from debates about the morality of individuals to a project that encompasses
the moral order of society.
237 Walton says of Victor Frankenstein "He must have been a noble creature in his better
days, being even now in wreck so attractive and aimiable." Shelley et al (1818/1994) p60
238 Cited in Baldick (1987) p60
239 Detectives use intuition and luck to solve cases as well, but however they actually solve
their cases we, the readers, are almost always given to believe that their success is a
function of their reason
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Indeed the early part of the 19th century saw a whole raft of 'improving'
activity taken up by those who believed that teaching the world to reason
would make it a better place. But that is the topic of the next chapter. The
gothic authors laid more emphasis on finding some ideal balance between
reason and feeling. Though there is no question that they believed in the
efficacy of reason and its loftier relative science as 'enlightening' forces all
round. In the following section, I will look at what happens when
supernatural forces tarnish science to make it an instrumental force of
frightening potential, the kind of force that Mary Shelley secularised. I
explore how this vision links to different models of science in public that
sought to conceal method and provoke wonder, but at the same time raised
anxieties about an 'occult' force of growing independence and power.
THE MONK, ZOFLOYA AND FRANKENSTEIN
A vastly different picture of science emerges from, what are known as
gothic horror novels, as opposed to Radcliffe's terror novels. In the
worlds of Radcliffe, violence, desire, rape and supernatural are threatened
but never happen, but in horror fiction the threats are carried through.
Lewis's The Monk (1796) and Dacre's Zojloya (1806) are squarely gothic
horror novels in this regard. Here science is an instrument of horror. Their
scientific representations oppose Radcliffe's in just about every respect.
Where Radcliffe's science is angelic, theirs is Satanic, where hers is
modern, theirs is alchemical, and where hers passively enlightens the mind
in a homely way, theirs is powerfully instrumental and demonic. The Monk
and Zojloya are similar stories with essentially the same structure. Mary
Shelley's Victor Frankenstein is the personification of extreme reason,
undoubtedly, but in the structure of his story, his motives and the way he
conducts his science, he shares very much more with scientists of the horror
novels. This is also true of many a 'mad scientist' who follows him.
Aside from the horror, these two works differ from Radcliffe in allowing the
supernatural to live. Oddly they do this while at the same time punishing
superstition as a failure of character, faith and reason. In both stories, the
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ideal of reason is held aloft as the only potential path to redemption, though
early on it is clear that it is too late for the protagonists, or the anti-heroes
who have rushed headlong into their final fates from the outset.
Unsurprisingly, these two texts in particular are dubbed as 'anti-
Enlightenment' probably because they are about the supernatural. Yet, they
are not - they pay lip service to reason and chide superstition; and moral, if
there is one, is that Satan sits astride the supernatural path. The Monk tells
the story of Ambrosio, who, tempted onwards by a satanic femme fatale
called Matilda, engages in ever more licentious and brutal acts. In Zojloya
the genders are reversed though the script is the same, and the young
protagonist, Victoria is tempted to illicit sexual relations and ultimately to
murder by Satan embodied in the seductive Moor called Zofloya.
Matilda and Zofloya are demonic tempters and the only characters of their
respective novels to have access to science. The kind of science they have
access to is distinctly alchemical in flavour and could easily be read as
magic (and to the modem eye, would be). They contrast Radcliffe's passive
science with a vision of instrumental alchemy put to illicit purpose and used
as a means of control. This is the power of technique writ large and dark.
The language of control is unmistakeable. Matilda's teacher "gave laws to
the elements: he could reverse the order of nature: his eye read the mandates
of futurity, and the infernal spirits were submissive to his commands ...,,24o
Zofloya who is able to concoct potions and poisons to suit any intent,
declares "In no instance have I ever failed in my calculations of the event.
That which I willed came to pass, and came to pass in the manner in which I
willed it!,,241
There are two obvious reasons why such a model of instrumental science is
painted with so dark a hue. First is its purpose, which in these novels is for
selfish, earthly ends, for the fulfilment of personal desire and nothing more.
So the Godliness and social value of Radcliffe's model is lost here.
Secondly, command of nature can be, and traditionally was, achieved by
240 Lewis, et al (1796/2004) p236
241 Dacre and Craciun (1806/1997) p161
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magic which, like technology, has the power to transform elements of the
external world. The association with magic, of course, condemns it from a
Protestant perspective and indeed motifs of magic and science are
thoroughly intermingled in both works. Zofloya, for example, explains that
"[t]o chemistry .. .1 became particularly attached, without, however resigning
my astrological pursuits.,,242 Likewise, Matilda's guardian studies "those
arts which relate to the world of the spirits" and in the next sentence has an
"unwearied application to the study of natural philosophy ... ,,243 Scientific
and magical imagery flip flops fluidly, running one into the other as
science-magic, chemistry-astrology or spirit philosophy-natural philosophy
fusions.
Such fusions are relatively common in popular fiction extending from this
period, or earlier, to today and they are an important theme of this study.244
Simon Locke (2005), for example, analyses various magic-science
constellations as they are represented in superhero comics. He argues for
the recognition of the complexity with which scientists are represented in
this arena, being "never simply one thing ... but multiple, mixed, and
moveable.,,245 In the same vein, dichotomous notions that posit either
disenchantment or enchantment are too simple to describe the complex
magical and scientific universes that Locke finds in superhero comics.
There is no question that the novels at issue in the present study would also
support this view. Usefully, Locke distinguishes between science that is
'enchanted' and magic that is 'scientized'. Zofloya, certainly, and
potentially Matilda too, are supernatural beings whose incorporation of
science into a magical repertoire 'scientizes' their magic. Frankenstein's
version of science, on the other hand, might be said to constitute a variation
on the theme of enchanted science.
Science-magic fusions of the kind found in the gothic horror novels
242 Ibid (1806/1997) p160
243 Lewis et al (179612004) p236
244 Several further examples appear in this study: see particularly, Chapter 5 for Braddon's
(1860) Trail of a Serpent pp135-171 and Chapter 7 Le Fanu's (1872) In a Glass Darkly pp
205-237
245 Locke (2005) p42
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represent power bestowed upon the protagonists by supernatural beings,
though whether Matilda is actually supernatural or not, we never know. In
structure these narratives are Faustian to their core:
• Faust desires something more. Magic powers are given to Faust by
Mephistopheles. Faust gains something more. Satan gains Faust.
• The Monk desires an innocent girl. Science-magic powers are given
to the Monk by Matilda. The Monk gains the girl. Satan gains the
Monk.
• Victoria desires young men. Science-magic powers are given to
Victoria by Zofloya. Victoria gains young men. Satan gains
Victoria.
The many versions of Faust differ on the details of the object(s) of his
desire, but all agree on the decidedly magical powers that he takes from
Mephistopheles in order to satisfy his appetites. The powers which are
given to Ambrosio and to Victoria are tinged with the scientific. Magic and
science become the interchangeable means with which desires can be
fulfilled. The use of special powers to satiate one's own longing, whether
natural or supernatural in provenance, is in the end subject to damnation.
The contrast with Radcliffe's model of science is so stark it needs no further
elaboration.
Two paintings, both by Joseph Wright, are informative in this regard, since
they echo the distinction between Radcliffe's and Lewis-Dacre's models of
science, which suggests that science was regarded more generally as
consisting of these two forms. As already noted above, The Orrery (1766)
depicts a Radcliffean model of science, but The Alchymist (1771) conforms
to an image more like the magical visions of Lewis-Dacre.i'" Where the
natural philosopher sits engaged with other people in a domestic scene
around an orrery, the alchemist works alone in a vaulted, church-like room,
his two assistants relegated to a backbench and engaged in their own
separate activity. The alchemist's room is littered with all manner of
246 See Appendix p271
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instruments, a furnace, retort and flasks of all shapes and sizes. Alchemy is
a secretive business, undertaken alone, in a place of spiritual, magical or
religious significance. The alchemist kneels in religious attitude looking
heavenward perhaps to conjure some spirit or other, while his retorts and
other strange instruments glow all around him. It is a kind of magic
chemistry with a mysterious, hidden or occult method.
On the contrary, Wright's natural philosopher, is homely, engaged with
family, uses uncomplicated mechanical apparatus and spreads wonder to
participants. These are the 'proper' behaviours of the institution of natural
philosophy for Radcliffe and for practitioners like Joseph Priestley and
colleagues. Yet, as I have already discussed, public science is undergoing
change at the turn from 18th to 19th century. The democratised model of
science that Priestley adheres to is losing its grip partly because of
intellectual and technical developments that require special instruments and
the skills to use them; and partly as a result of institutional change, in which
the scientist takes on a new persona as an expert distinct from a lay public.
The shift eventually changes natural philosophy from an inclusive to an
exclusive discipline, which is well exemplified by a conflict between
Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier over the process of combustion. Lavoisier
used highly sensitive, costly balances with which to weigh substances prior
to and following combustion. From such detailed measures he suggested
that combustion was a chemical process of combination, in opposition to
Priestley's view, which had it as a process of separation. English and French
models of chemistry clashed, but the debate became rather singly focussed
on the role of instruments, rather than on the chemistry itself. Lavoisier
emphasized the power of his instruments in revealing his new model of
combustion. Priestley disapproved on the basis that expensive instruments
were unaffordable to most people and so the French chemists' observations
could not be widely replicated. On top of that his convoluted experiments
interfered with the proper process of natural philosophy, in which direct
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experience was the only 'true' measure of nature.i'"
The terms within which the debate was conducted tended to coalesce around
the degree of openness or not, which the experimental method allowed for.
The English natural philosopher William Nicholson, speaking of the
complexity of Lavoisier's method, complains that "[t]he real degree of
accuracy in experiments is thus hidden from our contemplationv.i" What is
suggested here is that instruments, measurements and calculations combine
to form a smokescreen which effectively shuts down the possibility of
independent judgement of experimental results by others who are either
untrained in the method or who do not possess the equipment. Itwas also
seen as a restriction on the accessibility of experimental philosophy to the
lay population. What this amounts to is that the methods of natural
philosophy are becoming increasingly mysterious, hidden - or occult.
Humphry Davy on the other hand, consummate showman and performer,
sought to awe his audiences with spectacular shows of galvanic phenomena,
in which he would produce sparks of different colours, ignite gun powder,
or draw figures on gold leaf. The chemist-conjurer stands alone at his bench
producing bangs and flashes from a mysterious array of odd-looking
equipment. 249 The separation of public from scientist, the creation of an
expert who alone knows how to conduct the experiment and what it means,
turns science away from the enlightenment ideals so valued by Priestley and
returns it in some measure to the old model of alchemy. I am not suggesting
that natural philosophy in any way became secret or magical in practice, but
the effect of distancing and the performance of technical expertise to
outsiders who are not fully voiced in it themselves, gives science the edge of
occult magic. The metaphor of a 'ship-in-a-bottle' has been used by Harry
Collins (1985) to describe just this kind of situation.25o Similar to the
perplexing question of how ships get through bottle-necks, the issue of how
knowledge is produced by scientists is equally shrouded in mystery and
247 See Golinski (1992) pp 129-152 for a detailed discussion of the Priestley-Lavoisier clash
248 Quoted in Dear (2006) pSI
249 See Golinski (1992) pp1SS-235 for an excellent discussion of Davy in public
250 Quoted and summarised by Locke (2005) p27
magic or at least the aura of it.
In effect, natural philosophy at the tum of the 18th and 19th centuries is
starting to look more like its faded relative, alchemy. Interestingly enough
the gothic novels, TheMonk and Zojloya, take a Faustian script, a primarily
supernatural work and slightly naturalise it. I use the term 'slightly'
because their science does not represent straightforward natural philosophy.
It is a liminal construction that sits somewhere between magic and science.
Mary Shelley'S innovation is to take such naturalisation all the way, though
whether she actually does away entirely with the need for magic is another
matter.
Frankenstein
From the point of view of structure, Frankenstein is similar to TheMonk
and Zojloya, bar one intriguing factor - in the following statements the
second function shifts with interesting consequences:
• The Monk desires an innocent girl. Matilda gives science-magical
powers to the Monk. The Monk gains the girl. Satan gains the
Monk.
• Frankenstein desires the knowledge and power of creation.
Frankenstein studies science. Frankenstein gains the knowledge and
power of creation. Frankenstein gains disorder for others and
himself or his own hell on earth.
In the fairytales that Propp (1928) discusses, and for that matter, in many of
those that are still in circulation today, there is a crucial function fulfilled by
a character that he labels the donor_251 Generally the donor's function is to
give the hero a magical agent or helper of some kind, which aids him or her
in a time of crisis, perhaps in vanquishing the villain and restoring lost
people or goods to their right places. In TheMonk, Zojloya and indeed in
Faust there are such donors. Matilda, Zofloya and Mephistopheles bring
251 See Propp (1928/1968) pp39-S0
97
supernatural aid of a Satanic tum to the hero to help herlhim to realise their
desires. Stephen Knight (1980) has commented on a similar function in
20th-century fiction. For example, he describes the donor function in James
Bond stories where 007 is granted all kinds of technological gadgetry,
which replaces the need for the genie in the bottle, or other such magic and
aids the agent in a tight spot.
Shelley, however, has dispensed with the need for a donor, as science,
which more easily than magic can be learned, in the same way as reason
can, replaces the need for a magical agent. Science is Frankenstein's magic
helper. Itmeans that the hero can be hislher own donor. Knight (1980)
remarks the same of Sherlock Holmes, who of course needs no other donor
than his own head and hands. Knight explains this feature of Holmes stories
as "self-help, that great Victorian virtue, [which] is embodied in his power
to succeed with no more than his own abilities.,,252 Certainly the ability to
function alone chimes with the Victorian vogue for self-help, but I would
argue that it is actually the instrumental nature of some science, or
techno science, which makes it an ideal, modem substitute for magic.
The key difference between science and magic is that the latter is mostly
unfathomable by humans and always requires the kind of supernatural help
that is often supplied through the donor function. There are, of course,
those rare and special people, sorcerers and the like, who use ritual and
incomprehensible methods to conjure powers from the ether and transform
nature in that way. Though there is a sense in which magic powers cannot
simply be learned by anyone because of the need either for supernatural
helpers or for some special quality of 'soul' or feeling, that allows for
contact with supernatural forces. Yet science is a much more egalitarian,
human activity that was, after all, democratised in the is" century, at least
in representation, if not entirely in practice. In stories, science functions as
magic pulled down to earth. It is magic in human form. This is a
phenomenon picked up by Andrew Tudor (1989b) in his classic study of
252 Knight (1980) p77-8
horror films who among other things examines the initial cause for the
perturbation that inevitably takes place in the horror genre. Disorder can
emerge from supernatural or secular causes, of which secular causes are
science, crime or mental illness. Indeed, of nearly a thousand films that he
studied, just over a quarter had science as one of the primary sources for the
disorder.r" Shelley appears to have been one of the first people to publish
the idea that, just as Satan can make monsters, so can science.
Shelley repeatedly asserts in Frankenstein that the nature of Victor's
process is more or less self-taught science. On meeting M. Waldman, his
teacher at Ingolstadt, Frankenstein embarks upon a vigorous study of
"natural philosophy, particularly chemistry, in the most comprehensive
sense of the term ... ", later applying himself to "those branches of natural
philosophy which relate to physiology ... ,,254 Yet, much has been made of
the actual indistinctness of the process by which Victor finally builds his
creature. Some scholars have noted that Shelley'S invocation of the 'spark
of life' at the moment of creation may refer to the use of galvanic
apparatus.255 Ellis (2000) notes the same, but he places emphasis on the fact
that the creation scene is fundamentally gothic in its imagery. The midnight
hour, inclement weather, the isolated garret, add up to magical mood.
Sorcerers and witches work alone on such nights, not experimental
philosophers. Ifanything the gothic flavour is amplified by the very
indistinctness in process. So although Shelley firmly tells us that
Frankenstein's process is natural, she goes on to suggest otherwise by
clothing it in supernatural garb.
Not only is the atmospheric imagery magical, but Shelley also has
Frankenstein declare his allegiance to alchemy. When he arrives at
university, he says "when the masters of science sought immortality and
power; such views, though futile, were grand ... [now the] ambition of the
inquirer seemed to limit itself to the annihilation of those visions on which
253 Tudor (1989a)
254 Shelley et al (1818/1994) p78 and p79
2SS See Ellis (2000) pl52
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my interest in science was chiefly founded. I was required to exchange
chimeras of boundless grandeur for realities of little worth.,,256 The goals of
magic, the elixir of youth, the philosopher's stone and other tools that will
break the bounds of death, are what feed the ambitions of this scientist. As
Smith (1994) points out, Victor does not conform to the 'safe'
enlightenment model of pious natural philosophy, which held to the values
that Radcliffe enshrines. In many ways Victor hovers between science and
magic and reflects the shift from an Enlightenment model of science to a
Romantic one, from the stable and the knowable to the unstable and the
mysterious. Though that may be a too cliched understanding of Romantic
culture, it is faithful to Shelley's vision.
Last, Ellis (2000) argues as does Smith (1994), that Victor's discovery is not
in fact scientific in nature at all because it is made in secret. He believes the
secrecy of it puts Victor's project closer to alchemical magic than to modem
natural philosophy.f" Secrecy is of course associated with magic at the
time and taken together, all the magical inferences add up to make
Frankenstein as much a story about magic as it is about science. That it
was seen in this way at the time is evidenced by the fact that the first
publishers to take it up were a firm called Lackingtons who specialised in
"magic, the illegitimate supernatural, and horror"; one advert listed: The
Magus or Celestial Intelligencer; Lives of the Alchemystical Philosophers;
Apparitions, or the Mysteries of Ghosts, Hobgoblins and Haunted
Houses ..." etc as stock items_258
The threads of magic that run through Frankenstein and other mad scientist
narratives have been widely noted.259 Spencer Weart (1988), for example,
finds that the influence is long lasting. He describes 20th -century depictions
of physicists in popular culture who share much with the sorcerer and
concludes that "the public image of the scientist partly evolved out of ideas
256 Quoted in Smith (1994) "Frankenstein and Natural Magick" in Bann (1994) p48
257 Crosbie Smith (1994) "Frankenstein and Natural Magic" in Bann (ed) 1994
258 St Clair (2004) p3S9
259 For example Cohen (1981); Haynes (1994) p9-22; LaFollette (1990) pp98-100;
Lamboume et al (1990) p37; Locke (2005)
100
about wizards.,,260 Indeed, Weingart and co-authors (2003) find that where
a public-private split plays out in modem feature films, those disciplines
most often conducted in secrecy are the ones that are the most likely to flout
ethical values.i" Yet, beyond the gothic period, magic is not necessarily
immoral. The consummate scientific logician, Sherlock Holmes, compares
science to conjuring in ways that mirror the hidden process of the magician.
When Watson asks for further explanation, Holmes protests "I'm not going
to tell you much more of the case, Doctor. You know a conjurer gets no
credit when once he has explained his trick; and if I show you too much of
my method of working, you will come to the conclusion that I am a very
ordinary individual after all".262
It is notable that Shelley's Frankenstein appears at about the same time as
there is a shift in the nature of public science - a shift from passive, open,
pious science to something instrumental, showy and mysterious. As
William Nicholson put it in 1796, its methods are becoming 'hidden from
our contemplation' while its outcomes are ever more sensational and in
large measure, instrumental. It is well known that Shelley spent a lot of
time studying Davy, and as Golinski tells us, the chemist was concerned to
show the "efficacy of natural forces such as galvanism, and simultaneously
to demonstrate ...[his own] power to command them through the instruments
at his disposal.,,263 It is interesting to speculate as to whether Shelley is
reflecting a sense of dislocation with the methods of science that the lay
public(s) felt more poignantly at the time. What seems certain though, is
that by secularising the act of creation whilst at the same time giving it a
magical aura, Shelley effectively removes the moral constraints that pious
faith places upon magic. To put it another way, she presents a process,
which has the transformative power of magic, but has become unhitched
from the guide ropes that attached it to all the restraining values that were
paraded by Radcliffe and Co. In doing so Shelley warns that we have no
need of Satan, since we can use science to create our own hell on earth.
260Weart (1998) pl43
261 Weingart et al (2003) p285
262 Conan Doyle A Study in Scarlet quoted in Smith (1994)
263 Golinski (1992) p202; for Davy's works that Shelley read, see: Thoman (1998)
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Two models of science emerge from the gothic novels of Radcliffe, Lewis
and Dacre. Science is beneficent and human or destructive and demonic.
Shelley takes elements of each of these perspectives to create a vision of
science so prescient that it is now a modem myth. In the following chapter I
will explore how GWM Reynolds, journalist and author of the epic
Mysteries of London (1844-1846), weaves gothic influences into the fabric
of an 1840's cultural landscape. In so doing he champions a newly
rationalised scientific professional model in his medical men, while he
derides the belief that reason alone can improve the moral capacity of the
lower orders of society.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PROFESSIONAL MYSTERIES
GWM Reynolds (1844-1846) Mysteries of London
The Mysteries of London (1844-1845) is a social melodrama that was
published in cheap weekly instalments and was immensely popular, sitting
at the apex of a newly burgeoning mass market. 264 It relates the story of two
brothers who have lost their fortune. One brother is a paragon of virtue,
while the other turns to crime. What is interesting for the purposes of this
study are Reynolds' scientific characters - a 'daguerrotypist' and a
mesmerist and two medics who form the substantive focus of this chapter.
Reynolds integrates contemporary cultural developments, some newsworthy
and factional, with traditional, melodramatic, conceptions of morality. As
such he presents a snapshot of a complex and shifting professional
landscape in 1844-5 to which he applies a gothic moral tone that is updated
and re-packaged for a mid-Victorian audience. Out of the labyrinthine
streets and moonlit graveyards of Reynolds' urban gothic emerges the ideal
of a rational, scientific professional who is able to restore moral order at all
levels of society.
The dictum that reason is the path to human virtue was a key feature of all
the gothic novels in the previous chapter.265 In Ann Radcliffe's (1791)
Romance of the Forest, reason saves Adeline from crumbling either at the
first hint of ghostly superstition or in the face of the advances of the
Marquis. Conversely, it is lack of reason that gives reign to the Marquis'
basest passions allowing his selfish drives to obliterate his morality. In
Radcliffe's universe science is a form of reason elevated to near Godliness,
although it is strictly passive only serving to reflect the order of Nature. I
have suggested that the ordering functions of reason and science
264 The Bookseller (1868) stated that Reynolds had written more and sold in greater
numbers than Dickens and in a obituary notice in 1879 the same journal dubbed him "the
most popular writer of our time": quoted in Dalziel (1957) p36; Bentley's Miscellany
remarks on "mystery-mania" in 1845: quoted in Maxwell (1992) pix
265 Mary Shelley (I818) is equivocal on this point. The message of her text is complex,
though it is probably safe to conclude that she introduces the idea that reason taken to
extreme does not lead to virtue
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demonstrated here are turned instrumental in the detective genre. The
model of reason in gothic fiction that functions on an individual and
introverted level, performs the same function on an extraverted, societal
level in detective fiction. In this chapter I will explore how the same model
also describes the role of a newly rationalised scientific professional- the
medic, who is equally able to restore moral order and, in that sense, is a
prototype of the detective figure.
An alternative vision of science emerging from gothic horror fiction has
more in common with the modem myth of mad science. It is exemplified
by passion-fuelled portraits of gothic villains such as Ambrosio from
Matthew Lewis's (1794) TheMonk, and Victoria from Charlotte Dacre's
(1806) Zojloya, for whom science is deeply instrumental, a magical means
to satiate desire. Both magic and desire are ruled by Satan. Reynolds, like
Shelley before him, has his scientists draw a firm boundary that places the
supernatural beyond the bounds of science, while colouring them with dark
magical iconography. Yet, the effect of Reynolds' vision is to draw hints of
dark magic into a view of science that is actually both a potent
democratising force in society and is instrumental in restoring order.
Reynolds draws together the seemingly contradictory threads of the two
gothic models of science - the darkest instrumental version, steeped as it
was in magic, is largely disenchanted and combined with Radcliffe's deeply
virtuous, democratising model to produce a benevolent, instrumental
science. Yet, in relation to his mesmerist and his photographer, Reynolds'
statements are derisory. In this view, science is the domain of fraudulent,
self-serving aggrandised individuals, who, though mildly disruptive, are
ultimately irrelevant to the social world of the Mysteries novel. So science
is both a powerful social force for good and the vacuous activity of a few
egocentric individuals. He sorts 'good' from 'bad' science in this regard.
From his own day to this, Reynolds' prime place in the mass market has
drawn criticism. His republican, Chartist politics, for example, are seen as
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negated by his sensational, escapist, sometimes prurient, fiction.266 Marx
famously called him a "rich and able speculator", a man mercilessly
working the new mass market for his own gain_267The political dilemma is
not the precise concern here. Yet what makes Reynolds an important
contributor and gives his rebinding of gothic threads lasting effect was
largely his talent as an 'able speculator' on the mass markets. His narrative
blend of urbanised gothic and melodrama, which twists the secrets of a
bewildering array of urbanites into tangles of covert activity, is imitated in
Dickens Bleak House (1853-53) and assimilated into an arena of domestic
mystery in the 1860's by sensation novelists.i'"
I will focus on Reynolds' Mysteries Volumes I and II since these two
volumes complete the first story cycle; together they comprise 259 chapters
in all, which were published weekly between 1844 and 1845 and in bound
form in 1846.269 I will begin by examining the model of science and society
employed in the utilitarian improving campaign, which Reynolds whole-
heartedly rejects. Moving onward, I argue that Reynolds characterises
beneficent science by drawing on some particularly dark visions and in
doing so draws a surprisingly astute picture of the innovative process. I
then show how he ameliorates his medics from the moral murk, which at
first seems to besmirch them. Finally, I will suggest that Reynolds is
influential in instituting a rational, scientific, middle class professional as a
prototype for the literary detective and a new model of instrumental science.
266 Raymond Williams famously argued that radical literature such as Black Dwaifand the
Political Register was arousing and good for the people, whereas such popular works as
Reynolds produced were politically deadening: see Humpherys (1983) p83
267 Karl Marx quoted in Humpherys (1983) p82
268 See Maxwell (1992) pp 160-190 for a full discussion of how Dickens transforms
Reynolds take on 'urban gothic'; in 1860, Mary Braddon was requested to combine the
"human interest and genial humour of Dickens with the plot-weaving ofGWR [sic]
Reynolds" in her first novel Trail of a Serpent as discussed pp 135-71 of this work: see
Braddon (1893) in Braddon and Willis (1861/2003) p422
269 The text I am referring to throughout is the bound version published in 1846 by George
Vickers
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'IMPROVEMENT'
In broad terms, Reynolds follows Radcliffe in placing high value upon
material, rational understandings of the world, although the cultural
landscape of Radcliffe's 1790's was significantly altered by Reynolds'
heyday in the 1840's, and he places correspondingly different emphases on
the worth that science has for society. Radcliffe's romances embraced a set
of cultural values that linked reason, science, faith and virtue in a formula
for happy living. These values were compressed into a single discourse
under the banner of 'improvement' in her own time and beyond, especially
in the early 19th century'?', 'Improving literature', 'the march of intellect'
and 'useful knowledge' became bywords for a scaled up version of
Radcliffe's vision of reason as a self-disciplining, self-developing force.
The term 'improvement' was not one that Radcliffe used, but it
encompassed her values with altered emphasis and raised them from an
individual to a societal level. Improvement was the utilitarian application of
reason, knowledge, science, morality and faith, to society's ills.
The difference between Radcliffe's value set and utility hinged upon the
instrumentality of reason. No longer need reason be a purifying force for
the individual alone, it could also be a productive force for society. Steven
Shapin (1991) highlights this shift in emphasis when he writes of utilitarians
who by the 1830's advocate "the professionalization of the scientific role
and the state subvention of science - not because it fostered or was
compatible with gentility but because it was materially useful to civil
society. What was now asked for ... was state support, not for underwriting
the role of the Christian Philosopher and gentleman scholar, but for that of
the scientific expert,"!" Reynolds certainly aligns himself with science as
270 See Altick (1998) pp73-75 and pp131-132 for discussion of Hannah More and pp269-
273 for the trend in the 1830's for supplying useful knowledge in cheap print
271 Shapin (1991) p313 How far these groups directly sought state finance is a moot point
but they did court popular support
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both a meritocratic and a secular force, a picture that comes out in his
drawing of medical men.272
Yet, utilitarianism, was not a single, united belief. It encompassed all kinds
of persuasions and creeds with assorted motives clinging to one cluster or
another of utilitarian values. As Richard Altick (1998) points out,
utilitarianism "spread from its originating group until it was part of the
atmosphere every nineteenth century Englishman breathed". 273Although
Reynolds was broadly supportive of the utilitarian commitment to science
and its goal of improving the conditions (not necessarily the morality) of the
working poor, he had strong views on where the value of science lay.274 He
was opposed to those organisations, which perhaps falling into Shapin's
professionalizing category, publicly raised the bar for science, but
advocated science, or reason, alone as a method of 'improvement' for the
lowest orders.
The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (SDUK), brainchild of
Lord Brougham, was just such an organisation, a staunchly utilitarian group
who aimed at reforming society by disseminating knowledge. At a meeting
of founders in 1826, Brougham clearly defines the purpose of the society as
having, " ... necessity of some plan of co-operation for the moral
improvement of the great body of the population and the means by which
this object may be most effectually attained." Moral improvement of the
'masses' remained the justification for the society throughout its existence
until 1846. The means to achieve it was "the imparting of useful
information to all classes of the community ... ,,27sTo this end, the SDUK
became foremost among the pioneers of cheap literature in the 1830's.
272 Reynolds' fiction is melodrama, which comes close to morality tale in that
dishonourable characters are punished and the honourable are rewarded and he sends clear
moral messages about the worth of different activities or professions in this way
273 Altick (1998) pl29
274 In a 'Letter to the Industrious Classes' which appeared in Reynolds' Miscellany (1847)
he writes "I want to see you well educated, and your position also improved." Reynolds'
Miscellany 30 January (1847) 1 (13) pl99
27S Quoted in Smith (1974)
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The Penny Magazine (1832-1845) was one of the SDUK's most popular
productions, a weekly, rather bland, compendium of factual articles and
anecdotes, on topics ranging from geography, to zoology and biography.
Although it professed to be entertaining, its style was patronising in the
extreme, relating facts to a passive empty-headed reader. In many ways it is
a prime example of the early operation of the deficit model of the public
understanding of science.276 Its opening feature directly addressed the
reader and defined its editorial tenor as that which will "fix the mind on
calmer, and, it may be, purer subjects of thought than the violence of party
discussion, or the stimulating details of crime and suffering.',277 Here are the
Penny's two greatest betes noires - political, particularly radical press, and
street literatures like the Newgate Calendars, crime broadsides and cheap
romances.
In an era marked by political turmoil and fear of revolution, the SDUK
sought to flood the market with cheap print that was apolitical and factual,
and calmed, rather than aroused, its lower class readers. As a result, the
group had been a vociferous campaigner against the high taxes on
newspapers. In so doing they were instrumental in opening up the road to
cheap print, on the assumption that the press would fall under the control of
middle class liberals like themselves who could be trusted to disseminate
'factual' material. Their faith in improving literature was such that they
believed that the labouring classes would reject radical political writers like
the Cobbetts, the Paines and the Carliles as false prophets in favour of their
'calmer' and 'purer' subjects.278
276 For summary of deficit model of public understanding of science see Gregory and Miller
(1998) p89-90; see Durant (1993) 'What is Scientific Literacy?' in Durant and Gregory
(1993) on why knowing facts does not mean understanding science; Thomas and Durant
(1987) for a list of the reasons for promoting 'scientific literacy'; compare the latter with
Lord Brougham (1833) "Progress of the People-The Periodical Press" in King and Plunkett
(eds) (2005) p23 for a summary of reasons to promote 'improving knowledge'. In one
paragraph Brougham touches on all bar one of the reasons given by Thomas and Durant
in1987. Brougham omits aesthetics - to be expected for a utilitarian.
277 Penny Magazine March I" 1832 p l
278 See Altick (1998) 325-330 for discussion of politically radical writers and efforts to
suppress them. Radicals included: William Cobbett of The Political Register, Tom Paine of
The Age of Reason and The Rights of Man and Richard Carlile, radical bookseller, and
editor of The Republican.
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Their horror can only be imagined, when in the 1840's, the labouring
classes appropriated cheap print for their own brand of literature. All the
evidence points to the fact that improving magazines, like the Penny were
cast over in favour of cheap penny fiction, penny bloods, and sundry
miscellanies (that were not of the improving type). Evidence from
bookseller lists, from Henry Mayhew's London Labour and London Poor,
and from AB Reach's surveys of labouring culture in the Northern industrial
towns all points to a shift in taste away from the literature of improvement
and a growing market for fiction, political comment, with the occasional tit
bit of useful knowledge thrown in.279 Reynolds was one of the many who
took advantage of this shift in taste, and the publication of Mysteries began
two years before the demise of the Penny Magazine. If there was anything
more hateful to the members of the SDUK, it was George Reynolds'
particular mix of radical politics and romantic fiction. In 1846, announcing
the discontinuance of Knight's Penny Magazine (successor to the Penny
Magazine) publisher, Charles Knight, castigated his competitors as
representing "[a]l1 the garbage that belongs to the history of crime and
misery ... raked together, to diffuse a moral miasma through the land, in the
shape of the most vulgar and brutal fiction ",28o
One of the failings of improving literature generally, and of the Penny
Magazine, was likely its refusal to engage in any political debate.281 Despite
the best efforts of the SDUK to appear apolitical, most authors agree that
they had a fairly straight forward propagandist agenda to control the culture
of working people, in order to repress, replace or at least mitigate any
republican, jacobin or revolutionary inclinations.282 Haywood (2004) argues
that such anti-radical, liberal, improving agendas, so well exemplified in the
Penny, were one of the stimuli for the matrix of politics and escapism that
emerged under the leadership of Reynolds and others like him. The
279 For evidence of the spread of 'entertaining and political' literature see: Jacobs (1995);
Maidment (1984); Mayhew (1861/1968) especially Vol III; Reach and Aspin (1849/2007)
280 Charles Knight (1846) quoted in Dalziel (1957) p47
281 See Smith (1974)
282 See Altick (1998); Jacobs (1995); Haywood (2002; 2004); James (1974); Desmond
(1989); Maidment (1984); and Rauch (2001) p45 points out that the Penny was particularly
popular among the middle classes
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availability of cheap print pioneered by the utilitarian 'improvers' backfired.
The editors, journalists and authors who stole their market were fully
cognisant of the fact, and Reynolds, revelling in it, wrote in the first issue of
his Miscellany (1846): "Cheap literature has become respectable, because
the immense class that support it has latterly made a wonderful intellectual
progress; and those Periodicals which hope to gain and secure the favour of
that class, must provide literary aliment suited to the improved taste of the
present day.,,283
Mysteries and Improvement
Reynolds' opposition to the SDUK's particular brand of 'improvement'
finds its most damning indictment in the passages of documentary detail
which he uses to lay bare the deprivation, cruelty and poverty that shape the
lives of many of his poor characters. He is at pains to show that crime can
be a product of an unjust society and not simply the result of a lack of
reason and morality. Haywood (2004) has observed that "each of the fifty-
plus plots of the Mysteries of London concerns the corrupting and often
horrifically violent effects of a social system which exists to serve a
profligate aristocracy.,,284 In one example, Reynolds describes the
overcrowded living conditions in Smithfield, which "destroys all shame in
the daughters" leaving their virtue unprotected and open to the crime of
incest. "The wealthy classes of society are far too ready to reproach the
miserable poor for things which are really misfortunes and not faults ... ,,285
The SDUK's efforts to press improving literature on to the working poor
had done little to improve the conditions which they endured. In the face of
such pressing human need the links that utilitarian reformers had made
between 'proper' education and moral betterment were risible. To describe
poverty as it was in all its grim deprivation was one of Reynolds major
political achievements.i'"
283 Reynolds Miscellany Nov 07 1846 quoted in Haywood 2004 p 190 my emphasis
284 Haywood (2004) pl79
285 Reynolds (l846a) p43 (col b)
286 For example, see: Reynolds (l846a) pp 43-51 for description of London's poor and
pp353-61 for a harrowing description of child miners
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Further to hard-hitting documentary scenes, Reynolds disparages
'improvement' in a parodic take on 'useful knowledge'. When the young
and beautiful Ellen Monroe is thrown on hard times through no fault of her
own, she attempts to improve her lot through paid work. Her initial efforts
to earn a few pence through needle-work fall short of their daily need. She
is driven to find more lucrative employment and is lured into the 'den' ofa
'filthy-souled harridan' who apparently makes a living by providing
introductory services to girls who have fallen on hard times along with other
essential support services for the prostitution trade.287 Ellen is resistant, and
so, to start with, the old hag finds her work modelling her face for a
statuary, but step by step Ellen edges along the 'road to ruin,288. Next she
models her bust for an artist, and then she is enticed by a "French gentleman
of science ... who has invented a means of taking likenesses by the aid of the
sun ... [and] requires a beautiful woman to serve as a pattern for his
experiments. ,,289
What follows is an early representation of a daguerreotype, itself a sensation
aside from the pornographic content. The process had been invented in
1839, the year of Reynolds' plot, by Louis Jaques Daguerre and Henry Fox
Talbot who announced their work almost simultaneously.i'" Reynolds
raises the pitch by adding a touch of scandal to the scene, since the French
scientist "was desirous of taking full length female portraits in a state of
nudity:t291 Shocked by the request, but lured by the payment, Ellen agrees.
Initially Reynolds keeps favour with the supposed scientific nature of the
exercise and "her entire form is preserved, in all attitudes, and on many
plates, in the private cabinet of a photographer at one of the metropolitan
Galleries of Practical Science.,,292 Later he spells out the pornographic
287 Reynolds (1846a) p258 (col a)
288 Ibid P 171 "Road to Ruin" is the chapter heading
289 Ibid pl75 (col a)
290 Thomas (1999) pIll
291 Reynolds (1 846a) p175 (col b)
292 Ibid pl75 (col b)
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intent. Ellen's nudity "feasted the eyes of many a libertine in the private
room of the photographic department ofa Gallery ofScience.,,293
Reynolds invents a scientist-cum-photographer who keeps pornographic
photographs of a young woman, "in all attitudes, and on many plates" in his
"private cabinet" for gratification of "many a libertine". The scandal of the
whole scene is intensified by the real novelty of the daguerreotype itself.
From its first inception the technique was on show at the science galleries in
London, and was regularly advertised in press, amid articles here and there
relating technical details. In the early years of photography, between the
date of Mysteries plot in 1839, and its publication in 1844, the technique
was construed largely as a scientific curiosity and it is this tone that
Reynolds makes play of.294 Edgar Allen Poe captures its spectacle as "the
most extraordinary triumph of modern science", an innovation which
provided the means to achieve "a perfect identity of aspect with the thing
being represented ... The variations in shade, and the gradations of both
linear and aerial perspective are those of truth itself in the supremeness of
perfection.,,295 Pornographic daguerreotypes, which show a 'perfect
identity' and the 'supremeness of perfection' were as near as one could get
to real, living flesh.
The combined effect of these scenes is to draw attention to the way in which
'science' apparently legitimises pornography. Indeed we are led to
understand that the scientist is "entirely devoted to matters of
science ... having no soul for love, pleasure, politics, or any kind of
293 Ibid p278 (col a)
294 For example, The Morning Chronicle Sept 14 (1839) reports 'The apparatus ofM.
Daguerre, for the production of photogenic drawings ... was exhibited for the first time in
this country ... "; on Sept 25 (1839) The Morning Chronicle ran an advert for the same
exhibit now at the 'Royal Gallery of Practical Science, Adelaide Street..', from this date
onward for the rest of 1839 (date of Reynolds plot) adverts for one daguerreotype exhibit or
another appear almost daily. By 1844 (date of Mysteries publication) advertising in The
Morning Chronicle has dropped off to only 6 that year bearing the word 'daguerreotype';
although occasional technical articles appear in all press, see Lloyd's Weekly London
Newspaper Sept 1 (1844) 'Electrotype, Calotype, Daguerreotype' in 19th Century British
Library Newspapers Collection on-line database: http//find.galegroup.com/bncn Gale
Cengage Learning Accessed 24.07.10
295 Edgar Allen Poe (1840) quoted in Thomas (1999) p111-2 from 'The Daguerreotype' in
Alexanders Weekly
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excitement save his learned pursuits" - so, he is typically asocial and
obsessive. Yet, on first seeing Ellen, he eyes "his fair visitant from head to
foot, [and] he expressed himself infinitely obliged to the person who sent
her." 296 It seems, then, that he is able to appreciate beauty when he sees it,
the insinuation being that his lack of 'soul for love' is just hollow scientific
gloss. Lastly, public science galleries were exactly the kind of enterprise
that the SDUK keenly promoted. So, while the lower orders trudged around
the public galleries improving their knowledge on metallurgy and such like,
the higher orders hid in backrooms gratifying themselves with 'porno-
scientific' images of beautiful women.i'" This makes a mockery of the
SDUK's 'improving' mission. Reynolds' engagement of everyday
documentary detail makes his statement all the more potent because it
inevitably raises a question as to where reality ends and fiction begins.
Edward Jacobs (1995) has drawn attention to a propensity for lampooning
good works of utility in London street cultures, including 'penny gaff
theatricals and the penny fictions of Reynolds and others, all of which were
problematic to 'improvers' .298 This, he believes arises from a conflict
between the paternalistic culture propagated by reformers, like the SDUK,
and those cultures which they wished to obliterate. He has argued that the
growth of industry and consequential work-discipline time structures
imposed on the labouring poor were historically coincidental with the drive
to improve the minds of the masses. 299 In other words disciplining the mind
was part and parcel of a broader industrial rationalisation. Popular
education as was famously derided by Charles Dickens (1854) in Hard
Times, consisted of rote learning, memorisation and rigid time-tabling, all
amounting to a factory-style schooling characterised by the mechanical
repetition of facts. Jacobs finds that "both the early bloods of Lloyd and
Reynolds and the street culture surrounding London gaffs, conventionally
296 Reynolds (1846a) p175 (col b)
297 The connection between cutting edge technology and pornography is mirrored by
developments in early moving imagery taken by Eadweard Muybridge of nude women. See
http://www.eadweardmuybridge.co.uk/accessed23.06.11
298 Penny gaffs were shows staged in impromptu theatres, banned in 1839, but finally dying
out in the 1850's when the music hall culture displaced them, see: Jacobs (1995)
299 See Landes (2003) pp41-123 for summary of time-discipline and industrial growth
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equated literacy with industrial-work disciplines, and subjected this
'industrial literacy' to traditional forms of 'festive misrule. ",300 There is no
doubt that Reynolds is engaging in something akin to 'festive misrule' in his
drawing of Ellen's efforts to improve herself with the aid of an old hag and
a prurient scientist.
In later chapters, Ellen takes on a role as the subject of a mesmerist, who
calls himself the Professor of Animal Magnetism. The Professor gives
public lectures accompanied by a demonstration of his art, in which Ellen
fakes a mesmeric trance and simulates second sight. The show is a fraud in
its entirety. The charade comes to a head when in one of her clairvoyant
trances, Ellen gets a fit of the giggles. The laughter is infectious and the
audience too dissolves into giggles which progress to evermore raucous
laughter. The Professor of Animal Magnetism is literally laughed out of
town.301 The SDUK specifically recommended the value of public lectures
with accompanying practical demonstrations.Y' Laughing them out of town
is unquestionably another example of 'festive misrule'.
Excepting the irony of their association with useful knowledge, there is little
else remarkable about these scientists. Their plot function is minimal
besides providing a focus for derision and in a small way hastening Ellen's
downfall. Yet, the real perpetrator for luring the girl away from her
respectable roots is the 'old hag'. It is significant that these two men of
science come into the narrative via "the old woman ... ill-favoured in
countenance, and vile in heart.,,303 Plot-entry point is considered in some
detail by Propp (1928) who finds that "each category of characters has its
own form of appearing. ,,304That is not to say that the characters of novels
300 Jacobs (1995) p323 (his emphasis) i
301 See Winter (1998) for a history of animal magnetism. The story of Reynolds' mesmerist
is a parody of Thomas Wakley's trial (and invalidation) of John Elliotson's mesmeric
practise, which culminated in 1838-9, and revolved around Elizabeth O'Key, Elliotson's
famous subject, whom Wakley ultimately denounced as a fraud. The controversy was
published episodically in Wakley'S periodical The Lancet from 1838 and resulted in
Elliotson's resignation from veL. See Winter (1998) pp95-100
302 Smith (1974)
303 Reynolds (1846a) pl71 (col b)
304 Propp (1928/1968) p84
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could be so easily categorised, but what Propp's observation suggests is that
mode of entry has the potential to prime the reader for the kind of character
they are about to engage with. On top of being one of Reynolds' most
deplorable creations, the old hag clearly draws on a tradition of magical
and/or supernatural representation. The effect is to link her 'bad' magic
with 'bad' science.
On one occasion Ellen finds the old hag, witch-like ''watching the steam
that rose from a large saucepan upon the hob ... the harridan's dinner - tripe
and cows heel stewing with onions, and filling the close apartment with a
sickly odour.,,305And the oppressive clutter of her apartment is tainted with
the whiff of pleasures past turned rancid with age. Yet, in among the garish
"walls covered with cheap prints"; a patchwork of "strange and expressive
remnants of a vicious and faded luxury"; the empty scent bottles and
champagne bottle now filled with gin; the pillow stuffed "with well worn
silk stockings, tattered lace collars, faded ribands" etc; she has "more
singular than all the other features of her room ... a huge Bible, with silver
clasps, upon a shelfl,,306 All her possessions speak of something once
beautiful turned sour and, among her belongings, the Bible is cast over with
similar hue and here signifies hypocrisy.
The image of the Bible in the hands of the old hag is representative of
Reynolds' views on the Church in general, which he also exposes to a little
festive misrule. For example, his specious, lustful vicar, Mr Tracy, falls far
short of Mr Wentworth, the rational medic both in benevolence and power.
The contrast is highlighted by a scene in which the vicar performs the last
rites to an allegedly dying man, in a ruse to ogle the daughter of the house;
but he is made a mockery when the surgeon, who immediately follows him,
coolly restores the 'dying' man to health.307 This small episode
demonstrates the way in which Reynolds engages in sorting out dissolute
305 Reynolds (I846a) p258 (col b)
306 Ibid pI72 (col a)
307 Dalziel (1957) p 160 points out that Reverend Tracy (whose narrative runs from lust, to
murder to suicide) was an unusually extreme portrait of clergy, but she finds that "coldness,
laziness, snobbery and apathy" were more common failings among Anglican clergy in
popular fiction of the early-mid Victorian period
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institutions from deserving. In effect, the moral overtones of the
melodrama are invested in the ways in which professionals interact with
individuals, like Ellen, who inhabit the urban environment. In this regard,
bankers, vicars, old hags or freelance-folk practitioners and scientists of the
improving kind score poorly in Reynolds' moral registry.
In his own time and beyond, Reynolds has been accused of a lazy re-
hashing of the gothic script, which simply pits corrupt old power against
new and virtuous meritocracies. 308 Arguing against this notion, Haywood
(2004) has demonstrated that Reynolds radicalises his fiction partly by using
the 'old corruption' formula, which still carried weight in the 1840's, in the
light of disappointment with the 1832 Reform Act and the consequential
rise of the Chartist movement, of which Reynolds was a part.309 No doubt
this argument holds water as far as the politicising of fiction goes, but
Reynolds does something more subtle than simply hashing out the old
'profligate aristocracy' script. He chronicles the power relations within and
between institutions and between institutions and individuals. Neither
vicar, mesmerist, nor photographer are aristocratic. All are bourgeois
individuals who have been invested with certain powers because they are
experts of specialist domains. In other words, Reynolds' canvas is peopled
by professions, some emerging, some age-old, and some, like science,
incohesive.
As in any melodrama people and professions live or die on their moral
worth, so do Reynolds' urban institutions. Stockbrokers and bankers,
government officials, and clergy are almost entirely self-serving, while
aristocracy and policemen are variable and the criminal poor, as opposed to
the respectable poor, are unconscionable to a man and woman. Reynolds
smattering of decent characters must find their way amidst the network of
powerful, venal hypocritical professions on the one hand and a mercilessly
violent criminal underworld on the other. One of the tests of moral worth is
how such professionals, or indeed individuals, treat those who have less
308 See Haywood (2004) pI72-3
309 Ibid pp 174-91
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power than themselves. Within Reynolds' gothic nightmare one of the few
beneficent professions is scientific (reform) medicine.
Mysteries' effective sorting of the decent from the depraved professionals,
all of whom are drawn in typified melodramatic outline gives an overall
picture of urban institutions in something like Everett C Hughes (1971)
ecological landscape. In Hughes terms, the selection pressure on a
profession is constituted by the needs and the wants of the people so only
those professions that succeed in serving the people in some way survive.
Reynolds, of course, adds a moral twist to the tale, but essentially those
professions that he paints as hypocritically self-serving, in particular the
Rev. Mr Tracy, the pornographic daguerreotypist and the money-grabbing
mesmerist literally disappear from the text. There is also an element of
competition between professions for available functions, which is especially
evident in the scenes that have Mr Tracy ineffectually tending to the dying,
followed hot on the heels by Mr Wentworth who calmly secures a cure.
Furthermore, Reynolds inclusion of 'real-world' cases provides a
sociological snap shot of how the professions seemed to be serving the
people, or not, as the case may be. Given his popularity there are very
tentative grounds for assuming that Reynolds struck some chord with his
readers in this regard, although that is by no means a necessary condition of
his commercial success. That said there is reason to believe that the idea of
a rationalised, scientific professional, particularly focussed in the realm of
medicine, was gaining popular support if only among middle classes. This
is the topic of the following section.
DOCTORING AND ANATOMY
The Trouble with Innovation
The narrative aim of the real world doctor drives towards the restoration of
physical and mental health and even where this is not attainable it remains
the ideal. Fictional medics more evidently tum in both directions; they
either fulfil a restorative function, or they are cruel self-serving types whose
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function is to disturb the prevailing order in some way that threatens other
characters or communities. 310 The term 'mad doctor' is sometimes used to
refer to such villains, who are often driven by the study of anatomy,
physiology or vivisection. It is far from clear, though, where the line
between mad doctor and mad scientist is drawn, if indeed there is one.
Such narratives occasionally bleed into the world of 'faction' as in cases
like the 1888 Whitechapel murders, when the idea that a medic, a mad
doctor, could be the elusive Jack the Ripper, drew serious consideration
from press and police alike. 311 For some decades prior to and around the
period of publication of Mysteries, the 'factional' equivalent of the Ripper
story was that of the anatomist-surgeon who entered into dubious relations
with body snatchers and/or murderers, as Robert Knox had done with Burke
and Hare in 1828.312 The blurring of fact and fiction was Reynolds'
particular talent, a feature that adds a note of the forcefulness of news
reports to his melodrama. It also draws upon the readers' desire to discern
where facts begin and fictions end. Here Reynolds' dark, sometimes
disordering, surgeon-anatomist has restorative function, just as Robert Knox
presumably aimed for in the real world.
The first image of science to appear in Mysteries carries similar gothic
reverberations that characterise Victor Frankenstein's association with
vaults and charnel houses .
. .. the body-snatchers reached the low wall surmounted with a high
railing which encloses Shoreditch churchyard ... an individual,
enveloped in a long cloak, was walking up and down beneath the
shadow of the wall.
310 For examples of restorative medical narratives see: Samuel Warren's (1830-37)
Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician in Blackwoods; Elizabeth Gaskell's (1865) Mr
Gibson in Wives and Daughters; George Eliot's (1871-72) Dr Lydgate in Middlemarch.
Examples of disordering medical narratives are: Dr Benjulia in Wilkie Collins (1883) Heart
and Science; Dr Jekyll in RL Stevenson's (1886) Jekyll and Hyde; and Dr Moreau in HG
Wells' (1896) Island of Dr Moreau
311 See Christopher Frayling "The House that Jack Built" and Andrew Smith "The
Whitechapel Murders and the Medical Gaze" in Warwick and Willis (eds) (2007) pp13-29
and ppl10-123 respectively
312 Richardson (2001) pp132-143
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This was the surgeon, whose thirst after science had called into
action the energies of the body-snatchers that night.313
Such a dark apparition raises expectations of mad, bad or perhaps Satanic
science of the kind that was exemplified in the gothic horror novels or in
Frankenstein. Yet Reynolds goes on to tell quite another story.
The surgeon's narrative could be written as follows:
• The surgeon desires knowledge of anatomy and healing.
• The body snatchers provide a corpse, with which the surgeon
studies anatomy and he gains knowledge of anatomy and the power
of healing.
• In so doing, the surgeon gains order for others and himself.
Which is a transformation of Frankenstein's narrative:
• Frankenstein desires the knowledge and power of creation.
• Frankenstein studies science in the graveyard and gains the
knowledge and power of creation.
• In so doing, Frankenstein gains disorder for others and himself (or
his own hell on earth).
A comparison of the science narratives of Frankenstein and Dracula
revealed that disordering science sits in the first function and initiates the
action, while science which is restorative sits in the second function and
responds to a perturbation in the first. In Mysteries, the anatomist initiates
the misdemeanour of grave robbing with his desire for the knowledge of
healing, and the second function connects moral perturbation and restorative
potential, as does Frankenstein's.l'" The transformation occurs in the third
function when the anatomist uses his knowledge to respond to illness that
occurs in the third. So, while the narratives of Frankenstein and the
anatomist begin in the same manner, with a desire for knowledge leading to
313 Reynolds (l846a) p125 (col b)
314 Frankenstein's motives are equivocal in fact. Does the desire to obtain the power of
creation have restorative potential or not? He says "I might in the process oftime ... renew
life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption," which is about as
restorative as is possible to imagine. Yet he also reveals a profoundly egotistical motive,
"A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures
would owe their being to me." See Shelley et al (1818/1994) p83 and p82 respectively
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some kind of moral perturbation, they end in opposite states. Yet, whatever
their ending is, the first two functions of each narrative are innovating
functions. The relationship of innovation and perturbation here raises
questions about the perceived nature of innovation, questions that are given
added force by the 'factional' status of the anatomist's story.
Before moving on to innovation, a word about the novel. There is more
than one surgeon-anatomist in Mysteries. One is simply referred to as 'the
surgeon', or 'the anatomist' and first appears associated with body
snatchers. Some thirty-five chapters later Reynolds introduces Mr
Wentworth, a surgeon called to the birthing chamber of the shamed young
Ellen. Twenty-nine chapters following that, the bodysnatching anatomist-
surgeon returns in an episode, which requires his healing power. The only
distinguishing feature between the pair is that Wentworth resides in
Holloway Village, while his anonymous counterpart resides in Bethnal
Green. Such a seemingly trivial detail is easily overlooked and the two
surgeons give the impression of being only one, especially since Wentworth
is also often referred to as 'the surgeon'. The misapprehension would
presumably be all the more easily made for readers of weekly instalments
given the lapse of time that intervened between reading about one surgeon
and reading about the other. The fact of the matter is that they are two
characters, not one, though the impression created is, if not of one person, of
one profession, a scientific profession of considerable restorative potential,
initial surface impressions notwithstanding.
The association of anatomist and criminal grave robbers draws out the
inevitably 'disordering' edge of innovation. My original observation of the
science narratives derived from Frankenstein and Dracula that were my
starting point, has the restorative narrative as a conservative force, as indeed
are most detective stories, which aim to return the world to some former
ordered state (of course the world cannot be returned exactly to its original
state, but instead to a different but ordered state). So between my original
narrative pair, innovation lies entirely within the disordering narrative.
Indeed, the very action of innovating requires a break with the old order.
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Yet this pair of narratives cuts out the possibility that such a break in order
can ever be beneficent, a possibility now fulfilled by Reynolds' surgeon.
The anatomist's narrative begins with a 'thirst after science', which drives
him to the morally dubious act of illicitly exhuming dead bodies and in so
doing rejecting institutional or state sanctioned means by which anatomists
achieve their goal of learning. He is innovative in two ways, by procuring
the body in the first place and then by using it to innovate medical
knowledge that ultimately will aid in the restoration of health. The link
between innovation and deviance has a logic that has long been an object of
sociological comment. Robert K Merton (1938) distinguishes culturally
defined goals and interests and socially acceptable means of reaching them.
In his scheme, those individuals who maintain a socially sanctioned
aspiration, as for example, the surgeon's desire for anatomical knowledge,
but reject the institutional norms by which such goals are achieved, are
innovators. So too are some criminals, whose access to the institutional
means of achieving 'success' is blocked, and so must find other, deviant
means to achieve the same goal. Reynolds' surgeon is exactly such an
innovator.
Although the Anatomy Act was passed seven years prior to the 1839 action
of Mysteries, the illegal sale of dead bodies did continue beyond the Act,
particularly as Reynolds tells it, to independent anatomists or small, private
teaching institutions. Much of the detail in Reynolds' body snatching scenes
tallies with aspects of Richardson's (2001) extensive documentary study of
the trade. Following the Anatomy Act in 1832 the administration and
allocation of corpses for legal dissection was poorly handled and open to
corruption. The large hospitals could offer treatment to the parish poor and
expect to be given all available corpses in return. With too few bodies to go
round, small teaching institutions and independent anatomists lost out and
continued to use resurrectionists - the fictional surgeon of Mysteries is just
such an anatomist. Indeed Reynolds' time line fits Richardson's data
exactly. There was a marked drop in the number of legal bodies available in
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London from 1838 onward and so Reynolds' 1839 plot is frighteningly
plausible and relevant to contemporary readcrships.i'f
Further to the body-snatching episode, Reynolds supplies tantalising details
of the anatomist's dissecting rooms. For example, he describes the drainage
system that took the "fluid, which poured from the subjects ... " and the drain
and the pulleys attached to the ceiling by "which a body might be supported
in any position most convenient to the anatornist.Y'" These details
emphasize the gore that the anatomist must deal in, driving home the idea of
a deviant innovator who then must detach himself from any (normal)
squeamish, moral or superstitious sensibilities raised by the act of cutting up
a human body. So the surgeon is a criminal innovator in the graveyard, and
medical innovator in the dissecting room. In both realms he must override
social norms to achieve a goal, which is itself socially sanctioned. The
whole picture is greatly reinforced by the knowledge that such criminal-
medical innovators really did dig up bodies and cut them up.
Little personal detail is given of the grave robbing anatomist, though he is
"passionately attached to anatomical studies, devoted to purposes of
dissection and physiological experiment." 317 Clearly, he is every bit the
typified, obsessional, detached scientist. That said, the same kind of
emblematic details were used to mark out the pornographic photographer
who has "no soul for love, pleasure, politics, or any kind of excitement save
his learned pursuits" 318. Surgeon number two, Mr Wentworth, is more
rounded, but does nonetheless carry related insignias of science. He is, for
example, "pale, but good-looking, with light hair, and a somewhat
melancholy expression of countenance. He was attired in deep black. His
manners were soft and pleasing; but his voice mournful; and his utterance
slow, precise and solemn.,,319 He shares Frankenstein's combination of
31S Richardson (2001) p246
316 Reynolds (1846a) p331 (col a)
317 Ibid p33l (col a)
318 Ibid p175 (col b)
319 Ibid p247 (col b)
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'melancholy' air and 'conciliating and gentle' manner.320 The paleness of
the scientist, intellectual or magician, is associated with bouts of excessive
work or study.
In giving his photographer-scientist the classic obsessive, unfeeling air,
Reynolds draws attention to the potential for parading the cool, objectivity
of reason as a cover for all kinds of petty self-serving, self-aggrandising
behaviour. Yet, in his medical men, the same typified 'objectivity' and lack
of feeling turns into a necessary attribute in order that they can do the grim
work of investigating how the human body works. What emerges from
such a picture is a complexity of iconic representation even as it draws from
a pool of seemingly banal, stereotypical details. The reiteration of the same
typified details to wholly different effect shows that the function of this
typification is simply to label 'the scientist', and at least in 1846, that label
can encompass mad, bad, good and probably any other scientists.
On one occasion, Wentworth identifies himself with professional learning in
assuring his client, "I possess certificates from eminent medical men under
whom I have studied - I am not ignorant of my profession. My lord, I have
every inducement to devote all the knowledge I possess to the aim, which
you desire. My attentions shall be unwearied and unremitting ... ,,321 In
associating Wentworth so strongly with his profession, Reynolds extends an
air of the scientific to the whole profession. Wentworth's paleness supports
his claims to learning, and his melancholy is evidence of the lonely,
'unremitting' vigil of care; and to demonstrate his capability for such work,
he has a certificate. He is a fully-fledged member of a modem profession -
the same profession as the passionately scientific anatomist who enters the
plot via criminal resurrection men, is known to cut up dead bodies in his
house, while he can (and does) heal the living body when called upon to do
so. What Reynolds does with the edge of moral murk that attends the
anatomist and by extension his profession, is the topic of the following
sections.
320 Shelley et al (1818/1994) pS8 and p60
321 Reynolds (l846a) p381 (col a)
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Ameliorating the Anatomist
Having initiated the science narrative with a vision of grave robbing and
dark innovation, Reynolds then takes pains to reinstitute the moral character
of the anatomist. Some few paragraphs following the first glimpse of the
bodysnatching surgeon, Reynolds softens the anatomist with feelings of
conscience. As he watches the grave robbers at work, he "could not
altogether subdue certain feelings of horror at the business which had
brought him thither ... the methodological precision with which they [the
gang] performed their avocations-the coolness they exhibited in undertaking
a sacrilegious task ... his feelings of aversion were the same as he would
have experienced had a loathsome reptile crawled over his naked flesh." A
few lines on, " ... although a man of naturally strong mind, ...the surgeon felt
as ifhe beheld three demons disinterring a doomed one to carry him off to
hell!" 322
The anatomist's horror and repulsion on witnessing the grisly task at hand
throw him into more sympathetic light than is promised at first. The very
existence of feeling renders him the reluctant hero, burdened with a ghastly
task, which he must pursue for the good of science, perhaps even for the
good of humanity. Paradoxically he will use the very same 'methodological
precision' and 'coolness' that so disgusts him in the body snatchers, when
he opens the body later. Richardson (200 I) too has collated scattered
references that show the distastefulness with which some surgeons
approached dissection, including a remark made by William Lawrence,
surgeon to and friend of, the Shelleys, that the dissecting room was "a dirty
source of knowledge", though not, of course, without medical value.323 The
grimy side of knowledge production in the medical field seems unavoidable
and is made especially sensational at a time when the dead human body was
imbued with near numinous quality. That said, the ability to feel disgust
322 Ibid p126 (col b) - p127 (col a)
323 William Lawrence (1827) in The Dissector, quoted in Richardson (2001) p95; for
Lawrence and the Shelleys, see: Macdonald and Scherf in Shelley et al (1818/1994) pxvi
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distances this anatomist from the absolute emotional blindness of characters
like Frankenstein and many another mad scientist.
Reynolds' surgeon joins the resurrectionists at their work in order to direct
them to the vault of a freshly buried girl whose corpse he is keen to dissect,
having treated the course of her final disease. In reality, this must have been
a rare occurrence. As Richardson points out, it was the resurrection men
who took all the risk of illegal grave robbing and it is what they were paid
for. Regardless, having the surgeon on the scene gives him some
credibility, from the perspective that he is prepared at least to partake in his
own dirty work. Richardson records a widespread abhorrence of body
snatchers, while anatomists, who in many ways were as culpable for the
trade in illegal corpses as their lowly partners, remained relatively immune
to popular opprobrium, even though dissection was widely feared and still
viewed as retributive.Y" Anatomists occasionally did incur public
invective, but where resurrectionists raised a level of passion that fuelled
violent attack, sometimes resulting in death, anatomists rarely suffered
anything worse than attacks on property. Reynolds does not shy away from
the darkness, and dishonesty, of the anatomists' dealings with the dead, but
he seems keen to promote the same balance of accountability. So for his
surgeon-anatomist, grave robbing is simply a necessary evil.
Equally notable is the fact that Reynolds relates documentary details of the
grave robbers at work, but does not provide an equivalent level of detail
about the anatomist at work. The grave robbing passages of Mysteries are
filled with precise detail about how the men worked, the tools that they
used, and the techniques that they employed to keep from being detected.
Similar procedures are described by Richardson, even down to the
importance of noiselessness, moonless nights and the use of a 'dark
lanthorn', a candle or lamp with a shade to deflect light downwards and
avoid attracting attention. In addition to the technical detail, Reynolds does
not shy away from a description of how the men handle the body itself. As
324 Judges were given discretion to sentence murderers to dissection, an alternative to
gibbeting in chains in the mid 18th century, see Richardson (2001) p35
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the corpse of the young girl is lifted from her coffin, "[t]he polished marble
limbs of the deceased were rudely grasped by the sacrilegious hands of the
body-snatchers; and having stripped the corpse stark naked, they tied its
neck and hands together by means of a strong cord. They then thrust it into
a large sack made for the purpose.,,325 The girl's body is overtly sexualised
and the whole scene sensationalised in these few lines.
In her study of criminal narratives in early 19th-century broadsides, Heather
Worthington (2005) finds the same tendency to sensationalise and in so
doing, to entertain. She reports that where crimes involved sex and
violence, pornographic and gory details were "enlarged, expanded, and
illustrated" and packaged in stylised illustration and liltingly jolly verse, or
set within the distancing 'authority' of medical discourse. All were ways of
masking the voyeuristic content, allowing the reader simultaneously to
enjoy it and to judge it. She describes broadsides that relate the gruesome
details of violent crimes couched in the 'authoritative' voice of a surgeon,
which she suggests is a kind of covert voyeurism "in its scientific intrusion
into the hidden places of the physical body.,,326 Here, the reader can
experience the salacious details as mediated through the surgeon, who
unlike the body snatchers, has professional sanction to expose the 'hidden
places' of the body. Indeed, Richardson reports that there were rumoured
cases of anatomists who took more than a medical interest in some of their
dissection subjects.327
The issue of how corpses were treated bubbled up fairly frequently in both
medical and popular press in this period. Yet Reynolds distances his
surgeon from the body and locates the hinted obscenity almost entirely
within the 'sphere of action' of the body snatchers.328 Reynolds engages in
a similar process of titillation to that of the broadside tradition, but he masks
325 Reynolds (1846a) p127 (col a)
326 Worthington (2005) p16
327 See Richardson (2001) pp95-98
328 The term 'sphere of action' is taken from Propp (1928/1968) p79. He uses it to examine
how the functions are distributed between the characters. I am not using it in any such
taxonomic sense, and simply wish to indicate that Reynolds had a choice - he could have
placed the sexualised corpse into the sphere of action of the surgeon
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the prurient details by calling judgement upon the 'sacrilegious' body-
snatchers who ultimately throw the corpse into a sack more in the way of a
piece of meat than an object of beauty or sexuality. Indeed, the only
physical interaction between anatomist and corpse is in the moment that the
surgeon steps into his carriage and seats himself "close by his strange
freight. .. ,,329This is the last word on the surgeon for some chapters to come
- a gap of several weeks for the penny reader. Clearly the anatomist intends
to defile the corpse in a way that would diminish even the roughest of
handling by the resurrection men, though his professional-scientific
credentials legitimise these actions so much so that no details of the
anatomist at work are forthcoming. All that is given of him is his passionate
attachment to anatomical studies and devotion "to the purposes of dissection
and physiological experiment." 330His purpose is elevated over and above
voyeuristic ends.
The superstition that surrounds the dead with all its incumbent supernatural
potential and the spectre of un savoury resurrectionists combine into a gothic
aesthetic par excellence, which Reynolds uses to great effect. On delivering
a new body to the surgeon, one of the resurrection men lays the body out on
the dissection table, while the other receives remuneration from the surgeon
in his study. Once alone with the dead body, "[h]e thought he heard a slight
movement of the corpse, and his whole frame trembled. Almost at the same
moment some object was hurled violently against the window; the glass
shivered to atoms; the candle was thrown down and extinguished; and total
darkness reigned in the dissecting room ... he felt his hand suddenly grasped
by the cold fingers of the corpse.,,331 Rather in the way that Ann Radcliffe
explains away the supernatural, so does Reynolds. The corpse, it turns out,
was never dead at all, merely in a death-like trance; the violently hurled
object the work of a disgruntled neighbour who suspected grave robbing.
Paradoxically, the work of the resurrection men has on this occasion saved a
man's life.
329 Reynolds (1846a) pl27 (col b)
330 Ibid p331 (col a)
331 Ibid p331 (col b)
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Following this incident the anatomist turns doctor and acts in his capacity as
carer further ameliorating the reputation of the surgeon. His attentions
apparently restore the waking corpse to health. Juxtapose this against the
grisly details of the resurrection men, who are in fact not straight-forward
grave robbers, but killers to boot, modelled on the London gang of copycat
murderers who followed Burke and Hare.332 In this sense Reynolds draws a
stark contrast. Medics give life and resurrectionists take it. From the
mirage of a man who has called the body snatchers to the churchyard vaults
on a moonless night, comes a surgeon, a healer, who must quell his own
feelings of repugnance at the ghastly tasks ahead of him in order to restore
order to the human body.
Modelling Medicine Anew
The effect of the body snatching scenes drives home the necessary
murkiness of accessing medical knowledge, and distances the anatomist
from the worst of the moral turpitude at the same time. Further to this,
Reynolds gives his medics the credentials of the emerging scientific
profession, which effectively places a wedge between them and the old-
style medical men who were characterised by a paternalistic, moral tone.
Such an emergent profession is described at length by Adrian Desmond
(1989), whose aim is not so much to unpick the scientific gloss that was laid
on reform medicine (also evident in Reynolds), but to draw out the social
and political process of professional reform that went along with it.
Medical reformers sought to break the nepotistic, old corruption that sat in
power at the Royal Colleges and as a consequence were more likely to work
at the margins of the medical establishment, as do Reynolds' anatomist-
surgeons. Breaking 'old corruption' also gave them common ground with
radical politics per se. Desmond describes The Lancet published by the
surgeon and radical politician, Thomas Wakely, as the medical version of
William Cobbet's (radical) Political Instructor. Such a perceived affiliation
332 Richardson (2001) P 193-7
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between independent medics and radicalism along with Reynolds' clear
affirmation of this new model of medicine also affirms his deprecation of
'improving' drives.
A good example of the kind of doctoring which Reynolds eschews, is
exemplified in the much celebrated 19th -century fictional doctor created by
Samuel Warren. In a study, which takes account of scientific reforms in
medicine, Meegan Kennedy (2004) examines the intersection of gothic and
'curious' discourses that ran through and around debates about the proper
presentation of medical case histories. Samuel Warren's Passages from the
Diary of a Late Physician was serialised in Blackwoods between 1830 and
1837 and remained in print throughout the Victorian period. Warren's
fiction consists of a series of short stories masquerading as case histories
taken from the diary of a one-time medic, who is a pre-reform medic on
both Desmond's and Kennedy's accounts. There is no doubt that Warren's
vignettes, bearing such titles as Intriguing and Madness, The Spectral Dog
and Thunder-struck - The Boxer, amplified the sensational and moral
aspects of medicine. Such spectacle was well aligned with the discourse of
the 'curious' which, though considered to be an 18th-century phenomenon,
remained fashionable well beyond that. Kennedy describes how an
emergent professional class of medical men outlawed the flavour of the
carnivalesque miracle-cum-morality tale that the 'curious' case invoked.333
She argues that such sensational, miraculous stories share "the romantic
discourse of the Gothic, especially its interest in the supernatural and the
unexplainable and its narrative aim of arousing suspense, horror, and
astonishment in the reader.,,334 Gothic medicine of this kind is certainly
Warren's stock in trade and was immensely popular. In the Victorian
period he carne to epitomise an old fashioned, informal, personal style of
doctoring, which took an overbearingly moralising tone and combined it
333 The late 18th and 19th-century 'curious' appealed, perhaps more, to those outside the
medical profession and it emphasized the extraordinary and freakish, for example "A
Menstruating Man: A Curiousform of Hermaphroditism" (1899), or "Account of William
Dempster, who swallowed a table-knife nine inches long .;" (1824), both cited in Kennedy
(2004) p333
334 Kennedy (2004) p327
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with sensational, miraculous, and sometimes supernatural elements.t" As
such, Warren countered the clinical drive toward a realist medical discourse,
which stipulated the use of scientific nomenclature and plain language
devoid of emotion and subjective judgement. Indeed, 19th-century medical
reformers campaigned successfully for a formal, objective, professional
clinical discourse, which in the clinical sphere, at least, slowly replaced the
gothic note that hung on from the 18th-century 'curious' case.336
Reynolds himself combines gothic and medical discourses. Nevertheless,
where Warren's case histories represent medical practise as gothic in itself;
Reynolds' medics are distinguished from a gothic background by bringing
natural, material order to the disordered state. The bodysnatching surgeon
well exemplifies this feature of Reynolds in the scenes that follow the
incident of the waking corpse. When the patient begins raving of heaven
and hell, his friend becomes alarmed by the uncharacteristic verve, which
seemed like "an emanation from a source belonging to the mysteries of
other worlds". When the surgeon hears of this he passes off the delirium
"with the coolness of a professional man who saw nothing extraordinary in
such results following so strange a resuscitation, from a death-like trance ... "
and dismisses any superstitious proclivity in the visitor with the assertion
that the patient "may rave of any nonsense ... but that is no reason why we
should allow ourselves to be affected by it - as I see you are.,,337 Such a
claim aligns the surgeon on the one hand with the fictional scientist Victor
Frankenstein, who had never "feared the apparition of a spirit. .. " and on the
other, with the scientific medic for whom all things gothic, mysterious and
supernatural are beyond the bounds of professional expcrtise.i"
33S Desmond (1989) documents the medical reform drive in the second quarter of the 19th
century. He describes how the professional standard shifted from an emphasis on good
breeding and a classical education, to a scientific training. See pp32-33 for summary
336 To this day examples of the medical curiosities persist in the popular realm. Television
schedules are full of stories of obesity, rare genetic conditions, extraordinary feats of
survival etc
337 Reynolds (1844a) p349 (col a)
338 Shelley et a1 (1818/1994) p80
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One of the most striking features of Warren's Passages is its overbearing
moral tone. Indeed, in the Preface to the 1854 edition, the author describes
himself as having the feelings, "not of a Novelist, but of a MORALIST,,339.
His 'cases' include titles like The Forger, The Man about Town, which
make direct links between diseases of the body and diseased morals,
although almost all his stories have some moral message to impart. In The
Man about Town, Warren relates the case ofa man whose debauchery, his
"constant feeding on garbage", lead to an agonising, tortuous death, which
is described in detai1.34oWarren is near comic in his judgemental verbosity,
yet the sense of a disease causing moral miasma was deadly serious and the
patient caused his own death by "wallowing swinishly in the foulest sinks of
depravity, heading among the acknowledged outcasts, commingling
intimately with the very scum and refuse of society, battening on the
rottenness of obscenity, and revelling amid the hellish orgies celebrated
nightly in haunts of nameless infamy.,,341The imperious tone speaks for
itself.
In turning to Reynolds' Mr Wentworth, an entirely different model emerges
of the relationship between professional medic and the morality, or not, of
hislher patients. Wentworth is a struggling middle class medic, initially
drawn into the narrative by Ellen, who at this point on her 'road to ruin' is
full-term pregnant and about to give birth to an illegitimate child.
Wentworth is brought blindfold to the house and somehow delivers Ellen of
a baby boy in complete darkness without seeing her face. The surgeon takes
£40 for his trouble and the baby, who is to be cared for by his wife. He
leaves Ellen exhausted and forlorn but with her reputation still intact. Some
days later the doctor is called to the house again and is able to identify Ellen
as the mother of the baby he had so recently delivered. Ellen is terrified, but
Wentworth is compassionate. He reassures her that her secret is safe and
devises a way for her to visit the baby in secret. This episode serves to
339 Warren (1854) pv
340 Warren (1830) "Man About Town" in Morrison and Baldick (1995) p187 "Man About
Town" was first published in Blackwood's Magazine as were all of Warrens' Passages, but
the collected editions remained popular for much of the 19th century.
341 Warren (1830) "Man About Town" in Morrison and Baldick (1995) pl92
131
emphasise the doctor's adherence to an ethical code that strictly maintains
patient confidentiality and suspends moral judgement.
On another occasion, Wentworth tends to a well-known society mistress,
who has been badly burnt in a house fire. The surgeon is commissioned by
her lover to spare no expense and it is in this instance that he makes claims
to professional medical training: "I possess certificates," and knowledge, "I
am not ignorant of my profession ... ,,342 In the same scene, when questioned
on his willingness to treat a woman of equivocal moral standing, the doctor
asserts that "medical men have no scruples of that kind.,,343 In the event the
patient is restored to full health, unscarred even, and the surgeon is duly
recompensed for his able handling of the case: "Mr Wentworth became rich
in one day.,,344 The accent placed upon the character of the surgeon is of a
man of no small skill, an expert of impeccable integrity, whose professional
allegiance excludes moral reckoning of any kind. Man and profession are
duly recompensed.
Most interesting is the fact that Mr Wentworth's function is not only
confined to the restoration of physical health. Paradoxically by suspending
his own moral judgement and keeping patient confidentiality, Wentworth
allows Ellen and the society mistress to reinstitute their own moral standing.
Ellen eventually forces the child's father to marry her and can then openly
be a mother to her son and the society mistress, having returned to good
health, is wedded by her lover. According to the likes of Samuel Warren,
and indeed the utilitarian 'improvers', lost virtue has to do with
undeveloped reason and in Warren's worldview disturbed morals lead to
disturbances in physical health. Reynolds' narrative reverses this and
positions virtue as something that can be lost by dint of hardships suffered
at the hands of an unjust society, which cannot be rectified by fatuous
attempts at educating the victim. For Reynolds the restoration of virtue
342 Reynolds (1846a) p381 (col a)
343 Ibid p380 (col b)
344 Reynolds (1846b) p94 (col b)
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relies at least partly, upon specialist knowledge - the reason and science-
of a professional expert.
In reality the actual material benefits to patients from the new 'scientific
medicine' of the 1840's were patchy to say the least.345 Shortt (1983) has
argued on this count that medical professionalization coincided with a
middle-class cultural appropriation of science but was not caused by it.
According to Shortt, the 18th-century appreciation for natural knowledge, as
developed from the polite, domestic model of the sort that inspired
Radcliffe, had become by 1840, "an essential component in the value
system of the entrepreneurial middle class. Science was a mode of cultural
expression and a means of social legitimation.Y" In a sense, the
instrumental value of Radcliffe's beneficent, though rather passive, science
has been realised, ideally, ifnot practically. Professionalising medics
sought to gain a place in the day-to-day material lives of their clientele by
providing what medical services they could, while seeking a place in
middle-class value systems by using, not the content, but the rhetoric of
science.
Indeed, Shortt cites Peterson (1978) who comments that doctors "gained
stature not because they could always act effectively, but because only they
could name, describe and explain.,,347 Such a strategy of course, produces
the idea of special knowledge, unobtainable by those who do not know the
special method, which in itself is alluring and inclined to bring alive the
desire for it, especially in such an emotionally charged arena as health care.
The link that Radcliffe and Co made between reason and virtue is taken up,
remodelled and emphasised for a different people and a different period -
the value placed upon science, and presumably, then reason, is taken up by
the middle class professional doctor, who, in Reynolds' popular view, is
345 See Shortt (1983) p58 for useful summary of scientific medicine; Sparks (2009) for a
summary of science and fictional doctors p12-22
346 Shortt (1983) p67
347 M Jeanne Peterson (1978) The medical profession in mid- Victorian London cited in
Shortt (1983) p63
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able to promote both the physical and the moral health of his patient
community.
In the previous chapter, I argue that the fictional detective shares a heritage
in the gothic genre with the mad scientist, although each represents an
opposing model of science. The detective can be seen as an embodiment of
reason that in Radcliffe's 18th-century gothic is a source of individual virtue,
which when relocated to the detective becomes a source of moral order in
society. Reynolds' doctors are similar in this respect and might be seen as a
precursor to the detective. Along the same lines, Worthington (2005) has
drawn attention to the importance of Samuel Warren's Passages as a
prototype for the detective story in which the reader is introduced to a
professional case structure given by an observational eye. The moralising
aspect of Warren's case histories is repeated in detective stories and, like the
detective, Warren's doctor takes on a disciplinary role in condemning
deviance. Reynolds' middle-class scientific professional is another
important model for the detective figure - the rational, scientific, middle-
class professional who is able to restore order, whether that be moral, social
or corporeal order.
Given his plot is melodramatic and peopled by typified professionals
including clergy, bankers, government spies, lawyers, a mesmerist and two
medics, Reynolds shows surprising alacrity in giving his storylines the
texture of 'truth'. In one context, he makes a mockery of the emotionally
cold scientist, who in all the grand regalia of his objectivity, has no clue that
he is being passed off as irrelevant. Yet in a different context, the similarly
icy anatomist who begins as macabre body-snatcher ends, through a process
of emotional and physical distancing from the worst of the grisly details, as
professional healer. Reynolds seems to be building on the commonsense
feeling, sociologically formalised by Robert K Merton (1938), that the
innovator, particularly in science, is both challenging and desirable at the
same time.348 Further to this sociological instinct, Reynolds' big picture
348 The innovator is a theme that returns in this study. See pp140-42 for further examples
134
anticipates the ecological vision of Everett C Hughes (1971) in its pool of
professionals all vying for a position in the landscape of the functions,
which supply the needs of the people. Except in Reynolds' tale, it is
hypocrites who serve themselves without fulfilling any of society'S needs,
who are punished and disappear from the plot. In other words, this is
Hughes' model with the edge of a morality-tale.
Reynolds' position at the apex of an emerging mass market and his
enormous popularity with lower and middle classes gives him a special
position in the history of popular representation. His popularity meant that
he was much imitated in his own time and beyond.l" The point here is that,
although Reynolds' fiction has not stood the test of time, his influence is felt
in those authors who are still read today. In this way he was likely an
important vehicle in the trend to place increasing cultural value upon
science in his own time and beyond. With the vision of the scientific
professional in place, the full-blown detective novel still did not arise for
another decade or so. The next chapter focuses on how detective methods,
scientific methods and narrative methods converge in a detective narrative.
349 See Thomas (1996) in Reynolds and Thomas (1846/1996) for summary pix
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CHAPTER FIVE
REASON, MAGIC AND VILLAINOUS INGENUITY
Mary E Braddon (1861) Trail of a Serpent
GWM Reynolds' popular Mysteries (1844-46) demonstrates the value of the
newly rationalised professions in a plot peopled by institutional caricatures
of clergy, bankers, government spies, lawyers and medics. Most of these
are hypocritical, self-serving and hopelessly out of touch with the needs and
wants of the people, a function that Everett C Hughes identified as being the
key for the development and survival of any institutionalised profession.
The only humanitarian professional characters are the medical men - an
anatomist and a surgeon. In something bordering on a morality tale it is
these characters who are rewarded, while the self serving types are
punished. Reynolds' major contribution establishes a role for science as a
positive instrumental force in healing the sick. This is opposed to the kinds
of factual science that were doled out to middle and working class publics
considered to be in deficit of knowledge and virtue, a system which, for
Reynolds, encouraged hypocritical freeloaders.
Though relatively little known today, Reynolds influence was second to
none. Sitting as he did at the apex of the early mass market, he was in a
prime position to add to, set a tone for or perhaps even transform in some
manner, the popular sphere as it was itself growing. Probably for this
reason he was an influence on Mary Braddon, but also even on those
authors (like Dickens) who professed to take strongly against him.35o
Reynolds surgeon-anatomist is an important model for the detective figure -
the rational, scientific, middle-class professional, a man of science who is
able to restore order.3S1
350 See Braddon 'My First Novel' in Braddon and Willis (1861/2003) p422; Maxwell
(1992) p166-170
3S I See Barton (2003) who finds the label 'men of science' commonly used to describe a
number of different professional men who used or purported to use a scientific method in
the 19th century. Her period is actually mid-Victorian, later than Reynolds' Mysteries,
nevertheless the term seems appropriate, and was likely in use by the time Braddon was at
work
Two decades later Mary Braddon' s Trail of a Serpent (1861) presents a
network of specialists whose particular skill-profiles mark them out as
experts, but who have little identification with particular professional bodies
as Reynolds' medic does.352 Rational specialisation is almost a taken-for
granted norm, yet in the course of his narrative, Braddon's detective
actively disassociates himself from state licensed police detectives, who are
blundering fools in comparison. Instead of emphasizing the combined
potential of professional status and scientific method as Reynolds did,
Braddon's story focuses on the rational, scientific process itself and
explores the different forms that it can take. So, although her narrative
upholds the power and value of scientific methods of various kinds,
Braddon does not share Reynolds' enthusiasm for an institutionalised
professional science. Her detective is an independent expert whose function
is restorative and, like Reynolds' doctor, conducts a process based on
reason, which has an allegiance to science. Braddon's scientist, restorative
like Reynolds' grave-robbing anatomist, is the equally shadowy eccentric
magician-scientist who alone can provide elements of expertise that evade
Braddon's detective.
Although Trail is the first actual detective novel in this study, its narrative
reverses the usual logic of the detective plot to create a 'howdunnit' as
opposed to a 'whodunnit,' in which the murderer, Jabez North, is known to
the reader from the outset. 353 The novel then relates the parallel plots of
North's criminal career and the detective, Mr Peters' investigative process.
Crossing both plots is the enigmatic, magician-scientist, Laurent Blurroset.
These three characters form the principal focus of investigation here. They
all use, and represent, reason or science in different ways and, because the
narrative of a 'howdunit' is essentially taken up with method, method will
352 Trail of a Serpent was first published as Three Times Dead (1860), this version sold
badly, but was edited and reissued as Trail in 1861, selling 1000 copies in a week, it
became an immediate best seller. It was serialised in the Halfpenny Journal (1864-65).
Trail was reprinted several times throughout the 19th century. See Carnell (2000); Willis in
Braddon and Willis (1861/2003). The version used here is the 1861 text, taken from an
1890 text of Trail published by Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co in Braddon and
Willis (1861/2003)
353 See Willis Afterword in Braddon and Willis (186112003) p408-414
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form the main focus of this chapter. How far the fictional detective relates
to and is constructed from the image of the real profession is a topic that
will be taken up in the next chapter. That said, Braddon does make a
significant and lasting contribution to the construction of popular
conceptions of the investigative process.
In 1864 the Westminster Review testified to the importance of Bradd on's
work in establishing the detective as a familiar cultural figure, in writing
that "[i]f it be good to stimulate our predatory instincts ... while we trace the
dodgings and doublings of an accomplished scoundrel matched with an
adroit detective, then let all praise be given to Miss Braddon.,,354 Her
influence upon the emerging detective genre is rarely given the credit it
deserves. Braddon combines models drawn from an adventuring,
indomitable detective-type based upon Bow Street traditions, and a
rationalised vision of their process, which was partly derived from
contemporary popular sciences like phrenology and partly from debates
about how proper science should be conducted.r" Since her time, these two
elements, rational process, and what I will call 'picaresque detection', have
reverberated through subsequent generations of detective fictions. 356
The association between detective and scientist that Braddon paints is
equally significant. It is an early example of a relationship that persists
forever afterward and occasionally is conjoined in characters as diverse as
Conan Doyle's (I887) Sherlock Holmes and Kathy Reichs' (1997-2010)
anthropologist, Temperance Brennon. In her pairing of scientist with
detective, Braddon very much sits on the crest of a wave, as though
354 Quoted in Willis "Afterword" in Braddon and Willis (186112003) p410
355 The Bow Street Runners 1749-1839 were a mobile police force attached to Bow Street
Court in London. They were the brainchild of Henry and John Fielding. See Rawlings
(1995) for a discussion of their initial aim of investigating crime, although they later
incorporated regular patrols
356 The rational component of detective work was made famous by Edgar Allen Poe's
(1841-45) detective Auguste Dupin, whose process is intellectual, although both he and the
crimes he investigates are so rarefied as to be too improbable for an everyday detective. The
Murders in the Rue Morgue (1841) The Mystery of Marie Roget (1842-3) and The
Purloined Letter (1845) are the only of Poe's stories to feature Auguste Dupin.
Rational process and derring-do combine in varying proportions, of which extremes are
represented in 'golden age' fiction of authors like Agatha Christie and 'hard boiled' fictions
of authors like Raymond Chandler respectively.
anticipating Holmes and his scientific descendants. It is notable that in
Trail science is a necessary addendum to the detective's process, which
appears like a poor relation in comparison to an exotic cousin. As such, her
fiction provides an ideal opportunity for comparing methods, or models of
reason, between scientist and detective as they were perceived and
constructed in the formative years of detective fiction. I will argue that such
a comparison reveals that the model of reason exemplified by most mad
scientists is an alternative to the detective model and does not constitute a
critique. It represents the mysterious, intuitive side of reason, while the
detective demonstrates a more mechanical, open process.
Braddon created her detective-scientist pair in response to her villain who
"reigned triumphant till the Nemesis of the last chapter" as she described it
thirty years later.357 Here is a third model of reason, now turned to evil
ends. Within my selection of texts, there is a general shift away from
passions that were drivers of disorder at the tum of the 18th and 19th
centuries. Broadly speaking, what arises instead, to some extent, in
Frankenstein, and more substantially in mysteries fiction, in Braddon's
Trail, and in sensation fiction generally, is a concern with how a stratified
society might create monsters such that individuals occupying marginal
positions get forced into transgression, as their situation leaves them little
choice.358 The role of reason, and indeed of science, and the ways it may
function either to order societal forces and minimise crime, or to further
disorder them, becomes a fulcrum of interest over and above the potential
debasing effect of the passions. That is, of course, the crux of detective
fiction. The role of reason in the restoration of moral order is the one
remaining motif of Ann Radcliffe' s 18th_century gothic, which, in a 19th_
357 Braddon (1893) 'My First Novel' The Idler ~25 quoted in Braddon and Willis
(186112003) p422
358 For a Marxist reading of Frankenstein as metaphor for capitalist society in which the
Creature is equivalent to proletariat, see Moretti (1983) p83-90; see Reynolds (1846)
Mysteries for an example of how urban institutions corrupt; see Humpherys (1991) on this
topic. Sensation fiction is more concerned with how the institutions of family and law
combine with gender politics to create monsters, see Pykett (1994) pp8-13 on the social
significance of sensation fiction; there is the genre of so called Newgate fictions, in which
the focus of the narrative was on the criminal as hero/anti hero. Examples include: Charles
Dickens (1838) Oliver Twist and William Harrison Ainsworth's (1839) Jack Sheppard
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century reworking, includes the realisation that reason can also be a means
of deliberate transgression, as it is for Braddon's villain. From this point of
view, Trail is one of the first ofa slew of popular novels about reason that
arise in the form of the detective story.
Beginning with Braddon's initiating actor, I will consider how her villain
reflects a shift away from the cultural conflation of intellectual and moral
virtue. Moving on to restorative characters, I examine the process of the
magician-scientist and show that some of what looks like magic today was
in fact perfectly acceptable science, albeit popular science, in the 19th
century. Braddon, herself, plays upon the indistinctness of the boundary and
in doing so creates a classically odd and exotic scientist. In comparison the
detective's process is more prosaic, combining traditions of adventure and
crime with a systematic approach to data gathering. In the final section, I
attempt to draw such exotic and mechanical visions together, to explore the
meaning of enchanted science as opposed to the more down to earth model.
I will argue that Braddon's fiction holds within it a dual conception of
reason, which was widely debated across popular and intellectual cultural
domains, as both imaginative and mechanical, and that her scientist and her
detective represent different ends of this scale. Furthermore, I will suggest
that this duality of reason is reiterated in the generic figures of the detective
and the mad scientist forever afterward. Last I come full circle, to the
villain again, and show how debates about genius relate it to the imaginative
model of reason, which is exemplified by the mad scientist - a feature
which makes him a particularly good candidate to be an unequivocally bad,
or evil, villain.
REASON - A MEANS OF DELIBERATE DISORDER
Jabez North launches the action of Trail by disrupting the lawful and moral
order of a little town called Slopperton. Braddon's murderer is every bit the
melodramatic villain, his most potent weapon is a rare and calculating
intellect. He says of himself that " .. .it pleased that Power [Heaven or Fate]
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to give me nothing but my brains for weapons ... ,,359 Within the confines of
the current corpus, the possibility that reason need not be tied to moral
virtue first arises with Frankenstein (1818) and though Reynolds does allow
the darker side of rationality to emerge in a minor way, Braddon makes very
much more of the theme.36o One of the significant steps made by Reynolds
had been to recognise the uselessness of imposing 'useful knowledge' upon
the masses. Braddon's vision of malevolent reason takes a step further by
positioning the outcome of useful knowledge as a function of the moral
character of its bearer, entirely switching the assumed order of events in
which moral virtue inevitably follows from intellectual virtue.
In another way, Braddon's juxtaposition of reason and crime in a single
character is evocative of Reynolds' anatomist, whose dark science reveals
the ambiguities of innovation, which deviates from social norms, but at the
same time has its own restorative value. Braddon's villain, on the other
hand, has no such restorative function. He innovates in order to lift himself
from one marginal extreme of society to another. Initially fished from
'Slopperton's' river, North is brought up a charity foundling and rises to
become something of a town mascot as "assistant and usher at the academy
of Dr. Tappenden.Y" Braddon parodies the smug respectability of
Victorian charity, for in the eyes of Slopperton, North can do no wrong.
Yet his aspirations do not match his social position. The kind of wealth and
status that he truly desires, a goal undoubtedly championed by many a
Sloppertonian, is not available to lowly foundlings, who have lived off the
town's charity. This is another example of a Mertonian innovator who is
driven to unlawful means in striving for a goal that is culturally sanctioned.
In a 1959 addendum to Merton's deviance typology, Cloward, endorsed by
Merton, points out that while the original scheme had posited a differential
opportunity-structure, which provided greater or lesser access to legitimate
359 Braddon and Willis (1861/2003) pin
360 For example Reynolds draws an alarming picture of surveillance work undertaken by
the State which draws on the typified emblems of knowledge/science given flesh in 'The
Examiner' see Reynolds (1846a) pp75-76
361 Braddon and Willis (186112003) p6
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means, access to illegitimate means was also stratified. There are "socially
patterned differences of access to learning how to perform particular kinds
of deviant roles ...,,362 In other words, social networks provide support and
training in criminal technique, just as they would for any legitimatised
professional practice. Although there was a strong tradition of writing about
criminal social networks that could supply necessary know how, safe
houses, access to black markets and such like, Braddon's miscreant is part
of no such system. 363 Reynolds' anatomist, for example, must rely on a
network of grave robbing expertise since he himself has not mastered the
technicalities of illicit exhumation. In Trail, what replaces North's need for
any such a resource is his rarefied intellect.
The notion that reason can replace the need for society is a recurring theme
too, in mad science stories, in which the scientist is a loner and all the more
dangerous for it. The idea that social isolation can lead to immoral
behaviour is a central concern of Adam Smith's (1759) The Theory of Moral
Sentiments in which he argues that all moral restraint, or conscience, arises
through two-way social relations. Sympathy and self-restraint, neither of
which are very evident in characters such as Braddon's villain or in Victor
Frankenstein, arise as a result of empathy with another's state and a
concomitant moulding of our own expression to fit the extent of the other's
empathy. What this teaches us according to Smith are "[t]he soft, the
gentle, the amiable virtues ... [of] ... indulgent humanity ... [and] ... the
virtues of self-denial, of self-government. .. ,,364 Although Adam Smith's
philosophy prefigured Braddon's period by more than a century, the
proposal that social relationships are necessary for the development of
moral restraint, becomes almost a common sense dictum that runs through
many a narrative of the scientific villain, or the evil genius.365
362 Merton (1959) p188
363 Examples of fictional criminal communities occur in Charles Dickens (1838) Oliver
Twist; William Harrison Ainsworth's (1839) Jack Sheppard; and GWM Reynolds (1846)
Mysteries of London
364 Adam Smith (1759/2009) Loc 395
365 See Shapin (1996) pp I06-9 on the development in the Ith century of a cultural distrust
(among natural philosophers) of individual, or private, intellectual activity. For a modem
example see Weingart et al (2003) who find that in modem feature films, those disciplines
conducted in secrecy are the ones that are most likely to flout ethical values
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North, is just such a lone, and evil, genius, which raises an interesting
question about whether he could be called a mad scientist. His structural
function is unquestionably disordering, though that does not necessarily
make him a mad scientist. He is repeatedly referred to as philosopher who
is also "something of a physiologist as well as a mathematician" with a
"calculating brain and icy temperament'=". His object of study is people,
not nature, though his purpose is instrumental and selfish, he does not invent
a tangible object of the kind that can run out of his control. It is probable,
too, that without the insignia of a laboratory, he would not be widely
recognised as a scientist.
The laboratory is a typified emblem of science, which sometimes serves as a
diagnostic feature. Haynes (1994), for example, dismisses even the most
scientific of detectives, Sherlock Holmes, as irrelevant to considerations of
the scientist in fiction since he is similar to "routine crime-solvers such as
Agatha Christie's Hercule Poirot." 367 There is every reason to believe,
however, that such 'routine crime solvers' are scientists, or 'men of
science', in the sense that they must gather data and eliminate false
possibilities and that this approach, which forms the substantive part of a
detective narrative, effectively constitutes a form of scientific method.i'"
Indeed scholars argue over whether such methods approximate induction or
are closer to a hypothetico-deductive method.i'" The narrative of literary
laboratory scientist, on the other hand, is far less scientific, the process
366 Braddon and Willis (186112003) p143 and p180, respectively. For examples of North as
a 'philosopher' see Braddon and Willis (186112003) p8S and p92
367 Haynes (1994) p179
368 I use the 19th-century term 'men of science' here to show that I am not referring to
professional image and identification in describing detectives as scientists. I have already
noted the fact that in the 19th century many professionals were known as 'men of science', a
term that was preferred to 'scientist' because the professional bounds of science were much
more loosely drawn in this period than they are now. See Barton (2003) for a full
discussion of this
369 For example Agassi (1982); Smith (1994) p211-237
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being almost always obscured and amounting to something much more like
magic than any scientific method, a theme to which I will return below. 370
Mad scientist, or no, Braddon quite clearly designates North as an
intellectual, loner and acquisitive villain - a genius, even. In the 19th
century, Isaac Newton had long provided a potent model of a 'real' lone
genius, not evil admittedly, but definitely eccentric. Yet, Richard Yeo
(1988) has charted the way in which such eccentricity began to destabilise
the assumed link between intellectual and moral virtue. He finds that such a
shift was influenced partly by early 19th-century psychological ideas relating
genius to insanity and partly by the revelation of Newton's temporary
mental collapse. The idea of a genius as an extraordinary personality,
perhaps verging on madness, inevitably renders such a person a loner, even
in the midst of society. In Smith's terms the major drive for developing
moral sentiments, the two-way flow of empathy, cannot function fully for a
person who is by their very nature extraordinary, or mad. Indeed, in 1837,
William Whewell seems to recognise this problem when he describes
Newton's genius as "almost irreconcilable with the common conditions of
human life" requiring a "steadiness of will" and "the strongest character" as
a means of resisting vice.371
That is not to say that such a figure as an evil genius did not exist until 19th_
century cultural currents brought it to the surface, though the association
with secular science is a transformation of a figure that had often been
portrayed as magical. 372 In gothic horror fictions, Lewis' The Monk and
Dacre's ZojIoya, transgressive genius is located within supernatural
individuals like Matilda and Zofloya, who have the power to supply the
means by which Ambrosio and Victoria can meet their desires. All the evil
of Radcliffe's gothic, on the other hand, is located within the earthly powers
of individuals whose means reside in their elevated social rank. The
370 See Weart (1988) for a discussion of magical influence on popular portrayals of 20th_
century physicists; For Frankenstein's magical process see Smith (1994) "Frankenstein and
Natural Magick" in Bann (1994); and Ellis (2000) p152
371 Whewell (1837) from The History of the Inductive Sciences, quoted in Yeo (1988) p276
372 For example, Prospero in Shakespeare's The Tempest
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structural narratives of all of these villains are the same, beginning with
personal desire and ending in a disordered world:
• The villain desires wealth/powerlknowledge. The villain uses
exceptional powers of reason/social rank/magic to pursue his/her
goals. In doing so the villain creates disorder.
In the villain's narrative, magic, reason and social power all make the same
kind of sense. Means of action are, of course, interchangeable as Propp
(1928) shows in defining fairy tale functions. 373 Braddon's North is a
classic gothic villain who, like Radcliffe's Marquis will stop at nothing, has
no redemptive feeling and is entirely self-serving. What differs between
Frankenstein, whose narrative is also encompassed in these functions, and
North, is that the former does preserve some of the association between
reason and virtue. The distinction here points to one made by Andrew
Tudor (1989a) in his study of the mad scientist in 20th-century horror
movies, in which "evil men pursuing their own ends" are contrasted against
"good men corrupted by their overwhelming commitment to science. ,,374
Frankenstein's flaw is hubris as opposed to the near fiendish greed of the
gothic malefactor.
REASON - A MEANS OF RESTORING ORDER
Countering North are Braddon's detective, Mr Peters, and her magician-
scientist, Laurent Blurosset. It takes two brains and two styles of reason to
put the correct man behind bars, free the innocent one and restore the town
of Slopperton to order. The narrative function of both characters is entirely
focussed on, and responsive to North, who threatens to create ever more
expansive ripples of disorder. Following a bungled robbery involving a
murder, which Peters investigates, North fakes his own death by switching
clothes with his (conveniently) dead twin and flees Slopperton for Paris,
373 Propp (1928/1968) pp25-65
374 Tudor (l989a) p589
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where Blurosset opposes him. He arrives with an urgent need to secure an
income, though he "does not care to grow grey and decrepit in making a
fortune by that slow and uncertain mode which people call 'honest
industry",375. In an ironic twist of the aphorism credited to Francis Bacon,
'knowledge is power', North makes it his business to discover the secrets of
the affluent. Fixing on a rich young woman, Valerie de Cevennes, whom he
suspects of clandestine love, he undertakes a little surveillance and a few
gentle bribes to gamer all the data he needs to overpower her. In a sense, he
subverts the detective process to his own ends and the process is then
mirrored and surpassed by his two adversaries.
Ordering and disordering characters of this narrative are in an arms race,
each being pushed to develop greater methodological artifice by the
ingenuity of the other. Such a phenomenon is of course well known to real
agencies of the law today, where each new forensic technology is matched
by a novel technique for evading it on the part of the criminal.376 It is
unlikely though that this was the case at the time of Bradd on's writing since
the real detective work of the period was inclined to be distinctly
unsophisticated.l" All the more interesting then is the notion that the arms
race is an inevitability arising from pitting adversaries against one another
in a plausible narrative. Having introduced such a powerful villain,
Braddon requires, if you like, an equal and opposite force to counter him.
Something similar to an 'arms race' narrative is described by Davida
Charney (2003) in her reading of Dava Sobel's (1995) bestselling factual, or
perhaps, more accurately, 'factional', popular science book Longitude,
which relates the story of the invention of the marine chronometer. Charney
finds that Sobel adopts a 'horse-race' frame, which casts scientists as
37S Braddon and Willis (186112003) pl73
376 Examples of criminal counter tactics can be as simple as wearing gloves to avoid
leaving fingerprints, or as complex as computer hacking. Criminologist Paul Ekblom
(1997) has used metaphors from evolutionary biology to describe such an arms race and
advocates that technological designers take account of the need for ever changing security
measures
377 See Emsley (2000) p93 and Robert Morris (2006) "Crime Does Not Pay" in Emsley and
Shpayer-Makov (2006) and (2007) "History of Criminal Investigation" in Newburn et al
(2007)
individual heroes or villains in a competitive arena.378 From an analysis of
reviews of Sobel's book posted on Amazon, Charney finds that most
reviewers accept such framing without question. She uses this evidence to
support the notion that 'popular media' are responsible for creating a
pervasive understanding of science as an individualistic process, and
wrongly so, in her terms. Yet she does not consider that the horse-race
frame is potentially the very thing that readers on Amazon found so
compelling about Sobel's book.379 Indeed, it is likely that Sobel has
engaged many readers with the science of measuring longitude, who would
not have read a book about chronometers unless it was set within such a
classic narrative. That such a narrative form is in itself engaging is
evidenced by the example of its long history in popular fiction, and
Braddon's novel is just one of the many best-selling examples of it.
The Magician-Scientist
Of the two of Braddon's avenging angels, North's real alter ego is Laurent
Blurosset. First drawn into the plot by North himself, the magician-scientist
is the villain's equal in the coolness of impassivity, having "come to hold
everything beyond my little laboratory too lightly," as he himself
confesses.i'" North hires Blurosset to read the future for Valerie de
Cevennes in her cards. She, meantime, is persuaded by North that her
378 The conception of science as a 'race' has a long history that Nerlich (2009) sees as
arising from the 19th-century insistence on natural science as progress. She also describes
the 'race' to achieve the first human clone and its framing as such in both popular and
scientific discourse. See Nerlich (2009) "Breakthroughs and Disasters: The (Ethical) Use
of Future-Oriented Metaphors in Science Communication" in Nerlich et al (eds) (2009)
379 In the essay entitled Interpreting the 'Variorum', Stanley Fish (1976) describes
'interpretive communities' as groups of like-minded individuals, who share similar
assumptions about how a text should be read and converge on the same interpretation. The
idea has been empirically tested and seems to hold water. See Dorfman (1996) who finds
people untrained in literary criticism are more respond to the content of stories while those
with literary training focus on narrative, structure, genre etc. The point being that a
community of Amazon reviewers may not have articulated any views on narrative
technique in the way that Charney does, unless they happen to be a particularly literary
sample of reviewers. And some readers may have enjoyed Sobel's book because of its
framing, without realising it. It is possible that some people conflate the narrative with how
real world science works, but on the other hand they likely would not have read the book at
all if it had played down the human conflict in favour of process as Charney advocates.
380 Braddon and Willis (186112003) pl83 Here is a lone scientist, who has some awareness
of the value of social relations
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husband is unfaithful. Blurosset's reading confirms her unhappy union and
predicts her husband's imminent death, which "bears no outward signs of
violence.,,381 All this is undertaken in order to fire Valerie's jealous rage
and prepare the ground for her to consider revenge by poison. North is
successful, and Blurosset seemingly acquiescent. Valerie, made improbably
biddable by grief, agrees to the purchase of a little "something which will
change a glass of wine into a death warrant, but which will defy the scrutiny
of a college ofphysicians.,,382 Blurosset, however, secretly reads North's
duplicity in the cards, and supplies a drug, which creates a death-like state,
but is ultimately harmless. With this drug, Valerie poisons her husband and
believing him dead, is drawn into a veil of secrecy with North and
subsequently is compelled to marry him. Later in the novel, Blurosset
restores Valerie's husband to health following a prolonged fever and his
final act brings together wronged husband and wife and ends the magician-
scientist's part in the plot.
Though he has a restorative function, in his first appearance as an associate
of North's, Blurosset appears malign and his true function is not revealed
for some chapters to come. The sense of latent potential for malevolence is
highlighted by the show of magic. Like the Satanic tempters of gothic
horror novels, Blurroset engages the powers of magic and science equally,
being able to read the future in a pack of cards, to concoct potions and
poisons or to heal the sick.383 He has arcane manuscripts and books heaped
about him in piles: "Mathematical charts, inscribed with figures such as
perhaps neither Newton or Leplace [sic] ever dreamed of. Volumes in old
worm-eaten bindings, and written in strange languages long since dead and
forgotten upon this earth; but they all seem familiar to this pale student,
whose blue spectacles bend over pages of crabbed Arabic ... ,,384At the
381 Braddon and Willis (1861/2003) p150
382 Ibid P 153
383 For example Matilda of Lewis' (1794) TheMonk, and Zofloya of Dacre's (1806) novel
of the same name. See pp 91-97 for discussion of these
384 Braddon and Willis (186112003) p275
same time, "He is a chemist who will one day work a revolution in the
chemical science ... he is a fanatic ... his crucible is his mistress.,,385
Despite such exoticism, Braddon's magic is very much more rooted in the
everyday world than are the dark and powerful alchemical activities
represented by the gothic horror novelists. Blurosset is not himself an
ambiguous natural-supernatural being, even ifhe is a little unconventional
and his setting, for all its magical-scientific paraphernalia, is distinctly
domestic, cosy even. He lives in "a cheerful little apartment lighted by gas.
There is a small stove, near a table, before which is seated a gentlemanly-
looking man ...,,386The homely nature of the scene belies the exotic
magical-scientific performance that follows when he first meets Valerie. As
a consequence, both science, specifically chemistry, and magic of a
divinatory kind, are domesticated, as it were. Since, Blurosset practises
both in equal proportion, it is difficult to place him as either scientist or
wizard, or to work out which end of Simon Locke's (2005) scale of
enchanted science and 'scientized' magic, he falls into. In the gothic
examples this was more clear-cut since the beings themselves were magical.
Braddon, herself, equivocates on a similar point, for his mystery in that
respect is part of his attraction. Indeed Blurosset is "the fashion in
Paris ... [and] the rage in London ... he rarely stirs beyond the threshold of
his own door, though his presence is eagerly sought for in scientific coteries,
where opinion is still, however, divided as to whether he is charlatan or a
great man. The materialists sneer-the spiritualists believe.,,387 Here
Braddon engages with a cultural ambivalence over whether 'proper science'
should include the spirit world as an object of study or not, spiritualism
having been imported to England from America in the 1850·s. For although
the practise of card reading is a folk-magic skill, Braddon is careful to point
out firstly that Blurosset is a 'pseudo-magician' as opposed to a pseudo-
scientist, and secondly that it is the 'mighty dead' who privilege him with
385 Ibid P 151
386 Ibid p147
387 Ibid p278
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information about the future.388 So, his kind of fortune telling is, by nature,
spiritualist. Since spirit contacts were plausibly a topic for scientific
investigation, Blurosset probably falls into the enchanted science end of the
magic-science spectrum, which Braddon celebrates for all its exoticism,
mystique and restorative potential.
Indeed, what we are given of Blur osset's method is dressed up as decidedly
scientific, or at least, mathematical. For example, even as he reads the
future from a deck of cards, Blurosset "seems to be working some abstruse
calculations with these groups of cards, assisted by those he has in his hand.
The spectacles wander from threes to the nines; from the sevens to the fives;
back again; across again; from five to nine, from three to seven; from five to
three, from seven to nine ... ,,389Reading the future is the magician-
scientist's answer to North's particular talent for something close to mind
reading. As a means of getting close to Valerie, North confronts her maid
with the (hypothesised) fact of her mistress's secret marriage "One glance at
the girl's face tells him he has struck home, and has hit upon the entire truth.
He is striking in the dark; but he is a mathematician, and can calculate the
effect of every blow.,,39oBraddon dresses up the ability to read thoughts or
feelings as a science that can be calculated, or at least reasoned through.
Like spiritualism, in her own time, the science of reading people is made
credible by the contemporary cultural belief, contested as it may have been,
in the sciences of phrenology and physiognomy, which are heavily
referenced throughout her work.391
388 Ibid p278. For a summary history of spiritualism see: Otto (2008); on spiritualism and
science see: Noakes (2004) in Brown et al (2004) and Lamont (2004); for folk magic see
Davies (2003) who points out that magical methods such as folk remedies, fortune-telling,
anti-witchcraft protection and thief catching were one resource among many for people
experiencing all kinds of misfortune throughout the 19th century.
389 Braddon and Willis (186112003) p148
390 Ibid p128
391 For example see: Braddon and WiIlis (1861/2003) references to phrenology p7; pIS;
p26; p73; P121; P172; P 196; p 197; p256; p396; and references to mathematics or
calculation appear less often: p128; p143; p148; pl72; p307
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Braddon's Popular Science
Phrenology, physiognomy and mathematics are the most widely referred to
of all sciences in Trail, a factor that supports John van Wyhe's (2004)
argument for the inclusion of phrenology as a major contributor to the
cultural diffusion of scientific naturalism in the 19th century. Scientific
naturalism, or the idea that causal explanations for any number of
phenomena can be traced to nature, has been well described in such systems
as agnosticism, materialism and positivism, which became increasingly
prevalent in the 1860's. Van Wyhe's study of phrenology, Alison Winter's
(1998) study, Mesmerized, and James Secord's (2000) history of Vestiges of
the Natural History of Creation all, in various important ways, chart the
diffusion of a scientific world view into and through the fabric of everyday
culture, by means other than via established disciplines like chemistry,
doctrines such as materialism and positivism or epochal moments like the
publication of the Origin of Species of 1859.
Winter points out that already in the 1840's, "mechanics' institutes were
now abandoning 'useful' knowledge .. .improving institutions diversified,
choosing lecture topics according to their own members' intellectual taste."
The topics that rose in popularity were those that sat outside the normal
range of 'improving sciences'. High on the list were mesmerism and
phrenology, or a combination of the two partly because, as Winter says,
they "could not be defined by scientific luminaries in the same way that
they put their stamp on sciences like chemistry or comparative anatomy.
Mesmerism was therefore anyone's property.,,392 The same seems to have
been true of phrenology, and van Wyhe builds upon this to show how it
became an important vehicle for disseminating naturalism, a 'phrenological
naturalism' .
Certainly, the fact that Braddon refers so readily to it (often in combination
with physiognomy), as a kind of taken for granted causal explanation,
392 Winter (1998) p l l l
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shows how widely the ideas had been assimilated.i'" Given that it does
represent a kind of scientific naturalism, in linking skull shape and/or facial
features to behaviour, any character, detective or otherwise, who exploits
the link becomes herlhimself a kind of scientific naturalist. Several authors
have emphasized a link between the spread of scientific thought and the
emergence of detective fiction, but most like Charles Rzepka (2005) and
Laura Snyder (2004) emphasize the influence of seemingly orthodox
sciences such as geology, paleontology, cosmology and others. Although
Rzepka does make note of phrenology, he sees it as part of the thrust of
historical or 'reconstructive' sciences, in general, which looked to
understand historical narratives by interpreting material evidence as
opposed to ancient texts, and gave rise to a similarly 'reconstructive' drive
in detective fiction. There is no doubting that these developments were
coincidental, but the example of Braddon's work suggests a greater
importance for more populist sciences such as phrenology and
physiognomy.
References to phrenological causes are dispersed throughout Trail, but
physiognomy is further embedded in the text in what amounts to a diffuse,
taken-for-granted wisdom. The skew is probably only a product of the
accessibility of the face, as compared to contours of the head, which are not
apparent at distance. Braddon transposes character traits on to facial
features as a matter of course, so Valerie de Cevennes has "a little too much
of the demon in those great almond-shaped black eyes and that small
determined mouth. ,,394Richard Markham, the hero, has "a fine candid
countenance.v'" Jabez North, "very beautiful blue eyes ... [that] had a
shifting way with them,,,396 and Peters' adopted boy has "[ d]etermination,
concentration, energy, strength of will, and brightness ofintellect ... all
written in unmistakable lines upon that pale pinched face.,,397
393 For example, North's villainy is given foundation in phrenological terms as a
"deficiency in the entire moral region ... " Braddon and Willis (l861/2003) p7
394 Braddon and Willis (1861/2003) pl21
395 Ibid pl8
396 Ibid p7
397 Ibid P196
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It is significant that many of Braddon's characters, including Peters, North
and Marwood all have some ability to read character from a face, whereas
such a science as chemistry is confined to the expertise of Laurent
Blurosset, as indeed is fortune telling.398 This mapping of expertise
resonates with Winter's (1998) suggestion that some sciences were
'anyone's property' given Braddon's community of 'non-experts' who have
daily recourse to phrenological naturalism and physiognomical readings, but
not to the specialist arena of chemistry (or magic). Judging by the
occasional casual irony with which she references phrenology, Braddon
clearly expects her readers to have access to the same popular, non-expert
knowledge profile. For example, when a character called Richard Marwood
is wrongly arrested for crimes committed by North, he suggests that his
detainees are "afflicted with an over-large allowance of the organ of
adhesiveness ... " causing them to cling to him.399 Such an embedded
example of phrenological naturalism supports the view that perhaps
phrenology did function as an important source for the propagation of a
more generalised scientific naturalism, especially because in Trail other
sciences do not get the equivalent exposure.
Braddon's villain, however, is a particularly talented physiognomist, able to
assess the character of his victims in order to give himself a point of
leverage and control. As a result the two characters who counter him
necessarily have expressionless faces, particularly Blurosset who, by virtue
of the "blue spectacles, which entirely conceal his face," is able to
doublecross North. Indeed, "[y]ou cannot tell what he is thinking of; for it
is a peculiarity of this man, that the mouth ... has with him no expression
whatever.'.400 Mr Peters, too, is difficult to read being " ... exactly one of
those people adapted to pass in a crowd.,,4ol This is an effect of the arms
race narrative in which North's skill must be countered by the enigmatic
faces of his adversaries. For all that it demonstrates an immensely valuable
398 Ibid p197 for an example of Marwood's physiognomy; pl72 for North's; and p245 for
Peters'
399 Braddon and Willis (1861/2003) p26
400 Ibid p147
401 Ibid p28
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technique of detection, though here it is most keenly developed by the
villain, it is both evaded and matched in some measure by Peters, who, for
example, knows "the look of a man as is guilty ... ,,402 In this regard the
influence of phrenology and physiognomy has cast a long shadow, for
although phrenology was long contested, the fashion for it did not wane in
the early years of the 20th century. Some method of reading people remains
a vital part of the detective armoury, one that Sherlock Holmes develops
into scientific second sight. 403 The ability then bleeds into 20th-century
detectives as a kind of generalised understanding of people - one need only
think of Miss Marple's skill in reading motive and intent garnered from her
experience of the social life of a small village.404
Braddon's paired alter-egos, Jabez North and Laurent Blurosset, counter
one another in a good example of Charney's (2004) horse-race framing.
Such a frame when applied to characters who engage reason as the basis for
their actions, as do these two, leads to an ever-increasing armoury of
complex and powerful methods on the part of each player. The intuitive
brilliance of North, the lone genius, is best put to use in his talent for
reading people, and yet his adversary uses spiritual contacts to read the
future in a pack of cards. Such enchanted science is easily passed off as
straightforward magic or pseudoscience and its status as a form of
naturalism, however bogus it seems now, goes unacknowledged. Yet
Braddon's fiction supports the view that phrenology, physiognomy and
spiritualism were important vehicles for diffusing naturalism, however far
fetched they may now appear to be. The mapping of expertise in Trail falls
into a predictable pattern such that sciences like phrenology and
physiognomy are practiced by many of the characters, but chemistry, a long
established discipline, is the province of a single, life-long expert
practitioner. So far, we have seen the countering of one genius by another
402 Ibid p245
403 For example, Holmes 'reads' Watson in the first Sherlock Holmes story, see Conan
Doyle (1887/1981) p24
404 Miss Marple is depicted as a gossipy villager, who observes human nature which gives
her the knowledge and ability to read motive, truth telling, or lying, in people's
countenance and behaviour. For example see Agatha Christie's "Murder in the Vicarage"
(1930), the first of the Marple novels, in Christie (1997) vol III
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of a different kind, but there is a third and complementary method, which
comes in the hands of Braddon's detective, Mr Peters.
The Detective
Although Blurosset is his alter-ego, the principal of North's opponents is
really Joe Peters, the working class detective, whose narrative weaves in
and around North's story from the outset. If Blurosset and North could be
said to look forward to a more artful, rational, scientific or magical process
of detection, Peters, in some measure, harks back to a detective tradition of
old. Although in saying that, it is important to acknowledge that each
character does carry some element of the other and in many ways, Peters, is
a hybrid between a new, more expert detective and an older model based
upon a more haphazard and adventurous process. Early detective stories
took inspiration from morally murky thief-takers some of whom came to
man the London force, the Bow Street Runners and similarly, the criminal
investigation bureau, the Parisian Surete in Paris.
One of the most famous detectives of the century was Eugene Francois
Vidocq, a real French detective and one time criminal, who was bought into
the Napoleonic policing system, eventually rising to head up the Surete, He
published his memoires in 1827, which were swiftly translated into English
and became widely popular.405 He was renowned more for his audacity and
daring than for any rational empirical work, especially his talent for
disguise. He also relied heavily on his experiential knowledge of the
criminal underworld. His methods and style were very much in line with
the Bow Street tradition. In the same year, an English picaresque detective
appeared in the pages of the anonymously published Richmond: Scenes in
the life of a Bow Street Runner, which never gained quite the same foothold
as Vidocq, though it drew upon the same mix of adventure, elastic morality
and proximity with the criminal fraternity.f'"
40S See Knight (2004) pp23-24; Rzepka (2005) ppS9-62; Messac (1929) pp 286-302
406 See Introduction by EF Bleiler (1974) in Anon and Bleiler (1976)
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Braddon's detective Peters incorporates two particular elements which are
prominent activities of the Bow Street/Surete tradition; first and foremost is
a tendency to take the law into his own hands, and second, a talent for
blending into the background. The boldest of Peters' picaresque escapades
is when he masterminds and participates in a successful operation to break
Marwood out of a lunatic asylum where the innocent man was incarcerated
following a bogus plea of insanity. In such scenes, Braddon closely echoes
William Harrison Ainsworth's (1839) picaresque novel Jack Sheppard, the
story of the hero-criminal of the same name, who was famous for his
repeated prison escapes, his dare devil tactics and bids to rescue the
underdog along with his struggle against the 'evil' thief-catcher, Jonathan
Wild.
Furthermore, Peters adopts a foundling baby pulled from the River Sloshy
and named Slosh in remembrance - an exact equivalent of a character
named Thames in Jack Sheppard. These are references to a popular culture
well known to Braddon's audience and to that extent she reinvigorates the
themes of Ainsworth's novel. Jack Sheppard was a popular example of
what became known as 'Newgate' fiction, which included Charles Dickens'
(1837-39) Oliver Twist. Ainsworth's novel sold in greater numbers than
Dickens' and caused greater controversy. If Oliver Twist was considered to
be shockingly equivocal on the nature of criminal morality, Jack Sheppard
was ten times worse. It portrayed the lower classes, including Sheppard
himself, in much more sympathetic light than even the most benevolent of
Dickens' working classes or criminals. To some extent Braddon might have
escaped similar disapproval by making her protagonist a detective and law
enforcer and so rendering him marginally less ignominious than Sheppard,
the out and out criminal.
In their discussion of Jack Sheppard, Jacobs and Mourao (2007) focus on
what they call its 'excarceral' politics.407 By this they mean a culture of
escape and flight that stands in counterpoint to the carceral structures with
407 See Ainsworth et al (1839/2007)
which society literally incarcerates the working classes. Such structures
equate to the workhouse, factory, hospital or school, or apply more broadly
to the physical or class situations of the labouring classes, particularly in
urban situations. Jack Sheppard is identified as an excarceral work on two
counts. First, it identifies the protagonist with the working class and
second, it suggests that for people in that situation, escape and disguise are
necessary, possible and can be socially improving.
Indeed in Braddon's novel, Peters is, or at least begins as a working class,
uneducated 'scrub' who is forced to act unlawfully to obtain justice just as
Jack Sheppard does. Yet he is law enforcer, not runaway criminal, and the
innocent victim, Richard Marwood, is rather more privileged in origin. So
what Braddon's story appears to be suggesting is that in order to achieve
justice, of a kind that works on moral terms, then excarceral action may be
required, a damning indictment of the official channels of law, indeed.
Excarceral activity is, of course, another form of Mertonian innovation.
Reverberating with the excarceral, are the unauthorised detective methods,
which resurface regularly in detective fictions of the 20th century. They are
common in the so-called hard-boiled genre exemplified by Raymond
Chandler's detectives, as Joseph Agassi (1982) has pointed OUt.408 The
picaresque perhaps never completely loses its influence.
By such unorthodox means Peters rises to the privileged position of private
detective of personal means. Another of his skills is a variant on the
inevitable ability shown by all picaresque heroes to disguise themselves,
both in look and manner.409 In later years, Sherlock Holmes will
demonstrate his own prowess in the realm of camouflage. Peters, however,
has no need of such complex artifice, as he comes with his own in-built
408 See Agassi (1982) pi 06
409 See Ainsworth et al (1839-2007) pp286-300 for a story of one of Jack Sheppard's feats
of disguise Also see Caleb Williams by William Godwin (1794) in which the last third of
the book is the story of how the protagonist adopts one form of disguise after another to
escape his erstwhile employer and the thieftaker that he has enrolled.
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disguise.t'" Unusually, he is dumb, but not deaf; a feature that makes him
the consummate eavesdropper since others tend to assume that dumbness
comes attendant with deafness and drop their guard, giving away secrets
without realising that every word is being noted. Such is the means by
which Peters sets off on the trail of Jabez North from the early stages of the
novel. This, together with his "utterly commonplace and unnoticeable"
demeanour make the detective ideally suited for surveillance work.411
The last, but by no means the least of Peters' talents, and one that is not
inherited from any picaresque traditions, requires patience in the rather more
stolid affair of systematic data gathering. For example, in the final stages of
the story Peters, now on the trail of his quarry, traces North to Liverpool and
expecting him to fly the country on a ship, spends days trudging the docks
interviewing all whom he meets, before he picks up the lead again, but
"Still, neither Mr Peters's spirits nor patience failed him ... " His
companions, brought along to aid in the inquiries, do not exhibit the same
tenacity; "if anything, the detective's so-called assistants were decidedly in
his way" and at least one among them has sights on a more glamorous style
of work and "considered himself an amateur Vidoque ... ,"which is here set
in opposition to the dogged data gatherer.412 In bringing these skills
together, Braddon joins two strands of influence to create a detective whose
method, on the one hand harks back to an older tradition of adventure and
excarceral activity, and on the other looks forward to a systematic, scientific
approach to crime investigation. Such themes have remained remarkably
consistent, varying only by degree, but perpetually recycling through
generations of detective fictions. 413
STYLES OF REASON
Mechanical and Magical Methods
410 For examples of Holmes in disguise see The Man with the Twisted Lip for Holmes as a
wizened opium addict, and as an elderly book seller in The Empty House in Conan-Doyle
and Hodgson (1994)
411 Braddon and Willis (1861/2003) p28/9
412 Ibid p364
413 For example, Conan-Doyle's (1887-1915) Sherlock Holmes; Raymond Chandler's
(1939-1958) Phillip Marlowe; Kathy Reichs' (1997- 2010) Temperance Brennan
Braddon's magician-scientist, detective and villain embody distinct styles of
reason that relate to commonly recurring models cropping up across cultural
domains. In a paper that draws together the themes of fictional detective
work, reason and magic, Agassi (1982) explores these kinds of models and
the significance of reasoning style. He begins by comparing 'pedestrian'
scientific research with 'exciting' research, relating the former to Baconian
induction or Kuhnian 'normal' science and the latter to Kuhnian paradigm
shifts or what he calls, 'romantic' science. Given that the proper method of
science, especially Baconian science, was a particular obsession in 19th_
century culture, Agassi has some apt observations to offer regarding popular
conceptions of method, models of reason and their relation to the detective
narrative.
For Agassi, pedestrian research amounts in fictional terms to the detective's
legwork, calling at address after address, interviewing one person after
another, following up hopeless leads, all the kind of work that requires the
patience and persistence of Braddon' s Peters. This, he says, is the kind of
approach recommended by Bacon as the way to achieve solid scientific
progress. It amounts to induction - the "patient gathering of masses of
details and their repeated examination until, perhaps with the aid of a
systematic elimination of false possibilities, facts fall in to a pattern by
themselves, until the pattern or law of nature clicks, as it were.,,414 In
Bacon's view a guiding hypothesis, or preconceived idea ran the risk of
obscuring potentially significant data points and valuable clues by
suggesting shortcuts in fact gathering.
The details of what Bacon really did intend was a topic that drew a wide
circle of cultural commentators into energetic debate in the 19th century.
Jonathan Smith (1994) summarises the dialogue that revolved around the
idea of what proper scientific method should be. In broad terms he finds a
shift, across the 19th century, away from Baconian induction as the
414 Agassi (1982) plOI
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benchmark of bona fide science, to a general acceptance of a system similar
to the hypothetico-deductive method. Participants in the debate stemmed,
not just from science, but from all disciplines and were together involved in
the business of defining science. Leaving aside the exact details of Smith's
argument, what his work very clearly points to is the surprising prominence
of the Baconian question to the 19th-century culture. Itwas not restricted to
a few lofty minds conversing over the latest laboratory study, rather "It was
an issue of cultural importance that surfaced relentlessly in the productions
of novelists, scientists, logicians, philosophers, historians and poets.'.4IS
As a result of the sheer visibility of debates about induction, which were
partly, perhaps even largely carried out in the general press, some notion of
the Baconian question diffuses through the whole culture, if only as a
reference point marked by a few words or an image. These bubble up in
Braddon's novel, so Blurroset describes himself as" [t]he chemist, the
physiologist, the man whose head had grown gray in the pursuit of an
inductive science .. .'.416 In the event there is no evidence at all ofBlurroset
gathering any factual data of any kind. Oddly, Blurroset's methods and to
some extent North's, rely on mathematical calculation, a rather more
deductive approach than Bacon would have been happy with, which goes to
show that the word 'induction' has a more general importance in signifying
some kind of scientific, logical process. Nonetheless, Peters and North both
engage in bouts of data collection and to that extent represent an element of
the Baconian process.
The most widespread critique of Baconian method, now and in the 19th
century, hinged upon the role of hypothesis in scientific method. Coleridge
sums up critique and counter-critique in his evocation of what he referred to
as the "common notion of Lord Bacon." According to the great poet, this
notion directed "that you are to watch everything without having any reason
for so doing, and that after you have collected facts that belong to any
subject ... you may proceed to the theory." The 'common notion' was the
415 Smith (1994) p5
416 Braddon and Willis (186112003) p308
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wrong notion, for Coleridge and others, who argued for a more nuanced
reading of Bacon, requiring that some preconceptions are formed, "which
the pure reason in man reveals to him" before attending to nature, where
corresponding laws will (hopefully) be found. 417 Attempts at redefining the
Baconian method to rescue it from such a naive 'common notion' were
frequent enough and one way of doing so was to argue that Bacon did not,
in fact, prohibit the use of hypothesis.
In many ways Agassi reiterates this element of 19th-century thinking and
makes a similar manoeuvre to rescue Bacon from the' common notion'. He
finds that Bacon does not entirely proscribe hypotheses, rather the warning
is against letting a preconceived idea become a prejudice, such that the
investigative process is hampered. Agassi also argues that in advocating the
gradual elimination of possible explanations of the observed facts, Bacon
did not envisage an infinite number of possibilities. Instead, he advocates
the "principle of the simplicity of nature, or of limited variety.'.418 This,
Agassi argues, is well exemplified by empirical science during a normal
Kuhnian period on the one hand, and by the 'locked room' detective
scenario on the other. Whether 'limited variety' really can explain Kuhnian
normal science is a moot point and too large a topic in its own right to take
up here.
Regardless, in the example of a locked room mystery, limited variety is
exactly the scenario. The number of suspects is limited and identification
by elimination is made possible because the list is limited to a certain
number of possibilities. In fact, both notions of limited variety and of
hypothesis as prejudice are neatly demonstrated in Wilkie Collins' (1868)
The Moonstone."? When a diamond is stolen from a locked house, the
perpetrator has to be one of the members of the house party. Sergeant Cuff
fixes his suspicions indelibly on the 'wrong' suspect despite the limited
field, and the investigation stalls until it is re-ignited with new evidence,
417 Coleridge quoted in Smith (1994) p16
418 Agassi (1982) plOl
419 See this work ppl72-204 for a discussion of The Moonstone
later in the narrative. Collins' novel neatly demonstrates these two facets of
Agassi's Baconian interpretation.
Having said that, Braddon demonstrates that fictional detectives are on a
long rein when it comes to a specific research method. Right from the
outset, Peters decides on the strength of "a inward conwiction that he
[Marwood] was ... hinnercent of the murder ... [sic]'t420. This is another case
of hypothesis taken to prejudicial extreme, which effectively limits the field
of investigation to a single possibility that in the event, turns out to be the
correct one although the method is about as un-Baconian as it is possible to
be. Yet, at other times, Peters engages in an eliminative method. For
example, he excludes the possibility that a dead body identified as North is
in fact him, because the body lacks an identifying scar above the eyebrow.
To try and find any rigorous scientific methodology in the process of the
fictional detective is a fairly unrewarding business, since many of them,
including Sherlock Holmes, utilise a mishmash of systematic method and
inspired intuition as Peters does.421 That is not to say, however, that these
processes are not based upon methods which are perceived as scientific.
They are, but in a manner that incorporates a fundamental duality, which
underlies everyday notions about reason and science.
Agassi (1982) exposes a split between the notion of reason as an intuitive,
imaginative process and the image of the drudgery of recording and
collecting facts. He suggests that much of the fascination of mystery, thriller
and detective fictions is that they give expression to a major conflict about
reason, in which "[w]e hold as obvious both the view that reason is
mechanical and that reason is mysterious.'.422 In terms of Braddon's fiction,
Mr Peters represents the dogged data gatherer, the mechanical legwork and
420 Braddon and Willis (186112003) p244
421 Although some scholars have done just this see: Smith (1994) pp211-23 7 who has nicely
demonstrated that contradictory facets of Sherlock Holmes' methods reiterate both pro-
Bacon and pro-hypothesis positions of how 19th-century science 'should' proceed; also see
Agassi (1982). The methods of most, if not all, 19thC detectives, would contravene the
famous "Twenty Rules for Writing Detective Stories" devised by SS Van Dine (1928) (aka
Willard Huntington Wright) the first of which insists that "the reader must have equal
0EPortunity with the detective for solving the mystery" in Haycraft (1974) pp189
4 2 Agassi (1982) p 105
cog-wheel thinking in a limited domain, the element of reason that has a
translucent process. For Agassi this process conjures a vision of Kuhnian
'normal' science. Contrast this with Peters' intuitive judgements, or more
dramatically, perhaps, the mysterious process of Laurent Blurosset, possibly
corresponding to paradigm-shifting science. This process is obscure, can
happen in one step, or a flash, and is not easy to fathom, even in oneself. As
Agassi points out, here is an ambivalence indeed, the two models of reason
are incompatible and yet they appear to be applied in one form or another in
a wide variety of circumstances in different cultural domains.
In a famous psychoanalytic essay on detective fiction, AD Hutter (1975)
notes at the outset that the objective, rational elements of detection are
called into question "by the subjective and intuitive vision of the detective,
but they are made to appear as two faces of the same coin.,,423 In an earlier
articulation of a similar dichotomy, Marjorie Nicholson (1929) distinguishes
Baconian versus intuitive methods, identifying Scotland Yard with the
former lacklustre style, and intuitive thought as a francophilic process,
which reaches its goal surprisingly through the "strength oflogic alone.,,424
Indeed, Smith (1994) then identifies a further example of dichotomous
thinking about science, within 19th-century responses to Bacon.
Negotiations over 'proper' method threw up a new formulation, which
replaced the strictly Baconian style and "consciously sought to portray
science as an imaginative, speculative, creative enterprise" associated with
hypothesis formation. At the same time it "did not abandon its claims to be
an objective and authoritative pathway to truth, but it did assert more openly
that this truth is obtained through, rather than at the expense of, the creative
imagination. 'Baconianism' was seen as too sterile, too mechanical, and too
impersonal to capture the artistic quality of the scientist doing science.,,425
Furthermore, when sociologist Max Weber delivers a lecture in 1918
423 From AD Hutter "Dreams, Transformations and Literature: The Implications of
Detective Fiction" in Pykett (1998) p176
424 From Marjorie Nicholson "The Professor and the Detective" (1929) in Haycraft (1974)
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entitled Science as a Vocation, he appears to adhere to the same dual
concept of reason. When he compares the process of art with that of
science, he finds that both are reliant upon "destinies that are hidden from
us ... " because science requires inspiration and imagination,just as art does.
For him inspiration is a process that cannot be controlled, ideas arrive
suddenly and in unexpected ways, yet this cannot happen, he says, without
having done the legwork of "brooding and searching at our desks ... ,,426
Ironically, given Weber's dictum of the disenchanting effects of
technoscience, Agassi uses a magical metaphor to describe exactly this
dualistic notion ofreason.427 Fact collecting, or indeed 'brooding and
searching' at a desk, he says, is the "magic ritual preparatory to the mystic
insight.,,428 He finds such a pattern within the detective narrative itself,
which consists of a period of magic ritual, the data gathering, culminating in
a revelation of the whole picture - the whodunit, or the mystic insight. Such
a structure does apply in broad terms to most detective fictions, although
Braddon's work does not fit this model quite so tightly, being a 'howdunit'
as opposed to a whodunit. In effect, this makes her detective representative
of ritualistic fact collection, while her magician scientist carries most of the
mystical insight. In a way, Agassi's metaphor enchants both models of
reason, though it has been more usual to see intuitive, imaginative insight as
magical and Agassi's ritual, as mechanical, methodological science.
Such a bridge between magic and intuition was not lost on 19th -century
academics, who, believing that mechanical methods alone were insufficient
for innovative discovery, wished to inject science with a shot of imaginative
flair. For example, the philosopher and historian, William Whewell, wrote
of Newton, whom he believed to be a genius, "as an irresistible and almost
supernatural hero of a philosophical romance.,,429 Later in the century, the
physicist and science professionaliser, John Tyndall, talked in distinctly
426 Weber (1918) in Gerth and Mills (1991) p136
427 See pp264-69 of this work for a discussion of Weber's disenchantment in relation to the
whole corpus
428 Agassi (1982) pl05
429 Quoted in Smith (1994) p30
mystical terms of the scientific imagination as "the continued exercise of
spiritual insight, and its incessant correction and realization ... [E]xperiments
constitute a body of which ... purified intuitions are, as it were, the soul.,,430
Such visions of enchanted science as these, arising from intellectual
quarters, suggest that the metaphor of enchantment is, or certainly was,
widely indicative of imagination and intuition and was alive in the same
time frame as was Braddon's fiction.
The observation also suggests that magic has long been a reference point for
the invocation of the kind of thinking process that defies understanding.
Braddon's magician-scientist in Trail embodies just such impenetrability, as
his "expressionless mouth, which betrays no secret, tells nothing of the
nature of his thoughts. Sometimes he makes notes on a long slip of paper;
rows of figures, and problems in algebra, over which he ponders long.,,431
The reference to numbers somehow invokes a more mechanical, additive
style of thought, but how the magician moves between the numbers, the
spirits and the futures of his clients is shrouded in mystery. Both man and
process are obscure. The emphasis on hidden process echoes the gothic
"scientized" magic, which, I have argued, was a reflection of the
complication of scientific method and its distancing from public view.432
The issue here builds on the same notion, but the obscured process is also
representative of the little understood intuitive leap, an obscured thought
process, an imaginative insight, the eureka moment, or the way in which
some scientific discoveries are believed to be made.
Christopher Tourney (1992) is one among a number of scholars who have
interpreted the obscurity of process that is so often associated with mad
science as an "exercise in anti-rationalism," and a fundamental critique of
science.433 "The physical artefacts of ... science are presented as
miscellaneous material junk of alchemists, illogically connected and barely
justified", writes Tourney, such that the scientific process is portrayed
430 John Tyndall quoted in Smith (1994) p35
431 Braddon and Willis (186112003) pl81
432 The expression 'scientized magic' is taken from Locke (2005)
433 For example, see Haynes (2006); Weingart (2006); Tourney (1992); Frayling (2005)
"ambiguously, illogically and mysteriously, in other words, irrationally.'.434
Emptying the "rationalism out of the tangible evidence of science" is part
and parcel of the "homilies on the evil of science" that Tourney perceives in
the mad scientist.t" But the incorporation of magic, or what Tourney
suggests is antirationalism, I would argue does not necessarily add up to a
negation of science and rationality. On the contrary the invocation of magic
suggests something much more subtle about science. On the one hand
magic indicates that the process is a mystery to those of us who do not
practise its methods and on the other hand it is a nearly universal type of
thinking which exists at the level of a sudden understanding, an intuition.
Such leaps of inspiration can appear to be antirational in the sense that they
are unfathomable and uncontrollable.
When they are drawn together, as they are by Braddon, the scientist and the
detective reiterate these two models of reason. The association of the mad
scientist with such an inspired, mysterious model of reason explains why his
process is so often depicted as magical, short on detail, obscure, and
inclined to bear fruit suddenly from a combination of odd, alchemical
equipment. The detective on the other hand follows some kind of method,
which is on show, of necessity involves some data gathering and very often
some eliminative process as well. The narrative itself is an example of a
mechanical open process, though the detective, too, can have near magical
insight, of course. But the fact that the detective story is method, while the
mad scientist's narrative only hints at method, suggests that, to use Agassi's
metaphor, the detective represents the 'magical ritual', while the mad
scientist embodies the 'mystical insight'. What I do not mean to suggest,
however, is that the detective only uses mechanical-style thinking, nor that
the mad scientist only works by magical intuition. The difference is by
degree. The former acts out more of the ritual of data collection, while the
latter emphasises his reliance on magical insight.
434 Tourney (1992) p414
435 Ibid p414 and p411 respectively
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Genius or Method?
Smith (1994) has reported on the ways in which, science in the 19th century
sought to encompass an imaginative, creative process. Such a process is
one that cannot necessarily be learned because, by its very nature, it does
not often work in a stepwise fashion that can be taught. So, the effect of
absorbing creative imagination into scientific process amounts to stipulating
that special talent is required in order for the advancement of scientific
discovery. It is on this point that debates about genius dovetailed with
debates about scientific method, a matrix which is discussed by Richard
Yeo (1988) who finds that it was with reference to Isaac Newton that
notions of scientific genius came to the fore and raised questions about
whether scientific breakthrough was achieved by following a prescribed
method, or by the individual brilliance of genius. These two processes
clearly map on to the two models of reason that were identified by Agassi
(1982) and others. The mundane, data-gathering type of reason amounts to
discovery by specified method, and the intuitive, magical kind to individual
gemus.
Similar models of scientific process, it turns out, have important function in
the social lives of 20th century scientists. In order to explore how scientists
themselves explain innovation, Michael Mulkay (1985) has analysed written
accounts of the Nobel prize-winning discovery of oxidative
phosphorylation. Like any social group, scientists are challenged by
innovators who break with norms, though they, in particular, are caught in a
dilemma since, ostensibly, that is also what they all strive towards. Mulkay
points toward this conflict, which raises questions of how the "discoverer's
perspective on the world should have been different from, yet ultimately
consistent with, other peoples' perspectives on the one, knowable-in-
common world.'.436 In the face of such a contradiction, how do scientists
interpret discovery? Mulkay distinguishes two theories of discovery, which,
436 Mulkay (1985) p175
he hypothesises, are used under different social conditions, one is the
'genius' folk theory and the other is the 'cultural maturation' theory.437
Unsurprisingly, the 'genius' account focuses on the role of the individual
scientist, their uniqueness, creativity and exceptional mind. In the example
that Mulkay gives, this figure is drawn as a bright light, the only one able to
solve what was previously unsolvable.t'" Mulkay finds that this narrative is
employed predictably, in a way, in celebratory accounts of scientific
discovery in which a single scientist, or a small group of scientists are
honoured. The theory of 'cultural maturation', on the other hand, downplays
the role of the individual scientist and sees the discovery as an inevitable
outcome of a scientific process, which could have been made by anyone had
they been in the right place at the right time. This account, which treats all
discoveries as realisable by anyone, means that breakthroughs, identical or
not, are potentially manifold. Mulkay suggests that this theory is used to
diminish the perceived brilliance of contending discoveries, which may
have come to dominate the field within which the innovator works, though
his conclusions are, of necessity, tentative because of the tiny sample size of
three.439
Having said that, an interesting twist emerges if we apply Mulkay's folk
theories to a scientific villain, to Braddon's North, for example. In the
scientific community the cultural maturation theory is more likely to serve
as a means of opposition by way of downplaying the individual agency
involved in innovation. Such interpretations have exactly the reverse
meaning when applied to a villainous or criminal innovator because to
downplay individual agency, by suggesting that crime is an inevitable
outcome of process or society, is to detract from the moral turpitude of the
criminal, to mitigate in some measure. The criminal had little choice;
437 Ibid (1985) pp 174-176 for folk theories
438 Ibid (1985) pp 176-182 for this example
439 Yet, Mulkay's two folk theories of discovery are reiterated repeatedly in different
cultural domains. See: Yeo (1988) for a summary of the 'genius versus method' debate in
the 19th century; Smith (1994) for a reiteration of the same debate in relation to hypothesis,
imagination, genius and Baconian science; Charney (2003) for a description of the
hero/genius narrative 20th-century popular science writing.
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society creates criminals, indeed Merton (1938) talks of the 'pressures for
deviant behaviour'. This phenomenon was the crux of the matter for critics
of Ainsworth's (1839) Jack Sheppard, because the novel showed crime to
result from an overly stratified society in which morality and lawfulness
were not always indelibly linked. The mitigation of crime was one step on
the slippery slope for many a critic.44o
If, on the other hand, a criminal innovator is couched in terms of the genius
theory all such mitigation is removed. The emphasis now is on individual
immorality, which, combined with genius is a fearful fusion indeed. Such is
Braddon's villain and he openly casts himself in that light. For example,
when he finally shows his hand to Valerie, North says, "[y]ou have passion,
genius, courage ... but you have not the power of calculation, that inductive
science, which never sees the effect without looking for the cause, which
men have christened mathematics. I, mademoiselle, am a mathematician.
As such, I sat down to playa deep and dangerous game with you ... and you
will see that I hold the winning cards .. .I knew I was no bad player, and I sat
down to the game with the determination to rise a winner.,,441 North, clearly
trusting in his own ability to playa competitive intellectual game, as has
been described as a 'horse race frame', sets himself up as a villainous
genius. By having North describe himself in this way, Braddon is building
on the social value of the 'genius folk theory' and, in so doing, she
emphasizes the iniquity of the villain, extending it to melodramatic
proportions, turning North from straight-forward miscreant into arch villain.
Such is the model for the kinds of villainous 'mad scientist' whom Tudor
describes as "evil men pursuing their own ends.,,442 The effect of turning a
villain into a genius is to make him or her unequivocally bad, evil even.
Indeed such an effect explains, perhaps, why the 'mad scientist' is so
440 Reviews of Jack Sheppard from the Literary Gazette (1839); the Athenaeum (1839); The
Examiner (1839); Fraser's Magazine (1840) in Ainsworth et al (1839/2007) pp499-528 all
refer, with varying degrees of horror, to the mitigation of criminal responsibility and the
possible effects this could have on society.
441 Braddon and Willis (186112003) p174
442 Tudor (1989a) p589
common an instigator of disorder in the zo" century horror movie genre.443
He quite simply makes a first-rate villain. Interestingly enough, the model
of reason, which is inherently contained within most stories of mad science,
is not the same model that Braddon chooses for her villain. Though he is
most certainly a lone genius, his method has more in common with the
detective. The story of Trail is his story and so his process, from
surveillance, through bribery, disguise, and physiognomic skills, is visible.
Although it has its moments of inspired intuition or indeed, of luck, on the
whole North's process builds upon itself in an intelligible way, more in the
way of the mechanical mode of reasoning. If mad scientists were to be
defined as representative of reason based upon the intuitive model, then this
villain does not comply. On this basis he would be the dark detective.
One of the values of Braddon's fiction has been to draw out a more subtle
meaning from mad scientists, than are usually accorded to them. Their
intuitive unfathomable methods make them mysterious and perhaps
frightening especially when they work in a disordering direction. In this
respect, the detective does provide an alternative model of science in fiction,
The detective whose narrative is method and whose function is (usually)
restorative is an important counterpoint to the mad scientist in 19th, 20th and
21 st centuries. If the classic emblems of mad science are hard to locate
within zo" and 21 st century restorative narratives (though that is the
impression, but not necessarily the case) then this might be because it is the
detective to whom we need tum for such a model of science. As Agassi
has so rightly pointed out the detective story reiterates, or rather anticipates
themes of Kuhn ian science, in which the final revelation of whodunit
equates to Thomas Kuhn's revolutionary science, and the fact gathering up
to that point consists of 'normal science.'
Yet, I propose that the mad scientist's process - whether Braddon's
Blurosset, or Shelley'S (1818) Victor Frankenstein - is much closer to
443 See Tudor (1989b) ppI33-157. In over a quarter of the films in Tudor's study of horror
films (1931-1984) science is the source of disorder, and in well over half of these it is a
'mad scientist' who is at heart of the problem
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Kuhn's view of paradigm shifting episodes, in which " ... a new theory ... is
seldom or never just an increment to what is already known. Its
assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the re-evaluation
of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process ... ,,444 What he describes
here is the kind of leap in thinking that is not preceded by an open process
of reasoning. This is much like Braddon' s magician, who calculates in
some mysterious way that is unfathomable to others. This is a quality
perhaps of someone able to transcend paradigms because they lack social
restraint of consensus. The detective on the other hand problem solves in
the manner of 'normal science' within a socially restrained universe and is
committed to maintaining the same paradigm. With that said, these two
models are not so distinct as not to bleed into one another and Sherlock
Holmes, for example, straddles the two, though his story is his method and
when he solves crimes he always works within the shared paradigm of
moral order.t" In the following chapter, where I explore the construction
of a detective image, I find that these two models reoccur in another
detective-scientist pair - the vision, this time of Wilkie Collins (1868) in The
Moonstone.
444 Kuhn (1962/1996) Loc 235-9
445 I return to discuss Kuhnian themes in the concluding chapter pp260-62
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CHAPTER SIX
CONSTRUCTING THE DETECTIVES
Wilkie Collins (1868) The Moonstone
In 1861 Braddon told a story about a villain so powerful that he required the
expertise of a detective and a magician-scientist to bring him to order. Her
novel Trail of a Serpent featured a diminutive police assistant, who in rising
to the challenge of the case, is transformed from working-class 'scrub' to
man of means and private detective. The typically exotic scientist who
flashes in and out of the plot is instrumental in thwarting the villain at key
moments of his bid for power, while the detective plods through the
narrative collating evidence. In portraying this pair, Braddon makes a
significant and lasting contribution to the construction of popular
conceptions of the investigative process. She drew upon themes that were
current in contemporary cultural debates about how proper science should
proceed. Such debates touched upon a nexus of linked ideas on genius,
imagination, hypothesis and reason, which Braddon reiterates in various
ways within the confines of her story. A comparison of the methods of her
detective with those of her scientist reveal the former to be based upon a
rather mechanical, open process of reasoning while the latter represents the
mysterious, intuitive side of reason.
Wilkie Collins (1868) novel, The Moonstone, similarly features a scientist-
detective pair. The same dual conception of reason was equally alive and
still widely debated across popular and intellectual domains a few years
following Braddon's publication Trail. If, as I have suggested, these two
contradictory models of reason are represented, not just by Braddon's
characters, but to some extent by detectives and mad scientists more
generally, then Collins' detective-scientist pair ought to fit the same pattern.
Indeed, Collins does pick up on and rework very similar themes to Braddon
in this respect. Although that is where the similarity ends because The
Moonstone is set within a much more realist frame than Braddon's novel.
Collins minimises the sensational melodrama in so far as he can in a
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mystery story such as this is. This means that the differential between
characters is less pronounced and so is the distance between the two models
of reason.
Collins' use ofa more realist frame provides an opportunity that Braddon's
melodrama, in some measure, impeded, which is to examine how the dual
narratives of developing professional detective force and detective fiction
intersect. Collins is especially helpful in this regard because he drew upon
factual details of real world cases and people, whereas Braddon draws on
ideas rather than any factual details, and her work is more symbolic. The
first professional detectives were employed at Scotland Yard in 1842, and
the first detective stories began appearing shortly afterwards.i" A link
between the two is often assumed and a blurring of the line between fact and
fiction is a point of focus for much scholarly work on the public face of the
police force.447 Yet Collins' novel is not often discussed as one of the early
public images of the police detective department in its developing years.
Perhaps this is owing to disciplinary strictures, which tend to place the
histories of the professional police and the literary studies of detective
fictions under the covers of different journals.
Another good reason for re-visiting The Moonstone is because its influence
spreads way beyond its own time. It is one of the few 19th-century detective
novels to have been widely read since it was first published and over the
years it has attracted some erudite fans who have done much to keep it
alive. TS Eliot's oft-quoted tribute has it as "the first, the longest, and the
best of modem English detective novels" and Dorothy L Sayers speaks of it
as "probably the very finest detective story ever written.,,448 Collins'
detective, Sergeant Cuff, remains an iconic figure today and it is generally
agreed that he provided an important model for Conan Doyle's Sherlock
Holmes, a factor which places Collins' creation at the head of a veritable
446 See Knight (2004) pp30-38
447 For example see Leishman and Mason (2003). Note also the subtitle of their book:
Facts, fictions and factions
448 Eliot is quoted by Farmer (1999) in Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p 11 and by
Dorothy L Sayers in Haycraft (1946) p89
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detective dynasty.449 What was especially innovative about Sergeant Cuff
was the way in which Collins constructed his image out of a repertoire of
typified structures that are normally used to signify the scientist, magician
or knowledge-seeker. This makes Cuff a scientist, of sorts. It would be
foolhardy to say that he is the first scientific detective, but certainly he is the
first to have such strong influence on future popular images of the detective
police.
The social import of such images takes them way beyond the bounds of
their original narratives, as is nicely demonstrated by a study that compared
how USA detectives and police dealt with the drudgery of their work. In
this study, Janet Heinsler et al (1990) report that "[t]he detectives we
studied surmounted ... daily hassles and disappointments, but the campus
police did not. The detectives called upon their more glamorous media
image to construct a valued core identity that rendered mundane tasks
significant, not menial. They saw themselves as Sherlock Holmesian
'students of crime' and used this identity to redefine repetitive tasks as
important. In addition, the detectives found support for their valued identity
from ... supervisors, peers, and criminals ... The campus police lacked both
the symbolic capitaL.and the appreciative audience.'.450 That a 19th_
century figure of fiction can drift into culture and impact the lives of police
officers on a different continent a century later, is testimony indeed to the
power of fiction or modem myth. Wilkie Collins' The Moonstone is part
and parcel of the making of that myth.
Fictional images are both produced by and help to produce the sum of social
knowledge with which we understand and experience the society we live in.
This chapter is primarily concerned with the way in which Wilkie Collins
draws upon real-world and fictional traditions to create an iconic image.
The effort is to try and understand something of how The Moonstone was
both a response to its own time, a meaningful contribution to its own
449 Farmer (1999) in Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p16 and Hodgson (1994) in Conan-
Doyle and Hodgson (1994) pl l l
450 Heinsler et al (1990) p236
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culture, and simultaneously left a legacy of mythic proportion for
generations of detectives to come, both real and fictional.
The novel itself sets a mythic tone at the outset. In a prologue, Collins tells
the story of an ancient Indian diamond. The moonstone, blessed and cursed
by the god Vishnu, threatens to bring disaster to anyone who should steal it
from its sacred place. In these first pages, Collins sets a tone of mystery and
magic that pervades parts of the novel. As the story unravels so does the
mystery, but the magic is never quite unscrambled and the novel finishes on
a note of enchantment when the moonstone is restored to its place in the
forehead of the Moon god. What lies between folkloric prologue and
epilogue is the detective story proper, set in an English country estate in
1848. Although the detective work of the novel is shared by a whole host of
characters, the focus of this chapter is on the' great Cuff, the metropolitan
police detective, and the extraordinary Ezra Jennings, a weary doctor's
assistant and talented scientist. It is from the space between these two
characters that a meaningful image of the scientific detective emerges, an
image that has different meaning in Collins' own time, to the one that will
evolve to lighten the life of a few US police detectives over a century later.
The story begins when the diamond is bequeathed to Rachel Verinder and
presented to her on her birthday. It is collected and delivered by her cousin
and favourite suitor, Franklin Blake, and received with awe and delight by
Rachel to the wonderment of all her birthday guests. Even the rather
pragmatic butler, Betteredge, is captured by the brilliance of the stone,
which "seemed unfathomable as the heavens themselves.t'P' On the night
of her birthday, she wears it in a brooch at a dinner party, but the diamond
seems as if it has already begun to work its unhappy magic and the party is
unexpectedly flat and illat ease. That night the diamond disappears from
Rachel Verinder's chamber. In the morning the house is searched for
possible points of forced entry. None such is found. No-one has entered or
451 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p118
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left the house since the break-up of the dinner party. The diamond was
taken by an insider- from hence begins the classic 'locked room' mystery.
I will begin by setting The Moonstone in its own culture and to do so I will
first review the cultural response to the real detective police in the 19th
century. I aim to show that the Foucauldian viewpoint, powerful as it has
been in describing the rise of a state sanctioned disciplinary body and its
fictional mirage, loses some of the finer grains of history in the big sweep of
its picture. What arises from the details of history is that the practise and
ideal of policing, detective and otherwise, were quite at odds. I move on to
show how Collins reflects this contradiction in his portrayal of Cuffs
failure and how this representation blends fictional and factional details,
which give it a powerful realist edge and feed into the public image of the
detective. Following this, I will compare Jennings' process to Cuffs and
find that Collins builds upon the same models of reason as does Braddon,
incorporating in Jennings both magical and contemporary scientific
traditions. Last I look at how the two characters compare with one another
and with other typified scientists in terms of their iconography. Cuffis
given the veneer of a scientist - but he is a failed scientist. Collins begins a
process, which I will argue, amounted to a critique of the detective squad in
his own time, but ended in the laudatory myth of the all-knowing detective.
DEVELOPING PROFESSION, DEVELOPING FICTION
The development of a real world professional detective force and the
emergence of a fictional detective genre happened in Britain over roughly
similar time periods. It is reasonable to suppose that there is a link between
the two, and no doubt there is one, but the precise nature of the connection
is not easy to pin down. Literary scholarship, which is concerned with the
development of 19th-century detective fiction usually acknowledges a link
but does not investigate it in any great detai1.452 Of the most detailed
considerations of the boundary between fictional and factual domains, none
452 For examples, see Hutter (1975) in Pykett (1998) p 178; Thomas (2006) in Bourne-
Taylor (2006)
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have focussed on Collins' The Moonstone.453 Ronald Thomas' (1999)
Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science, is perhaps the most
comprehensive literary example, which explores intersections between
states of knowledge, of technology, nationalist politics and notions of the
body as a text that can be read and disciplined by detectives, real and
fictional. Occasionally he finds that fictions anticipate forensics, but in
rather a loose sense, and anyway his main interest is not in the construction
of image, but rather in literary and cultural ideologies.l" Criminological
literature tends to have more of an interest in image, but most of this work
focuses on 20th-century fictions and on professional policemen.Y' Having
said that, what becomes apparent from all such work is the propensity for
the blurring of the boundaries of fact and fiction, which has been a
distinctive feature of the representation of police throughout their history.456
One reason for the lack of detail linking real and imaginary police is
perhaps that scholars of detective fiction tend to have a literary outlook
which seeks the demonstration of a particular theoretic bent within the
fiction. Indeed Thomas (1999) provides a nice summary of these
approaches, from Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic analysis of Poe, to Peter
Brooks' reading of Sherlock Holmes plots as dual narratives of death and
desire.457 Many such scholars, including Thomas himself, prefer the view
that a Foucauldian drive away from sovereign power toward a disciplinary
model created a fictional genre and real police in a single sweep. Control of
453 See Thomas (1999) and Worthington (2005)
454 See Thomas (1999) pp4-S for brief note on Poe's, Dickens' and Conan Doyle's
popularisation of scientific theories, also for a 'commonplace' tendency of early
criminologists to attribute inspiration to one or another fictional detective including the
insistence of French forensic scientist Edmond Locard that colleagues read Conan Doyle's
Holmes stories. Yet there is little to suggest that fiction leads fact in any other way except
by symbolically recommending a systematic, rationalised, scientific system of detection. In
this last regard Collins' The Moonstone is another of the texts to make a similar
recommendations.
455 For example see Mawby (2007) in Newburn et al (2007); Leishman and Mason (2003);
O'Sullivan (2005)
456 For in depth discussions of 20th-century faction see Leishman and Mason (2003);
O'Sullivan (2005); and Mawby (2007) in Newburn et a1 (2007) pl48 for earlier examples
of faction
457 See Thomas (1999) p7
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self and others is emphasized through the synergy of rationalism, science
and detection across cultural domains.458
Arguments that look to Foucault tend to treat the development of literary
and real world detection as each mirroring, perhaps amplifying, the
disciplinary process of the other. The nub of the argument is nicely
summed up by Thomas (200 I) "the literary act of transferring the authority
to tell the secret story of the individual suspect to a designated professional
expert is also a political act, one that corresponds historically to the reform
of the English criminal code, the decline of aristocratic power, and the
insistent rise of the modem professional police force in England.,,459
Firstly, the 'insistent rise' of the professional police implies that there was
an unproblematic cultural acceptance of a law enforcement body, which
steadily advanced its technical expertise. Although this was sometimes
how policing was painted by those with a vested interested, it was in fact far
from the truth.460 Nevertheless, in terms of a broad sweep the statement
does hold water, but it implies that the literary form along with law reforms
and professionalization advance along a single path and that the meaning of
the fiction corresponds directly to these large-scale socio-political changes.
What this amounts to is a conflation of historical fact and fiction.
First, in terms of fiction, there are influences aside from a disciplinary drive
that stimulate the invention of a detective narrative. In an early classic
study of the sensation genre, Winifred Hughes (1980), talking of The
Moonstone, offers an alternative view on why Collins embraces the
detective figure. She writes "What happens in the Moonstone is that the
professional viewpoint begins to take over - the dispassionate, almost
458 See pp34-36 of this work for a discussion of detectives and Foucauldian discipline.
Scholars working within the Foucauldian paradigm include Knight (2004); Miller (1980) in
Pykett (1998); Pallo (2006); Thomas (1999); Worthington (2005)
459 Thomas (2001) "Detection in the Victorian Novel" p 177 in David (ed) (2001)
460 See Jager (200 I) on the history of judicial photography: although anthropologists and
criminologists recommended it, police photography was by no means systematically
applied until the end of the 19th century and was more useful as a display of effectiveness, a
symbol of modem, scientific, legal and professional police work, than as a useful tool.
Jager questions its utility as an instrument of discipline even after it was systematically
employed
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clinical perspective of human sin and human suffering expressed by various
doctors, lawyers, and police detectives who playa larger and larger role in
sensational fictions.'.461 This is true to an extent, although, in Collins'
particular mystery of the missing moonstone, the input of an independent,
non-professional outsider is required to unravel it.
That is as may be, but Hughes' belief is that Collins' professional-detective
narrative is a means for him to restrict the chaotic and contradictory themes
of the sensation genre, which incorporated a gothic penchant for
supernatural potentialities. She argues convincingly that the bid to create a
plot, which "trace[s] results back, by rational means, to natural causes"
provides Collins with the space to showcase his talent for intricate,
naturalistic plotting, without having to deal with the confusion of keeping
both natural and supernatural causes in play. 462He had done exactly that in
Armadale (1866), which is a mystery that allows for potential supernatural
causation - a feature, which to Hughes' mind had somewhat diluted the
impact of his mainly naturalistic plot. Such a view, as Hughes holds, does
not exclude a Foucauldian one by any means, but it acknowledges that, as
much as detective fiction develops in concert with the ideals of discipline, it
may also develop for reasons particular to the literary fashions of the period.
Although, it is also plausible to suggest that in rationalising his plots,
Collins was indeed, disciplining them.
Different considerations come into play with regard to the development of a
real-world police force. Jan Golinski (1998) speaks of science when he
warns that the tacit assumption of teleology can obscure the finer grains of
history, though it applies equally to the police. He argues that to avoid
insinuating an idealised goal driven process, professionalization might be
best viewed as "the unintended outcome of the interaction of uncoordinated,
even conflicting, forces.'.463 Such a view accords well with Everett C
Hughes' ecological model of professionalization, in that ecological
461 Hughes (1980) p163
462 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p3S1
463 Golinski (1998) p69
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specialisation of a Darwinian kind is usually reckoned to be a distinctly un-
teleological process.464 Hughes sees the competitive element of the
evolution of institutions as arising from the needs and wants of the people
which can be fulfilled by any number of means that are not initially linked
to anyone institution. So, a profession can only develop if it offers a
service that concurs with the needs and desires of the people. Yet, where
Hughes then departs from a Darwinian model (and Golinski) is in the view
that, once arisen or perhaps on emerging, the institution survives and
develops because it maintains a place in the day to day lives of the people
and in their desires, and most importantly its "professionals do not merely
serve; they define the very wants which they serve.'.465
An attempt to define the wants of the people corresponds with elements of
what criminologist Rob C Mawby (2007) has labelled, 'image work' which
he defines as all the ways in which meanings of policing are projected,
including anything from placing uniformed officers in visible positions, to
actively engaging journalists. Mawby and others find that in all such work,
the "police have consistently promoted their image as crime fighters and
investigators despite crime fighting being neither their primary activity nor
their most impressive quality.',466 By happy coincidence for 'image
workers', crime fighting is attractive to storytellers of all kinds because it
works as a traditional heroic narrative. Indeed this is one of the likely
reasons for the construction of police as crime fighters in the first place.
The notion of a heroic force who must protect the populace by warding off
waves of malevolent crime is an appealing selling point. The first English
state police bureaucracy or the 'New Police' was instituted in 1829 in
London to fulfil such a role. The Scotland Yard detective squad followed
some thirteen years later in 1842.
The New Police were designed to function via standardised processes of
crime control, operated by professionals who excluded or at least narrowed
464 For example see Bowler (1989) pp5-6 or Darwin (1859/1968) "I believe ... in no law of
necessary development" P348
465 Hughes (1984) p424
466 Mawby (2007) in Newburn et al (2007) pl46
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popular involvement in law enforcement. The first joint Police
Commissioners, Richard Mayne and Charles Rowan, specifically
engineered a benign and dignified image of a bureaucratic, disciplined force
in order to subvert the strength of opposition that existed to any kind of state
police force.467 The introduction of a plain clothed detective department
faced an even greater public relations problem because of their association
with French governmental spies or secret agents who had once been
employed to root out English Jacobins. An 1845 article in The Times
emphasizes this view: "When Sir Robert Peel first introduced his favourite
measure, he lulled the suspicions of those who saw in it the latent springs of
a spy system ... The detective force seemed somewhat at variance with this,
but its object was confessedly useful. ..Nevertheless there was and always
will be something repugnant to the English mind in the bare idea of
espionage. It smacks too strongly of France and Austria ... ,.468Such
sentiments fuelled fears about the erosion of civil liberties, duplicitous
methods, and the taint of criminality that clung to the police by association
with Eugene Vidocq (1828) and others like him.469
By the time The Moonstone was published in 1868, the New Police were
well established, though their public image was still variable. A continuing
mood of suspicion co-mingled with admiration for a new body of crime
fighters of the kind projected by Mayne and Rowan. They appear to have
been intermittently lauded for their courage and efficiency or castigated for
buffoon-like bungling. For example, a letter to the editor of the Times in
1865 refers to the "extreme stupidity" of an inspector, who, if he "had been
an accomplice ... could not have played the cards better for [the felon]." An
equally derogatory letter calls for "reform in Scotland Yard. Until a more
efficient system of police is organised, neither our homes nor our property
467 See Reiner (1992) pp60-73 for discussion of the legitimation of the first New Police
468 The Times Dec 02 1845 p4 col E. Two further letters to the editor, also complaining of
underhand detective methods, appeared in The Times Jul 04 1851 p5 col C and Jul 05 1851
p7 col C. The latter is insistent that "The end does not justify the means" and is signed "A
Barrister"
469 See Emsley (2005) p241; Knight (2004) plO; Worthington (2005) p 117
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can be regarded as secure.'0470 Such lamentable visions of policing are
posted between congratulatory pieces that praise the "superior efficiency of
our modem police" are thankful for the "rapid logic of a detective" and the
"ready instinct with which the two constables pounced upon their man ... ,0471
Such excerpts from The Times indicate a rather extreme form of
ambivalence; especially pertinent is the swing from 'extreme stupidity' to
the 'rapid logic of the detective'.
The late 1860's, too, was a period of crisis for the New Police who, in 1867,
failed to prevent a bomb attack on Clerkenwell prison, despite having
received accurate prior intelligence. Twelve people were killed and many
more injured. There was a public outcry. A furore exploded into the press;
so much so that the Home Office instigated an inquiry to deal with what
Punch and others called the 'Defective Department. ,472 A year later
Richard Mayne, then sole Police Commissioner died, amidst a moral panic
over rising crime. Faced with a failure to deliver on the crime fighting
front following so soon after an embarrassing demonstration of
incompetence, Mayne's successor decided to place more, rather than less,
emphasis on the detective department. 473
It is at this point in the development of the real-world detective squad that
Collins was searching for a way to develop the naturalistic detail of his plots
to their fullest extent. That he was successful in creating a masterful form
of naturalistic plotting is evident from Henry James' comment on Collins'
"massive and elaborate ... mosaic work, for the proper mastery of which it
would seem, at first, that an index and notebook were required. They are
not so much works of art as works of science.'0474 Collins' success in
drawing readers like Henry James into detective activities with his 'index
and notebook,' places his work as one of the milestones in the diffusion of a
470 Times 17 May 1865 p 13 col B "How not to catch a thief' and Times 29 Oct 1868 p5 col
D "London Burglars"
471 Times 09 Dec 1864 p6 col E
472 See Morris (2006) 'Crime Does Not Pay' in Emsley and Shpayer-Makov (2006) p83
473 See Reiner (1992) p70
474 From Henry James (1865) 'Mary Elizabeth Braddon' in James and Edel (1984) p743
new genre, though his actual police detective, like the 'public image' at this
time is harder to pin down.
THEMOONSTONE, DETECTION AND SCIENCE
'The Great cufr47S
The 'great' Sergeant Cuff steps onto a cultural stage, as it were, in which a
real police force were apparently openly failing the people whom they were
intended to serve. This circumstance is mirrored by the famed detective's
summons to the Verinder country home where fictional police, being
equally inadequate, have made no headway in the case of the missing
moonstone, and require a metropolitan police detective to set the situation
straight. A "renowned and capable character ... the celebrated Cuff' is
greeted with great fanfare, for "when it comes to unravelling a mystery,
there isn't an equal in England.'.476 What then follows is a demonstration of
exactly how not to approach an investigation. On this point Collins' plot,
like Braddon's Trail, engages with 19th-century debates about scientific
method and particularly with the role of hypothesis in generating
knowledge.t"
Cuff begins promisingly with a detailed search of the crime scene - Rachel
Verinder's bedchambers. Taking note ofa freshly varnished door, "He laid
one inquiring finger on ... [a] small smear ... " and looked to the local
Superintendant for an explanation, who shrugged it offas "a mere trifle.,,478
The response comes back, "I made a private inquiry last week ... at one end
of the inquiry was a murder, and at the other end there was a spot of ink on
a tablecloth that nobody could account for .. J never met with such a thing as
a trifle yet ... ,,479 Cuff's enquiries then reveal that the wet varnish on Rachel
Verinder's bedroom door was smeared within the same time period that the
diamond was taken, leading him to surmise that the door paint was smudged
475 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p158
476 Ibid p155
477 See pp 158-66 of this work
478 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p158 and 159
479 Ibid p159
by clothing adorning the thief. So the "mystery of the smear on the
bedroom door ... means the mystery of the Diamond also.'.480 Strictly
speaking, of course, he could not be sure that it was the thief and not
another who smeared the door, but he discounts as many other possibilities
as he can. In an exemplary Baconian process of gradual elimination he finds
it was not, for example, the household dogs, neither was it Miss Verinder's
maid etc."! So far so good.
The mistress of the moonstone, Rachel Verinder, is apparently in some
emotional upheaval following the loss of her jewel. Behaving seemingly
erratically, she barges into the midst of Cuffs enquiries after the door paint,
with an insinuation that the detective be cautious about accepting Franklin
Blake's word as fact. Ignoring the detail that Blake and Miss Verinder had
been lovers and so were potentially embroiled in some sort of tiff, Cuff fixes
his suspicions indelibly on Miss Verinder from this moment on. The family
butler, Betteredge sees that in a moment "a new light (and a horrid
light) ... [had] suddenly fallen on the case, in the mind of Sergeant Cuff -
purely and entirely in consequence of what he had seen in Miss Rachel, and
heard from Miss Rachel, at that first interview between them.'.482 Before
going very much further Cuff declares that "Nobody has stolen the
Diamond ... ,.483In other words, Miss Verinder has hidden, sold or otherwise
disposed of her own diamond.
Cuff goes on to demonstrate perfectly the danger of being blinded by a
preconceived hypothesis, which according to Agassi (1982), was what
Bacon's warning amounted to.484 The detective is so prejudiced that he then
fits all other evidence, which he collects meticulously, to this one
preconception, a hypothesis that is never tested against other possibilities.
So when one of the family servants, also behaving oddly in various ways, is
reported to have been awake through the early hours, her bedroom door
480 Ibid P 173
481 See Agassi (1982) for an explanation, or Smith (1994) and pp158-66 of this work
482 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p161-2
483 Ibid P166 Collins' emphasis
484 See p 161-62 of this work for a discussion of hypothesis as prejudice
locked and a fire burning on a midsummer night, he assumes her to be
acting on behalf of Miss Verinder in some manner. In fact, the girl has
fallen in love with Blake and having seen the varnish stain on his nightshirt,
hides it, and then sits the night long, sewing a replacement to save him from
suspicion. Some days later, when the girl drowns in local quicksands, Cuff
believes her to have met with a fatal accident whilst attempting to hide the
smeared clothing on behalf of Rachel Verinder. Betteredge, aware of the
girl's unrequited love, has a different understanding: "The girl's altered
looks the numbed, deadened way in which she listened to me, and spoke
to me but a few hours since ... warned me, even as the Sergeant spoke, that
his guess was wide of the dreadful truth.,,485Indeed, a suicide note
recovered some time after the event, reveals Betteredge to have been
correct.
Such a sequence of events has Cuff falling short of the job on two fronts.
His prejudice is clearly one. He is also a bad judge of character and this, as
I have discussed in relation to phrenological and physiognomical readings in
the previous chapter, is one of the detective's most prized, and important
skills.486 In the interaction between Betteredge and Cuff, which is sustained
through the whole of Cuffs visit to the house, Collins juxtaposes the
'common sense' feeling of the former against the reason of the latter.
Although Betteredge is unable to even begin to fathom who stole the jewel,
he is a reasonable judge of character and following Cuffs explanation of the
case against Miss Verinder, Betteredge proudly announces himself
"constitutionally superior to reason" which enables him to "hold firm to my
lady's view" that the character of the young mistress would have prevented
her being able to do anything so duplicitous as to steal her own diamond.487
Cuff on the contrary looks to find answers in reason alone. In terms of
method, he begins well and is an assiduous data gatherer from first to last,
but his hypothesis is deeply flawed, and since he settles on it so soon and
holds to it without test, so his reasoning is equally flawed.
485 Collins and Fanner (1868/1999) p218
486 See the near mythologizing of this skill in the popular, factional work of Summerscale
(2008) pp77-89, which re-tells the story of the famous Road murder of 1860.
487 Collins and Fanner (1868/1999) p229
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Fictional or Factional?
Cuffs grounds for suspecting the young mistress are almost entirely tied up
with her unwillingness to cooperate, which according to his previous
experience of family scandal adds up to some secret indebtedness on her
part. On this point, a review in the Spectator expressed similar sentiments to
Betteredge and Lady Verinder, in that "[t]he idea of a girl like Rachel
Verinder ...stealing her own jewel, is one which, though it might by
possibility have taken in the detective, cannot take in the reader.'.488 The
failure of the detective's reason is then no surprise to the reviewer, although
the reader, of course, is more discerning. These aspects of 'the great Cuff
project a rather poor view of the efficiency of the Detective (or Defective?)
department. Much in the same way that the pledge of crime control made
by the real police disappoints, so does Cuffs promisingly powerful
presence and his ultimate contribution to solving the mystery is small.
Finally, his accusations have him dismissed from house and case by Lady
Verinder.
In addition to his reflection of contemporary debate, Collins incorporates
details from the real-world detective, Inspector Jonathan Whicher, and his
involvement with the Road murder. Whicher was lambasted in the press for
his part in the case, after he accused Constance Kent of murdering her three-
year-old half-brother. His case rested upon a missing nightgown that he
believed the adolescent girl to have disposed of after having stained it with
her brother's blood. Collins reiterates both the missing garment and
Whicher's supposed failure of reasoning. Whicher was apparently
discredited and resigned, only to be vindicated some years later, when in
1865 Constance Kent came forward of her own volition and confessed to
the crime.489 These details were undoubtedly well known to many of
Collins' audience since the Road murders were highly sensationalised in the
popular press where the divide between fact and fiction was equally difficult
488 Quoted at length in Collins and Fanner (1868/1999) p547
489 See Fanner (1999) pp26-27 and pp560-576 in Collins and Fanner (1868/1999)
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to pin down. In the way of a myth, Whicher's story never dies it seems, for
he has recently been given new life in a 21 st century bestselling' factional'
work by Kate Summerscale, who has celebrated the detective with a real
kaleidoscope of fact, fiction and faction.490
By incorporating such contemporary detail and debate into The Moonstone,
Collins gives Cuff an edge of realism and the real police force the edge of
his fiction. Indeed, a Times review of The Moonstone acknowledges the
likeness to life and amplifies the fuzziness between fact and fiction even
further:
Cuff is the inevitable detective, a character apparently so regularly
retained on the establishment of the sensational novelists that it
would be convenient for a due appreciation of their new works to
find appended to advertisements of them, along with extracts from
the critical journals, such remarks as "Very true to life!" and the like,
dated from Scotland Yard. We cannot affect to love the police-court
flavour these characters infuse into modern tales. But "the great"
Sergeant Cuff would almost reconcile one to the type.491
Again, a note of ambivalence. Surprisingly Cuffs failure fails to put the
reviewer off the 'police court flavour' and brings out a tone of acceptance if
not sympathy toward it. I return to this issue below.
Such a confusion of imagined and material worlds is so characteristic of
crime writing across different domains that it draws inevitable questions
about how public( s) divide fact from fiction.492 An issue that is, of course,
as important to those who are concerned with deficits of public
understandings in science as it is to police 'image workers' .493
Nevertheless, in terms of television crime stories, Leishman and Mason
490 Summerscale (2008)
491 The Times Saturday Oct 3rd 1868 'The Moonstone' p4
492 See Leishman and Mason (2003) for treatment of modem media crime representation,
its authenticity, possible meaning and effects; Hurd (1981) "The Presentation of the Police"
in Bennett et al (1981); and Warwick (2006) for a discussion of the construction of the
serial killer in fiction, faction and factual domains
493 Michael and Carter's (2001) focus group study of science in public, for example,
suggests that fictional images are not confused with reality by lay public(s)
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(2003) comment that any "assessment of the realism and authenticity of
fictional representations of the police is based on the viewer's own
knowledge and experience ofthem.,,494 In 1868, most readers of The
Moonstone would have been hard pushed to have any direct experience of
detectives, since there were only 15 detectives in a force of 8,000 men.49S
In this sense, then cultural producers of all kinds, reporters of crime and
novelists included, in the mid-l S" century are pivotal in terms of
constructing the detective as an ever-abiding icon of culture. That said, the
presentation of fiction cannot simply impose an image upon its audience,
whatever social world is imagined it must be 'convincing' or 'believable'
and 'fit' with the mindset of the reader.496 To this effect, Collins'
assimilation of real-world elements of policing grounds the story in what
Hurd (1981) has referred to as a 'heritage of realism' which amounts to an
engagement with socially constructed and sanctioned knowledge, whether
that be from contemporary debate, typificatory detail, or mythic
structures.t'"
Especially powerful in Collins time, is the notion that Hurd (1981) utilises
of a 'half formed picture,' by which he means a process, person, or type,
held within the minds of a readership and completed by the fiction. To
argue that a single work of fiction, in itself, can complete the 'half formed
picture' seems to go a little too far. Though the idea of a partly formed
image, which can be modified by individual details from different
knowledge sources, fiction included, is more likely. A 'public image', of
say, detectives, police or indeed scientists, builds through an accretive
process that combines information and impressions from eclectic sources
that in themselves have drawn upon one another, in a network of 'realisms'
494 Leishman and Mason (2003) p3
495 See Reiner (1992) p70
496 That is not to suggest that fiction must always reflect the extant real world. Magic and
fantasy are believable, because they: a) fit in with a tradition of story telling which is
familiar, and b) they engage with other psychological realisms, for example the perception
of reason as mundane or intuitive (see previous chapter ppI58-66). These two levels of
'fit' add up to what Hurd describes as 'heritage of realism', Hurd (1981) in Bennett et al
p55
497 See Kirby (2003), whose study of consultant scientists on film sets finds fictional
narratives that naturalise both accurate and inaccurate science.
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each gaining authenticity by making reference to the others.498 Alexandra
Warwick (2006) has used the idea of a 'discursive concept' to describe a
rather similar process in the build up of a complex of images and meanings
such as are invoked by the terms' Jack the Ripper' or 'the serial killer' .499 If
a 'public image', is in fact a complex of images, so the public face of a
detective, is not one, but many faces, then it is possible, indeed likely, that
some of these images will apparently conflict with one another. This is
especially the case in the mid-IS'" century, with regard to the detective. So,
while the Times professes not to like the 'police court flavour' invoked by
Cuff, they are at the same time 'reconciled' to it by Cuff.
Collins' incorporation of details from the famous Whicher case is a trigger
point invoking a host of cultural references to this detective and his
colleagues at Scotland Yard. One writer in particular, who is likely to have
been known to many of Collins' readers, and who also wrote about
Whicher, is Charles Dickens. He had written about the police from the early
days of his work as a journalist on the Morning, and subsequently the
Evening Chronicle. SOD The novelist's own love of order, his "mania for
tidiness, punctuality, routine and efficiency" fuelled a boyish hero worship
for the police, particularly the detective police according to Dickens scholar,
Phillip Collins (1962), and his articles about the latter are nothing short of
eulogies.i'" Historians both of real and fictional police argue that Dickens
was very influential in constructing a positive image of the detectives in a
series of five articles, which he wrote for Household Words (1850-1853).502
The first article was entitled Detective Police and appeared in Household
Words in two parts in July and August of 1850. It consists of a report on a
498 In my view, Hurd's (1981) 'heritage of realism' is a network of cultural references
499 Warwick (2006) see especially pSS4
500 See Worthington (2005) pp130-136 for detailed discussion of Dickens' early pieces,
which featured 'bobbies' not detectives.
SOl From Collins (1962) Dickens and Crime quoted in Worthington (2005) p161
S02 Authors who cite the importance of Dickens include Mawby (2007) in Newburn et al
(2007); Thomas (1999) and (2001) "Detection in the Victorian Novel" in David (ed) (2001)
and (2006) "The Moonstone, detective fiction and forensic science" in Bourne-Taylor (ed)
(2006); Worthington (2005); Symons (1985); and Summerscale (2008) takes Dickens'
word as read
visit, made by the whole detective squad of seven, to Dickens' own office; a
factor that suggests they were very keen to court this particular journalist,
and rightly so. What is especially striking about the descriptions that
Dickens relates is his emphasis on their 'scientific' skills. So, Inspector
Weild, as he calls him, has "a knowing eye"; Sergeant Dornton "is famous
for steadily pursuing the inductive process, and from small beginnings,
working on from clue to clue until he bags his man"; and Sergeant Witchem
"has something of a reserved and thoughtful air; as if he were engaged in
deep arithmetical calculations'V'" To a man, they are respectable
looking ...of...unusual intelligence ... with an air of keen observation and
quick perception when addressed; and generally presenting in the faces,
traces more or less marked of habitually leading lives of strong mental
excitement.T'" In sum, Dickens describes men who are "forever on the
watch, with their wits stretched to the utmost.. .[and their]
Suspicion ... directed, by careful inference and deduction, upon the right
person ... ,,505
Following his descriptions of the detectives themselves, Dickens goes on to
relate some of the anecdotes that they recounted on their visit. None show
much evidence of 'careful inference and deduction' nor of 'steadily
pursuing the inductive process'. In the four detective tales that follow, all
are cases that involve tracking down known offenders, so there is never a
need for directing 'suspicion by careful inference and deduction.' In one
story the culprit is tracked through the postal service; another involves
entrapment; a third, undercover work to catch a gang of thieves; and in the
last case, the felon is apprehended via a coincidental meeting. In all cases
the men show a complete disregard for evidence; amusingly in the postal
case, the suspect is eventually acquitted owing to "a defect in the
evidence.,,506 Oddly enough the skills that the detectives do have - bravery,
for one, dedication to duty, determination, knowledge of the criminal social
S03 Dickens and Pascoe (1997) p247. Weild is a pseudonym for Inspector Field and
Witchem is a pseudonym for Whicher; Cobb (1957) has identified all the real-world
equivalents
S04 Dickens and Pascoe (1997) p248
sos Ibid p261
S06 Ibid p253
world and a talent for disguise - are all features that go unremarked by
Dickens, presumably because those attributes were a little too closely
associated with the unsavoury Continental methods or the outmoded Bow
Street Runners.
Dickens at first builds the squad up as capable intellectuals and then
demonstrates that their methods are not even investigative, let alone any
exemplar of supposed brainpower. To openly express conflict, or
contradiction, in such a manner that the dilemma involved is somehow
evaded, glossed over, or linked by a narrative, is the job of myth, modem
myth, and some would say of fiction, in general. 507Collins follows and
amplifies Dickens in this trend. His "renowned and capable" police
detective comes much flaunted as the only man up to the mystery.50g He
begins promisingly with assiduous data collection, but in the end cannot
come up to the intellectual challenge of the investigation. Further to this, the
mirage of Whicher that resides within Collins' Cuff highlights the failure of
the latter even further, for Whicher had been right all along, whereas Cuff
was entirely mistaken. Yet Collins does allow his detective a measure of
success. Once the investigation comes to a head and the novel cuts to the
chase, then the great man is able to lead the way to the thief with style and
confidence. Here on the streets of London, Cuff demonstrates the same
actual skills that Dickens relates in the Detective Police.509
The tensions that these authors encompass in different ways seem to reflect
contemporary cultural contradictions between the ideal of policing and its
practice. The ideal, which was disseminated from its first
institutionalisation, was of an expert, apolitical, scientific force, rather
similar to the kind of professional image that was advocated and believed by
GWM Reynolds (1844-46) to be a counter to the old, corrupt order. By the
time of Collins' writing, and indeed before and after, this professional
507 See Carroll (1981) on myth and Hurd (1981) in Bennett et al (1981) on police television
drama and its treatment of contradictions
508 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) pISS
509 Similarly, Dickens' journalistic account ofInspector Field (1851) on a tour of duty,
places him as near mythical hero and man of the people, more reminiscent ofa picaresque
hero than a policemen
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image ran counter to the very public failures of the 1860's detective squad.
Both ideal and practice are played out in Collins' and Dickens'
representations and they contradict, just as they did in the contemporary mid
19th century English society. This is a point that sometimes goes
unacknowledged in studies that emphasize the Foucauldian rise of
disciplinary technologies and institutions. For example, there is a yawning
gap between what Thomas (2001) describes as Cuffs "keen powers of
observation, his uncanny judgement of character, and his acute deductive
reasoning ... " and what Collins shows his detective to be capable of
doing.slO
Historians of 'real-world' crime generally agree that most offenders in the
19th century, who were caught, were arrested at the scene of the crime or
captured as a result of positive identification by witnesses and victims,
rather than being subject to any kind of detective work.i!' The actual skills
used by policemen for most of the 19th century were minimal and largely
unsophisticated.I'f Indeed, in a Home Office enquiry following the 1867
Clerkenwell bomb attack, a Superintendent giving evidence on this matter
in 1868 is noted as saying, "in my whole experience [since 1835] I never
knew a man of superior education join unless there was a screw loose
somewhere." This kind of inference was not unusual.i'? According to RM
Morris (2006) the scarcity of educated manpower available to the police
force was a persistent worry for much of its 19th century history. What had
drifted into the culture of this 'reality' was reflected in Collins' work hidden
behind the image of the scientific, capable Cuff.
Once Cuff fails, the mystery of the moonstone is left with no single
detective eye able to follow it through to resolution. Instead elements of the
puzzle are relayed from one character to another, baton like, for each to
make a contribution, however small, before passing it on to the next. In a
510 See Thomas Detection in the Victorian Novel pI83 in David (ed) (2001)
51 I Emsley (2000) p93
5t2 See Emsley (2000) p93 and Morris (2006) "Crime Does Not Pay" in Emsley and
Shpayer-Makov (2006) and Morris (2007) "The History of Criminal Investigation" in
Newburn et al (2007)
5t3 See Morris (2006) "Crime Does Not Pay" in Emsley and Shpayer-Makov (2006) p83
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now famed reading of The Moonstone, DA Miller (1980) describes how the
function of the detective is dispersed through the whole community of
characters. In Collins' story a "policing power is inscribed in the ordinary
practices and institutions of the world"sl4 and "natural curiosity and
common gossip double for an informal system of surveillance that is in
force on the estate well before the Moonstone is stolen."SIS This is indeed
the case, as evidenced in the way the servants tell tales on one another.
Miller's work is one of the first and most perceptive of the Foucauldian
approaches to detective fiction, and it allows for the acknowledgement of
the failure of official channels of crime detection and the success of
unofficial ones. Although, one does have to ask whether Collins' depiction
of a failed professional does not constitute a criticism of the official
channels of crime detection, particularly given the regular popular griping
about police inadequacy that was evident in contemporary press.!"
Indeed, as if to press that message home, there is an unofficial detective in
The Moonstone who is anything but mundane. He brings the speciality of
scientific application to the detective process, in such a way as to underline,
more emphatically than does Braddon, that this is the process of successful
detection, because of all characters he is the most effective in the restorative
function. But, like Braddon's magician-scientist, the 'extraordinary
Jennings' is an eccentric outsider who carries no institutional legitimacy.
The Extraordinary Jennings
In the interim, with Cuff gone, 'detective fever' transfers from one character
to another, even infecting minor characters who are charged with providing
key pieces of information, filling in elements of the mystery as they dO.SI7
In the main, however, Franklin Blake, the young friend and lover of Rachel
SI4 Miller (1980) in Pykett (1998) p208
SIS Ibid p207
SI6 See Morris (2006) "Crime Does Not Pay" in Emsley and Shpayer-Makov (2006) for a
summary of dissatisfaction with police
SI7 "Detective fever" is a phrase Collins uses liberally to reflect the way in which the
characters 'infect' each other and the reader, as they each take their turns at investigative
work. See: Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p191; 215; 248; 249; 369; 372; 374; 504.
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Verinder, Mr Bruff, the family lawyer, and the extraordinary Ezra Jennings
take up the reins of detective work. Blake and Bruff go as far as they can,
but the investigation stalls when Rachel Verinder declares that she actually
saw Blake take the diamond from her chamber. Blake has no memory of
the deed. It is at this point that Ezra Jennings, Dr Candy's assistant and
sometime scientist, appears on the scene, with new evidence. He has
discovered that, in order to prove a personal point on the effectiveness of
drugs, Dr Candy had secretly administered opium to Franklin Blake
unbeknownst to him or anyone else on night of the robbery. Though Candy
planned to reveal all to Blake the following morning, he was unable to,
having been taken ill himself that night - so ill that his memory was badly
and irrevocably damaged.
Jennings, who cared for the sick doctor, finds a method of decoding
patient's delirious wanderings and in so doing, discovers Candy's tricks
with the laudanum bottle. As a self-confessed expert in the physiological
effects of opium, Jennings hypothesises that Blake, being worried over the
safety of the diamond, took it while in an unconscious drugged state and hid
it somewhere safely. He persuades the central characters to conduct an
experiment to replicate 'exactly' the circumstances of the crime, and when
they do, Blake takes the diamond but falls asleep with it in his hand. The
question then becomes did someone else take the diamond from Blake or
did Blake hide it? At this point Jennings' part in the story is over. Apart
from setting the investigation back in progress, Jennings' function has also
been to exonerate Blake in the eyes of Rachel Verinder and to restore the
couple to harmony. In this regard Jennings is the ultimate restorative
character, since the convention for all Victorian novels is to end, or resolve,
with marriage.
Though he is a lowly doctor's assistant, Jennings has some mysterious past,
involving an accusation, which has prevented him from achieving the great
things that are suggested in his character. He is a classically odd looking
and socially isolated scientist whose loneliness drives him to use his leisure
time in study of the human brain. Jennings, in fact, is marked with many of
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the emblems ofthe mad scientist, although his function is restorative. As
such, he is reminiscent of Bradd on's magician-scientist, Laurent Blurosset.
Mad scientists, Ihave proposed, represent a model of reason, which
obscures process, incorporating intuition, imagination, ideas and
hypotheses, as opposed to the detective who represents the rather more
dreary, though open, process of additive, mechanical thinking and data
gathering.i" Jennings is unusual among fictional scientists who use the
experimental method, in that much of his process is also open. So his is not
quite the unfathomable method ofa magician-scientist like Braddon's
Laurent Blurosset, though neither does it represent the mundane data
gatherer of Braddon's Mr Peters.
From the outset, Jennings has a clearly framed hypothesis and collects data
accordingly. His initial reliance on theory aligns his mode of thought more
closely with imagination and intuition than with the legwork of amassing
data. When, his employer, Dr Candy, falls delirious, he has an ideal
opportunity to test a theory, which he has been pondering. His belief is that,
in cases of delirium, the loss of connected speech does not necessarily
signal the loss of connected thinking. By recording verbatim Dr Candy's
incoherent wanderings, he is able to study them at length and ascertain
whether they do have an underlying meaning. At this point, his method
does take a mysterious turn, though he emphasizes its simplicity by
describing it as "something like the principle which one adopts in putting
together a child's 'puzzle'. It is all confusion to begin with; but it may be
all brought into order and shape, if you can only find the right way.',SI9 The
right way is not given, and the reference to a child's puzzle invokes ideas of
childlike receptivity and imaginative fantasy that partly lead AD Hutter
(1975) to emphasize Jennings' ability to take on the perspective of others
and draw on their subjective experience, an intuitive skill, invaluable to
many a detective.s2o
SI8 See pp158-66 of this work for this discussion
SI9 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p442
S20 As I have already noted, the detective most famed for this ability is probably Agatha
Christie's Miss Marple, whose understanding and observation of behaviour is second to
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Other critics have described Jennings, in this regard, in rather more exotic
terms, as Stephen Knight (2004) does, who writes of a cross between a
"mesmeric seance and a psychoanalytic session.,,521 Such interpretations
come closer to the kinds of enchanted science that are represented by
Braddon's scientist who is able to 'read' events in the cards, in a similarly
seance-cum-psychoanalytic set up.522 What happens in such sessions is that
the scientist sees the future, the private thoughts, or the past as a whole
picture, at once, in a flash. Jennings too has such flashes of intuition. For
example, as Blake explains his mystifying story of stealing the diamond
without any memory of having done so, nor having had any desire to own it,
all of a sudden, Jennings "started to his feet, and looked at me with
breathless eagerness" ... "'Stop!' he said. 'You have suggested more to me
than you suppose. Have you ever been accustomed to the use of
opium?,,,523
Such flashes of inspiration, along with the experiment that follows, provoke
the kind of review as appeared in The Times: "Ezra Jennings, is one of those
occult medical geniuses that are found in novels ... ,,524 It is not absolutely
clear from the text of the review, what is meant by 'occult' - magical or
hidden, since both meanings were in use at the time.525 Whichever, Collins'
portrait of Jennings reaches into the same intersection of genius, creativity,
science, magic and imagination, as did Braddon in her representation of
Blurosset. In this respect too, these authors can be seen as invoking Hurd's
(1981) 'heritage of realism,' because, despite the fact that their
representations are decidedly fantastical, they invoke real-world issues - an
example of how fact and fiction can be blurred. Fiction is one of the
cultural products within a network of 'realisms' that cross-reference one
none. That said, most detectives have some ability to understand the intent and motive of
others, except, it seems Sergeant Cuff
521 Knight (2004) p45
522 See pp147-50
523 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p449
524 The Times Saturday Oct 3rd 1868 p4 col D 'The Moonstone'
525 See entry 'Occult' Oxford English Dictionary http://www.oed.com!accessed 18th
August 2010
another, taking authenticity and meaning one from another. Such a network
might include scientific ideas, material realities, fictional narratives, socially
sanctioned typifications and more. There is no line between fact and fiction
in terms of such networks.
One of the fictional 'realisms,' upon which Collins draws is a tradition of
certain well-defined magical cues. Jennings, for example, seemingly
materialises from nowhere at moments when the 'detective fever' loses its
momentum. On three separate occasions he appears coincidentally, just at
the moment he is needed.526 This, of course is a fairy tale tradition, in the
way, for example, of the fairy godmother. That the characters of fairy tales
have typical means of entering plots, I have already noted following Propp
(1928).527 The device is a way of priming the reader for the kind of
character that they are going to meet with and Propp finds that the
accidental encounter is the characteristic means of entry for the donor. The
fairy godmother is just such a donor, whose part in the structure of the story
is to provide the hero with "some agent (usually magical), which permits
the eventual liquidation of'misfortune.v'f" Jennings too is a donor. The gift
of knowledge that he offers absolves Blake from any guilt and is the trigger
that allows the mystery of the missing stone to be laid to rest.
Moving seamlessly from such magical cues, Collins then follows through
by drawing on 'real-world' processes in an unusually clear illustration of
experimental science. So, although the man comes enchanted, his gift does
not. Jennings' knowledge comes in the end through squarely based
scientific, not magical, channels. The experiment itself seems improbable
in its goal to induce the crime a second time. Nevertheless, Jennings shows
himself to be a man who knows how to conduct an experiment, however
improbable. First he has the flash of intuition that tells him that Blake's
state on the night of the robbery combined with the opium draught could
have triggered the theft. Next, he declares "We must put our conviction to
526 See Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p390; p402; and 435
527 See p114 of this work
528 Propp (1928/1968) p39
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the proof ... Are you willing to try a bold experiment?"s29 Then, he
contextualises his hypothesis for Blake within the "admitted principles, and
recognised authorities ... " of William Carpenter, professor of forensic
medicine at University College London, Dr John Elliotson, the physiologist
famous for supporting the use of mesmerism as anaesthetic, and George
Combe, the inevitable phrenologist.P" The effect for the reader is to ground
the story in real-world science and with Blake convinced too, the pair set
out to replicate the night of the robbery down to the last detail.
The character of Jennings, then, reaches into both the magical and the
scientific spheres, invoking an overlapping heritage of realism of fact and
fantasy. Hutter (1975) argues that Jennings "is the ultimate detective of the
novel who succeeds precisely because he is able to see both the significance
of the most trivial details and to allow his mind to wander past the
boundaries of rational thought."s31 To what extent Jennings does wander
beyond rational thought is actually not clear from the story, and it is
probably from the invocation of mystery and magic that Hutter takes this
impression. That said, his perspective on Jennings as the 'ultimate detective
of the novel' holds up, especially when he is compared to Cuff. Cuffs
assiduous data collection and prejudicial hypothesis is to Jennings' superior
knowledge, flair for ideas and understanding of hypothesis testing, as a poor
cousin is to a wealthy relative. In this regard Cuffs is very much the model
of mundane reason as compared to Jennings' genius. The inequality
between the pair serves only to emphasize the negative side of the cultural
ambivalence toward the detective figure, that was evident in insinuations of
'extreme stupidity' and calls for 'speedy reform' which writers to The Times
were moved to voice. S32 Collins' remedy is given in a method that was
developed by scientists, mad, sad or otherwise.
529 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p457
530 Ibid p458-59
531 Hutter (1975) in Pykett (1998) pl83
532 Respectively, The Times May 17 1865 pl3 col B 'How Not to Catch a Thief; The Times
Oct 291868 'London Burglars' p5 colD
IMAGE WORK
As if to really emphasize the need for a scientific method of policing, or
perhaps to critique its lack, Collins gives Cuff many of the external
attributes, the typificatory details that signify science, or knowledge.
Following the build up to his much vaunted arrival at the Verinder house,
there then arrives a "grizzled, elderly man, so miserably lean" with a face
"sharp as a hatchet"; skin "as yellow and dry as a withered autumn leaf';
and eyes that "had a very disconcerting trick ... oflooking as if they expected
something more from you than you were aware of yourself. His walk was
soft; his voice was melancholy; his long lanky fingers were hooked like
claws. He might have been a parson, or an undertaker ... "s33This is
Sergeant Cuff, clearly not what the house party expect, nor relish.
Likewise, Jennings is unforgettable by appearance alone, or worse than that
Blake is moved to agree with Betteredge's summary that "speaking from
popular point of view, [his look] was against him."s34 In other words his
looks shocked. Jennings combines a youthful body and the face of a
seventy year old. "His fleshless cheeks had fallen into deep hollows ... His
forehead rose high and straight from the brow. His marks and wrinkles
were innumerable ... [his] eyes, stranger still, of the softest brown -looked
out at you, and ... took your attention captive at their will"S3Sand his black
hair was emblazoned with shocks of pure white.
These two figures are built from similar materials, showing signs of
depleted strength and a faded magic, yet retaining some spark of mesmeric
power in the eyes. Wizened looks too, often come as a sign of accumulated
knowledge, sometimes magical, sometimes natural. The fictional wizard,
alchemist or indeed, 'old hag', are usually characterised as haggard,
physically spent and advancing in years, sometimes prematurely.P" In
533 Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) p155
534 Ibid p436
S3S Ibid p390
536 GW Reynolds, for example, has a classic 'old hag' in the Vol! of the Mysteries of
London. The old wise woman, benevolent or malevolent, was a stock figure of gothic
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William Godwin's Sf Leon, for example, the powerful alchemist who holds
the secret of the philosopher's stone is "feeble, emaciated and pale, his
forehead full of wrinkles and his hair and beard as white as snow. Care was
written in his face ... yet his eye was still quick and lively, with a strong
expression of suspiciousness and anxiety.,,537
The same complex of signifiers conjures Shelley'S vision of the crazed, or
'used- up' scientist Victor Frankenstein, who had once been good-looking,
but now whose cheek has "grown pale with study, and ... [his]
person ... emaciated with confinement" owing to the ''unremitting ardour"
of his task. 538Vestiges of such drained vitality recur again in GWM
Reynolds' (1844) portrait ofMr Wentworth, who is "pale, but good-
looking ... [with] a somewhat melancholy expression of countenance. He
was attired in deep black ... his voice was mournful. .. ,,539The surgeon, like
Cuff, is gloomy as an undertaker, pale from over-work and good looking as
Frankenstein once was. A similar refrain again arises in Braddon's (1861)
drawing of her magician-scientist, Laurent Blurroset, who is another "pale,
thin studious-looking man ... ,,540
This is the aesthetic of the knowledge-seeker, scientist or magician. The
pinnacle of which, must be Collins' Dr Benjula, the vivisectionist of Heart
and Science (1883). Benjula "was so miserably ... thin that his enemies
spoke of him as 'the living skeleton'. His massive forehead, his great
gloomy gray eyes, his protuberant cheekbones, overhung a fleshless lower
face ... His complexion ... was a true gipsy-brown, and being darker in tone
than his eye, added remarkably to the weird look, the dismal thoughtful
scrutiny, which it was his habit to fix on persons talking to him ... His
straight black hair hung ... either side of his hollow face. His great dusky
fiction: see Punter (1996) p142. These kinds of character, male or female, would also have
been familiar to many readers from their own life experience, as example of 'cunning folk'
who ministered folk medicine, sold love potions, retrieved lost belongings and captured
thieves: see Davies (2003); also Weart (1988) for a brief discussion of the fictional scientist
as sorcerer or alchemist
S37 Godwin and Brewer (1799/2006) P155
538 Shelley et al (1818/1994) p85
539 Reynolds (1846a) p247 (col b)
540 Braddon and Willis (1860/2003) p275
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hands ... showed amber-coloured nails ... he could handle the frailest objects
with exquisite delicacy ... "s41 Such exaggerated iconography appears to
extend the potency of the message turning this knowledge seeker into a
veritable genius, and by dint of that, exploding his villainy to melodramatic
proportions.542
The point here is that all these characters, bar one, are scientists of some
kind. Only Cuff is not. The detective, then, has taken on the facade of the
scientist, knowledge-seeker and magician. Cuff's reputation and his image
belie his abilities. By the end of the century, Conan Doyle's apotheosis of
scientific detection will follow through with method as well. Like Cuff,
Holmes looks like a scientist, as Watson recounts, "In height he was rather
over six feet, and so excessively lean that he seemed considerably taller.
His eyes were sharp and piercing ... his thin hawk-like nose gave his whole
expression an air of alertness and decision. His hands invariably blotted
with ink and stained with chemicals, yet he was possessed with
extraordinary delicacy of touch, as I frequently had occasion to observe
when I watched him manipulating his fragile philosophical instruments."s43
Naturally, not all detectives were or are drawn from the typified parts of
scientists as are Cuff or Holmes. In the 19th century some were derived
from the picaresque tradition, and there were a host of more prosaic types,
like Braddons' Mr Peters, along with a number of women who appeared in
cheap 'yellowback' novels from the 1860's onwards.I" The scientific face
of the detective is one among a number of public faces, which in a manner
imbricate fictional and factional influences forming a frustratingly slippery
complex that at times appears to run in contradictory directions. That said,
it is significant that the only two of these 19th-century detective faces have
remained popular in the 20th and 21 st centuries. They are Collin's Sergeant
Cuff and in much larger measure, Sherlock Holmes, who has just been
541 ColIins (1883/1990) p61
542 See pp166-171 of this work for a discussion of the way genius appears to amplify the
iniquity of the villain.
543 Conan Doyle (1887/1981) A Study in Scarlet p 18
544 See Knight (2004) pp33-48 for a survey of 1860's detective fictions.
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given a new Hollywood treatment in a feature film bearing his name and a
21Sl_centurygloss in a new UK television serial also bearing his name.545
The continued currency of The Moonstone places the novel as pivotal in a
formative period of construction of the iconic detective image that would,
like Frankenstein, tum into a modem myth.546 Collins' development of a
naturalistic narrative encourages him to create a detective whose expertise
lies in the investigation of natural knowledge, or in science. Such a move is
really an elaboration upon the ideal of scientific policing. Yet, to achieve
this Collins, is borrowing from other traditions of representation, to fill in,
or add to, a 'half-formed' detective image, as it were, he uses the typified
emblems of the scientist. This is a powerful move indeed, since Cuff, the
detective, now resonates with the archetype of the knowledge-seeker,
scientist or magician, and such icons symbolise, what Gieryn (1995) has
described as "an enduring cartographic classification of the cultural
territories that people use to make sense out of the world about them.,,547
This amounts to a shift in perception of the boundaries of the detective -
slbe is now a scientist, or in Collins' narrative, he should be a scientist.
Such a shift in perception is reminiscent of the process that Shortt (1983)
describes in relation to the medical men of the 1840's, undoubtedly also the
process of which Reynolds' (1844-46) Mysteries was a part. In his belief it
is unlikely that the reformed medical profession of this decade widely
benefited their patients with any greater material cures. Yet, under the
semblance "of an objective explanation of natural phenomena, science
became a code-word for a methodology, a designation for specialized
expertise, and a vehicle for social mobility" that was particularly valued by
the middle classes.i'" Just as the physicians of the 1840's earned legitimacy
by assimilating the rhetoric of science, so detectives effectively constructed
545 Sherlock Holmes (December 2009) directed by Guy Ritchie A Warner Brothers Film;
Sherlock (Summer 2010) BBC Television Drama Series consisting of three 90-minute films
first broadcast 25th July, lSI August and 8th August 2010 on UK terrestrial television
546 Conan Doyle's debt to Wilkie Collins (1868) The Moonstone is broadly accepted, see
Farmer (1999) in CoIlins and Farmer (1868/1999) p16
547 Gieryn (1995) p415
548 Shortt (1983) p64
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a depoliticised, scientific image, which carried greater legitimacy owing to
its scientific gloss, particularly in relation to the dangerous image of the
Continental spies. The language of science, according to Shortt" had
entered the substratum of nineteenth-century British thought at a level quite
divorced from its practical achievements." 549 This is Collins' subtext and
it is perhaps even more apposite to the detective police than it was to the
reform doctor.
There is no question that the advent of the fictional scientific detective is
grist to the mill in the activity of maintaining the people's desire for crime
fighters, if only by virtue of keeping the ideas of 'crime' and 'fighters'
current in the popular mind. So, it is, for science too. That said, in Collins'
detective-scientist collaboration, the police detective falls short of the
scientist, and later in Conan Doyle's work, the professional policeman is a
dull automaton compared to the brilliant amateur. In other words, the really
clever work is not always carried out by the established authorities, in fact,
it is often a means of showing up their inadequacy. That said, in overall
terms, the image is potent enough to bathe all crime fighters in some of its
reflected glow and in the zo" and 21 st centuries science has made a stronger
relationship with the officialdom of crime fighting. sso In this case, then,
Collins unwittingly created an image, which in his own 'fully formed
picture' symbolised the failure of real world police in the 1860's. Yet, in
doing so, he launches an icon so powerful that it is reiterated for nigh on a
century and a half in celebration of the crime fighter, official or not. Taking
into account the importance of image to the development and maintenance
of professional status, such a turnaround reflects Golinski's warning that
professionalization might be best viewed as "the unintended outcome of the
interaction of uncoordinated, even conflicting, forces. ,,551 A factor that is
just as true for the scientific professions whose work hitches a restorative
ride with the mythic, all knowing detective.
549 Ibid p63
550 For example in the UK are television dramas Silent Witness, Waking the Dead and
Cracker and from America CS!, Criminal Minds and Quincy, featuring crime fighting
r:athologists, psychologists and assorted forensic scientists
51 Golinski (1998) p69
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Since the 1860's, conspicuous and rewarding relationships have persisted
between fictional detectives, scientific methods and scientists. I will now
move on to explore a situation in which this partnership, which is so
successful in fighting crime, reaches the limits of its plausibility in stories
that pit reason against supernatural transgressors. The occult detective who
applies science or reason to ghostly phenomena is an ephemeral figure who
has not stood the test of time in the way that criminal detectives have. The
most sophisticated example of this figure is Sheridan Le Fanu's (1872) Dr
Hesselius, who appears in a volume of short stories entitled In a Glass
Darkly that alsoinc1udes a vampire story. In the next chapter I will
examine the experiment to bring reason to bear on the supernatural and ask
why the sole surviving icon from this period is the vampire hunter - a
modem myth in its own right.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
MAGICAL DETECTION OR DETECTING MAGIC
J Sheridan Le Fanu (1872) In a Glass Darkly - Bram Stoker (1897)
Dracula
The focus of the previous two chapters has been on texts in which the
official institutions designed to carry out crime prevention and detection
fail. Mary Braddons' (1861) heroes, Mr Peters and Monsieur Blurosset,
both work outside official professional bodies of the law, though both have
considerable rational and magical expertise. Together they outperform the
state-sanctioned institutions from courts, to police force and house of
detention. Likewise, Wilkie Collins' (1868) professional policeman,
Sergeant Cuff, fails, and the crime is only solvable with the help of the
maverick outsider, Ezra Jennings. Although these stories demonstrate
failure of state sanctioned professional channels, they do uphold GWM
Reynolds' (1844-46) vision of the value and efficacy of the scientific
method. In both novels models of reason are apportioned out such that the
detective gets the larger share of the drudgery of data gathering, while the
scientists demonstrate magical leaps of intuitive thought that ultimately tum
their respective investigations around.
J Sheridan Le Fanu's In a Glass Darkly (1872) returns to a similar
landscape of themes raised by gothic fiction, which opposed magic, in
association with Satan, and reason, with virtue. In 1872, morality goes
unassumed and the polarity is softened such that Le Fanu creates the feel of
two systems of thought meandering side-by-side, occasionally intersecting
to create a confusion of potentialities. Reason is the province of a scientific
investigator, a metaphysical doctor, who gives glimpses of Holmes-styled
razzle-dazzle logic, and appearing as he does some fifteen years before
Holmes, shows that a cliche of an all-knowing detective was already well
worked. Certainly, there is no evidence of data-gathering in this portrait and
Le Fanu's investigator conforms to the magical model of reason, both
literally and metaphorically.
lOS
Yet, in Le Fanu's short story 'Green Tea,' unlike Braddon's and Collins'
narratives, both the professional expertise and scientific approach fail.
Oddly enough just as Collins created a fiction, which constituted a critical
perspective on professional potentialities in his own time and ended as
laudatory myth decades later - so Le Fanu's work has met with a similar
fate. As Sherlock Holmes is to Collin's Sergeant Cuff, so Bram Stoker's
vampire slayer, Professor Van Helsing is to Le Fanu's Dr Hesselius, a factor
that adds to the significance ofLe Fanu's work.ss2
Le Fanu's volume comprises five stories, although it is really only the first
three, and particularly the first of those, which will form the focus for this
chapter along with the framing narrative. The five stories are 'Green Tea';
'The Familiar'; 'Mr Justice Harbottle'; 'The Room at the Dragon Valont';
and 'Carmilla.' They claim their origin from amongst the papers of a
deceased, fictional scientist and physician, Dr Martin Hesselius, and are
edited and introduced by his secretary who frames each story with its own
prologue and epilogue. The first three stories of the collection are rare
examples of Tzvetan Todorov's (1975) genre, 'the fantastic' in that
supernatural events are strongly suggested, yet each tale also hints that
events may have natural provenance. The fourth story is a crime mystery
that falls entirely within the natural realm and the fifth is a vampire tale and
entirely supernatural.
I will begin by exploring how Le Fanu builds Hesselius as a professional, by
his emphatic separation of expert from lay discourses, which cut across the
whole volume of stories. In a Glass Darkly rather drives home the point
that professional expertise cannot solve every problem. What emerges is a
kind of distant professional wizardry, emphasized by Le Fanu's artful
imitation of professional and lay voices, which anticipate a flavour of the
'contingent and empiricist' repertoires that were described by Gilbert and
SS2 Farmer (1999) in Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) pl6 and Hodgson (1994) p l l l in
Conan-Doyle and Hodgson (1994); for Le Fanu's influence on Stoker see Skat (2001)
pl03; Byrne (1973) p92; and Tracy (1993) pxxi in Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993)
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Mulkay (1984) as a means for scientists to negotiate authority. Indeed, Le
Fanu skilfully imitates a kind of professional pomposity that ultimately is
laughably impotent. In this respect, he dismantles the facade of
professional potency that Reynolds so avidly recommended. Nevertheless,
a professional of any kind is likely to be hampered in a fantastic setting,
since the genre is defined by its lack of resolution. Itmaintains the potential
for real and imaginary so that the reader is left hanging between the two,
unable to come down on either side. This idea moves me on to a discussion
of the late 19th-century fantastic culture, and its attempt to divide real from
imaginary, science from non-science, natural from supernatural.
Finally I examine the late 19th-century experiment that followed from Le
Fanu's example, but more straight-forwardly attempted an investigation of
the supernatural by natural means. I demonstrate that the central conflict
between the scientific cause-and-effect narratives and the ghost story is a
clash of time schedules, which effectively means that the two systems
simply talk past one another. Last I will go on to raise the spectre of the
modern myth that arises from this experimental fusion of science and
supernatural and explore why the vampire hunter was, and still is, a
plausible story, when other occult detectives did not stand the test of time.
PROFESSIONALS THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY
Expert Frames for Lay Narratives
Dr Hesselius' presence in In a Glass Darkly is confined to the framing
device that links the stories through prologue and epilogue, apart from in
'Green Tea' where he does take a part in the story. The effect is of a literal,
textual distance between the metaphysical scientist and his object, a factor
that serves to highlight his seeming 'objectivity.' In the preamble to each
story Hesselius' secretary makes great play of the physician's expertise,
which is superior and more complex to any general knowledge that the
reader may bring to the text. In the prologue to the first story, he is at pains
to point out that Hesselius himself "writes in two distinct characters. He
describes what he saw and heard as an intelligent layman might, and ... he
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returns upon the narrative, and in the terms of his art, and with all the force
and originality of genius, proceeds to the work of analysis, diagnosis and
illustration."ss3 In the event of the actual stories, Hesselius' secretary avers
over and again that 'the genius' of 'analysis, diagnosis and illustration' is, in
the main, withheld from the 'unlearned reader. ,SS4
Such a tone of pomposity pervades the linking frame of the whole volume,
which is scattered with phrases that apologise, for example, for "this
irregular form of publication ... ,,555 or the "medically imperfect. .. "
statement to which the doctor has added "a great deal which is of interest
only to a scientific physician ... "SS6 and "[t]he strictly scientific view of the
case would scarcely interest the popular reader ... "ss7 Since the volume is
" ... simply to interest the 'laity' ... " he refrains from a " ... precis of the
learned Doctor's reasoning ... " which involves " ... some of the profoundest
arcana of our dual existence, and its intermediates, ,,,558 Here is a near
parody of the professional who guards his knowledge in order that it appear
all the more alluring. It is reminiscent of John Baptista Porta's (1658)
instruction to keep methods secret and in so doing create wonder and
appreciation in the audience.ss9
The effect of so accentuating the gap between professional and lay
discourses creates the illusion of a mysterious, expert culture that is alien
and off bounds to a lay-person. In one sense, Le Fanu is reaching into the
kind of scientific authority, which Shortt (1983) so well described as "a
code-word for a methodology, a designation for specialized expertise ... -sso
Yet, the cases have been selected, we are told, from Hesselius' "immense
collection of papers" on the criterion that they may "amuse or horrify the
553 Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p5-6
554 In fact, in 'Green Tea' some technical detail is given despite the editor's affirmation that
he "reserves all that borders on the technical for a strictly scientific paper .,;" Le Fanu and
Tracy (1872/1993) p6 and p8
555 Prologue to 'The Room at the Dragon Valont' Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p 119
556 Prologue to 'The Familiar' Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1992) p41-42
557 Prologue to 'Mr Justice Harbottle' Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p84
558 Prologue to 'Carmilla' Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p243
559 See p64 of this work for citation of Porta (1658)
560 Shortt (1983) p64
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lay reader ... ,,561 The job of professional scientific discourse was precisely
to avoid creating any such affect in the reader, and instead to present an
'objective', unemotional account of proceedings in technical, though plain,
language. In contrast, the aim of amusing and horrifying the reader is very
much a characteristic of the gothic narrative.
The combination of gothic and medical discourses here raises again the
spectre of the 18th-century appetite for sensational or miraculous medical
case histories given by the term 'curious', which were engaged by Samuel
Warren in his Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician (1830-1837).
Elsewhere I have discussed the observations made by Meegan Kennedy
(2004) ofa medical reform agenda, beginning in the 1830's, which aimed to
outlaw the flavour of 'curious' that pervaded clinical discourse, professional
and otherwise.562 As Kennedy (2004) well demonstrates, Warren's Passages
were a good example of the type of carnivalesque narrative that reform
medics were keen to banish from the professional arena. Le Fanu, whose
content is, if anything more gothic than Warren's, with a stronger accent on
the supernatural, emphatically situates professional discourse as outside of,
or other to, the gothic, in a way that Warren did not.
Nevertheless a review appearing in the Athenaeum shortly after publication
of In a Glass Darkly does see a connection with Samuel Warren.
Considerable skill is displayed in the mechanism by which the series
of wonders is connected, purporting, as it does, to be a selection
from the case-book of one Dr. Hesselius, a German professor of
'metaphysical medicine' ... A certain verisimilitude is given to the
most extravagant flights of fancy by this method, which resembles,
perhaps, the successful machinery which Mr. Warren employed in
'The Diary of a Late Physician' more closely than do numerous
subsequent parodies of that now celebrated book.563
561 Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) pS and p6
562 See pp128-134 of this study
563 'Novels of the Week' The Athenaeum July 61872 p13
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The link to a network of realist discourses, the same 'verisimilitude' to
which this reviewer refers, is neatly described by Kennedy (2004) as a
'fiction of factuality.' She argues that, by such a technique, Warren's
Passages raised anxieties in the medical community by co-opting the
structure of the professional case history for the purposes of imitating
factuality. In so doing, Warren "jeopardized the rhetorical authority of other
medical texts seeking to claim cultural status as professional, serious, and
true.,,564 Warren's cases were ostensibly written by the hand of the doctor
as any case history at the time would be. Through his complex framing
device, however, Le Fanu allows the reader only glimpses of a professional
discourse, while the central lay narratives are 'other' to it, just as the review
acknowledges with its reference to 'flights of fancy' and 'parodies' of
Warren. Aside from the physical separation of the discourses, Le Fanu
accentuates the distinction between the two with a skilful imitation of
profession versus lay voice.
As Hesselius, Le Fanu adopts a clipped style of language, emotionally
detached and peppered with technicalities. For example, "the cerebral
circulation undergoes periodically that vibratory disturbance, which, I
believe, I have satisfactorily examined and demonstrated, in my MS essay
A.17. This vibratory disturbance differs, as I there prove, from the
congestive disturbance ... examined in A. 19." A body of research is invoked
by the numbered references and the verbs too - examine, demonstrate and
prove - are verbs of science. A few sentences later, the tale begins for real,
and the voice of 'Rev. Thomas Herbert' starts off, "I was a young man at
the time, and intimately acquainted with some of the actors in this strange
tale; the impression which its incidents made on me, therefore, were deep,
and lasting." 565Immediately, in the first sentence of the story proper, the
tone has switched to a personally affective account. This signals a change
of genre from the professional to the lay, and a shift in mood from clinical
observation and dusty library stacks to home fireside.
564 Kennedy (2004) p329 and p333 respectively
565 Hesselius' voice is from the prologue of'The Familiar' and the voice of the clergyman
from the story itself, Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p42
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The two voices that Le Fanu so deftly imitates here broadly anticipate what
Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay (1984) have labelled as 'empiricist and
contingent repertoires' from their study showing that scientists use
alternative interpretative strategies in the face of controversy. The
repertoire refers to distinctive patterns of language, such that in an
empiricist frame "speakers depict their actions and beliefs as a neutral
medium through which empirical phenomena make themselves
evident ... professional actions and scientific views [are] seen as inevitable,
given the realities of the natural world under study." In the contingent
repertoire on the other hand, "actions are no longer depicted as generic
responses to the realities of the natural world, but as the activities and
judgements of specific individuals acting on the basis of personal
inclinations ... ,,566
I do not wish to push this analogy too far, since the original example of the
empiricist repertoire comes via the passive voice, third person accounts,
which almost entirely remove the human factor from 20th -century
professional scientific papers. Clearly, Le Fanu's Dr Hesselius has not
reached such heights. Yet, the essence of the contrast that the empiricist
repertoire is built around material facts, while the contingent one is built
around personal human experience is evident between Le Fanu's
professional voice, and the personal voice of the stories themselves.i'"
Expert Failure
Having belaboured the division between lay and professional discourses and
exalted the expert beyond anything to which any ordinary person may
aspire, Le Fanu immediately tears down the edifice. The only story in
566 Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) pp56-57
567 Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) cite the work of Melvin Pollner to suggest that such
interpretive strategies used by scientists might echo a much more widely used everyday
strategy. Simon Locke (1999) refers in more depth to the same work in discussion of
'golem science' and public understanding. The fact that Le Fanu is imitating similarly
divergent strategies in 1872 suggests that they may indeed have a wider, everyday
incidence
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which Dr Hesselius takes a part is the first of the volume and here he falls so
far short of his function that he is worse than useless. Indeed Thomas Loe
(1998) describes the first tale 'Green Tea' in terms of its 'strange
modernism' because it appears to raise authority, only to resist it.568 As a
general point, this is so, and fits well with some of the developments in
contemporary cultures at the time, to which I shall return. First, I want to
draw attention to the same dichotomy as was highlighted by Le Fanu's
alternating voices, and suggest that In a Glass Darkly generally draws a
landscape in which the gap between professional and personal has opened
up to such an extent that success in one arena almost inevitably means
failure in the other.
'Green Tea,' sets out as if it were a detective story. Hesselius and reader
alike are presented with the enigma of a mild mannered, charitable priest
who has an odd secret. Mr Jennings is "always tolerably well ... [but] when
he goes down to Warwickshire, to engage in actual duties of his sacred
calling, his health soon fails him, and in a very strange way. ,,569 And so,
begins the mystery of the haunted clergyman. Hesselius is at first depicted
as every bit the all-knowing, razor sharp detective-cum-doctor. Doctor and
vicar meet at a party thrown by Lady Mary Heyduke, and when drawn by
the mystery of the vicar, Hesselius scrutinises him with "more minuteness
than the ordinary practitioner" and finds in him the "likelihood of rewarding
inquiry. ,,570
Immediately, Jennings is turned 'investigated' to Hesselius 'investigator,' a
factor that makes their relationship manifestly more evocative of detective
and suspect than of doctor and patient. The language, too, is couched in
terms of suspicion and guilt rather than diagnosis and disease. So, it is "in
the agitation of a strange shame and horror" that Jennings sometimes falls ill
in the midst of his ministerial duties.57l There is an element of furtiveness
568 Thomas Loe (1998) "The Strange Modernism ofLe Fanu's" 'Green Tea'" in Stewart
(ed) (1998) pp293-306
569 Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p7
570 Ibid p8
S7l Ibid p7 (my emphasis)
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about him, as a man " ... whose transactions and alarms were carefully
concealed with an impenetrable reserve ... " Yet he is no match for the
doctor who" ... penetrated his thoughts without him being aware of it, and
was careful to say nothing which could betray ... [his] suspicions .."s72 Last,
on finding that the priest shares his interest in 'metaphysical medicine'
Hesselius probes the point, and Jennings turns guilty suspect: "He dropped
his eyes, and folded his hands together uneasily, and looked oddly, and you
would have said, guiltily for a moment."S73
Armoured with his observations of the 'suspect-patient', Hesselius indulges
in a display of veritable Holmes-styled 'deductive'logic for Lady Mary, a
long-time friend of Jennings. He dazzles her with his inexplicable
knowledge. Jennings is a bachelor who has given up writing on a topic of
an esoteric nature; he drank a good deal of green tea; and one of his parents
once saw a ghost. Lady Mary, confirms him to be correct on all counts, is
incredulous and declares the doctor to be quite the 'conjurer'. He ends this
little routine with the affirmation that "I have already conceived a theory
about him .. .1 should like much to ascertain from his own lips."s74 So far so
good, Dr Hesselius makes an impactful start. What follows is a long
interview between Jennings and Hesselius, in which the debilitated
clergyman 'confesses' his case history. He is the victim of a haunting that
takes the form of a malevolent monkey, which has taken greater and greater
hold on his life. Yet, the whole story and circumstance of the haunting is
ultimately surplus to Hesselius' requirements because his final assessment
of the case is based almost entirely on the key 'deductions' he showed off to
Lady Mary, with a little Swedenborgian philosophy thrown in.s7s
S72 Ibid p9
m Ibid plO
574 Ibid pl2
575 Hesselius is a medic with an interest in 'metaphysical medicine' and in this respect owes
a debt to the Swedish scientist cum Christian mystic, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772).
His notions of spirituality are beyond the scope of this piece, except to say that fundamental
to Swedenborg was the idea that life exists on dual planes of existence, the spiritual and the
physical.
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In theory a 'metaphysician' is the right expert for the job, perhaps more able
than most to deal in both physical and spiritual matters. Indeed, 'Green
Tea' ends on a long explanation of how nervous fluids, being 'spiritual'
fluids, connect body and soul. Yet, Hesselius' doctoring function proves to
be ineffectual to say the least. Thomas Loe (1998), along with Richard
Haslam (1998), both make note of the fact that at the very moment when
Hesselius is most needed by the beleaguered priest, he is unattainable,
having taken leave of his usual lodgings so as not to be disturbed whilst
deliberating the case.S76 Yet Hesselius already has a theory worked out as
he tells Lady Mary, add to which Jennings has recently made a suicide
attempt on the apparent recommendation of the monkey. Unaccountably,
at this moment Hesselius leaves the poor clergyman alone after insisting,
"should the monkey return, I should be sent for immediately.Y" On that
note the doctor cloisters himself away where he cannot be reached at all,
with the result that Jennings' desperate pleas for help go unheard and the
next day Hesselius finds his 'patient' dead, his throat cut by his own hand.
Loe (1998) quite rightly interprets Hesselius' failure as expressing
ambivalence toward the doctor's method of knowing - science - which, on
the one hand, promised new and rational explanations of mysterious
phenomena and, on the other, challenged old systems of belief. The result is
some strange middle ground where neither science nor belief can find firm
footing. In the event, it is not just science that is destabilised, rather it is the
broader, though related category, of 'the professional,' that has fallen short
of the mark. In Mary Braddon's (1861) and Wilkie Collins' (1868) novels,
professional police detectives fail because they have neither competency of
reason nor of scientific know-how to successfully unravel the mystery.S78
Yet, Hesselius' failure is apparently not at the level of specialist
competency, since he has the case pretty much sewn up from the start. He
fails at the personal and commonsense level. It does not take scientific or
576 Haslam (1998) "Le Fanu and the Fantastic of Ghost-Colonial Ireland" in Stewart (ed)
(1998) pp267-286 and Loe (1998) "The Strange Modernism ofLe Fanu's "<Green Tea '" in
Stewart (ed) (1998) pp293-306
577 Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p33
578 See pp135-204 of this work for discussion of these characters
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professional expertise to understand the risk of leaving a suicidal, haunted
and distressed man to spend the night alone with no way of contacting the
help he needs.
Le Fanu is masterful in demonstrating Hesselius' guilt-ridden pontification
after the death, which is well described by Haslam (1998) as a "pompous,
self-exculpatory denial of responsibility.,,579 It also amounts to an over-
specification of causative agents in Jennings' demise. The case, we are
given to believe is "the process of a poison" in which Mr Jennings has
disrupted the equilibrium of 'spiritual' or 'nervous fluid' by taking too
much green tea; he is anyway subject to "hereditary suicidal mania" and on
top of that he did not place "full and unreserved confidence" in Hesselius,
who ends the story, "[i]fthe patient do [sic] not array himself on the side of
the disease, his cure is certain.,,58o So Hesselius' final act in this case is to
apportion blame to the patient.i"
In drawing a scientific professional who has the 'force and originality of
genius,' Le Fanu is reaching into the whole tangle of related ideas that I
have already explored, which interprets genius as conferring an
extraordinary and potentially isolating persona on the bearer.582 Isolation
suggests the loss of the ability to forge social connections, or more
significantly to empathise, which, of course, is a feature that seems well
demonstrated by Hesselius' lack of human connection to the hard-pressed
Mr Jennings.583 So, although the effect of 'Green Tea' is as Loe (1998)
describes it, to undermine an overly positivist position, it equally suggests
that a narrowly professional role is simply not enough if society is to
579 Haslam (1998) "Le Fanu and the Fantastic of Ghost-Colonial Ireland" in Stewart (ed)
(1998) p272
580 Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/19993) p37 (poison quote) and all others p40
581 That the idea of disease as moral miasma was still current at this time is evidenced by
the continued popularity of Samuel Warren's Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician
(1830) which has a distinctly moral tone and though it was strongly contested by
£rofessionals, it still had considerable popular currency
82 Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p5-6
583 That said, the genius and isolation that mark out Wilkie Collins' (1868) scientist, Ezra
Jennings, do not preclude the capacity for empathy - see p193-98 of this work. For a
discussion of the unempathic lone genius, see pl42 and pp166-71
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harness the benefits of science. Or in the simplest of terms, if professionals
are not humane first, then dire consequences may follow.
Indeed, the first three stories of In a Glass Darkly feature professionals of
Church, Navy and Law and each is haunted by some mirage that seems to
relate to guilt over some personal failure or other. Mr Jennings the
clergyman is the mildest of the three - aside from Hesselius' profusion of
potential causes, there are also hints that Jennings' haunting has origins in
some of his own arcane and unchristian research.i'" In 'The Familiar',
Captain Barton is haunted by a miniature of the man whom he has wronged
in the Navy, and Mr Justice Harbottle, in the story of the same name, is
haunted by a mirage of his own judicial cruelty. In this respect, these stories
reinvigorate traditional themes that replay old scripts about the wronged
returning but they all introduce the idea that guilt is a causative agent.S8S
'The Familiar' ends on a question about Barton's state of mind: "It
seems ... more than probable that they [ghost and guilt] were at least, in his
own mind, closely associated.Y'" Harbottle is found hanged following
surreal accounts of a ghostly court and a terrifying spectral gibbet, yet
"there is medical evidence to show that, in his atrabilious state, it was quite
on the cards that he might have made away with himself."s87
Such caveats create a kind of uneasy equivocation placing the reader on
uncertain ground. All three stories force the issue - ghost or guilty
conscience? Loe (1998) describes the effect as a decentring of authority.
True, this is the overall effect, but it comes via the personal failings of these
four (Hesselius included) high-ranking professionals, who have in common
some inability to access the most basic elements of human conscience.
Each one has some lack in their capacity for empathy or for personal
584 Jennings begins his case history with reference to his own exhaustive research on pagan
religions, which he had become involved with but admits it was "not good for the mind -
the Christian mind, I mean. Paganism is all bound together in essential unity, and, with evil
sympathy ... and the subject is a degrading fascination and the nemesis sure. God forgive
me!" Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p21
585 See Davies (2007) pS for examples of ghosts who return to seek revenge and the
credulity of systems of law on such matters.
586 Le Fanu and Tracy (1872/1993) p82
587 Ibid P117. An atrabilious state is melancholic
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restraint - the two most important sources of Adam Smith's (1759) moral
sentiment. 588
Thomas Loe's (1998) observations ofLe Fanu's propensity to oppose
different versions of reality in 'Green Tea' does more than raise questions
about the merits of the professional, scientific or lay spheres. It also raises
questions about the natural-supernatural boundary. In her study of
supernatural fiction, Julia Briggs (1977) quotes a letter sent from Le Fanu to
his English publisher, George Bentley, stating his intention to produce a
narrative which hovers in "equilibrium between the natural and
supernatural, the supernatural phenomena being explained on natural
theories - and people left to choose which solution they please.,,589 The first
three tales of In a Glass Darkly achieve exactly such an outcome, a factor
that makes it possible to take Hesselius as charlatan, wizard or creditable
scientist, or all three. Although in this period, the science was creditable
and certainly some contemporary reviewers took it absolutely seriously.i'"
That aside, Briggs describes these stories as "poised between demanding
our total assent to a traditional supernatural world, and on the other hand
exposing such experiences to the detached and curious judgement of an
impartial investigator.Y" If the act of exposing such experience to an
'impartial investigator' is aimed at pinning down either supernatural or
natural causation, however, then the investigator is set up to fail because the
point is that the reader resolve the cause for themselves. Le Fanu skilfully
manipulates the situation in 'Green Tea' so that Hesselius' professional
expertise is protected, since his verdict proposes multiple erudite causes to
explain Mr Jennings' 'illness'. The failure, as I have already argued, is in
588 For example, .... to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our
selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human
nature." Smith (1759/2009) Loc 416-17
589 Le Fanu quoted in Briggs (1977) p49
590 An Athenaeum review remarks on the plausibility of science in, 'Novels of the Week'
The Athenaeum July 6 1872 pI3. And a review in The Graphic takes the science so
seriously as to spend more than half the space in a pedantic critique of the consistency of
Dr Hesselius' theoretical reasoning across the volume, see "New Novels" The Graphic Aug
31972
591 Briggs (1977) pst
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his personal inability to meet the needs of a fellow human. The point here is
to simply to say that the genre, which itself avoids resolution, does not
automatically undermine professional investigative procedure, even though
this may at first seem to be the case.
As a whole, In a Glass Darkly with its emphatic separation of expert and lay
discourse, its distinction between professional and personal voices, and the
personal failings of its professionals raises the question of whether technical
mastery, in the broadest possible sense, reduces our ability to live humane
and fulfilling lives.
GHOSTS IN A FANTASTIC CULTURE
Tzvetan Todorov (1975) described the genre demonstrated by Le Fanu's
equivocation between natural and supernatural as the 'Fantastic.' He poses
the dichotomy perfectly, either the devil is an imaginary being, or else he
really exists (though rarely encountered). The moment of indecision, of
unknowing, is how Todorov defines the fantastic, which "occupies the
duration of this uncertainty. Once we choose one answer or the other, we
leave the fantastic for a neighbouring genre, the uncanny or the
marvellous.Y" Le Fanu's first three stories are wholly situated in this
middle ground, whereas novels, such as Radcliffe's gothic can contain
elements of the fantastic, but then resolve them, as does Radcliffe in her
own rationalist terms, the text eventually reverting to the natural (uncanny)
domain.593
Few narratives, in fact, conform to the fantastic in their totality, largely
because the genre forces the reader to interrogate the line between real and
imaginary - does the devil exist or not? Is Mr Justice Harbottle haunted by
a ghost or does he imagine it? In order to be hesitant in the face of these
592 Todorov (1975) p25. The uncanny, here refers to disturbing, mystifying or frightening
stories of natural causation (many crime novels or thrillers, for example), and the
marvellous is the same though rooted in supernatural causation
593 See p79 of this study for a discussion of Radcliffe's explained supernatural. And
Todorov (1975) p41
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questions, the reader must accept the possibility that both statements could
be correct and knowable. Chris Morash (1998), to whose definition of the
supernatural genre I will return, points toward the difficulty that the defining
features of the fantastic in Todorov's terms arise not from the text
themselves, but from the reader's response to the text. A person who does
not believe in the possibility of a supernatural realm cannot experience the
fantastic, except by suspension of their own belief, in which case, the
moment of hesitation loses much, or all, of its power. Morash makes
exactly this point in another way: "that element of hesitation which
constitutes the fantastic will vary from reader to reader ... so that the real
object of study in Todorov's argument turns out to be not the genre of the
supernatural literature per se, but the belief systems of its readers ..,594
In fact, Todorov does acknowledge this element of reader response, if only
by sideways glance at the short lifespan of the genre. The fantastic only
appears between the late 18th and the early zo" century, unlike the full-
blown supernatural tale that has always existed and still does. One reason
for this stems firstly from the fact that "[i]t is the category of the real which
has furnished a basis for our definition of the fantastic ..,595 Is the
malevolent monkey that haunts Mr Jennings real or unreal? For a reader to
hesitate on this question, s/he must believe that s/he can know the answer
and that both options are equally possible. What is relevant here is
Todorov's argument that the fantastic relies upon a belief in an 'immutable,
external reality' that can be captured by literature and provide a common
basis against which to measure the imaginary.I" Such an idea is what leads
him to suggest that "the literature of the fantastic is nothing but the bad
conscience of this [19th-century] positivist era. ,,597
Supernatural entities can be read as manifestations of metaphysical powers
of a kind that positivism might deny, or as the forces of an obscure natural
594 Morash in Stewart (1998) (ed) p129
595 Todorov (1975) p167
596 By 'immutable' here, I believe Todorov to be referring to a 'single' reality, rather than
reality that is immutable over time
597 Todorov (1975) p168
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dimension which was beyond the current limits of positivist enquiry. What
this boils down to is another version of Todorov's question about the
supernatural- is it real and metaphysical or unreal and natural. These kinds
of questions were not simply the province of popular fictions. They
pervaded the last third or more of 19th-century English culture in different
ways and at all levels. Science and supernatural were juxtaposed in a way
that echoes Todorov's assertion that underlying the existence of the fantastic
was a belief that there was a single reality that could be measured and
reproduced in a text. Indeed, in the last third of the 19th century, or more,
there seems to have been a surge of interest in resolving the dichotomy of
either real or unreal, along with a whole creative profusion of ways to
address the issue, and a belief that the enterprise could bear fruit.
In literary and pre literary cultures, the supernatural is ubiquitous, and
probably because of this, it has proven a slippery focus for academic
scrutiny, lending itself on the whole to psychoanalytic and formal readings
that emphasize constant, rather than contextual interpretations.i'"
Nevertheless the ever-abiding prevalence of human-ghost relations speaks
of their cultural import and, as such, the ways in which science is allied
with, or opposed to, the spirit world is a very compelling topic. Indeed,
social historian of the supernatural, Owen Davies (2007) stresses the
cultural significance of ghosts on the basis that they "flitted through some of
the most profound developments in intellectual thought over the last 500
years ... to discover how they were conceived in the past is to understand
how society itself changed."s99
His own study on the history of haunting reveals that a wholehearted,
though always contested, belief in ghosts has persisted through Reformation
598 For a psychological or psychoanalytic reading see: Briggs (1977); Stoddart (1991);
Scarborough (1917) or Todorov (1975) on genre and formal readings. It is important for
my approach to take into account that, as Punter (1996) citing Birkhead points out,
although the supernatural was largely absent from the early 18th century novel, it was
present before this in early popular chapbooks, broadsheets, ballads and translated tales,
and ghost stories need to be seen in the light of this provenance; see Punter (1996) P 13; and
see Davies (2007) for a social history of ghosts
599 Davies (2007) plO 1
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and Enlightenment, through fads for mesmerism, spiritualism, and well into
20th and 21st centuries.t'" Aside from the intellectual engagement with
ghosts, which was unquestionably important in the period ofLe Fanu's
writing, his ghost stories need also be seen in light of the persistence of
popular belief, an important and oft neglected facet of supernatural history
in the 19th century.i'"
Coincident with the rising fashion for spiritualism was the spread of the
daily press, which according to Davies (2007), helped shaped public
perception of ghosts.602 At the same time, ghost hunts, sometimes drawing
thousands of people on to the streets, were regularly reported by, and a
likely product of, the press.603 They became a feature of court lists owing to
the disturbances that ensued from them and were costly affairs in terms of
police man-hours. Perhaps as a consequence, police and courts were
sceptical and court reports painted the hunts as unruly and overly
superstitious. An Inspector giving evidence on the haunting of a residence
in Pond Place referred to it at as "an absurd story" while a magistrate
presiding over a case following disturbances at a ghost hunt in Woburn
Square expressed "his astonishment at the credulity of those who could be
so misled by an idle ghost story ... ,,604 The ghost hunt was very much an
600 See Davies (2007) pp65-132. He describes, as significant, the survival of ghosts beyond
the Reformation when purgatory - the transitional arena in which souls were made ready
for Heaven - was vetoed by the new Church of England (see ppI04-108). For 21 si century
~hosts see pp241-249
01 The phenomenon of popular belief in ghosts in the second half of the 19th century is
often passed over or elided with spiritualism, undoubtedly important, but nonetheless
different; see Davies (2007) p9
602 Davies (2007) p91
603 A rumoured haunting at No 6 Pond Place in Chelsea drew crowds such that "the
neighbourhood had been in a state ofuproar ... it had been necessary to send a number of
the police to disperse the crowds," see The Times Sept 12 1853 plO Col B. A follow up
reports a seance in which the spirit of "Shelley, the poet" confirmed that there was a spirit
in No 6 Pond Place, see The Times Sept 12 1853 p5 Col F. Large crowds caused nightly
disturbances at St George's Church, Southwark, see The Times May 27 1865 p II Col G.
The same happened at Woburn Square, London, see The Times June 01 1867 p11 Col E.
Crowds of between 5,000-6,000 people are reported to have converged nightly on Christ
Church, Westminster until a PC Thew apprehended a man running across the graveyard
with a sheet over his head, see The Times Jul 061874 pI3 Col E. Crowds of300-400
people congregated in New Weston Street, Southwark hoping to see the ghosts of notorious
murderers the Mannings who had lived nearby, see The Times July 061876 p11 Col A
604 The Times Sept 12 1853 plO Col B and The Times June 01 1867 pIl Col E, respectively
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urban working class affair, which seemed to shout out the reality of ghosts,
while the courts boomed back their rationalist answer in the negative.
Yet an alternative form of ghost hunt was apparently reserved for the middle
classes. Spiritualism was likely seen by many as a more thoughtful, and
perhaps more decorous, route to the spirit world. Nevertheless there is
undeniable sensationalism in the act of a medium, who called up spirits that
variously talked, rang bells, rapped the table, moved objects, wrote
messages, and caused people to levitate. Indeed it proved to be a veritable
cultural hot spot for mid-Victorian society drawing to it a remarkable
variety of discourses on, science, supernatural, mesmerism, phrenology, the
Scriptures, Christianity, electricity, telegraphy, to name a few.6os
On this note, Davies (2007) points toward a key shift in orientation to ghosts
evidenced by the fact that "[ s]piritualism was about the human desire to
make contact with the dead, while much of the prior history of ghosts was
about spirits seeking out the living and attempts to prevent or limit their
earthly appearance. With spiritualism the tables were turned in more ways
than one. ,,606Such a turnaround in itself suggests a newly charged will to
interrogate the boundary between natural and supernatural. Indeed
spiritualism provided a much expanded intellectual ground for debating the
real and the unreal, especially because in comparison to random hauntings,
the seance more or less aimed to call up the dead on demand, thereby
providing ideal conditions for scientific experiment and research.
Spiritualism was the ultimate convergence of supernatural with scientific
and rational interests and all manner of societies were formed to apply the
order of reason to matters ghostly.607
60S See Cooter (1984) and Van Wyhe (2004) on phrenology; Noakes (2004) 'Spiritualism,
science and the supernatural in mid-Victorian Britain' in Brown et al (2004) pp23-43;
Noakes (1999) on spiritualism and telegraphy; Noakes (2002) 'Instruments to lay Hold of
Spirits: Technologizing the Bodies of Victorian Spiritualism' in Morus (2002) ppI25-164;
Luckhurst (2002) and Lamont (2004) on spiritualism and science; Winter (1998) on
mesmerism
606 Davies (2007) p 132
607 For example, in 1851 the Cambridge University Ghost Club was inaugurated; in 1862
the London Ghost Club followed; the Oxford Phasmatological Association was established
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Noakes (1999) and others detail the complexity of the issues involved in
spiritualism and caution the too rigid use of categorisation in this respect,
since the meaning of the terms 'natural' and 'supernatural' themselves were
under negotiation.t'" Debates were indeed complex and many were
conducted in the press.?" For example, Noakes (2004) writes that "a survey
of books, pamphlets and articles on Spiritualism from the mid-Victorian
period underlines the lack of consensus on the provenance of Spiritualistic
manifestations, with works upholding a range of natural and supernatural
explanations including evil spirits, angels, conscious acts of trickery,
unconscious psychological and physiological mechanisms or hitherto
unknown forces associated with the human body.'.610 Yet what is
apparently not at stake according to Noakes' analysis is the existence ofa
single knowable reality. Each of the causes he lists ultimately flows from
either supernatural or natural provenance. The whole spiritualist project
seems to be a gigantic exercise in the fantastic.
Ultimately, if there was a single, knowable reality, the next logical question
would by whom and by what method, could that reality be best exposed?
The 'truth' of the narrator is an issue to which the historian, Peter Lamont
(2004), in some measure turns, in his discussion of the play on
trustworthiness between lay observation and 'expert' observation that arose
from a 'crisis of evidence' stimulated by the spiritualism debate. Using the
case of the famous medium David Home as an example, Lamont (2004)
shows that his particular spiritual feat of levitation was an extremely
in 1879; and the Society for Psychical Research, which became the most active of all such
tiroups, began its work in 1882. See Davies (2007) p89
08 Also see: Cooter (1984); Noakes (2004) in Brown et al (2004) and Van Wyhe (2004) for
cautionary notes on categorising science, Spiritualism, pseudo-science etc
609 Noakes (2004) "Spiritualism, science and the supernatural in mid-Victorian Britain" in
Brown et al (2004) pp25-28 quotes examples from the J1/ustrated London News, The
Saturday Review and a long run of correspondence in The Times. Stories about spirits,
ghosts and spiritualism ran right through the regional press as well, for example: Cheshire
Observer March 25 1871 p8 "A Real 'Sensational' Report of visitation by a spirit .."; The
Wrexham Advertiser March 12 1870 p4 "A Terrible Midnight Adventure"; The Dundee
Courier & Argus March 14 1870 "Extraordinary Doings ofa 'Ghost"'; Manchester Times
June 18 1870 "Credulity"; New York Herald Jan 15 1870 "Mr Home, The Spiritualist at
Darlington"; The Derby Mercury Aug 2 1871 "Modem Superstition and Credulity"
610 Noakes (2004) "Spiritualism, science and the supernatural in mid-Victorian Britain" in
Brown et al (2004) p28
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awkward empirical fact for those who wished to dismiss supernatural
action. Home levitated somehow, but conjurers were not able to explain
how and some scientists who examined his work, such as William Crookes
FRS, concluded his phenomena were real. Crookes went as far as to
postulate the existence of a 'new psychic force', but was vehemently
attacked by anti-spiritualist scientists like John Tyndall, William Carpenter
and others, on the basis of incompetence amounting to bad science, yet none
could be more eminent than Crookes, with three Royal Society medals to
his name.611 Lamont (2004) describes the whole debacle as impetus for
science to shore up the boundaries and muster cultural authority with
increasingly sophisticated observational methods.
The application of scientific method to the supernatural realm both in
practice and in literature could be seen as indicative of such a 'shoring up'
of scientific authority. Oddly enough, the project largely had the opposite
effect, and occult detectives were heavily compromised in scientific terms,
often needing to rely on all those skills formally disassociated from
scientific method, such as subjectivity, their feeling nature and perhaps the
power of their own souls. These characters were popular in fiction for a
short period spanning the tum of the 19th and 20th centuries, but have not
been so widely and regularly re-worked as has the criminal detective or the
mad scientist. Yet the experiment to mix science and supernatural has
produced some surprisingly long lasting results of mythic proportion. This
is the topic of the next section.
THE DETECTIVE NARRATIVE AND THE SUPERNATURAL
Hesselius, a Detective?
One potentially truthful narrator of reality that storytellers chose to
experiment with was the rationalised, scientific detective figure. Indeed, the
term 'occult detective' is what most scholars reach for when they describe
Hesselius, although there are reasons to believe he is anything but, and I
611 See Lamont (2004) and Noakes (2004) in Brown et al (2004) for discussion ofCrookes'
experiments and the subsequent attacks made on his competence.
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will return to this. He is nevertheless reckoned to be a forerunner of other
such men of supernatural-scientific expertise as Bram Stoker's (1897)
vampire hunter, Professor Van Helsing; E and H Heron's (aka Hesketh and
Katherine Prichard) Flaxman Low; Algernon Blackwood's Dr John
Silence; and William Hope Hodgson's Thomas Carnaki, the ghost finder.
The one long-lasting, towering icon to emerge from this group is the
vampire hunter. In this section I will show how the normal detective
narrative, with its method based upon science, is destabilised in the face of
many supernatural phenomena. Yet the experiment of placing detectives in
the occult, which, in the main, seems not to have taken a lasting hold on the
mass market, created a mix that ultimately allowed science to piggy-back
one of the most popular genres ever to have existed in fiction - the vampire
story.
In a study that explores how the discourses of vision, both scientific and
spiritual, intersect with those ofliterary ghosts and detectives, Srdjan Smajic
(2010) remarks that where Hesselius fails as doctor and exorcist, he
succeeds as "a detective of the causes of occult phenomena and motivations
for actions and behaviours.,,612 Perhaps, Hesselius does have more success
in the detective line than in the medical way since he does suggest some
potential causal factors. Yet, his over determination of causes is a long way
from the usual denouement of the detective story, which demonstrates the
single, knowable reality. The detective narrative sets out with many
possible realities, which it investigates, weeding out one after another to
reveal the one true one at the end.
This, as Joseph Agassi (1982) suggests, is an echo of Baconian method and
it is the narrative shape that characterises the detective story per se. By
this, he means that the overall detective narrative begins by demonstrating
the drudgery of fact collecting and a gradual elimination of suspects, and
then quickens momentum and excitement nearing resolution, when the facts
all come together. This shape undoubtedly matches the narrative of
612 Smajic (2010) p152 (his emphasis)
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Baconian induction and the narrative of the detective story. Fundamental to
such a narrative, both in inductive science and in literature, is the move
from a disordered world (of facts or society), to an ordered world (of
understanding or retribution). In other words, the Baconian narrative
follows a restorative pattern. Both Mary Braddon's (1861) novel, Trail of a
Serpent and Wilkie Collin's (1868) The Moonstone could be said to follow
such a narrative arc. 613
'Green Tea,' however, does not have the same structure. There is no
investigation. Hesselius appears to make his final inferences at the outset
whilst chatting to Jennings 'upon indifferent subjects' at a cocktail party.
This is apparently the sum of Hesselius' enquiry and the intervening long
interview with Jennings does not seem to furnish him with further details
that allow him to either eliminate false possibilities or to find new ones.
Loe (1998) suggests that in juxtaposing of the "lack of causality in the
sequence of events to Hesselius' supposedly rational inquiry, one can see
how Le Fanu strengthens the effect of the story by having one type of
structure countering the other.,,614 The effect is to oppose a Baconian
narrative. The story begins with a simple question. What is wrong with Mr
Jennings? We end with the same question plus a whole array of potential
answers with no way of choosing between them. In this regard, 'Green
Tea' ends with a more disordered world than the one it started with. And in
so doing, the narrative structure sits within the hesitant ground of the
fantastic and not the detective story.
Todorov describes the structure, which in a fantastic tale, such as 'Green
Tea', usually presents dual narratives, "one probable and supernatural, the
other improbable and rational.,,6lS Indeed, of the two, the supernatural story
may well have seemed the more probable at the time of writing. This is not
necessarily because the supernatural is less plausible now, rather it is
because psychological theory, which provides a natural alternative to it, has
613 See pp 158-166 and pp 193-198 of this work
614 Loe (1998) in Stewart (ed) (1998) p301
61S Todorov (1975) p49
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become culturally embedded in a way that it was not in the 1870's. In other
words, the rational explanation of Jennings' haunting may have
corresponded to MR James' recommendation of a 'narrow loophole' left
open for a rational explanation, and not been the dominant reading at the
time of'publication.t'" That the loophole has widened with the advent of
Freud and the spread of psychological thought is clear.
Regardless, a mix of probable and less probable scenarios does exist, but
where the fantastic leaves all potential realities open, the detective story
seeks to reveal the one knowable reality. And this is the ultimate difference
between the fantastic and the detective story although they share dual
narrative structure, as Todorov (1977) has pointed out in a now famous
essay entitled 'The Typology of Detective Fiction.' Here he stipulates that
the detective story, contains "not one but two stories: the story of the crime
and the story of the investigation.t't'" Todorov (1977) explains that we may
"characterise these two stories by saying that the first - the story of the
crime - tells 'what really happened,' whereas the second - the story of the
investigation - explains 'how the reader (or the narrator) has come to know
about it".618 In other words, the first story consists of events as they
happened and the second the investigation.
Furthermore, these two stories correspond to ways in which readers make
sense of narratives in general. These were initially described by Russian
formalists and relate to the way that readers deal with distortions of time,
such as flashbacks, flash-forwards or perhaps even, sideways moves
(omnisciencej.t'" At a basic level, narrative structure consists of the order
of events in which they are given by the text - the sjuzet - which includes
all its anachronies of time shift and is sometimes referred to as plot. Then
there is the chronological sequence of events, which in most cases differs
from the order given in the sjuzet and is constructed by the reader - this is
616 M.R James (1924) in Collins (1924) Introduction pvi
617 Todorov (1977) p44
618 Ibid p45
619 Todorov (1977) uses the terms 'fable (story)' and 'subject (plot)'. but it is often
conventional to use the original formalist terms, fabula and sjuzet as does Morash (1998)
"The Time is Out of Joint (0 Cursed Spite)" in Stewart (ed) (1998)
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the fabula. What Todorov (1977) notices is that, in detective fiction, the
story of the crime, or 'what really happened' corresponds to fabula, and the
detective's investigation corresponds to sjuzet, the story as it is written. Put
another way, the detective derives the 'truth' of what really happened from
the clues s/he finds just as the reader derives the fabula from the sjuzet,
In detective fiction the two narrative structures work together, the one
supporting the other, so that the Baconian shape, the fact gathering and
elimination of false possibilities, gradually positions elements of fabula with
increasing impetus in their chronological order. This effectively situates the
detective between the reader (and sjuzet) and the fabula - in a sense, the
detective becomes 'guardian' of the fabula. Seen in this light, the notion of
restorative narrative takes on new meaning. It is only through the detective
that the reader is able to reconstruct or to re-order the narrative to fit its
'true' chronological pattern. Likewise, the scientist constructs a fabula from
Nature's sjuzet, a correspondence that has not gone un-noted.
Charles Rzepka (2005), who argues that the advent of detective fiction is
congruent with the rise in historical sciences, observes just this connection
between scientist, nature and narrative.62o He also points to one of the most
influential of popular scientific developments of the 19th century, Charles
Lyell's (1830) explication of uniformitarianism in Principles of Geology, as
a key development in the making of a detective narrative. The term
'uniformitarianism' was actually first coined by William Whewell with the
publication of Principles, to distinguish it from other theories of geological
change.621 Lyell argues that the earth's structure can, or should, only be
understood by recourse to processes visible in the present that had acted in
the past with the same degree of intensity. Rzepka (2005) has argued that
such thinking, popularised in Principles, was influential on the detective
narrative, because its inference of an orderly nature and an orderly process
that forges nature, meant that the present is the sure key to the past.622
620 See Rzepka (2005) p33
621 See Secord (1997) "Introduction" pxix in Lyell and Secord (1830/1997)
622 See Rzepka (2005) pp68-71
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Similarly, Laura Snyder (2004) has drawn attention to the ways in which
Conan Doyle modelled Holmes' methods on conceptions of scientific
procedures that were popular in the mid to late 19th century. They are well
described by TH Huxley (1896) in his essay On the Method of Zadig, in
which he draws on Voltaire's (1747) detective, Zadig, from the story of the
same name, to exemplify the process of science. The observations of
scientists, he says, are "retrospectively prophetic and strive towards the
reconstruction in human imagination of events which have vanished and
ceased to be ...623 Perhaps, even more powerfully, he continues "inasmuch
as ... retrospective prophecies are the result of following backwards, the very
same method as that which invariably leads to verified results, when it is
worked forwards ... [provides] as much reason for placing full confidence in
the one as in the other ...624 Science, then is the method by which the past
can be (re)constructed and the future too, a means for establishing a
narrative of nature. Similarly, Holmes pontificates to Watson, that "[t]he
ideal reasoner ... would, when he had once been shown a single fact in all its
bearings, deduce from it not only all the chain of events which led up to it
but also all the results which would follow from it,',625
The notion of science as a reasoning process that allows the 'reasoner' to
move around in time, and to do so with confidence for Smajic (2010),
deeply implicates it in the occult (by which he means the 'supernatural', not
the 'hidden'). He sees Holmes' 'ideal' reasoning as something similar to
"communicating with the dead .,;" reading, as it does an object that doubles
"as a portal to the spirit world .,." and "[tjhis, or something like it, occurs in
every scene in which the detective makes an inference about the unseen
based on his observations of the seen ...626There is no doubt that there is a
concordance here.627
623 Huxley (1896/2008) Kindle Ed Loc 106-8
624 Ibid 131-3
625 From Conan Doyle "The Five Orange Pips" in Conan-Doyle and Green (1892/1993)
p114
626 Smajic (2010) pl90
627 The observation that Holmes is a magical figure is fairly commonly made. See: Botting
(1996) p154; Knight (1980) p72-3; Saler (2003)
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Yet he concludes a short analysis of In a Glass Darkly, by stipulating that
"[w]hat we get in Hesselius then is science forging inroads into what it
denies and represses, and of detective fiction returning to its occult roots -
but also a case of the ghost story's incorporation of the intellectual concerns
and investigative procedures typically encountered in detective fiction.'.628
There are two problems with this viewpoint. The first is his simple
assumption that science 'denies and represses' supernatural beliefs. This is
not an issue I wish to take up here since it has been well established that
relations between science and belief are far more complex and nuanced than
this suggests.629 The second problem is more apposite and involves the
application of detective method to occult phenomena and it has to do with
the problems that this creates in terms of the narrative of time in cause and
effect relationships.
In an essay entitled, 'The Time is Out of Joint (0 Cursed Spite!),' Chris
Morash (1998) has pointed out a key irrationality of the supernatural, which
in certain measure interferes with the detectives' ability to supply the
necessary tools for the reader to re-order time. His title is taken from
Hamlet, who speaks this line after the appearance of the ghost of his father.
A ghost represents the dead returned and as such it is "a grotesque,
disruption of the linearity of time and hence of reason itself.'.630 This
particular feature of the supernatural makes for a distinct narrative structure.
Morash, using the example of Charles Dickens' (1843) A Christmas Carol,
demonstrates that movements in time in the supernatural narrative, between
Christmases past, present and future, "are not presented in such a way that
we as readers are asked to put them back in their correct chronological
628 Smajic (2010) p154-55
629 On science and spiritualism see Noakes (2004) 'Spiritualism, science and the
supernatural in mid-Victorian Britain' in Brown et al (2004) pp23-43; Noakes (1999) on
spiritualism and telegraphy; Noakes (2002) 'Instruments to lay Hold of Spirits:
Technologizing the Bodies of Victorian Spiritualism' in Morus (2002) ppI25-164;
Luckhurst (2002) and Lamont (2004) also on spiritualism and science; Winter (1998) on
mesmerism as science
630 Morash (1998) 'The Time is Out of Joint (0 Cursed Spite!): Towards a Definition of a
Supernatural Narrative' in Stewart (ed) (1998) p123
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sequence when constructing a fabula.,,631 Scrooge's travels in time are
happening in the present of the story. Similarly the ghosts of past, present
and future are incursions from different times into the present. For, Morash,
"[t]his is the key structural definition of the supernatural tale.,,632 What this
amounts to is that time is allowably 'out of joint' in the fabula, something
that does not happen in non-supernatural fiction, which only permits
anachrony to exist at the level of sjuzet,
According to Holmes, the detective is tasked with ironing out the anachrony
of the sjuzet, so that they and the reader can construct a fabula by "placing
upon record that severe reasoning from cause to effect ... ,,633But, in a
supernatural world fabula and sjuzet are collapsed into one, and so the
rational, scientific detective is effectively redundant. Huxley, too, reminds
us that the establishment of cause and effect relies upon, "[t]he constancy of
the order of nature, being the common foundation of all scientific
thought.,,634 Here then is a difficulty for the occult detective. The
investigation of a realm, the supernatural, which does not have the same
'constancy' of 'order' makes it impossible to reason from cause to effect
and vice versa.
Such problems are well demonstrated by a case study discussed in an essay
written by Susan Hoyle (2004) on the declining credibility of the witchcraft
narrative in 19th-century England. She argues that it was not so much that
the claims of science stole a march on the credibility of magic, or even
gained greater respect, rather it was a falling off in acceptability of the kind
of story that the witchcraft narrative was prone to tell. At the same time she
finds a "rise in acceptability of a forensic narrative based on the
demonstration of detective skills ... ,,635 She illustrates her case with
evidential statements reported from court proceedings and, though her
631 Ibid (1998) p131-2
632 Ibid (1998) P132
633 From Conan Doyle "The Copper Beeches" in Conan-Doyle and Green (1892/1993)
p270
634 Huxley (1896/2008) Kindle Ed Loc 135 (my emphasis)
635 Hoyle (2004) "The Witch and the Detective: mid-Victorian Stories and Beliefs" in de
Blecourt and Davies (eds) (2004) p46
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empirical evidence is sparse, she presents two cases that show how natural
and supernatural narratives talk past one another in a similar way to Le
Fanu's rationalist frame and supernatural story appear to do. She also
suggests why and under what circumstances one narrative is preferred over
another.
Hoyle analyses a case that involved a charge of wounding - a witch-cutting.
The Davis family believed themselves to have been cursed by a neighbour,
and since the traditional means of breaking a spell is to draw blood from the
witch, John Davis cut his neighbour's cheek quite badly. According to the
Davis's, the curses had taken the form of repeated instances of haunting.
The case seemed to hang on one of these, in which, an invalid daughter was
assaulted when "a man and woman came down the chimney ... both persons
headless, and seized her by the body, cast her violently on the ground, and
then tossed her in the air, after which they took the sofa she had used and
went through a similar feat with it.,,636 This was the story given in defence.
The prosecution case rested upon the evidence of "Police-Superintendent
Richardson [who] showed that the accumulated dust around the legs of the
furniture proved that no such thing could have happened.,,637 As Hoyle
(2004) points out, the two narratives talk past one another. Firstly, the fact
that the dust was not disturbed was no evidence against the presence of
headless spirits since the magic that called up the spirits was surely able to
enchant the dust. The dust narrative only works under natural material
conditions. Similarly, if the order of time is distorted by an incursion of
past into present then would not the normal order of cause and effect also be
disturbed? In which case it is no longer possible to "conclude from an effect
to the pre-existence of a cause competent to produce that effect ... ,,638
Though he does not detail it as such, this is the nub of the conflict that Loe
(1998) identifies when he juxtaposes the "lack of causality in the sequence
636 The Times Nov 04 1867 'Witchcraft in Warwickshire' p7 Col D
637 Ibid p7 Col D
638 Huxley (1896/2008) Kindle Ed Loc 91-2
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of events [in 'Green Tea'] to Hesselius' supposedly rational inquiry.,,639
Indeed to combine a narrative that at heart is reliant on the linearity of time,
with another that, by definition, distorts the time dimension, seems almost
guaranteed to create the effect of the fantastic, since the reader has a choice
of narratives, each talking past the other. Yet, many of the scientific
supernatural investigators who followed Le Fanu's example were not, as he
was, aiming to create such an effect. These authors were more likely swept
along by the increased popularity and credence of a narrative that
demonstrated detective skills, as Hoyle (2004) has illustrated within the
legal system.
In the case of the witch-cutting, the court allowed the evidence about the
dust and the papers reported it as legitimate evidence against the haunting
even though it was no proof against witchcraft which was not on trial
anyway (the cutting was). To demonstrate the opposite effect, Hoyle (2004)
goes on to report a second case in which a man accused of poisoning, a
known 'cunning man,' was not convicted despite the fact that there was
ample evidence against him for the poisoning.t" In this case, the forensic
evidence was poorly marshalled by an inexperienced surgeon who had no
prior knowledge of the case and contradicted himself as well. Hoyle argues
that in this situation, "the prosecution for drugging failed because it did not
have the services of someone who could tell a good forensic story. ,,641
What these two cases reveal is that when a forensic, or cause-and-effect,
narrative was adequately marshalled, it was more persuasive than a
witchcraft narrative in the courts at the time (so it has likely remained
today).
That the belief in the supernatural did not wane in the face of the spread of
scientific ideas is, apart from anything else, clear from the spiritualist
revival and plethora of ghost clubs that followed from it. Science itself is
639 Loe (1998) in Stewart (ed) (1998) p30 1
640 Cunning folk were one of the magical trades, who variously sold love-potions, found
lost items, recovered stolen property and warded off witches. See Davies (2003)
641 Hoyle (2004) "The Witch and the Detective: mid-Victorian Stories and Beliefs" in de
Blecourt and Davies (eds) (2004) p59
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unlikely to have caused a decline, observable through court reports, in
witchcraft belief across the 19th century. Hoyle (2004) suggests that what
changes people's belief is, at least partly, to do with fashions in storytelling.
The story, which came to be preferred in the courts, and elsewhere, as
evidenced by the spread of detective fiction, was the story of process, or of
method, and its concomitant demonstration of cause and effect.
Perhaps as a result of the growing fashion for cause and effect stories,
several occult detectives and scientists followed from Le Fanu's example, a
factor that has sometimes been interpreted as the triumphant note for
science and secularisation. Ascari (2007) in a manner, does just this, for he
argues, that "[b]y specialising in supernatural mysteries, the detective - who
had already acquired the status of an 'epistemological superman' - came to
grips with a different kind of menace, embodying the collective desire of
control not only over crime and the urban space, but also over exotic, the
primitive and, ultimately, the unconscious.r't" The situation is more
complex.
In the face of the supernatural, cause and effect reasoning is destabilised. So
that in such experiments as Algernon Blackwood's (1908/2004) Dr John
Silence, and E and H Heron's (1899) Flaxman Low stories, detectives are
forced into using other means than reason, no matter how insistent they are
on the natural provenance of events at hand. For example, Dr John Silence
could "vicariously absorb these evil radiations into himself and change them
magically into his own good purposes.T" And occult detective Flaxman
Low, who insists there is only natural causation, says of one case
"everybody who, in a rational and honest manner, investigates the
phenomena of spiritism will, sooner or later, meet in them some perplexing
element, which is not to be explained by any of the ordinary theories.',644
642 Ascari (2007) p81
643 Blackwood (1908/2004) Loc 824
644 See E and H Heron (1899/2006) Loc 366 (The nom de plume for Hesketh and Katherine
Prichard)
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I am not arguing that the methods of the occult detective-cum-exorcist are
ineffective, simply that they do not conform to normal, rationalised
scientific methods and process, in 19th-century terms anyway. In his
extensive study of horror films, Andrew Tudor picks up intuitively on just
this difficulty that science has in the uncharted territory of the supernatural.
He writes of the separation of science from supernatural and psychological
perturbations in the horror genre: "Throughout the modem genre, expertise
- meat and drink to science-based horror movies - has been devalued."
This is what happens "in a fictional world in which people can be routinely
and inexplicably transformed into psychotics or zombies, [when] a belief in
science seems peculiarly inappropriate.t'I"
That said, the one truly successful occult detective is the vampire hunter, a
figure that has spawned a variety of modem ghost busters who pit science
against supernatural to varying degree. Of all supernatural investigators it
appears to be the vampire hunter who has grown to mythic proportion.P"
The trailblazer for this breed of investigator is Stoker's (1897) Professor
Van Helsing, the destroyer of Count Dracula. The advance that Stoker
makes on other psychic investigators which gives his novel a coherence that
the others do not have, is that his ghoul, though through and through
supernatural has a material body. The Count's materiality allows the team
to combine vampire lore with natural law to create more than a semblance
of a cause-and-effect procedural investigation. What is fascinating about the
success of this story is that it manages to retain the detective process intact.
Indeed the whole structure of Dracula, like Wilkie Collins' The Moonstone,
is epistolary and has the mark of a Baconian shape, a narrative occupied
645 Tudor (1989b) p592
646 There are other types of narrative. For example Ghostbusters (1984), a comedic feature
film about parapsychologists, which turns the 'ghostbuster' into ajoke of sorts. A BBC
television drama series, Apparitions (2008), and William Peter Batty's (1971) The Exorcist
return the supernatural to the professional expertise of the clergy rather than science.
However, many more popular supernatural investigators are based on the investigative
vampire hunter, see: Buffy the Vampire Slayer the (1997-2003), Joss Whedon's vampire
hunter (who destroys a whole range of ghouls); Van Helsing (2004), the feature film;
Stephenie Meyer's (2005-2010) Twilight Series about a vampire family, who police the
vampire world and in a manner are vampirised versions of Van Helsing
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with factual information, slowly building in intensity up to the moment of
capture.
Once on their quarry vampire hunters use a kind of magic that has elements
of a science anyway, a 'scientised' magic.647 Vampire lore has clear-cut
methodological rules that can be rote learned, and do not rely upon the
subjectivity or soul of the detective or hunter. What emerges from Stoker's
handling of science and supernatural is a structure and an outcome that
proclaims the power of belief while it demonstrates the power of'science.r"
Given the difficulty of bringing together two worldviews that talk past one
another, this was and still is, an unexpected gift for popular science. It is
unlikely that many scientists would see this as enhancing the cultural
authority of their discipline, but to have their image embedded in one of the
most popular story formats ever to have existed is cultural authority
indeed.649
Le Fanu is at the foot of a set of experiments that test scientific rationalism
in the face of supernatural time schedules. Yet his own stories were rooted
far more firmly in his own time and explicitly aimed to challenge the idea of
a single, knowable reality, or a Baconian ordering process. Le Fanu's
fantastic not only undermines the potential of scientific method to find the
answer, he also questions whether professional expertise can take over, or
obliterate, common sense human decency. In 'Green Tea,' the genius-cum-
expert, alone and eccentrically absorbed in a circumlocutious complexity of
hypotheses, misses the one, the only, obvious solution, to stay with his
suicidal patient. In painting such a picture, Le Fanu has dismantled the
enthusiastic projections of Ann Radcliffe at the end of the 18th century and
GWM Reynolds in the 1840's on the value of science and reason. Oddly
enough, in similar fashion to the fate of Wilkie Collins' Sergeant Cuff, Dr
Hesselius is said to have influenced Bram Stoker's drawing of Van
647 A term taken from Locke (2005) p33
648 Jann (1989) has noted exactly this in an article entitled 'Saved by Science?'
649 For example, the Twilight series is a publishing phenomenon. Meyer's books have spent
235 weeks on the New York Times best-seller list, 136 of them at the top slot. See
Grossman (2009) and Alexander (2009)
Helsing.650 What begins in Le Fanu's story as a cutting critique of scientific
expertise is transformed into laudatory applause that allows the world to
escape the hellish loneliness implied by vampirism.
650 See Skal (2001) pl03; Byrne (1973) p92; and Tracy (1993) pxxi in Le Fanu and Tracy
(1872/1993)
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CHAPTER EIGHT
BETWEEN MAGIC AND REASON
Concluding Thoughts
My overall aim has been write a history of two fictional icons of science
and, in doing so, to move away from the temptation to find a single, uni-
dimensional meaning for the scientist in fiction. This inevitably means that
any conclusion must be interpretive, tentative and allow for many different
answers. Here I attempt to focus on the most striking and consistent points
to arise from the corpus as a whole. I will begin by summarising the
thinking behind my approach and the significance of the work that has come
out of it. Moving on to a consideration of the corpus and its major themes, I
will draw out some of the overarching motifs that commonly coalesce into
narratives about science. In essence, these fictions tend to unify the
symbolic systems of magic and science at some level, and then they draw
into this unified system issues related to professional expertise, innovation
and transgression. I examine these themes in turn and in the final section I
will speculate on the meaning that emerges from these observations in
relation to Max Weber's (1918) vision of a world that is disenchanted by the
inexorable spread of technoscience.
Although I have based my study on 19th-century fiction, it was the perpetual
twinning of Dracula with Frankenstein in zo" and 21 st century cultures that
lead me to propose that Bram Stoker's (1897) Professor Van Helsing might
provide a model of science as important as Victor Frankenstein is today.
My initial observation was that the so-called mad scientist, by which I
simply mean the whole string of characters who share heritage with Mary
Shelley's (1818) scientist, excludes Van Helsing as an oddity, perhaps with
the effect that he has been a relatively neglected figure in scholarly work on
science in fiction. David Skal (1993; 1998) has also made note of this fact,
but the question of whether Stoker's scientist is a one-off representation
peculiar to vampire fiction, or is indicative of an alternative wider fictional
heritage of science, has not before been seriously addressed.f"
In taking my cue from Stoker's vampire hunter then, I have stepped outside
the typified limits of what a scientist is. To do this, I have emphasized
process over iconography in order to identify scientists from non-scientists,
or the scientific from the non-scientific. I have argued that Professor Van
Helsing is a scientific detective by process, an investigator and an empiricist
who seeks knowledge on the basis ofreason.652 Scientific detectives, such
as he and Sherlock Holmes are undoubtedly 'men of science' in mid-
Victorian terms.653 They also share process, albeit more distantly, with such
seemingly disparate hard-boiled characters as Raymond Chandler's
detective Phillip Marlowe, who also uses a similar investigative process.654
These observations led me to examine some of the 19th-century texts that are
considered influential in the development of the figure of a fictional
detective keeping the mad scientist always in relief.
Yet, my emphasis on process is not, for a moment, to suggest that
iconography is not powerful. It certainly is, as evidenced by the emblematic
features of the mad scientist, the unkempt, laboratory-bound villain who
•
represents the public's fear, has framed much of the discourse on fictional
science and is a likely reason for passing over Van Helsing or other
detectives as important in this regard. He, after all, comes associated with a
crucifix and holy water, his garb is not limited to the test tubes and galvanic
apparatus that are so redolent of science. The advantage of stepping beyond
the laboratory bench is that it reveals a whole raft of alternative characters,
which are rarely studied in the context of science in public.
651 Skal (1993) p82-3 and (1998) p33 notes the pairing and centrality of science to the story
of Dracula
652 Add to which his creator calls him "one of the most advanced scientists of his day." See
Stoker (1897/1993) p147
653 See Barton (2003) for 'men of science'
654 See Leane (2007) for an analysis of popular scientists who use these hard-boiled types
as models for their own (popular) investigative process
239
In a study of scientific villains in the BBC television series, Dr Who, Lindy
Orthia (2010) refocuses a tendency that she finds in the scholarly literature
to emphasize villainous characters and interpret them as symptomatic of
public(s) fearfulness, as the 'mad science trope.' I have rendered a similar
ensemble of ideas as a typfication, which I feel better explains its
persistence, its universality outside of fiction and its utilisation as a kind of
social currency.655 Either way, trope or typification, I would suggest that
the complex as described by Orthia has framed much of the work so far on
the fictional scientist, with important exceptions, of course.656
I too have noted a propensity within some of the scholarly literature on
fictional science to emphasize negative, usually mad, bad images.657 There
are two possible reasons for this. One is the sheer prevalence of science in
the disaster narrative, which makes it a topic of interest in its own right.658
The other is a concern that seems to stem from an elision of ideas about the
function of fictional images and public understandings, or lack of them.
Some scholars of science in literature are inclined, as Orthia has pointed out,
to assume a scientific villain is both symptom of and influence on negativity
or fear on the part ofpublic(s) toward science.659 This is a deficit-type
assumption. The inference is that public(s) are socially naive and unable to
understand the language of story telling, so much so that they believe that
science really is mad, bad and dangerous.
655 The notion of a typification has more flexibility, in that only one or two typified
components need be invoked to signify science. So, although I agree with Orthia (2010), I
would distinguish typification from a trope as being less rigidly prescribed
656 For work that sees scientists as different to this typified model, see Locke (2005); Orthia
(2010); Russell (2007)
657 For studies of representation which focus on, or emphasize mad, bad science see Baldick
(1987); Basalla (1975) "Pop Science: The Depiction of Science in Popular Culture" in
Holton and Blandpied (eds) (1975); Cohen (1981); Frayling (2005 and 2006b), Haste
(1997); Haynes (1994; 2003; 2006), Jackson (2008); Jones (2001); Jorg (2003); Millhauser
(1973); Rose (2003); Schummer (2006); Skal (1998); Tourney (1992); Tudor (1989);
Tumey (1998); Weart (1988); Weingart (2006); Weingart et al (2003); Weingart and
Pansegrau (2003) for scientists bemoaning bad press see Emsley (2001) Sir David King in
Frayling (2006b); Gilbey (2008); McDonald (1989); Pollack (1998); Rohn (2006)
658 See Tudor (1989)
659 Orthia (2010) pIS Authors who claim that scientific villains (and mad scientists)
constitute a critique of science include Frayling (2005 and 2006b), Haste (1997); Haynes
(1994; 2003); Jorg (2003); Milhauser (1973); Tourney (1992); Tumey (1998); Weart
(1988); Weingart (2006); Weingart et al (2003); Weingart and Pansegrau (2003)
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Scientists, too, and this may influence scholars of science in fiction, are
inclined to make similar assumptions. Michael and Carter (2001), for
example, reported that scientists and science teachers tacitly employed a
deficit type model when asked about the value of fictional science. For
them science in literary contexts provides an inspirational platform that can
lead consumers on to further exploration of the topic. But they generally
also had concerns that fiction would misinform public(s) because of
inaccurate portrayals. This is not an uncommon view among scientists.F"
In this scenario, then, public(s) are doubly in deficit, unable to understand
the art and function of storytelling and unable to spot inaccurate science.
Yet, science in fiction does inform our understandings of it, not in any
factual sense, but rather in the sense of what it means. Indeed, storytellers
are unlikely to have a concern about whether public(s) understand science or
not. No biology student reads Jurassic Park in order to learn how to extract
DNA from amber encased insects, but they might reflect on what the
process of DNA extraction mayor may not be able to achieve. They may
ask themselves where could this science go and what are the responsibilities
involved in owning it? Indeed, the picture that emerges from focus group
research is just that. Fictional images and narratives constitute a pool of
resources for thinking about science and its meaning.f" Two studies, Bates
(2005) and Michael and Carter (2001), which analyse the ways in which
people actually engage with popular science, support this view. They find
that public(s) can utilise fictional, factual and factional sources in complex
and sophisticated ways; acknowledge the value of all kinds of cultural
production; and accept conflicting interpretations at the same time.
Public(s) draw upon a variety of sources including fiction and socially
sanctioned typifications in order to debate their own various claims about
the values and meanings of different kinds of science to their own and
others lives.
660 Rose (2003); Turney (1998); Gilbey (2008); McDonald (1989); Pollack (1998)
661 Bates (2005) reports that subjects combine many different cultural referents from fact
and fiction in support of their own particular claims about genetics recognising multiple,
conflicting images as valid interpretations. Michael and Carter (2001) report that students
did not absorb factual or fictional sources indiscriminately, but saw both as 'faction' and
incorporated and valued many different sources of knowledge for different reasons
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I have drawn a comparative history of two prominent imaginary figures,
broadening out the palate of scientific representation, as it were, to include
other professionals, or people, who use science. I have emphasized the
process of detection as it developed in the 19th century and have compared
this to some mad scientists who inhabit the same literary ground. The main
relevance of this history is in the fact that these two figures still exist today
within a shared pool of socially constructed images. The detective is as
equally prescribed as the scientist. He is a criminal investigator who might
peer at a footprint through a magnifying glass, have hawk-like powers of
observation, a rarefied ability for reasoning from effect to cause, a drawn or
pale look and often a difficult or conflicted home life. Indeed, Sherlock
Holmes is to the detective what Victor Frankenstein is to the mad scientist.
What is striking about these two figures is that although they appear very
different now, each having their own professionally typified peculiarities,
they have arisen from within a group of related fictions.
A taxonomist of literary images would almost certainly place them in a
single clade, both arising from the common ancestor of gothic fictions that
were extant at end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century. 662 This is
no whimsical metaphor. A biologist uses cladistics to reveal evolutionary
relationships in order to better understand how each form of life has
developed in a changing environment and hence how it can make a living in
its present environment. A literary taxonomist, by analogy, might want to
map the developmental relationships of iconic fictional figures in order to
better understand their relationships to their own cultural contexts and by so
doing perhaps gain a deeper insight into their meanings in the contemporary
cultural landscape. One might also add that where an animal or plant must
make a living by surviving long enough to reproduce, the survival of an
iconic fictional figure is guaranteed as long as it still has meaning for the
culture that gives it life, and if it were to cease to have meaning, it would no
longer be reproduced and would go extinct.
662 A clade is a group of life forms related to a single common ancestor.
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My aim has been to recover something of the past understandings of
science, or rather the past meanings of science, to which these two icons
relate. Their histories are so deeply entwined that some of the characters in
this corpus are hard to pin point as either mad scientist or detective, falling
somewhere between the two, as for example, Dr Hesselius, Sheridan Le
Fanu's (1872) doctor-detective or Mary Braddon's (1861) Jabez North, the
scientific evil-doer who uses the detective method and what of Sherlock
Holmes - detective and mad scientist? The entangled history of the two
characters places the detective more squarely as a man or woman of science,
although there is a general inclination today to treat the figure more
narrowly as a crime fighter. Perhaps this is because scientific, investigative
process has become so ordinary and so embedded in contemporary culture
that we are no longer able to see it as scientific. On the surface of it today,
mad scientists and detectives are sufficiently divergent to appear unrelated.
Indeed, the first major, though simple, point to be made about
understandings of science in fiction that arise from this work, is that science
in this corpus is not all bad, mad and dangerous. Though it may be typified
as such, this is not the master narrative of science in fiction and probably
never has been either.663 This, at least, is the picture that emerges from this
limited survey of some of the most popular fictions of the 19th century.
Whether the picture would hold up in a wider sample, it is not possible to
say and needs further study. But, the fact that both mad scientist and
detective narratives have retained the same popularity through the
intervening century plus, suggests that the detective figure provides us with
an alternative master narrative of science, a modem myth, and a resource for
thinking about science and society today and in the past.
In the body of the thesis I have defined science narratives as either
disordering or restorative, using my method inspired by Vladimir Propp
(1928/1968). I ask what is the function of science within this story? In other
663 See p255 (footnote) and pp235-237ofthis work for modern fictions supporting this view
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words, what does science mean in this story? This an unquestionably
simplistic way of gauging meaning, but it has been helpful simply as a
demonstration of the fact that, in the 19th century at least, one recurring
'myth' of science has it as an ordering process in the restoration of morality,
and its opposite is in the narrative of the mad, bad scientific villain, who
creates disorder. It seems significant that these two modem myths, as they
are, have so often appeared together as versions upon versions of Dracula
and Frankenstein. It is as though together these two stories have greater
meaning than they do alone.
Having said that, it appears a simple business to identify Sherlock Holmes
as having an ordering function, and Victor Frankenstein as having a
disordering one. Indeed, based upon their narrative function, that is correct,
but their personal moral orientation cannot be entirely equated with
function. Shelley (1818), for example, hints at a noble potential in
Frankenstein, and conversely Sherlock Holmes' periodic descent into drugs
and depression suggests a darker side to his nature. While Propp's
(1928/1968) idea of function has been useful as an overall indicator of the
meaning conferred upon science by the texts, it may sometimes have led me
to gloss over some of the finer grained subtleties that exist in some of the
representations. That said, where possible I have discussed these kinds of
complexities, particularly in cases like GWM Reynolds' body-snatching
surgeon, in which image and function seem to diverge. So despite my
simple starting point, I do try to honour some of the nuance that is
undoubtedly present even in these most formulaic genres of fiction.
In the next section, I will go beyond this simple guide to textual meaning,
and attempt to draw together some of the major themes that are commonly
associated with science and scientists within the whole corpus. I have
borrowed the notion of recurring literary themes from Tzvetan Todorov
(1975). In his work The Fantastic he seeks to map networks of linked
themes arising from the fantastic genre as he defines it. His concern is to
discover the themes that distinguish the fantastic genre from others. I have
adapted the idea here, to ask what are the themes that coalesce around
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representations of science in the different, though admittedly related, genre
fictions that I have included in this corpus.
Mapping distributions as opposed to meanings is a type of knowledge,
which Todorov proposes is "more limited" but "less disputable" than an
interpretative analysis.T" For example, he finds concepts, such as sexuality
and death, within the same thematic network as specific terms like the devil
and vampires, and is at pains to point out that it does not then follow that the
devil means sex or the vampire means necrophilia. Rather more usefully he
writes of the compatibility or co-presence of themes that repeatedly arise
concurrently or in clusters. Likewise, I have identified a linked network of
themes that combine with notions of science and scientists and aggregate
around both restorative and disordering forms. Having identified his
networks, Todorov re-works them in psychoanalytic terms as related to self
and other. 665 In a deeply interpretative step in the last of my concluding
thoughts, I relate the network which I have identified, more prosaically it
has to be said, to concerns about science and society. At the core of this
network I want to place science and magic, while the abstractions that
regularly radiate about them in the texts that I have analysed are reason,
transgression, innovation and professionalism.f"
In drawing the texts together as I have in the current corpus, I have created a
narrative of my own, a story that has elements of ontogeny. At the outset,
human transgression was a powerful theme in literature, countered only by
the individual force of reason, but by the end the detective, person and
narrative, embody reason as an instrument for containing both natural and
supernatural transgressions. In the gothic period, the strong links between
reason and individual virtue are opposed to supernatural magic which is
664 Todorov (1975) p141
665 Despite his remonstrations against interpretation, his own discussion of fantastic themes,
of the self and of the other, is ultimately interpretive. He does avoid proposing singular
meaning or direct signification and by exploring commonalities across a whole network of
linked themes, and this strengthens the interpretive analysis, but interpretive it still is.
666 Here, as before, I use the term magic in the broadest possible sense to indicate a process
or type of transformational knowledge that encompasses supernatural forces which may be
instrumental, or not. I do differentiate between this type of knowledge and knowledge that
is associated with organised religion or indeed secular magic
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repudiated as immoral, and by the fin de siecle, in the gothic revival, I find
reason and magic are mobilised together in stories that vanquish such
deviant or troublesome entities as vampires, criminals or ghosts. My story
requires a word of warning. This work is interpretative at every level, from
choice of corpus, the details I draw from individual texts to the
identification of networked themes, and finally the tentative conclusions that
I will draw from them. In doing this, I have opted for a more 'disputable'
but less 'limited' analysis, than Todorov suggests might be possible.
THE FICTION AND ITS THEMES
Science, Magic and the Gothic Origins of Detectives and Mad Scientists
Science and magic are categories, symbolic systems that designate aspects
of the social world. Since the 1th and 18th centuries in the West anyway,
they have been subject to such a degree of boundary work that many people
today operate under the assumption that the two systems are opposed to one
another. Where science is natural and rational, magic is supernatural and
irrational. 667 Such views, often serving as unarticulated underpinnings to
bigger statements, are dotted throughout scholarly works on gothic fictions
and all its related forms.668 Angela Carter whose own 'gothic' repertoire
aims to interrogate boundaries, nicely sums up its obsession with the
junction between reason and supernature or unreason and nature. When
faced with the seductive, supernatural beauty of a vampiric Countess, the
naive matter-of-fact Hero reassures himself: "Soon it will be morning; the
crowing of the mundane cock and first light will dissolve this gothic dream
with the solvent of the natural. Yes, perhaps I shall take her to Vienna; and
we shall clip off her finger nails and take her to a good dentist, to deal with
her fangs.,,669 The parody plays upon the polarity of natural and
667 Such oppositional tenus underlie Max Weber's proposal that rationalism leads to
disenchantment See Gerth and Mills (1991) pp139-143
668 The term 'pseudoscience,' for example, contains a remnant of this distinction between
natural-rational means and supernatural-irrational means. Also see Scarborough
(1917/2001) p6; Tourney (1992), especially p414: "the physical artefacts of science
are ... miscellaneous material junk of alchemists ... illogically connected" and Tourney
(1996) ppI28-29; for the opposite view see, Smith in Bann (1994) for discussion of natural
magick as the roots of Frankenstein's science pp39-59
669 Quoted in Frayling in Myrone (ed) (2006) pIS
supernatural and in itself reveals the extent to which this opposition has
become broadly accepted, assumed and unquestioned. If it were not the
case, the tableau would not achieve its comic effect.
The dividing line itself is the joke, and only a few words are necessary to
suggest the worlds on either side of it. Dreams, and so irrationality, and the
supernatural, sit on one side against the mundane, the natural, and the
rational, technical world of the dentist. The whole statement then
encompasses the idea that the natural acts as a solvent to irrational,
supernatural entities like vampires. This reiterates the 18th-century gothic
precept in which reason really can dissolve supernatural entities, or those
that walk the earth at least, the only allowable supernatural being in the
power of God. It also precisely describes Radcliffe's 'explained
supernatural' and is linked to much of the discourse in gothic texts, which
relegates superstition to a weakness of mind, a failure of reason and the
bane of Catholic belief. Some scientists took advantage of the same idea to
advertise the benefits of their own specialism. Most notable among them
was Humphry Davy who advocated natural philosophy as a means of
calming an oversensitive and feeling nature of the kind that might be prone
to supernatural suggestibility.V"
The related dictum that reason is the path to human virtue is also key for all
the gothic writers in this cOrpUS.671 Ultimately the terror and the horror of
their texts arises from threats to reason. This happens in two ways. The
first is as I have described, reason wavers in the face of an overactive
imagination and superstition takes hold. The second, similarly, comes about
when reason is not strongly developed, but in this case allows the basest
passions, or sensual, selfish drives, to obliterate morality. This is what
makes a gothic villain, as is evident in Radcliffe's (1791) licentious
aristocrat, The Marquis, his milder accomplice, La Motte; in Matthew
670 See this work p8I
671 Mary Shelley (ISIS) is more equivocal on this point. The message of her text on this
point depends on whether Frankenstein's 'science' is perceived as having its basis in reason
or magic and this is not clear-cut. Though it is fairly safe to conclude that she introduces
the idea that reason or magic taken to extreme does not lead to virtue
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Lewis's (1794) Ambrosio, the licentious monk; and a third sexually
motivated character, in Charlotte Dacre's (1806) Victoria. All of these
examples point in the same direction. They promote the power of reason to
right the wrongs of desire. Romance a/the Forest is a particularly strong
fable in this regard, and Radcliffe continually drives home the value of
reason for all of her characters almost from the first page, beginning as we
do with a "gentleman whose passions often overcame his reason ... ,,672
Radcliffe's pious science was an elevated form of reason, passive in the
external world, but apparently able to elevate the mind and spirit of the
practitioner beyond ordinary virtue. This vision of science consists of a
strictly observational discipline that attempts to find the reflection of God's
mind in the works of Nature. This, then, is about as far from the hackneyed
image of a crazed, self-absorbed scientist as one could get. Here, science is
domestic, democratising, pastoral, spiritual and not only is it unthreatening,
it is positively uplifting. Its lack of instrumentality means that it has a
function only through its association with reason and where reason can curb
the most dangerously tempting of the passions, science can do better and is
said to be able to balance human feeling to exquisite proportion.
I have suggested that this myth about reason and science, if it can be called
that, contains the essential ideational elements of detective fiction. The
reasoning detective is able to apprehend the impassioned criminal in the
same way that the gothic heroine, Adeline, uses her reason to resist both the
passions of the Marquis and her fear of the supernatural. Reason and
science have equivalent functions in both detective and gothic scripts.
Indeed, it was a gothic revivalist, Edgar Allen Poe, who was one of the first
to popularise the detective as a rational investigator. Earlier incarnations of
detectives had existed but they had relied to a greater extent on picaresque
skills than on reason.673 Later in the 19th century detectives take up magical
means to pursue material objects and vice versa, but the skeleton of the
672 Radcliffe (179111986) p2
673 Vidocq was picaresque for example, and Braddon's (1861) Mr Peter has his moments of
derring-do
narrative, which remains popular today, very often still involves the rational
purification of the worst excesses of the passions, though the story has been
secularised.
The modem myth of mad science has more in common with the passion
fuelled portraits of Ambrosio and Victoria, for whom science functions as a
means to satiate desire, whether that be for power, control or sexual
delights. These images of science fuse it with Satanic magic, such that the
stories retain a strongly moral and religious tone. Indeed, both of these
villains ultimately pay their dues to Satan. Shelley's innovation was to take
Satan out of the equation and draw a deeply ambivalent picture of the
scientist, as perhaps noble, perhaps reasonable, maybe magical, but always
neglectful of his social responsibility. Victor Frankenstein's overblown
ideas about his own potential are of similar, perhaps even greater,
proportion than the villains of Lewis's and Dacre's writing. Their desires
are centred around the acquisition of personal power for pleasure, but
Frankenstein is of another tradition altogether, he admits his desires have
more in line with the alchemists who sought to control life and death, no
less.674 In many later incarnations the mad scientist retains such a link with
alchemy, maintaining a certain equivocation between magical and scientific
phenomena.675 I would suggest then that the figures of the detective and the
mad scientist arise out of the same groundswell of literary images and ideas.
And, although they usually have opposing functions, they are each
compatible with the same set of themes.
The two symbolic systems, magic and science (usually reckoned to be based
on belief and reason respectively), are central, because they are the basis or
means of action for each of these two characters. Both are forms of
transformational knowledge and, in narratives, they can serve equivalent
functions. Of course, all knowledge is transformational in one sense, since
it transforms the mind, but in the narratives here, excepting Ann Radcliffe's
674 See Smith in Bann (1994) and Ellis (2000) pl52
675 For discussions of the magical elements of mad science see Ellis (2000); Schummer
(2006); Smith in Bann (1994); Tourney (1992); We art (1988)
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gothic, science and magic are instrumental in the external world. They are
a means, intentionally or not, of ordering or disordering the imaginary
worlds of the fictions. The reason I use the term transformational, as
opposed to instrumental, is that Radcliffe's notion of reason sits more
readily under that banner since it has the power to transform the individual
and can only influence the exterior world indirectly through its effect on
individuals. Whichever way, science, connected in some way to magic, is a
feature that cuts across the whole corpus.
Gothic Science and Magic in the 1840's and Beyond
In the 1840's, GWM Reynolds' (1844-46) Mysteries of London is set in an
urban environment peopled by professionals, most of whom seem to be
unscrupulously self serving and corrupt. Magic and science are drawn
together in scenes associating grave robbers with medics (anatomists-
surgeons). These characters resemble Victor Frankenstein in their self-
confessed rejection of the supernatural, while simultaneously surrounded by
insignias of magic like a moonlit graveyard, a lonely garret, a corpse or a
death-like trance. Reynolds scientist-medic has split off from the magical,
supernatural realm, such that he is able to negotiate eerie scenes, "with the
coolness of a professional man ..;" 676 The function of Shelley's mad
scientist is flipped here, and Reynolds' anatomist succeeds where
Frankenstein fails. The surgeon-anatomist does Jearn how to heal the living
by dissecting the dead and is rewarded for doing so.
These two examples demonstrate that magic is a compatible theme for
science, beyond the gothic preoccupation with piety and regardless of
whether science has a restorative or disordering function. In Reynolds'
writing, the suggestion is of a dark, gothic, perhaps Satanic magic, which is
denied by the scientific protagonist. Mary Braddon's (1861) Monsieur
Blurosset is a full-blown magician-scientist, and taking a powerfully
restorative role in her plot, has little of the same darkness about him. On the
676 Reynolds (1844a) p349 (col a)
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contrary, in some scenes he radiates a positively cosy aura of fireside
fortune telling. Wilkie Collins' (1868) enigmatic scientist, Ezra Jennings,
carries the iconic hallmarks of the magician, although his process, unlike
Blurosset's, is rooted in reason, science and experiment.
And last, in "Green Tea," the first story in the volume In a Glass Darkly,
Sheridan Le Fanu (1872) has reason investigate magic. The metaphysician,
Dr Hesselius, whose professional expertise is lauded in a framing narrative,
is ultimately impotent, in a rare example of a story that conforms to Tzvetan
Todorov's (1975) genre 'the fantastic' in which the reader is left undecided
and hovering between the natural and supernatural. Indeed, one of the
troubles for scientific or magical methods as investigative tools in this genre
is that ultimately the transgressor must not be revealed. In each of the three
hauntings of In a Glass Darkly the reader never knows whether there has
been a genuine unearthly haunting or whether the transgression occurred in
the mind of the protagonists. Because the fantastic hesitates between
natural and supernatural, no method can ever be wholly effective, even so
the upshot is to cast doubt on the efficacy of the professional, Dr Hesselius.
I shall return to this point below, but first it is worth looking at the way in
which Bram Stoker (1897) manages a seamless join between supernatural
magic and scientific logic. Stoker is particularly important because his
story was a trigger for this study and it, or elements of it, have been re-
worked so often as to keep audiences rapt today.
I have argued that when reason investigates magic, the cause-and-effect
basis of the scientific detective narrative is destabilised by the supernatural,
which is not governed by the same time schedule as are cause-and-effect
narratives. Ghosts, vampires and ghouls are 'revenants,' they represent
introgressions of past into present and when time loses its normal direction,
the normal flow from cause to effect is also disrupted. Although there are
branches of science post-Einstein that theoretically could deal more deftly
with supernatural time schedules, they are not the kinds of thinking
employed by scientific detectives, neither in the late 19th century, nor today.
The result is that occult detectives, such as Algernon Blackwood's Dr John
lS1
Silence (1908) or E and H Herons' Flaxman Low (1899), are either forced
to employ magical methods that are subjective, somehow requiring the
psyche, or soul, of the individual investigator to put to rest or explain
various visitants from the past, or they are unable to explain the phenomena
at hand.677 Then the usual reasoning of the process of detection either fails
or must tum into a feeling process. Either way the sense of science that is
created by working stepwise backwards from effect to cause is lost.
Yet, Bram Stoker and many beyond him have successfully united reason
and magic in a way that seems acceptable to our commonsense selves. This
is partly because the vampire takes a material form and so the detective and
his team are able to combine a little of the classic material effect-to-cause
reasoning to track the vampire down. Once on their quarry vampire hunters
use a kind of magic that has elements ofa science anyway, a 'scientised'
magic.678 Vampire lore has clear-cut methodological rules that can be rote
learned, and it does not rely upon the subjectivity or soul of the detective or
hunter. What emerges from Bram Stoker's handling of science and the
supernatural is a story that proclaims the power of belief while it
demonstrates the power of science. Professor Van Helsing is truly a
scientist who resides somewhere between magic and reason.
That the formula is a success is evidenced by numerous immensely popular
re-workings of the vampire-hunting story. Many of these continue with the
loose tie up between natural, scientific means and magical formula,
sometimes learned from ancient tomes that reside in dusty libraries, as in
Joss Whedon's (1997) television hit Buffy the Vampire Slayer. The first
book of Stephenie Meyer's (2005) Twilight series adds an interesting twist
to the science-magic fusion, in that Dr Cullen, a handsome and "brilliant
surgeon who could probably work in any hospital in the world ... " is a
677 For example Dr John Silence could "vicariously absorb these evil radiations into himself
and change them magicaIly into his own good purposes." Blackwood (1908/2004) Loc 824.
Occult detective Flaxman Low, who reckons on there being no supernatural, says of one
case "everybody who, in a rational and honest manner, investigates the phenomena of
spiritism will, sooner or later, meet in them some perplexing element, which is not be
explained by any of the ordinary theories." See E and H Heron (1899/2006) Loc 366
678 A term borrowed from Locke (2005) p33
lSl
'vampirised' form of Van Helsing. So while he and his family drink the
blood of animals, they seek out and discipline other vampires who still have
the taste for human blood. Thus, Dr Cullen combines the techno scientific
brilliance and righteousness of Van Helsing with the supernatural powers of
Dracula. Add to which the core of the narrative joins natural and
supernatural in a love affair, a feature that has probably done much to make
these novels into the publishing phenomenon that they have been.679
Clearly, then some degree of magic-science union has abiding appeal. It is
evident in all texts of the corpus from the 1790's gothic to the 1890's neo-
gothic and beyond in 20th and 21 5t_century re-tellings of similar narratives.
Science may be dressed in magical iconography and vice versa, or there
may be a straightforward blending of two processes. There is, however, a
distinct shift in literary concerns beginning in Reynolds' (1844-46)
Mysteries when gothic aesthetics are brought into an urban and more realist,
contemporary setting and stay pUt.680 As fairytale, dream-like landscapes
and crumbling edifices from the late 18th century make way for dim lit
graveyards and labyrinthine city streets, transgression, secrets and mystery
are drawn into the everyday. Still science retains the magnetic draw of
magic, but, after the initial gothic period, it triggers more prosaic concerns
that coalesce around images of magical science and scientific magic. I
shall return to look at the significance of science and magic fusions after
exploring some of the other concerns that arise in the post-gothic period in
connection with such transformational knowledge.
There are a set of three interlinked topical motifs that are notable in the
corpus for their co-presence, and apparent on-going compatibility. This is
the kind of pattern that Todorov (1975) maps of recurring connections
between uncanny and other events in the fantastic, which for him designate
the semantics of the genre. Here the concern is with the semantics, or
meaning, that such radiating concerns raise in relation to science. The three
679 See Alexander (2009) and Grossman (2009)
680 This is not to suggest that Reynolds was the first writer to do this, he was just the first
one in this body of texts
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motifs that recur in connection with science across the different fictions are
professionalism, innovation and transgression, all combining in some
manner to produce moral order on the one hand or disorder on the other.
Such motifs cluster about scientific-magical actors regardless of their
narrative function and they represent some of the cultural concerns that
presumably arose in the face ofa growing body of knowledge, which was
transforming lifestyles, communities and society as a whole. In the
following section I will summarise notions of professionalism, innovation
and transgression.
Professionalism
The twisted plots of GWM Reynolds' (1844-46) Mysteries converge upon
the representation of professions and in something akin to a morality play,
they sort the wheat from the chaff. Although professionals are depicted in
the earlier gothic genre, there they consist mainly of soldiers, clergy or
lawyers, the traditional professions reserved for the younger sons of the
gentry and none are professional scientists, nor scientific professionals.
Reynolds extends his picture to include financiers, lawyers, clerks,
bureaucrats, police, doctors and more. Importantly, he shifts the association
of reason, science and virtue that was so lauded by the gothic authors into
the newly rationalised medical profession. Yet, he outlaws the kinds of
scientist like the daguerreotypist and the mesmerist who use popular
channels to earn ill-gotten gains that serve purely for their own self-
gratification. These scientists are seemingly independent men, freeloaders
on a hypocritical system. Here Reynolds disparages the kind of deficit
model that operated at the time and linked a lack of scientific knowledge
among the workers to their lack of moral fibre. He is derisory about the
kinds of factual science that were disseminated through efforts like the
Penny Magazine and Science Galleries.
In Mysteries the pornographic daguerreotypist and the money-grabbing
mesmerist serve none of the needs of the populace and indeed Reynolds'
parodic portrait of them paints them as an irrelevance, outcompeted by the
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upward mobility of a new model of scientific professional. The 'proper'
social and moral advantage of science, for Reynolds, has it as an
instrumental force, a means to improve society that is administered by
expert professionals. A similar model that places a high value on science
for society is re-worked by forthcoming detectives, both real and fictional,
who have varying relations to the professional. Whichever way, there is an
assumption that high value is attended upon those people, professional or
otherwise, who can deliver a function that is required by a population, or by
analogy to fiction, required by a narrative. As I have noted, this idea, and
Reynolds' text in particular, is an anticipation of Everett C Hughes' (1971)
ecological metaphor in which institutions evolve as a result of selection
pressures constituted by the needs and wants of the people. To survive, the
profession must fulfil a necessary or sought after function.
With that said, the following three texts are not as optimistic as Reynolds
about the ability of the newly rationalised, scientific professions to succeed
in such an undertaking. Mary Braddon's (1861) heroes, Mr Peters and
Monsieur Blurosset, both work outside official professional bodies of the
law, though both have considerable rational and magical expertise.
Together they outperform the state-sanctioned institutions from courts, to
police force and house of detention. Likewise, Wilkie Collins' (1868)
professional policeman, Sergeant Cuff, fails and the crime is only resolved
with the help of the maverick outsider, Ezra Jennings. These stories of
professional failures echo general contemporary concerns about the
particular ability of the professional police force to detect crime, which had
promised much by the promotion of a scientific image, but had delivered far
less. That said, these two stories do uphold the view that scientific expertise
in itself can fulfil an important function for society. This vision has been
alive ever since and is evident in the endless rehashing of the story of a
scientific detective like Sherlock Holmes and the popular forensic fictions
that have regularly appeared on television and in fiction best seller listS.681
681 UK television dramas such as an updated 21 si century Sherlock Holmes, along with older
shows such as Silent Witness, Waking the Dead and Cracker. American imports have
included Quincy, CS!, CS! NY. CS! Miami, and Criminal Minds. Then novels like those of
255
Indeed, Sherlock Holmes is a potent enough icon that his image became a
morale-boosting point of identification for real police detectives living on a
different continent a century after the fictional detective first moved into
221B Baker Street.682 The observation is testimony indeed to the power of
fiction or ofa modem myth. Wilkie Collins' (1868) The Moonstone is part
and parcel of the making of that myth and his Sergeant Cuff is generally
agreed to have provided an important model for Conan Doyle's Holmes.t'"
Cuff is an especially innovative creation. His image is born out of a
repertoire of typified emblems that are normally used to signify the scientist,
magician or knowledge-seeker. This gives Cuff the look of a scientist. Yet
the 'great Cuff fails to live up to his much-lauded image. Real detectives
of the period had also been painted as men of science, and their sometime
failure to deliver on this point, or indeed to deliver the criminal at all, was a
familiar gripe in newsprint at the time. Collins' portrait of Cuff cleverly
points toward a gap between image and performance that his audience were
primed to pick up. Yet, what amounted to a contemporary critique of the
detective squad ended in a myth that many a real detective is, no doubt,
pleased to be identified with. This is a wonderful example of how the
meaning of an image shifts along with the culture that harbours it.
Although the professional fails in The Moonstone, science conducted by a
magical outcast is able to turn the mystery around. Yet, in Sheridan Le
Fanu's (1872) short story 'Green Tea,' both the professional expertise and
scientific approach fail. I have already alluded to the fact that given that the
point of 'the fantastic' genre is to leave the reader unresolved on the cause
of the transgression - no kind of detective or scientific expertise can be one
hundred per cent effective. That said, the general reader does not keep a
definition of 'the fantastic' in mind, and the lack of resolution appears to
result from some wanting in the professional, Dr Hesselius. This effect is
Kathy Reichs, Patricia Cornwell and Jefferson Bass feature forensic science and are regular
best sellers
682 Heinsler et al (1990)
683 Farmer (1999) in Collins and Farmer (1868/1999) pl6 and Conan Doyle and Hodgson
(1994) plll
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emphasized by Le Fanu's emphatic separation of expert from lay discourses
across the volume of stories. In a Glass Darkly rather drives home the point
that professional expertise is no magic bullet. Indeed, Le Fanu skilfully
imitates a kind of professional pomposity that is laughably impotent. He
dismantles the facade of professional potency that Reynolds so avidly
recommended and drives home Everett C Hughes' point that if it is to be
relevant, a professional body must pay attention to, cultivate and succeed in
some fulfilment of function.
Along similar lines, Bram Stoker's (1897) Dracula demonstrates that a
narrowly scientific approach is no panacea. Although Stoker is not as
derisory about his professionals, Dr Seward the psychiatrist has too narrow
a scientific focus and would certainly fail without the guidance of an
eccentric outsider, Van Helsing. It takes more than science to avert the
potential loneliness and devastation of a vampire outbreak, as Van Helsing
points out, "we have the power of science ... [and] tradition and
superstition ... Does not the belief of vampires rest on them?,.684 Without
belief in the supernatural, of course, the vampire wins.
Since Stoker created Van Helsing the vampire hunter has turned into
something of a storybook institution. It constitutes a fictional version of one
of Hughes' 'bastard institutions' in that the individuals of this occupation
represent "chronic deviations from established institutions" and have "a
certain stability, although they do not have support of open legitimacy.,,68s
Vampire hunters flout the normal boundaries of science by drawing
unashamedly upon magical rite while they deviate from the normal bounds
of magic lore in being scientific. They are often members of an
institutionalised profession as well, but practise at its periphery, in order to
maintain their maverick alter-ego under low profile. Yet they fulfil a
fictional function and have been reinvented over and again as a modem
myth. They seem to send a message that reason or science is power, but
684 Stoker and Byron (1897/1998) p277
685 Hughes (197111984) pp98-99 'Real' bastard institutions include gambling, black
markets, prostitution etc
257
only when it does not exclude other ways of understanding and functioning
in the world.
Stoker's decision to bring in an eccentric outsider to tackle a problem that is
intractable for appropriate professionals, highlights a tension within
professional groups between regulation and creativity. Professional groups
encourage specialism by such activities as devising and regulating entry
examinations or other qualifying criteria for membership. Of course, such
regulation is well and good, but the downside to it, which Stoker points out,
is the loss of flexibility in the face of a novel problem. Creativity and
innovation cannot be regulated, partly because by their very nature they
involve stepping outside the boundaries of normal knowledge to create a
new understanding, vision or technique. This tension has been the subject
of long sociological enquiry and is another of the core motifs to recur
together with science, magic and expertise in this corpus.
Innovation or Transgression
Innovation by its very nature must break with a social standard of some
kind. It is, in a sense, a form of deviant or transgressive behaviour although
it is not necessarily immoral. The relationship between innovation and
deviance was formally captured by Robert K Merton (1938) and his model
of innovation is well demonstrated by the activity ofGWM Reynolds'
(1844-46) bodysnatching surgeon. In this scenario, the desire for
anatomical knowledge is a culturally sanctioned goal, yet it is unattainable
for the surgeon owing to the scarcity of state licensed cadavers available for
dissection. So, the surgeon simply innovates the means to reach a goal that
does, after all, fulfil the wants and needs of the people, even though his
means transgress social norms, are deviant and in this case, also criminal.
Braddon's villain, Jabez North, is another example of a Mertonian innovator
who is driven to unlawful means in striving for a goal, in this case wealth,
which is also culturally sanctioned.
These are extreme cases where innovation has turned to moral
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transgression, but scientists are forced to deal daily with a related but far
more subtle conflict. As Merton's theory would predict, scientists like any
social group are challenged by innovators who break with norms of, in this
case, knowledge, though they, in particular, are caught in a dilemma since
ostensibly, innovation is what they all strive towards. I have argued that
models used by Michael Mulkay (1985) to describe the way scientists
interpret innovations and discoveries made by their colleagues map in broad
terms to the methods of mad scientists and detectives. The 'genius' folk
theory focuses on the role of the individual scientist, their uniqueness,
creativity and exceptional mind. The theory of 'cultural maturation', on the
other hand, downplays the role of the individual scientist and sees the
discovery as an inevitable outcome of a scientific process, which could have
been made by anyone had they been in the right place at the right time.
Mulkay finds that scientists use these models for social purposes, either to
emphasize or to downplay the unusual quality of the particular individual
that made the innovation.
Similar patterns are anticipated by Braddon (1861) and Collins (1868) in
their respective portraits, each of a detective and a scientist. In both cases,
the scientist is the more extraordinary and eccentric individual of the pair,
seemingly able to rely on intuition and bursts of inspiration. The detective,
by comparison, is a rather dull and plodding data gatherer. Mulkay's
genius folk theory describes these scientists well, while his cultural
maturation model better describes the way that the detectives work. There
is a more general point to be made here, which is that all these visions,
social models and literary figures alike contain within them a commonly
held dual conception of reason as being both imaginative and mechanical at
the same time. Furthermore, such notions of genius and individual brilliance
on the one hand and learned method on the other became a pivotal focus for
19th-century debates about how science should properly proceed. Did
science mainly proceed by mechanical, additive thinking in which case
could it be learned, or could it only progress via leaps of intuitive genius?
All these ideas represent two poles of reason and I suggest that these map
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onto fictions of detectives and mad scientists generally. Mad scientists tend
to work by intuitive, unfathomable methods, which are magical, if only in
their obscurity. Think only of Frankenstein's magical aura, which persists
despite his insistence on pure natural philosophy. William Whewell,
believing Isaac Newton to be a genius, writes of him in 1837 that he is "an
irresistible and almost supernatural hero of a philosophical romance.,,686
Ideas about magic, imagination, romance and scientific genius have long
constituted a well-woven complex of harmonious themes. The detective
narrative, on the other hand, plods through a method. Anyone can learn to
walk from door to door fact checking, but not anyone can resemble a
supernatural hero. So, as dogged data gatherer Mr Peters is to his magical
ally Monsieur Blurosset, so Sergeant Cuff is to Ezra Jennings and so, in a
measure is every detective to every mad scientist. All lie somewhere on a
scale between magic and reason.
This is not to say that the detective figure is not associated with the same
thematic complexes. Sherlock Holmes is a prime example of magical
genius, but it is ultimately brought into the service of a socially prescribed
moral order. Mad scientists usually are genuine innovators, doing
surprising work that others have not done before them and changing their
social world into the bargain. The common sense vision of reason as a dual
process, its relevance to the detective narrative and the way in which it
reflects Thomas Kuhn's (1962) vision of science are ideas that were brought
together by Joseph Agassi (1982). He describes how the Kuhnian template
for 'normal science' is represented by the fact gathering stages early in the
detective narrative and the revelation of whodunit at the end he finds
equivalent to revolutionary science. While I do not entirely disagree with
this idea, I feel it can be usefully developed.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) Kuhn describes
revolutionary, paradigm shifting science as having a deep impact upon the
actual lives of the scientists who undergo the shift. It involves the rejection
686 Quoted in Smith (1994) p30
2.60
of long held theoretical traditions that have served to provide the
community with its the foundation for practice of 'normal science,' its
research questions and its problem solving aims. There is usually strong
resistance to this. A new theory can radically alter the landscape of available
research options, and it fundamentally shifts what Kuhn calls "the scientific
imagination," by which he means the actual parameters of scientific
thought.687 Such earth shattering shifts in thinking are exemplified by large-
scale changes in worldview triggered by revolutionary paradigms like the
Copernican, Newtonian, and chemical revolutions. Yet, Kuhn describes the
process as proceeding commonly at a much lower and less obvious level.
Small shifts draw similar resistance from colleagues, but the group is
smaller, and there is no equal magnitude of change in worldview.
The latter, Kuhn's small revolutions, I would suggest are well exemplified
in detective fiction. They happen when a new suspect throws the
investigation off its course. The final whodunit too, is only a small
revolution in that its function is to restore the old social and moral order,
albeit with a difference caused by irreversible effects of the crimes. The
mad scientist, on the other hand, shifts or disorders the whole social world
of the novel from the outset. The point being that it is an innovation in
science that shifts the outcome, often the whole story, of the narrative.
Frankenstein's monster is a case in point of the disordering kind. Yet,
Braddon's magician-scientist is able to shift the order of events by rescuing
one of the protagonists, such that the whole outcome of the story is altered
in an ordering direction. Detectives make breakthroughs that always
conform to social order. They are Kuhnian problem solvers within a
paradigm of socially constrained moral order.
BETWEEN ENCHANTMENT AND DISENCHANTMENT
Mad scientists, evil or otherwise, and detectives are long abiding icons of
fiction. They provide alternative visions of how rationality, science or plain
687 See Kuhn (1962/1996) Loe 227
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reason arises from and influences people and society. I have proposed that
fictional icons can only survive for as long as they bring meaning to the
culture that gives them life. I would suggest that these figures have persisted
for so long because the sheer extent and multiplicity of the potential
meaning they bring gives them continued credence for different cultures in
different ages. Literary meaning, however, is a thorny issue, because in
one sense fiction refers only to itself. Yet because it describes objects,
characters and actions that do have a non-textual reality it does have some
representative role outside its own world.688
In their attempt to map some of the complexities of how fiction functions,
Michael and Carter (200 I) refer to the "dynamics, by which people shift
criteria of what is valuable 'knowledge', of what is valuable about different
sources ofknowledge ...,,689 Within the category of valuable knowledge
they reported popular fictions, which were not confused with pedagogic
resources by non-scientists, rather they were understood as a constructive
means of debating the complexity of human experiences that arise in the
face of certain scientific developments. Although I do not have access to
similar data on how people use the iconic images of mad science and
detection, I would hypothesise that such icons fulfil this kind of function.
To confirm this would require further study. Yet the case is supported by
the fact that the popular narratives in this study work through and
experiment with human conundrums that arise from an increasingly
technoscientific society and these are the same kind of problems that have
occupied the minds of such preeminent academic thinkers as Everertt C
Hughes, Robert K Merton, Thomas S Kuhn and Michael Mulkay.
One of the more general points to emerge from this thesis is just this
continuity between the focus of certain academic concerns and issues
worked out in popular narratives about science. Simon Locke (2005) has
688 See Todorov (1975) p59-60 for a discussion of literary representation. It relates partly to
the reason why fictional representations can be helpful thinking resources, because they
have the flexibility of being neither real nor unreal: "We must also be careful not to
confuse the problem of representation with truth: only poetry rejects representation but all
literature escapes the category of true and false." p83 (his emphases)
689 Michael and Carter (2001) p28-9
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noted the same regarding the content of superhero comics and Philip M
Strong (2006) takes up the point in a paper entitled "The Rivals: An Essay
on the Sociological Trades." He argues that journalists, novelists and
dramatists are "professional students of the social world," along with
sociologists, of course.690 He goes on to explore similarities and differences
and finds that interpretative sociology has some continuity with the ways in
which novelists construct their imaginary social worldS.691 The current
study clearly supports the notion that popular and academic spheres are not
as firmly divided as they might at first seem and that science challenges
society as a whole and different cultural sectors work through the issues it
throws up in their own terms using their own or a shared pool of thinking
resources.
To suggest continuity between academic and popular realms returns us to
ideas about the splitting of cultures that perpetually arise when the two
words, 'science' and 'the public' are brought into proximity. The particular
public that CP Snow berated in his 1959 lecture consisted of 'literary
intellectuals' and his vision of them as Luddites in binary opposition to
scientists is now almost a cliche. In recent decades it has been denounced
as irrelevant and outmoded, a surrogate political debate or an attempt to
exalt science to a position over and above other types of knowledge'f". Yet,
anxieties over the splitting of knowledge have long been at issue, a topic
that is nowhere better expressed than in William WheweU's (1834) lament
on the increasing specialisation of disciplines. He bemoans the fact that
"the students of books and of things are estranged from each other in habit
and feeling ... But the disintegration goes on, like that of a great empire
falling to pieces."?" Notions of human estrangement and the fragmentation
690 Strong and Murcott (2006) pl19
691 Strong uses the example of Mikhail Bulgakov's (1975) A Country-Doctor's Notebook
within which he finds a model of social interaction that he had only been able to observe
once in the consulting room, yet the fiction suggested to him that his single observation
may have had wider significance
692 See Leane (2007) pp61-64 for a review of critical approaches to 'two cultures' and
Ortolano (2009) for a detailed history of 'two cultures' as it relates specifically to British
post-war cultural politics
693 William Whewell (1834) reviewing "On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences by Mrs
Somerville" Quarterly Review in Kramer et al (2003) p360
of community here anticipate the kinds of alienation that are characteristic
responses to techno-scientific reductionism. And this is one of the major
issues at the heart of the 'two cultures' debate.
I proposed that mad scientists might in this regard be boundary objects
between two cultures. My reason for suggesting so, was that they have been
the ammunition for endless jibes that pass backwards and forwards from
arts to science buildings.T" In this corpus of texts mad scientists, and their
detective counterparts, are deeply entrenched with magic, the symbolic
system which professional Western science has excluded from its bounds.
Where science seeks to disconnect itself from magic, almost all the fictions
in this corpus perhaps with the only exception of Ann Radcliffe's (1791)
Romance of the Forest, seek to unite the two systems. Similarly the sense
of a science that fractures and a fiction that unites cuts across the Snow-
Leavis controversy. In the course of CP Snow's original (1959) lecture, he
splits literary intellectual from scientist, traditional from modem, science
from art, individual from society, pure from applied, and so on. One of the
difficulties that FR Leavis (1962) has with this account is its apparent
assumption that human experience and behaviour is reducible, quantifiable
and interpretable in such simple terms.695 Essentially, Leavis, champion of
fiction (though not of the popular kind) challenges Snow's assumption that
humans are knowable in such reductionist terms.
A related notion, that the world is perceived as potentially knowable and
'rationalisable,' lies at heart of Max Weber's (1918) lecture "Science as a
Vocation," and is the source of his pronouncement that science and
rationalisation have a disenchanting effect on society. He is at pains to
point out that rationalisation does not mean that each person has increased
knowledge of the technicalities of their lives. Few people know how the
streetcar functions, for example. Indeed, the person living in a rationalised
society perhaps has less knowledge of such things than a "savage" who
"knows incomparably more about his tools." Yet, intellectualisation,
694 See Introduction to this work pp18-26
695 See Collini (1998) in Snow and Collini (1959/1998) ppxxix-xliii
according to Weber, leads to a situation in which there is a generally held
belief that the world is knowable by rational means. "Hence, it means that
principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play,
but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This
means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to
magical means in order to master or implore spirits, as did the savage, for
whom such mysterious powers existed.,,696
One interpretation of the fictional drive to reinvigorate mysterious powers,
or to reconcile reason and magic might be to assume that in an age when
society was becoming increasingly technical and disenchanted, fiction
resisted the trend and attempted to re-enchant the world by making
knowledge whole again. Michael Saler (2003) has commented on just such
a drive to re-enchant modernity through an interplay of cultural productions,
such as Sherlock Holmes stories and imagination. In line with the idea that
fiction resists the fragmentation of cultures, Saler suggests that Holmes
"became a modem icon partly because he utilised reason in a manner
magical and adventurous, rather than in the purely instrumental fashion that
many contemporaries feared was the stultifying characteristic of the age.
He expanded the definition of rationality beyond a narrow, means-ends
instrumentalism to include the imagination - he calls his procedure 'the
. .fi f he i . . '"697scienti le use 0 t e imagination .
Yet Holmes' reason absolutely is 'means-end instrumentalism.' It is his
means of restoring a moral order, which, lest we forget, is deeply connected
in historical terms with rationality and reason in the first place. That said,
the scientific use of the imagination was a topic that drew considerable
energy in the 19th century and was related to the intuitive, enchanted type of
reason evident in genius that so well describes the mad scientist. So how
does this fit with Saler's ideas about Holmes' enchantment of reason? For
Saler, Holmes makes reason magical because "[h]e believed that every
detail of modem life, ranging from the footprints of a giant hound, to
696 Weber (1918) in Gerth and Mi1Is (1991) p139
697 Saler (2003) p604
advertisements in mass circulation newspapers, was charged with
meaning.,,698 To imbue the mundane with meaning is indeed magical
thinking. Yet, as Saler also notes, observational capacity of the Holmesian
kind is a skill related to reason that can be learned. This is the data-
collection, and the kind of process described by the 'cultural maturation'
theory, or the mechanical model of reason.
What I would suggest is that enchantment does not exist in binary terms in
the way that it is so often discussed. Holmes makes a fundamentally
instrumental, rational, means-end process seem magical by lending meaning
to the mundane. Yet, the image of truly magical thought, where intuitive
sparks fly and shouts of eureka fill the air, belongs to the domain of the mad
scientist, whose process is obscure and cannot be learned. For all that, it is
worth noting that in his techno-reductionism the mad, bad scientist, uses an
enchanted process to disenchant the world. This is the reverse of Holmes,
yet, not all mad scientists are, of necessity, bad. So, just as Thomas Kuhn
sees revolutionary science as existing in shades of grey, so enchantment
comes in variable shades and doses. Indeed, Max Weber does talk of a
"process of disenchantment" which implies that we may not yet have
reached the zero point on that scale, although the fact that he sees science as
being incompatible with religious belief suggests he is indeed working with
a simple binary mode1.699 Whichever way, such a simple model does not
describe the complexities in the fiction at hand, a factor that Locke (2005)
has also noted in relation to scientific figures in superhero comics.
Oddly enough, Weber himself invokes the mystery of intuitive thought in a
comparison between the process of art and science. There is a tension at the
heart of his discussion in this respect. His disenchantment is predicated on
the fact that the world is all-knowable, though this seems a highly
questionable assumption at the best of times. So although technoscientific
knowledge apparently supplants the need for belief in 'mysterious powers,'
he himself invokes mysterious power in a description of scientific
698 Ibid p614
699 Weber (1918) in Gerth and Mills (1991) pl39
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inspiration, which is an unfathomable and uncontrollable process. "Ideas
occur to us when they please, not when it pleases us ... ideas come when we
do not expect them, and not when we are brooding and searching at our
desks. Yet ideas would certainly not come to mind had we not brooded at
our desks .. .inspiration plays no less a role in science than it does in the
realm of art ... the psychological processes do not differ. Both are
frenzy ... and 'inspiration"'. 700 Here he clearly describes the dual
conception of reason as both mechanical (brooding at our desks) and
imaginative (frenzy and inspiration). Is there perhaps a little enchantment,
even, in the midst of Weber's disenchantment?
Further to the obvious relationship between the interwoven themes of
science and magic and enchantment in the current study, there is a trend
beyond Reynolds' initial enthusiasm for professional men of science, to
demonstrate a certain disenchantment with the institutionalised
professionals. This appears as an ambivalence arising from the fact that
expertise and specialisation fragment knowledge with a concomitant loss of
flexibility in the face of novel problems. Indeed in this respect the fiction
seems to resist Weber's dictum that, "[o]nly by strict specialisation can the
scientific worker become fully conscious ... that he has achieved something
that will endure. A really definitive and good accomplishment is today
always a specialized accomplishment.Y'" After Reynolds, the fictions
apparently value a much more fluid kind of expertise and narrow specialism
alone is never sufficient to surmount human problems. The notion that
different knowledges are necessary reverberates with Collins and Evans'
(2002) suggestion that categories of knowledge be reformulated according
to expertise and experience, such that legitimacy should be granted along
these lines and not simply according to epistemology.
To this day fictional professionals are required to bring a special kind of
flexible expertise to their particular quest otherwise they may fall short of
the bar. Further work needs to be done to understand how far modem
700 Ibid (1991) pl36
701 Ibid (1991) pl3S
myths about detectives and vampire hunters insist on the presence of the
outsider in order to restore order to the world. Yet the same message is
undoubtedly still manifest in the pages of at least some vampire fictions,
whose protagonists, truly merging reason and magic, do occupy roles
marginal to the institutionalised, rationalised professions.
Further to this, in the recent bestselling detective fiction, Stieg Larsson's
(2008) The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, an outsider, a journalist, not a
detective is able to tum the case around within a year despite the fact that
the state-sanctioned police authorities have been unable to fathom it in forty
five years. A certain amount of enchantment too sparkles through this
narrative. "On one day in June he was in Hedestad, thinking about
something altogether different when his bus turned on to Jarnvagsgatan and
it suddenly came to him ... The insight struck him like a thunderbolt out of a
clear sky.,,702 The thunderbolt woke him up to the significance ofa tiny
detail in an old photograph of a Children's Day Parade. In the 21stcentury
there is still magic in the mundane and in the imagination.
It is beyond the bounds of this work to do more than note the continued
existence of such thought patterns in contemporary 21 st-century fictions.
Yet, the exploration of the history of the fictional detective has shown that
in their developing years, these figures were drawn into the same thematic
networks as were fictional scientists, supporting the view that they do, or
certainly did, provide a useful alternative model of science. Stepping
outside the typified bounds of laboratory science has allowed us to go
beyond the idea of the "master narrative of science" as the story of a mad,
bad and dangerous man. Together the two icons - mad scientist and
detective - give us a more complex picture of science and the ways in which
we can think of it, than either can do alone.
Above all else, this study demonstrates that there is an extraordinary
richness in images of science, of its method and of those who practise it,
702 Larsson and Keeland (2008) p265
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even in some of the most formulaic of fictions. I have shown that a few
themes coalesce around a whole variety of 19th-century images, which
appear to be relevant today, although they are likely to have shifted
somewhat to reflect other zo" and 21st_century concerns. The point is that
an understanding of the image of science in fiction requires more, much
more, than a lazy re-hashing of stereotypes about mad scientists and public
fears. Literary images that reoccur bring meaning to the culture in which
they exist. Such meanings, like the culture they come from, are multi-
faceted and unsettled and any investigation of popular images of science
should at least attempt to honour such complexity. I have tried to do this by
examining iconography, narrative function and cultural context. Although
my way is not necessarily the best or the only way, it has exposed the
fallacy of the temptation to seek out a unified image of science and its
meaning. There is no single meaning, just as there is no single science, real
or imaginary.
APPENDIX
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